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TLRY, Tilray Brands Inc. Common Stock

Pharmaceuticals consumer brand UnprofitableDistress / turnaroundSerial acquirer

Our Manitoba Harvest business is a leader in the hemp-based food category in the U.S.

In Canada, we continued to lead the Canadian cannabis market with the highest cannabis revenue in Canada.

Outside of North America, we have supplied high-quality medical cannabis products to patients in over 20 countries spanning five continents through our global subsidiaries, and through agreements with established distributors.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

TLRY · Tilray Brands Inc. Common Stock

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$821M

+4.1% YoY · 15% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM

Cash & investments $220M

Cash burn · annual $45M

Runway 4.9 yrs

Gross margin 28%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is led by Distribution Business (33%) and Cannabis (30%), with 2 more segments behind.
Situation: Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 37% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 6 of the record's 10 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has run around −77% through the cycle on a 24% gross margin, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. Inventory runs near 36% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on the pipeline against the patent cliff, and pricing. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −32%, above 15% in 0 of 9 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 4 segments, the largest Distribution Business at 33%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025

Distribution Business33%$271M
Cannabis30%$249M
Beverage Alcohol Business29%$241M
Wellness Business7%$60M

By geographyEMEA39%United States33%Canada26%Rest of World1%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMFeb 2026
											Income statement
$13M	$21M	$43M	$179M	$405M	$513M	$628M	$627M	$789M	$821M	$858M	RevenueRevenue
21%	—	33%	24%	24%	24%	19%	23%	28%	29%	28%	Gross marginGross mgn
39%	37%	113%	42%	23%	22%	26%	26%	21%	20%	21%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
9%	15%	14%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($7M)	($7M)	($58M)	($139M)	($104M)	($132M)	($610M)	($1.4B)	($175M)	($2.3B)	($1.5B)	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−55.7%	−36.5%	−134.1%	−77.5%	−25.7%	−25.8%	−97.1%	−218.4%	−22.1%	−277.9%	−173.7%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($8M)	($8M)	($68M)	($25M)	($103M)	($367M)	($477M)	($1.5B)	($245M)	($2.2B)	($1.3B)	Net incomeNet inc.
											Cash flow & returns
($3M)	($6M)	($46M)	($42M)	($101M)	($45M)	($177M)	$8M	($31M)	($95M)	($45M)	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$2M	$2M	$4M	$17M	$36M	$68M	$155M	—	—	—	$149M	DepreciationDeprec.
$3M	($186K)	($3M)	($56M)	($52M)	$238M	$109M	$1.4B	$182M	$2.1B	$1.1B	Working capital & otherWC & other
$488K	$11M	$50M	$74M	$45M	$39M	$34M	$21M	$29M	$33M	$33M	CapexCapex
3.9%	53.1%	116.4%	41.1%	11.0%	7.6%	5.4%	3.3%	3.7%	4.0%	3.8%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($4M)	($8M)	($50M)	($59M)	($136M)	($84M)	($211M)	($13M)	($60M)	($128M)	($78M)	Owner earningsOwner earn.
−30.1%	−38.3%	−115.5%	−33.0%	−33.6%	−16.3%	−33.6%	−2.1%	−7.6%	−15.5%	−9.0%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($4M)	($17M)	($96M)	($116M)	($145M)	($84M)	($211M)	($13M)	($60M)	($128M)	($78M)	Free cash flowFCF
−30.1%	−82.3%	−223.6%	−64.6%	−35.8%	−16.3%	−33.6%	−2.1%	−7.6%	−15.5%	−9.0%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
—	—	—	$18M	$26M	$0	$0	$27M	$61M	$18M	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
-220%	-51%	—	-58%	-8%	-3%	-11%	-32%	-4%	-125%	-66%	ROICROIC
-312%	—	-34%	-9%	-8%	-8%	-11%	-44%	-7%	-145%	-86%	Return on equityROE
−312%	—	−34%	−9%	−8%	−8%	−11%	−44%	−7%	−145%	−86%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
—	$2M	$518M	$97M	$361M	$488M	$416M	$449M	$261M	$256M	$220M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
—	$983K	$17M	$36M	$38M	$87M	$95M	$86M	$102M	$121M	$118M	ReceivablesReceiv.
—	$7M	$16M	$88M	$140M	$256M	$246M	$201M	$252M	$271M	$292M	InventoryInvent.
—	$6M	$11M	$39M	$41M	$58M	$69M	$71M	$105M	$107M	$115M	Accounts payablePayables
—	$3M	$22M	$85M	$137M	$286M	$272M	$216M	$248M	$285M	$295M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
—	$12M	$554M	$259M	$582M	$884M	$804M	$773M	$678M	$689M	$719M	Current assetsCur. assets
—	$50M	$26M	$92M	$120M	$401M	$280M	$433M	$299M	$280M	$258M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
—	0.2×	21.4×	2.8×	4.9×	2.2×	2.9×	1.8×	2.3×	2.5×	2.8×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
—	—	—	$163M	$447M	$2.8B	$2.6B	$2.0B	$2.0B	$752M	$752M	GoodwillGoodwill
—	$54M	$657M	$896M	$1.7B	$6.0B	$5.4B	$4.3B	$4.2B	$2.1B	$2.1B	Total assetsAssets
—	$19M	—	—	$100M	$204M	$402M	$221M	$158M	$148M	$444M	Total debtDebt
—	$17M	—	—	($260M)	($284M)	($14M)	($227M)	($102M)	($108M)	$224M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
—	—	—	—	-4.1×	-4.3×	-15.4×	-29.4×	-3.5×	-55.2×	-36.1×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$3M	($5M)	$198M	$285M	$1.2B	$4.5B	$4.4B	$3.3B	$3.4B	$1.5B	$1.6B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.7%	0.7%	48.7%	12.2%	4.5%	3.4%	5.7%	6.3%	4.0%	3.0%	4.3%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
18.8M	18.8M	20.8M	50.9M	54.0M	67.4M	60.2M	77.2M	92.8M	111M	110M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$0.67	$1.10	$2.08	$3.53	$7.50	$7.61	$10.45	$8.12	$8.50	$7.38	$7.83	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.42	$-0.42	$-3.26	$-0.49	$-1.90	$-5.45	$-7.93	$-18.81	$-2.64	$-19.65	$-12.26	EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.20	$-0.42	$-2.40	$-1.17	$-2.52	$-1.24	$-3.51	$-0.17	$-0.65	$-1.15	$-0.71	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.20	$-0.90	$-4.65	$-2.28	$-2.69	$-1.24	$-3.51	$-0.17	$-0.65	$-1.15	$-0.71	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.03	$0.58	$2.42	$1.45	$0.83	$0.58	$0.57	$0.27	$0.32	$0.30	$0.30	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$0.13	$-0.26	$9.52	$5.61	$23.09	$66.17	$73.13	$42.92	$37.09	$13.58	$14.20	Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×2.45 into 2019 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Share counts before 2022 are restated ×2 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Share counts before TTM are restated ×1/8 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+30.5%/yr	−0.3%/yr
Capital spending / share	+31.0%/yr	−18.6%/yr
Book value / share	+66.9%/yr	−10.1%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.

