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AVAV, AeroVironment Inc.

Aerospace & Defense capital-intensive Distress / turnaroundCyclical

We are a defense technology provider delivering integrated capabilities across air, land, sea, space, and cyber.

We develop and deploy autonomous systems, precision strike systems, counter-UAS technologies, space-based platforms, directed energy systems, and cyber and electronic warfare capabilities.

Our family of uncrewed systems includes Group 1-3 UAS which are deployed globally and offer multi-mission capability, autonomy, versatility, reliability and ease of use, providing the warfighter with critical situational awareness.

Latest annual: FY2026 10-K

AVAV · AeroVironment Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2026

$2.0B

+140.9% YoY · 38% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $2.0B 5-yr avg $900M

Gross margin 25% 5-yr avg 34%

Operating margin −15.7% 5-yr avg −7.2%

ROIC −5% 5-yr avg −4%

Owner-earnings margin −7% 5-yr avg −4%

Free cash flow margin −7% 5-yr avg −4%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is AxS (69%) and SCDE (31%).
Situation: Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 40% and operating margin about 9.1% through the cycle, a spread the cycle sets more than the company does. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −33% and 13% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Inventory runs near 18% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on the backlog and program execution. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 6%, above 15% in 1 of 10 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

AxS is 69% of revenue, with SCDE the other meaningful segment at 31%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2026

AxS69%$1.4B
SCDE31%$619M

By geographyDomestic72%International28%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	2026’26	TTMTTMApr 2026
											Income statement
$229M	$271M	$314M	$367M	$395M	$446M	$541M	$717M	$821M	$2.0B	$2.0B	RevenueRevenue
40%	41%	41%	42%	42%	32%	32%	40%	39%	25%	25%	Gross marginGross mgn
21%	19%	19%	16%	17%	22%	24%	16%	19%	22%	22%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
12%	10%	11%	13%	14%	12%	12%	14%	12%	6%	6%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$21M	$30M	$34M	$47M	$43M	($10M)	($179M)	$72M	$41M	($311M)	($311M)	Operating incomeOp. inc.
9.1%	11.2%	10.8%	12.8%	11.0%	−2.2%	−33.1%	10.0%	5.0%	−15.7%	−15.7%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$13M	$18M	$47M	$41M	$23M	($4M)	($176M)	$60M	$44M	($265M)	($265M)	Net incomeNet inc.
27%	35%	9%	12%	2%	—	—	3%	2%	—	—	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
($8M)	$70M	$27M	$25M	$87M	($10M)	$11M	$15M	($1M)	($78M)	($78M)	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$5M	$6M	$8M	$10M	$19M	$61M	$100M	$36M	$41M	$265M	$265M	DepreciationDeprec.
($30M)	$41M	($35M)	($32M)	$37M	($72M)	$77M	($97M)	($107M)	($117M)	($117M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$9M	$10M	$9M	$11M	$11M	$22M	$15M	$23M	$20M	$63M	$63M	CapexCapex
3.9%	3.5%	2.8%	3.1%	2.9%	5.0%	2.8%	3.2%	2.4%	3.2%	3.2%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($13M)	$64M	$18M	$14M	$75M	($32M)	($3M)	($8M)	($21M)	($141M)	($141M)	Owner earningsOwner earn.
−5.8%	23.6%	5.7%	3.8%	19.1%	−7.2%	−0.6%	−1.1%	−2.5%	−7.1%	−7.1%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($17M)	$60M	$18M	$14M	$75M	($32M)	($3M)	($8M)	($21M)	($141M)	($141M)	Free cash flowFCF
−7.5%	22.2%	5.7%	3.8%	19.1%	−7.2%	−0.6%	−1.1%	−2.5%	−7.1%	−7.1%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
5%	7%	11%	16%	6%	-1%	-26%	9%	5%	-5%	-5%	ROICROIC
3%	4%	10%	8%	4%	-1%	-32%	7%	5%	-6%	-6%	Return on equityROE
3%	4%	10%	8%	4%	−1%	−32%	7%	5%	−6%	−6%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$200M	$257M	$323M	$303M	$181M	$102M	$133M	$73M	$41M	$632M	$632M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$69M	$57M	$31M	$74M	$63M	$60M	$88M	$70M	$102M	$316M	$316M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$41M	$37M	$54M	$46M	$72M	$91M	$139M	$150M	$144M	$313M	$313M	InventoryInvent.
$16M	$21M	$16M	$20M	$25M	$19M	$31M	$48M	$72M	$161M	$161M	Accounts payablePayables
$94M	$73M	$69M	$99M	$109M	$132M	$195M	$172M	$174M	$469M	$469M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$354M	$399M	$470M	$504M	$402M	$369M	$477M	$516M	$607M	$1.9B	$1.9B	Current assetsCur. assets
$48M	$62M	$45M	$67M	$96M	$101M	$121M	$145M	$172M	$439M	$439M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
7.4×	6.4×	10.5×	7.5×	4.2×	3.6×	3.9×	3.6×	3.5×	4.3×	4.3×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$122K	—	—	$6M	$314M	$334M	$181M	$276M	$257M	$2.5B	$2.5B	GoodwillGoodwill
$433M	$473M	$509M	$585M	$929M	$914M	$825M	$1.0B	$1.1B	$5.7B	$5.7B	Total assetsAssets
—	—	—	—	$198M	$188M	$133M	$27M	$30M	$729M	$739M	Total debtDebt
—	—	—	—	$17M	$86M	$545K	($46M)	($11M)	$97M	$107M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
$382M	$409M	$463M	$510M	$612M	$608M	$551M	$823M	$887M	$4.4B	$4.4B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
1.5%	1.8%	2.2%	1.7%	1.8%	1.2%	2.0%	2.4%	2.6%	1.9%	1.9%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
—	$1M	—	—	—	—	$156M	$156M	$18M	$241M	$241M	Goodwill written downGW imp.
											Per share
23.3M	23.8M	24.1M	24.1M	24.4M	24.7M	25.0M	27.3M	28.2M	49.1M	49.1M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$9.82	$11.38	$13.06	$15.25	$16.21	$18.06	$21.58	$26.23	$29.13	$40.27	$40.27	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.56	$0.75	$1.97	$1.71	$0.96	$-0.17	$-7.04	$2.18	$1.55	$-5.40	$-5.40	EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.57	$2.68	$0.75	$0.58	$3.09	$-1.29	$-0.14	$-0.28	$-0.74	$-2.87	$-2.87	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.74	$2.53	$0.75	$0.58	$3.09	$-1.29	$-0.14	$-0.28	$-0.74	$-2.87	$-2.87	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.39	$0.40	$0.37	$0.47	$0.46	$0.90	$0.59	$0.84	$0.69	$1.27	$1.27	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$16.39	$17.18	$19.22	$21.17	$25.12	$24.63	$22.00	$30.11	$31.47	$89.64	$89.64	Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×1.74 into 2026 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+17.0%/yr	+20.0%/yr
Capital spending / share	+14.2%/yr	+22.5%/yr
Book value / share	+20.8%/yr	+29.0%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

