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MYGN, Myriad Genetics Inc.
GENETICS S.A. to develop a global liquid biopsy companion diagnostic solution.
Our long-term growth str ategy is buil t on leveraging our differentiated strengths, including our reputation for trusted high-quality tests and customer service, and our established, extensive commercial reach in community medicine.
Under this strategy, we plan to leverage our strong scientific foundation, deep clinical partnerships, and technology-enabled capabilities to expand adoption of our testing portfolio and integrate our precision medicine solutions more deeply into clinical workflows across the Cancer Care Continuum, Prenatal Health, and Mental Health.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by Hereditary Cancer (45%) and Prenatal (23%), with 2 more lines behind.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has reached 21% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −21%) on a 70% gross margin — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. Read this kind of business on the pipeline against the patent cliff, and pricing. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −14%, above 15% in 1 of 10 years). By owner earnings: roughly 9% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Revenue spreads across 4 lines, the largest Hereditary Cancer at 45%.
- Hereditary Cancer45%$372M
- Prenatal23%$186M
- Mental Health17%$144M
- Tumor Profiling15%$122M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $741M | $729M | $744M | $851M | $639M | $691M | $678M | $753M | $838M | $825M | $829M | RevenueRevenue |
| 82% | 80% | — | — | — | — | 70% | 69% | 70% | 70% | 70% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 49% | 60% | 58% | 65% | 79% | 78% | 76% | 76% | 33% | 31% | 30% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 10% | 10% | 10% | 10% | 12% | 12% | 13% | 12% | 14% | 13% | 13% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| $153M | $44M | $122M | $8M | ($232M) | ($191M) | ($141M) | ($257M) | ($124M) | ($387M) | ($389M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 20.7% | 6.0% | 16.4% | 0.9% | −36.3% | −27.6% | −20.7% | −34.2% | −14.7% | −47.0% | −46.9% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $117M | $17M | $133M | $5M | ($200M) | ($27M) | ($112M) | ($263M) | ($127M) | ($366M) | ($400M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $166M | $106M | $116M | $84M | $61M | $19M | ($106M) | ($111M) | ($9M) | $2M | $2M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $27M | $48M | $54M | $73M | $72M | $63M | $53M | $62M | $61M | $54M | $52M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($9M) | $11M | ($99M) | ($27M) | $163M | ($53M) | ($85M) | $50M | $8M | $279M | $318M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $5M | $6M | $8M | $9M | $10M | $18M | $45M | — | — | — | $75M | CapexCapex |
| 0.7% | 0.8% | 1.1% | 1.0% | 1.6% | 2.6% | 6.7% | — | — | — | 9.0% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $161M | $100M | $108M | $75M | $51M | $600K | ($152M) | — | — | — | ($72M) | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 21.8% | 13.7% | 14.5% | 8.8% | 7.9% | 0.1% | −22.3% | — | — | — | −8.7% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $161M | $100M | $108M | $75M | $51M | $600K | ($152M) | — | — | — | ($72M) | Free cash flowFCF |
| 21.8% | 13.7% | 14.5% | 8.8% | 7.9% | 0.1% | −22.3% | — | — | — | −8.7% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $37M | $216M | $0 | $279M | $0 | $0 | $57M | $0 | $0 | — | $0 | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $163M | $32M | $0 | $50M | $0 | $0 | — | — | — | — | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 17% | 3% | 14% | 1% | -19% | -21% | -13% | -29% | -15% | -90% | -78% | ROICROIC |
| 16% | 2% | 14% | 0% | -23% | -3% | -13% | -34% | -18% | -99% | -119% | Return on equityROE |
| 16% | 2% | 14% | 0% | −23% | −3% | −13% | −34% | −18% | −99% | −119% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $239M | $199M | $211M | $192M | $218M | $398M | $170M | $141M | $102M | $150M | $124M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $92M | $89M | $100M | $134M | $90M | $91M | $102M | $114M | $121M | $115M | $124M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $38M | $42M | $34M | $31M | $27M | $15M | $20M | $22M | $28M | $31M | $28M | InventoryInvent. |