Share count

890Mpeak FY2025

ROIC

−125%low FY2016

Gross margin

29%low FY2022

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

($128M)owner earningsvs.($2.2B)net incomelow FY2022

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $2.2B loss into ($128M) of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	($2.2B)	($245M)	($1.5B)	($477M)	($367M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	—	—	—	+$155M	+$68M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$24M	+$32M	+$40M	+$36M	+$17M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$2.1B	+$182M	+$1.4B	+$109M	+$238M
Cash from operations	($95M)	($31M)	$8M	($177M)	($45M)
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$33M	−$29M	−$21M	−$34M	−$39M
Owner earnings	($128M)	($60M)	($13M)	($211M)	($84M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	-16%	-8%	-2%	-34%	-16%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $24M), owner earnings is nearer ($152M).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? -55.2×

Does not cover its interest

Operating income ($2.3B) ÷ interest expense $41M

What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$71M

Net cash

Cash $222M + ST investments $35M − debt $186M

What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $71M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 157d

Long (60+ days)

DSO 54 + DIO 170 − DPO 67 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital -32%

Below average through the cycle

9-yr median, range -220%–-3%; -122% latest = NOPAT ($1.8B) ÷ invested capital $1.5B

Industry peers: median 4%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran -122% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin -33%

Consumes cash through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range -115%–-2%; latest ($128M) = operating cash ($95M) − maintenance capex $33M

Industry peers: median 12%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -16% of revenue this year, a -33% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $24M of SBC) leaves ($152M).
Are earnings backed by cash? ($95M)

Loss, and burning cash

Net income ($2.2B) · cash from operations ($95M)

In the filing’s words And the filing leans heavily on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings — steering you off the GAAP figure just where the cash is not backing it. Read the reconciliation in the notes before taking the adjusted number.

