← All companies ← TRMK Manual TRNO → ← TEX Farm & Heavy Equipment TTC →

TRN, Trinity Industries Inc.

Farm & Heavy Equipment capital-intensive

Through wholly-owned subsidiaries, including Trinity Industries Leasing Company, and a partially-owned subsidiary, TRIP Rail Holdings LLC, we primarily offer full-service operating leases for freight and tank railcars.

Trinity Industries, Inc. and its consolidated subsidiaries ("Trinity," "Company," "we," "our," or "us") own businesses that are leading providers of railcar products and services in North America.

We market our railcar products and services under the trade name TrinityRail .

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

TRN · Trinity Industries Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$2.2B

−30.0% YoY · 4% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $2.1B 5-yr avg $2.3B

Operating margin 31.5% 5-yr avg 18.8%

ROIC 8% 5-yr avg 8%

Owner-earnings margin 16% 5-yr avg 15%

Free cash flow margin 16% 5-yr avg 15%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is Railcar Leasing and Services Group (56%) and Rail Products Group (44%).
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 23% and operating margin about 15% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. On a spread this thin the operating result swings hard on small moves in cost or volume — it has ranged from −8.8% to 30% over the years, so the cost line is where the needle moves. Inventory runs near 21% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 8%). By owner earnings: roughly 16% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 2 segments, the largest Railcar Leasing and Services Group at 56%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025