| $21M | $22M | $26M | $33M | $21M | $30M | $29M | $26M | $32M | $30M | $33M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $109M | $109M | $108M | $132M | $96M | $77M | $93M | $111M | $116M | $116M | $119M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $315M | $302M | $328M | $349M | $389M | $485M | $275M | $314M | $298M | $333M | $313M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $72M | $218M | $102M | $118M | $146M | $204M | $137M | $156M | $164M | $134M | $130M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 4.3× | 1.4× | 3.2× | 3.0× | 2.7× | 2.4× | 2.0× | 2.0× | 1.8× | 2.5× | 2.4× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $195M | $316M | $319M | $417M | $329M | $239M | $287M | $287M | $286M | $52M | $47M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $881M | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.6B | $1.4B | $1.3B | $1.2B | $1.1B | $1.0B | $707M | $674M | Total assetsAssets |
| — | $99M | $9M | $234M | $225M | $0 | $0 | $39M | $40M | $120M | $180M | Total debtDebt |
| — | ($100M) | ($202M) | $42M | $6M | ($398M) | ($170M) | ($102M) | ($63M) | ($30M) | $55M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 511.3× | 7.3× | 38.1× | 0.6× | -21.5× | -28.9× | -43.9× | -88.8× | -44.1× | -36.9× | -28.2× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $740M | $768M | $966M | $1.1B | $881M | $968M | $886M | $783M | $701M | $368M | $337M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 4.3% | 4.1% | 3.6% | 3.9% | 3.9% | 5.3% | 5.6% | 5.4% | 5.9% | 4.3% | 3.9% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| — | — | — | — | $82M | — | — | — | $800K | $235M | $239M | Goodwill written downGW imp. |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 73.4M | 68.8M | 72.0M | 76.0M | 74.3M | 78.0M | 80.6M | 82.8M | 90.6M | 92.6M | 93.7M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $10.09 | $10.59 | $10.33 | $11.20 | $8.59 | $8.85 | $8.42 | $9.10 | $9.25 | $8.90 | $8.85 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $1.60 | $0.25 | $1.85 | $0.06 | $-2.69 | $-0.35 | $-1.39 | $-3.18 | $-1.41 | $-3.95 | $-4.27 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $2.20 | $1.45 | $1.49 | $0.99 | $0.68 | $0.01 | $-1.88 | — | — | — | $-0.77 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $2.20 | $1.45 | $1.49 | $0.99 | $0.68 | $0.01 | $-1.88 | — | — | — | $-0.77 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.07 | $0.09 | $0.12 | $0.11 | $0.14 | $0.23 | $0.56 | — | — | — | $0.80 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $10.08 | $11.17 | $13.42 | $14.33 | $11.86 | $12.41 | $10.99 | $9.46 | $7.74 | $3.97 | $3.60 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | −1.4%/yr | +0.7%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +42.2%/yr (6-yr) | +44.7%/yr |
| Book value / share | −9.8%/yr | −19.6%/yr |
The year, in the company's words
the filing →Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.
- Hereditary Cancer+2.2%
“Hereditary Cancer revenue increased $7.9 million due to a 7% increase in volume, partially offset by a 5% decrease in average revenue per test.”
✓ figure matches the filed record - Prenatal+5.2%
“Prenatal revenue increased $9.2 million due to a 10% increase in average revenue per test, partially offset by a 4% decrease in volume primarily driven by a decline in SneakPeek volume.”
✓ figure matches the filed record - Mental Health-15.3%
“Mental Health revenue decreased $26.1 million primarily due to a 20% decrease in the average revenue per test.”
✓ figure matches the filed record
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2022 the business reported a $112M loss but ($152M) of owner earnings: $40M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.
| FY2022 | FY2021 | FY2020 | FY2019 | FY2018 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($112M) | ($27M) | ($200M) | $5M | $133M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$53M | +$63M | +$72M | +$73M | +$54M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$38M | +$36M | +$25M | +$34M | +$27M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$85M | −$53M | +$163M | −$27M | −$99M |
| Cash from operations | ($106M) | $19M | $61M | $84M | $116M |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$45M | −$18M | −$10M | −$9M | −$8M |
| Owner earnings | ($152M) | $600K | $51M | $75M | $108M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | -22% | 0% | 8% | 9% | 14% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $38M), owner earnings is nearer ($190M).