Revenue+140.9%
“Revenue for the fiscal year ended April 30, 2026 was $1,976.8 million, as compared to $820.6 million for the fiscal year ended April 30, 2025, representing an increase of $1,156.2 million, or 141%. The increase in revenue was due to an increase in product revenue of $722.6 million, and an increase in service revenue of $433.6 million.”
✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2017–2026

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

49Mpeak FY2026

ROIC

−5%low FY2023

Gross margin

25%low FY2026

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

($141M)owner earningsvs.($265M)net incomelow FY2026

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2018FY2024

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2022–FY2026cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business turned a $265M loss into ($141M) of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

	FY2026	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022
Reported net income	($265M)	$44M	$60M	($176M)	($4M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$265M	+$41M	+$36M	+$100M	+$61M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$38M	+$21M	+$17M	+$11M	+$5M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$117M	−$107M	−$97M	+$77M	−$72M
Cash from operations	($78M)	($1M)	$15M	$11M	($10M)
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$63M	−$20M	−$23M	−$15M	−$22M
Owner earnings	($141M)	($21M)	($8M)	($3M)	($32M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	-7%	-3%	-1%	-1%	-7%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $38M), owner earnings is nearer ($179M).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Material weakness in financial controls

“In connection with the preparation of its audited consolidated financial statements for the year ended December 31, 2024, BlueHalo identified three material weaknesses in its internal control over financial reporting.”

