Owner Scorecard


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TTC, Toro

Farm & Heavy Equipment capital-intensive

We design, manufacture, market and sell professional turf maintenance equipment and services; turf irrigation systems; landscaping equipment and lighting products; snow and ice management products; agricultural irrigation systems; rental, specialty and underground construction equipment; and residential yard and snow thrower products.

We focus on innovation and quality in our products, customer service, manufacturing, and marketing.

We commit to funding research, development, and engineering activities in order to improve and enhance existing products and develop new products.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
TTC · Toro
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$4.5B
−1.6% YoY · 6% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $4.7B 5-yr avg $4.4B
Gross margin 33% 5-yr avg 34%
Operating margin 9.4% 5-yr avg 11.2%
ROIC 16% 5-yr avg 20%
Owner-earnings margin 16% 5-yr avg 9%
Free cash flow margin 16% 5-yr avg 8%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Professional (79%) and Residential (19%).
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 34% and operating margin about 13% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. Inventory runs near 19% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on the capital-goods cycle and the aftermarket. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run high across the record (median 23%, above 15% in 10 of 10 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 11% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Professional is 79% of revenue, with Residential the other meaningful segment at 19%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • Professional79%$3.6B
  • Residential19%$858M
By geographyUnited States81%International19%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMay 2026
Income statement
$2.4B$2.5B$2.6B$3.1B$3.4B$4.0B$4.5B$4.6B$4.6B$4.5B$4.7BRevenueRevenue
37%37%36%33%35%34%33%35%34%33%33%Gross marginGross mgn
23%23%22%23%23%21%21%22%22%22%22%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
3%3%3%3%4%4%3%4%4%4%3%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$334M$355M$373M$325M$426M$518M$576M$431M$533M$410M$439MOperating incomeOp. inc.
14.0%14.2%14.2%10.4%12.6%13.1%12.8%9.5%11.6%9.1%9.4%Operating marginOp. mgn
$231M$268M$272M$274M$330M$410M$443M$330M$419M$316M$340MNet incomeNet inc.
30%24%27%15%19%18%20%18%18%16%18%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$384M$361M$365M$337M$539M$556M$297M$307M$570M$662M$832MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$64M$65M$61M$88M$96M$99M$109M$119M$128M$143M$150MDepreciationDeprec.
$79M$15M$19M($38M)$99M$25M($277M)($162M)($200K)$184M$321MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$51M$58M$90M$93M$78M$104M$144M$150M$104M$84M$73MCapexCapex
2.1%2.3%3.4%3.0%2.3%2.6%3.2%3.3%2.3%1.9%1.6%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$334M$302M$304M$244M$461M$452M$188M$188M$466M$578M$759MOwner earningsOwner earn.
13.9%12.1%11.6%7.8%13.7%11.4%4.2%4.1%10.2%12.8%16.3%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$334M$302M$275M$244M$461M$452M$154M$157M$466M$578M$759MFree cash flowFCF
13.9%12.1%10.5%7.8%13.7%11.4%3.4%3.5%10.2%12.8%16.3%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$24M$31M$697M$138M$25M$402M$21M$800K$4M$210MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$66M$76M$85M$96M$108M$112M$126M$142M$150M$151M$151MDividends paidDiv. paid
$110M$159M$160M$20M$0$302M$140M$60M$246M$290MBuybacksBuybacks
37%42%39%20%24%30%21%15%19%17%16%ROICROIC
42%43%41%32%30%36%33%22%27%22%25%Return on equityROE
30%31%28%21%20%26%23%12%17%11%14%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$274M$310M$289M$152M$480M$406M$188M$193M$200M$341M$180MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$158M$176M$185M$221M$223M$253M$290M$407M$460M$378M$575MReceivablesReceiv.
$307M$329M$358M$652M$652M$738M$1.1B$1.1B$1.0B$921M$923MInventoryInvent.
$175M$212M$257M$319M$364M$503M$579M$430M$453M$368M$552MAccounts payablePayables
$290M$293M$287M$553M$512M$488M$762M$1.1B$1.0B$931M$947MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$779M$860M$895M$1.1B$1.4B$1.5B$1.7B$1.8B$1.8B$1.7B$1.8BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$464M$522M$533M$757M$856M$937M$1.1B$949M$976M$912M$1.1BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.7×1.6×1.7×1.5×1.7×1.6×1.6×1.9×1.8×1.9×1.6×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$195M$205M$225M$362M$424M$422M$583M$451M$450M$451M$591MGoodwillGoodwill
$1.4B$1.5B$1.6B$2.3B$2.9B$2.9B$3.6B$3.6B$3.6B$3.4B$3.7BTotal assetsAssets
$351M$332M$313M$701M$791M$691M$991M$1.0B$922M$922M$1.0BTotal debtDebt
$77M$22M$23M$549M$311M$286M$803M$838M$722M$581M$836MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
17.3×18.6×19.5×11.3×12.9×18.1×16.1×7.3×8.6×6.9×7.7×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$550M$617M$669M$860M$1.1B$1.2B$1.4B$1.5B$1.6B$1.5B$1.4BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.4%0.5%0.5%0.4%0.5%0.6%0.5%0.4%0.5%0.4%0.5%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
112M111M109M108M109M109M106M105M104M99.8M97.7MShares out (diluted)Shares
$21.36$22.52$24.10$29.03$31.09$36.49$42.75$43.24$43.91$45.19$47.68Revenue / shareRev/sh
$2.06$2.41$2.50$2.53$3.03$3.78$4.20$3.13$4.01$3.17$3.48EPS (diluted)EPS
$2.98$2.72$2.79$2.26$4.25$4.16$1.78$1.78$4.47$5.79$7.77Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$2.98$2.72$2.53$2.26$4.25$4.16$1.46$1.49$4.47$5.79$7.77Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.59$0.68$0.78$0.89$0.99$1.04$1.19$1.35$1.43$1.51$1.54Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.45$0.52$0.83$0.86$0.72$0.96$1.36$1.42$0.99$0.84$0.75Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$4.91$5.55$6.16$7.95$10.26$10.61$12.80$14.35$14.86$14.56$14.00Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+8.7%/yr+7.8%/yr
Owner earnings / share+7.7%/yr+6.4%/yr
EPS+4.9%/yr+0.9%/yr
Dividends / share+11.1%/yr+8.8%/yr
Capital spending / share+7.1%/yr+3.1%/yr
Book value / share+12.8%/yr+7.3%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
100Mpeak FY2016
ROIC
17%low FY2023
Gross margin
33%low FY2022
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
1.0×peak FY2023