Railcar Leasing and Services Group56%$1.2B
Rail Products Group44%$952M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$3.1B	$2.4B	$2.5B	$2.8B	$1.7B	$1.5B	$2.0B	$3.0B	$3.1B	$2.2B	$2.1B	RevenueRevenue
25%	26%	23%	21%	24%	23%	19%	18%	22%	—	—	Gross marginGross mgn
10%	14%	12%	8%	11%	12%	9%	7%	8%	10%	10%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$479M	$368M	$315M	$397M	($155M)	$257M	$334M	$417M	$492M	$649M	$651M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
15.5%	15.4%	12.6%	14.4%	−8.8%	16.9%	16.9%	14.0%	16.0%	30.1%	31.5%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$344M	$703M	$159M	$138M	($147M)	$182M	$60M	$106M	$138M	$253M	$255M	Net incomeNet inc.
24%	—	21%	30%	—	8%	31%	8%	27%	26%	26%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$1.1B	$762M	$379M	$394M	$652M	$612M	($13M)	$296M	$574M	$360M	$381M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$217M	$230M	$252M	$277M	$259M	$266M	$276M	$293M	$294M	$305M	$303M	DepreciationDeprec.
$498M	($193M)	($61M)	($48M)	$515M	$143M	($372M)	($126M)	$118M	($221M)	($200M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$50M	$22M	$37M	$88M	$96M	$24M	$38M	$41M	$54M	$46M	$43M	CapexCapex
1.6%	0.9%	1.5%	3.2%	5.5%	1.6%	1.9%	1.4%	1.7%	2.1%	2.1%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$1.0B	$740M	$342M	$306M	$556M	$588M	($51M)	$254M	$520M	$314M	$338M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
33.7%	30.9%	13.6%	11.1%	31.8%	38.8%	−2.6%	8.5%	16.9%	14.6%	16.4%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$1.0B	$740M	$342M	$306M	$556M	$588M	($51M)	$254M	$520M	$314M	$338M	Free cash flowFCF
33.7%	30.9%	13.6%	11.1%	31.8%	38.8%	−2.6%	8.5%	16.9%	14.6%	16.4%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0	$48M	$0	$0	$0	$17M	$80M	$62M	$0	$0	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$67M	$73M	$77M	$82M	$92M	$89M	$77M	$86M	$93M	$99M	$99M	Dividends paidDiv. paid
$35M	$79M	$506M	$225M	$191M	$833M	$52M	$0	$21M	$71M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
9%	8%	10%	12%	-6%	19%	3%	6%	6%	8%	8%	ROICROIC
9%	16%	7%	7%	-8%	18%	6%	10%	13%	23%	24%	Return on equityROE
7%	14%	4%	3%	−14%	9%	−2%	2%	4%	14%	14%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$742M	$779M	$179M	$166M	$132M	$167M	$80M	$106M	$228M	$201M	$133M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$379M	$204M	$277M	$260M	$164M	$228M	$324M	$364M	$379M	$389M	$326M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$666M	$403M	$525M	$433M	$285M	$433M	$629M	$684M	$476M	$469M	$483M	InventoryInvent.
$1.0B	$607M	$801M	$694M	$450M	$661M	$953M	$1.0B	$855M	$858M	$809M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$754M	$209M	$209M	$209M	$147M	$154M	$196M	$222M	$222M	$222M	$222M	GoodwillGoodwill
$9.1B	$9.5B	$8.0B	$8.7B	$8.7B	$8.2B	$8.7B	$8.9B	$8.8B	$8.4B	$8.3B	Total assetsAssets
$851M	$866M	$397M	$523M	$448M	$399M	$5.6B	$5.8B	$5.7B	$5.4B	$5.4B	Total debtDebt
$109M	$88M	$218M	$357M	$316M	$231M	$5.5B	$5.6B	$5.5B	$5.2B	$5.2B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
2.6×	2.0×	1.8×	1.8×	-0.7×	—	—	—	—	—	3.1×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$3.9B	$4.5B	$2.2B	$2.0B	$1.7B	$1.0B	$1.0B	$1.0B	$1.1B	$1.1B	$1.1B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
1.0%	0.9%	1.2%	1.0%	1.5%	1.4%	1.1%	0.8%	0.8%	1.1%	1.1%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
149M	152M	146M	127M	116M	104M	84.2M	83.4M	84.2M	82.9M	81.9M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$20.79	$15.77	$17.14	$21.62	$15.10	$14.61	$23.48	$35.77	$36.57	$26.02	$25.20	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$2.31	$4.62	$1.09	$1.08	$-1.27	$1.75	$0.71	$1.27	$1.64	$3.05	$3.12	EPS (diluted)EPS
$7.00	$4.87	$2.33	$2.40	$4.80	$5.67	$-0.60	$3.05	$6.18	$3.79	$4.13	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$7.00	$4.87	$2.33	$2.40	$4.80	$5.67	$-0.60	$3.05	$6.18	$3.79	$4.13	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.45	$0.48	$0.53	$0.64	$0.79	$0.85	$0.91	$1.03	$1.11	$1.19	$1.21	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.33	$0.14	$0.25	$0.69	$0.83	$0.23	$0.45	$0.50	$0.64	$0.55	$0.52	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$26.37	$29.61	$15.10	$15.95	$15.00	$9.92	$12.02	$12.44	$12.58	$12.99	$13.17	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+2.5%/yr	+11.5%/yr
Owner earnings / share	−6.6%/yr	−4.6%/yr
EPS	+3.1%/yr	—
Dividends / share	+11.4%/yr	+8.5%/yr
Capital spending / share	+5.7%/yr	−7.8%/yr
Book value / share	−7.6%/yr	−2.8%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

Operating income+32.1%
“Operating profit – Operating profit for the year ended December 31, 2025 totaled $649.2 million, representing an increase of $157.7 million, or 32.1%, from the prior year. The increase was primarily due to the $194.2 million gain on the divestiture of Triumph, higher gains on lease portfolio sales, and lower selling, engineering, and administrative expenses, partially offset by lower external deliveries in the Rail Products Group and costs associated with workforce reductions.”
✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

83Mpeak FY2017

ROIC

8%low FY2020

Gross margin

22%low FY2023

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

16.7×peak FY2023

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$314Mowner earningsvs.$253Mnet incomelow FY2022

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $253M of profit into $314M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$253M

Owner earnings$314M · 15% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$253M	$138M	$106M	$60M	$182M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$305M	+$294M	+$293M	+$276M	+$266M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$23M	+$24M	+$23M	+$23M	+$21M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$221M	+$118M	−$126M	−$372M	+$143M
Cash from operations	$360M	$574M	$296M	($13M)	$612M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$46M	−$54M	−$41M	−$38M	−$24M
Owner earnings	$314M	$520M	$254M	($51M)	$588M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	15%	17%	9%	-3%	39%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $23M), owner earnings is nearer $291M.

Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 3.0×

Adequate

Operating income $649M ÷ interest expense $219M

What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $5.2B · 8.0× operating profit

Heavy net debt

Cash $201M + ST investments $75M − debt $5.4B

What this means
Netting $276M of cash and short-term investments against $5.4B of debt leaves $5.2B owed, about 8.0× a year's operating profit (8.4× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 8%

Below average through the cycle

10-yr median, range -6%–19%; 8% latest = NOPAT $478M ÷ invested capital $6.3B

Industry peers: median 13%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 8% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 15%

Solid through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range -3%–39%; latest $314M = operating cash $360M − maintenance capex $46M

Industry peers: median 7%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 15% of revenue this year, a 15% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $23M of SBC) leaves $291M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 1.42×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $360M ÷ net income $253M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 54%

Returns about half

Dividends + buybacks $170M ÷ Owner Earnings $314M

What this means
Of $314M Owner Earnings, $170M (54%) went back to shareholders, $99M dividends, $71M buybacks. Net of $23M stock comp, the real buyback was about $48M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 0.15×

Harvesting

Capex $46M ÷ depreciation $305M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 4 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $2.2B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity —

Current ratio ≥ 2× · —

What this means
Current assets / liabilities not in the data yet.
Earnings stability Near

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Pass

Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Miss

Earnings +33% over the record · −59%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.09/share (latest year $3.18), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $13.55/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 9 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 14% → 20% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The record and the words agree: the margin widened and the filing attributes the gain to its own pricing, not volume alone.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 14% early to 20% lately, median 15% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 3%

What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
Owner earnings growth −8%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 8% a year over the record.
Worst year 2020 · −8.8% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count −6.3%/yr

What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
Dividend record rising

What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $5.1B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

Reinvested$495M · 10%
Dividends$834M · 16%
Buybacks$2.0B · 39%
Retained (debt / cash)$1.8B · 35%

Returned to owners$2.8B
62% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $834M as dividends and $2.0B as buybacks.
Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $4.5B and cash and short-term investments fell $609M.
Average price paid for buybacks$28.06
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 22M shares were bought for $620M, about $28.06 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $16.76 (2016) to $29.41 (2018), and 2018, near the top of that range, was also its heaviest buyback year ($506M).
Net change in share count−44.9%
The diluted count fell from 149M to 82M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record$1.19/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 11% a year. It was never cut over the span.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	E. Jean Savage	$5.6M	$7.2M	$588M
2022	E. Jean Savage	$5.5M	$9.7M	($51M)
2023	E. Jean Savage	$5.7M	$1.7M	$254M
2024	E. Jean Savage	$7.2M	$17.4M	$520M
2025	E. Jean Savage	$7.5M	$2.3M	$314M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership5%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$23M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 4% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Trinity Industries Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?13.3% vs 26.1%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 26.1% early in the record and 13.3% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$851M → $5.4B
Debt rose from $851M to $5.4B while owner earnings went from about $707M to $363M — about 1.2 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 15 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean

Did the share count rise anyway?
Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Income taxes as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Farm & Heavy Equipment

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
GBXGreenbrier Companies Inc. (The)	$3.2B	15%	7.6%	8%	3%
GNTXGentex	$2.5B	36%	23.7%	22%	21%
FSSFederal Signal Corporation	$2.2B	26%	11.4%	13%	7%
TRNTrinity Industries Inc.	$2.2B	23%	15.4%	8%	16%
DORMDorman Products Inc.	$2.1B	37%	13.4%	14%	7%
AVAVAeroVironment Inc.	$2.0B	40%	9.5%	6%	-1%
SMPStandard Motor Products Inc.	$1.8B	29%	8.0%	11%	5%
ATMUAtmus Filtration Technologies Inc.	$1.8B	27%	15.3%	36%	8%
Group median	—	28%	12.4%	12%	7%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Trinity Industries Inc. has delivered.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Trinity Industries Inc. earns about $339M on its 15.7% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 14.6% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($339M) Net of stock comp (−$23M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+12%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25−8%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $338M on 80M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-23; net debt $5.2B. The if-converted diluted count is 82M, 3% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh TRN against another business →

The owners of TRN: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Trinity Industries Inc. (TRN), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/TRN, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← TRMK its page in the Manual TRNO →

Industry order: ← TEX the Farm & Heavy Equipment chapter TTC →