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -36.9×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($387M) ÷ interest expense $11M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net cashCash $150M − debt $120M
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $30M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- TightDSO 51 + DIO 45 − DPO 44 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle10-yr median, range -90%–17%; -90% latest = NOPAT ($306M) ÷ invested capital $338MIndustry peers: median 4%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -90% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle7-yr median margin, range -22%–22%; latest ($44M) = operating cash $2M − maintenance capex $45MIndustry peers: median 10%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -5% of revenue this year, a 9% median across 7 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $35M of SBC) leaves ($79M).
- Loss, but cash-generativeNet income ($366M) · cash from operations $2M
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- No surplus to allocate
What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.84×MaintainingCapex $45M ÷ depreciation $54M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $825M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 2.49×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · $120M vs $199M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 6 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −382%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-2.67/share (latest year $-3.87), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $3.90/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 4 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 6 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 9 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 14% → −32% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 14% early to −32% lately, median −21% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Worst year 2025 · −47.0% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2025, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +2.6%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.
“We may also not be able to keep pace with the rapid technological changes in our industry, or properly leverage new technologies, such as AI, to achieve or sustain competitive advantages in our tests, systems and processes.”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$124M
- Receivables$124M
- Inventory$28M
- Other current assets$37M
- Debt due within a year$59M
- Accounts payable$33M
- Other current liabilities$38M
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2016–2022
Over the record, the business generated $445M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$102M · 23%
- Buybacks$244M · 55%
- Retained (debt / cash)$99M · 22%
- Returned to owners$244M
71% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $244M as buybacks.
- Average price paid for buybacks$31.71
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 8M shares were bought for $244M, about $31.71 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $19.75 (2017) to $36.13 (2016), and 2016, near the top of that range, was also its heaviest buyback year ($163M).
- Net change in share count27.7%
The diluted count rose from 73M to 94M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
$318M written down across 3 years (2020, 2024, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 54% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Net income |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Paul J. Diaz | $12.8M | $29.8M | ($27M) |
| 2022 | Paul J. Diaz | $11.4M | −$4.5M | ($112M) |
| 2023 | Paul J. Diaz | $12.1M | $14.2M | ($263M) |
| 2024 | Paul J. Diaz | $13.6M | $7.2M | ($127M) |
| 2025 | Paul J. Diaz | $689k | −$7.8M | ($366M) |
| 2025 | Samraat S. Raha | $5.7M | $2.5M | ($366M) |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Net income is the whole business's, as filed, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership1.9%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio60:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$35M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 4% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Myriad Genetics Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
2 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?−4.8% vs 16.7%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 16.7% early in the record and −4.8% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?27.7%
Diluted shares grew 27.7% over 2016–2022, even as the company spent $244M on buybacks. The repurchases were a treadmill: stock issued to staff outran them, so owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Biotechnology
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| LNTHLantheus Holdings | $1.5B | 51% | 17.2% | 24% | 17% |
| IONSIonis Pharmaceuticals | $944M | 99% | -16.9% | -11% | -14% |
| NEOGNeogen | $895M | 47% | 16.0% | 9% | 10% |
| ANIPANI Pharmaceuticals Inc. | $883M | 62% | 8.8% | 4% | 17% |
| ARWRArrowhead Pharmaceuticals | $829M | — | -106.8% | -51% | -77% |
| MYGNMyriad Genetics Inc. | $825M | 70% | -17.7% | -14% | 9% |
| TLRYTilray Brands Inc. Common Stock | $821M | 24% | -66.6% | -32% | -32% |
| COLLCollegium Pharmaceutical Inc. | $781M | 56% | 6.8% | 44% | 31% |
| Group median | — | 56% | -5.1% | -4% | 9% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Myriad Genetics Inc. has delivered.
Myriad Genetics Inc.’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, below the record’s own through-cycle owner earnings. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, Myriad Genetics Inc. earns about $69M on its 8.4% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s −5.3% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
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9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow ($72M) on 94M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-01; net debt $55M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits off the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($75M) runs well above depreciation ($52M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ($43M), the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← MYFW its page in the Manual MYRG →
Industry order: ← MRNA the Biotechnology chapter NBIX →