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$578Mowner earningsvs.$316Mnet incomelow FY2023

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $316M of profit into $578M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$316M
Owner earnings$578M · 13% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$316M$419M$330M$443M$410M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$143M+$128M+$119M+$109M+$99M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$19M+$23M+$19M+$22M+$22M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$184M−$200K−$162M−$277M+$25M
Cash from operations$662M$570M$307M$297M$556M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$84M−$104M−$119M−$109M−$104M
Owner earnings$578M$466M$188M$188M$452M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$30M−$35M
Free cash flow$578M$466M$157M$154M$452M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue13%10%4%4%11%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $19M), owner earnings is nearer $559M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $410M ÷ interest expense $59M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $581M · 1.4× operating profit
    Modest net debt
    Cash $341M − debt $922M
    What this means

    Netting $341M of cash and short-term investments against $922M of debt leaves $581M owed, about 1.4× a year's operating profit (2.2× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 31 + DIO 112 − DPO 45 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • High through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 15%–42%; 17% latest = NOPAT $343M ÷ invested capital $2.0B
    Industry peers: median 11%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 17% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 4%–14%; latest $578M = operating cash $662M − maintenance capex $84M
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 13% of revenue this year, a 11% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $19M of SBC) leaves $559M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $662M ÷ net income $316M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $441M ÷ Owner Earnings $578M
    What this means