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Investing or harvesting? 0.21×

Harvesting

Capex $33M ÷ depreciation $155M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Miss

Revenue ≥ $2B · $821M

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Pass

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.46×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Pass

Debt ≤ working capital · $186M vs $408M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 10 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-11.11/share (latest year $-18.76), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $12.97/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 0 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 10 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 7 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin −75% → −173% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices but names price competition too — and the margin slipped, so the pressure is winning here.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about −75% early to −173% lately, median −77% — competition or costs are biting in.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC —

What this means
The reinvested base moved too little against the change in profit to read a reliable return on it here — the figure would be a small-denominator artifact, not a moat. Judge this one on the owner-earnings record and the cash it returns instead.
Worst year 2025 · −277.9% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2025, understand why before trusting the good years.
How management talks about it Promotional

What this means
The returns have faded, yet the filing reaches for a promoter’s vocabulary — world-class, best-in-class, disruptive — more than an owner’s. When the words sell harder than the results deliver, the gap is the thing to weigh.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Framed as a capability

The filing positions AI as something the company uses, not something it fears.

“AI and Cryptocurrency Business Strategy We are dedicated to leveraging advanced technologies to align with our shareholder interests, the consumer of tomorrow, enhancing efficiency and driving growth.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Feb 28, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$719M

Cash & short-term investments$220M
Receivables$118M
Inventory$292M
Other current assets$88M

Current liabilities$258M

Debt due within a year$64M
Accounts payable$115M
Other current liabilities$78M

Current ratio2.79×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.66×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.85×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$461Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$64M due · $220M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Feb 28, 2026 balance sheet

Cash runway2.8 yrsthe business is consuming cash; this is how long the cash on hand lasts at that rate

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+11.3%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters2.5× → 2.8×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$782Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value$170MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$205M$23M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$774M37% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity50%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$216Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $336M of capital spent building

$265M written down across 2 years (2021, 2022): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2020	$1.9M	−$7.2M	($136M)
2021	$13.7M	$16.5M	($84M)
2021	$6.5M	$7.5M	($84M)
2022	$19.5M	$5.6M	($211M)
2023	$15.7M	$6.1M	($13M)
2024	$10.1M	$11.2M	($60M)
2025	$10.3M	−$5.1M	($128M)

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership0.8%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
CEO pay ratio266:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2025 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Stock-based compensation$24M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 3% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Inventory, Acquisitions, Contingencies as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Pharmaceuticals

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
TRLVTrulieve Cannabis Corp.	$1.2B	60%	12.1%	6%	13%
USNAUSANA Health Sciences	$925M	82%	12.7%	57%	10%
ANIPANI Pharmaceuticals Inc.	$883M	62%	8.8%	4%	17%
ARWRArrowhead Pharmaceuticals	$829M	—	-106.8%	-51%	-77%
MYGNMyriad Genetics Inc.	$825M	70%	-17.7%	-14%	9%
TLRYTilray Brands Inc. Common Stock	$821M	24%	-66.6%	-32%	-32%
COLLCollegium Pharmaceutical Inc.	$781M	56%	6.8%	44%	31%
RGENRepligen Corporation	$738M	55%	13.4%	4%	12%
Group median	—	60%	7.8%	4%	11%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Tilray Brands Inc. Common Stock is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.

Today’s price $

The assumptions Required return 9% Years to get there 10 Revenue growth 0%

Revenue, delivered15%/yr’20→’25

Mature owner-earnings margin 15%

Enter a price to run it.

Owner earnings it must reach—

Margin the price demands—

Owner-earnings margin today−9%

Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.

Weigh TLRY against another business →

The owners of TLRY: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Tilray Brands Inc. Common Stock (TLRY), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/TLRY, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← TLN its page in the Manual TLS →

Industry order: ← TGTX the Pharmaceuticals chapter TLX →