The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? —

Interest expense not tagged in the data

What this means
No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $107M

Net debt against an operating loss

Cash $377M + ST investments $255M − debt $739M

What this means
Netting $632M of cash and short-term investments against $739M of debt leaves $107M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 96d

Long (60+ days)

DSO 58 + DIO 77 − DPO 40 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 5%

Below average through the cycle

10-yr median, range -26%–16%; -5% latest = NOPAT ($246M) ÷ invested capital $4.8B

Industry peers: median 11%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -5% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin -1%

Consumes cash through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range -7%–24%; latest ($141M) = operating cash ($78M) − maintenance capex $63M

Industry peers: median 7%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -7% of revenue this year, a -1% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $38M of SBC) leaves ($179M).
Are earnings backed by cash? ($78M)

Loss, and burning cash

Net income ($265M) · cash from operations ($78M)

In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? —

No surplus to allocate

What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
Investing or harvesting? 0.24×

Harvesting

Capex $63M ÷ depreciation $265M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Near

Revenue ≥ $2B · $2.0B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Pass

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 4.30×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Pass

Debt ≤ working capital · $739M vs $1.5B WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 3 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Miss

Earnings +33% over the record · −306%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-1.07/share (latest year $-5.24), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $86.95/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 7 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 6 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 10% → −0% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words Input costs rose and the filing says it could not fully pass them on — which is where this margin compressed.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 10% early to −0% lately, median 9% — competition or costs are biting in.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −5%

What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
Worst year 2023 · −33.1% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2023, understand why before trusting the good years.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2026 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“There are difficult issues to navigate in the development and use of AI, which may result in reputational harm or liability, and failure to introduce new and innovative products that have AI capabilities could put us at a competitive disadvantage.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Apr 30, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.9B

Cash & short-term investments$632M
Receivables$316M
Inventory$313M
Other current assets$629M

Current liabilities$439M

Debt due within a year$10M
Accounts payable$161M
Other current liabilities$269M

Current ratio4.30×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio3.59×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio1.44×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$1.5Bthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$10M due · $632M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Apr 30, 2026 balance sheet

Cash runway4.5 yrsthe business is consuming cash; this is how long the cash on hand lasts at that rate

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+143.4%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters4.3× → 4.3×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$977Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Debt incl. operating leases$845M$106M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$80Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2017–2026

Over the record, the business generated $138M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$192M · 140%

Source of funding−$55M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $55M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.
Net change in share count110.6%
The diluted count rose from 23M to 49M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$3.4B60% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity57%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$430Kover 10 years buying other businesses, against $192M of capital spent building

$572M written down across 5 years (2018, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Wahid Nawabi	$2.5M	$6.5M	$75M
2022	Wahid Nawabi	$3.5M	−$1.0M	($32M)
2023	Wahid Nawabi	$4.9M	$7.0M	($3M)
2024	Wahid Nawabi	$7.6M	$16.1M	($8M)
2025	Wahid Nawabi	$7.4M	$6.6M	($21M)

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$38M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 2% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why AeroVironment Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.

3 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 1 came back clean.

Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?−3.6% vs 7.8%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 7.8% early in the record and −3.6% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?110.6%
Diluted shares grew 110.6% over 2017–2026. Owners were diluted on net; each share owns less of the business than it did. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?7 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 7 of the last 10 years, $577M in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean

Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Aerospace & Defense

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
AIRAAR Corp.	$2.8B	19%	4.9%	5%	1%
FSSFederal Signal Corporation	$2.2B	26%	11.4%	13%	7%
TRNTrinity Industries Inc.	$2.2B	23%	15.4%	8%	16%
DORMDorman Products Inc.	$2.1B	37%	13.4%	14%	7%
AVAVAeroVironment Inc.	$2.0B	40%	9.5%	6%	-1%
SMPStandard Motor Products Inc.	$1.8B	29%	8.0%	11%	5%
ATMUAtmus Filtration Technologies Inc.	$1.8B	27%	15.3%	36%	8%
ATROAstronics Corporation	$862M	22%	1.8%	2%	4%
Group median	—	26%	10.5%	9%	6%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

AeroVironment Inc. is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.

Today’s price $

The assumptions Required return 9% Years to get there 10 Revenue growth 0%

Revenue, delivered34%/yr’21→’26

Mature owner-earnings margin 15%

Enter a price to run it.

Owner earnings it must reach—

Margin the price demands—

Owner-earnings margin today−7%

Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.

Weigh AVAV against another business →

The owners of AVAV: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "AeroVironment Inc. (AVAV), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/AVAV, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← AVAH its page in the Manual AVB →

Industry order: ← ATRO the Aerospace & Defense chapter AXON →