    Of $578M Owner Earnings, $441M (76%) went back to shareholders, $151M dividends, $290M buybacks. Net of $19M stock comp, the real buyback was about $271M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.59×
    Harvesting
    Capex $84M ÷ depreciation $143M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $4.5B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Near
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.87×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Near
    Debt ≤ working capital · $922M vs $793M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +38%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $3.73/share (latest year $3.32), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $15.26/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 10 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 14% → 10% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words Input costs rose and the filing says it could not fully pass them on — which is where this margin compressed.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 14% early to 10% lately, median 13% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 8%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Owner earnings growth +6%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 6% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2025 · 9.1% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −1.3%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“Our competitors or other third parties may incorporate AI into their products more quickly or more successfully than us, which could impair our ability to compete effectively and adversely affect our results of operations.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, May 1, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.8B
  • Cash & short-term investments$180M
  • Receivables$575M
  • Inventory$923M
  • Other current assets$81M
Current liabilities$1.1B
  • Accounts payable$552M
  • Other current liabilities$579M
Current ratio1.56×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.74×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.16×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$629Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+8.1%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.9× → 1.6×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$343Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Debt incl. operating leases$1.1B$120M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$25Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$0
'27$100M
'28$20M
'29$280M
'30$0
later$525M

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$0the first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$100Mthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$280Min 2029the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Total scheduled principal$925Mevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Oct 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $4.4B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$954M · 22%
  • Dividends$1.1B · 25%
  • Buybacks$1.5B · 34%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$825M · 19%
  • Returned to owners$2.6B

    74% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $1.1B as dividends and $1.5B as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $666M and cash and short-term investments fell $93M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$72.92

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 20M shares were bought for $1.5B, about $72.92 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $41.11 (2016) to $100.42 (2021), and 2021, near the top of that range, was also its heaviest buyback year ($302M).

  • Net change in share count−12.8%

    The diluted count fell from 112M to 98M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$1.51/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 11% a year. It was never cut over the span.

  • Return on what it retained14%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($694M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $98M, so each retained $1 added about 0.14 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$841M24% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity31%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$1.3Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $954M of capital spent building

$133M written down across 1 year (2023): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Richard M. Olson$8.6M$14.5M$452M
2022Richard M. Olson$7.3M$10.4M$188M
2023Richard M. Olson$9.0M$548k$188M
2024Richard M. Olson$8.3M$3.7M$466M
2025Richard M. Olson$8.4M$5.7M$578M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership1.9%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio112:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$19M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 5% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Toro is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$351M → $1.0B

    Debt rose from $351M to $1.0B while owner earnings went from about $313M to $411M — about 1.1 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 2.5 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

  • Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?19% → 32% of sales

    Receivables and inventory grew from $465M to $1.5B while revenue grew 95%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (19% of revenue then, 32% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Inventory, Acquisitions as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Farm & Heavy Equipment

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
AGCOAgco Corp /de$10.1B23%5.6%10%5%
LIILennox Intl$5.2B29%14.0%44%11%
WFRDWeatherford International plc$4.9B56%3.2%5%5%
FLSFlowserve$4.7B30%7.7%7%6%
TKRTimken$4.6B29%12.8%11%7%
TTCToro$4.5B34%12.7%23%11%
LECOLincoln Electric Holdings Inc.$4.2B34%14.3%23%11%
PNRPentair plc. Ordinary Share$4.2B35%15.0%13%16%
Group median32%12.8%12%9%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Toro has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Toro earns about $519M on its 11.5% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 12.8% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+13%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+6%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $759M on 95M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-28; net debt $836M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Toro (TTC), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/TTC, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← TTAN its page in the Manual TTD →

Industry order: ← TRN the Farm & Heavy Equipment chapter WAB →