Owner Scorecard


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TROX, Tronox Holdings

Industrial Gases capital-intensive UnprofitableDistress / turnaroundCyclical

Tronox is the world's leading vertically integrated manufacturer of TiO 2 pigment.

The mining, beneficiation and smelting of titanium bearing mineral sands also creates meaningful quantities of co-products including zircon, pig iron and the rare-earth bearing mineral, monazite, which we also supply to customers around the world.

The following sets forth the percentage of our revenue derived from sales of our products by geographic region for the year ended December 31, 2025.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
TROX · Tronox Holdings
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$2.9B
−5.7% YoY · 1% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $2.9B 5-yr avg $3.2B
Operating margin −8.0% 5-yr avg 6.9%
ROIC −4% 5-yr avg 4%
Owner-earnings margin −9% 5-yr avg 2%
Free cash flow margin −9% 5-yr avg 1%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is TiO2 (79%), Other products (11%) and Zircon (9%).
Situation
Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 23% and operating margin about 7.1% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −8.7% and 16% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Inventory runs near 38% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on the spread and utilization. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 3%, above 15% in 0 of 8 years). By owner earnings: roughly 4% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

TiO2 is 79% of revenue, with Other products the other meaningful line at 11%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025
  • TiO279%$2.3B
  • Other products11%$326M
  • Zircon9%$274M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$1.3B$1.7B$1.8B$2.6B$2.8B$3.6B$3.5B$2.9B$3.1B$2.9B$2.9BRevenueRevenue
10%23%27%55%Gross marginGross mgn
14%15%15%13%13%9%8%10%10%10%10%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
1%0%1%1%0%0%0%0%0%1%1%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($53M)$141M$200M$95M$271M$577M$458M$186M$219M($253M)($233M)Operating incomeOp. inc.
−4.0%8.3%11.0%3.6%9.8%16.2%13.3%6.5%7.1%−8.7%−8.0%Operating marginOp. mgn
($61M)($285M)($7M)($109M)$969M$286M$497M($316M)($48M)($470M)($462M)Net incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
$84M$165M$170M$412M$355M$740M$598M$184M$300M$60M$24MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$177M$182M$195M$280M$304M$297M$269M$275M$285M$302M$306MDepreciationDeprec.
($56M)$237M($18M)$241M($914M)$154M($168M)$221M$63M$228M$176MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$86M$91M$117M$198M$195M$272M$428M$261M$370M$341M$298MCapexCapex
6.6%5.4%6.4%7.5%7.1%7.6%12.4%9.2%12.0%11.8%10.2%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($2M)$74M$53M$214M$160M$468M$329M($77M)$15M($281M)($274M)Owner earningsOwner earn.
−0.2%4.4%2.9%8.1%5.8%13.1%9.5%−2.7%0.5%−9.7%−9.4%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($2M)$74M$53M$214M$160M$468M$170M($77M)($70M)($281M)($274M)Free cash flowFCF
−0.2%4.4%2.9%8.1%5.8%13.1%4.9%−2.7%−2.3%−9.7%−9.4%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$0$0$1.7B$0$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$46M$23M$23M$27M$40M$65M$87M$89M$80M$48M$56MDividends paidDiv. paid
$0$0$288M$0$0$50M$0$0BuybacksBuybacks
-1%4%6%11%10%2%2%-5%-4%ROICROIC
-6%-34%-1%-15%57%14%21%-16%-3%-33%-36%Return on equityROE
−11%−37%−4%−18%55%11%17%−21%−7%−37%−40%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$248M$1.1B$1.0B$302M$619M$228M$164M$273M$151M$199M$126MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$278M$328M$317M$482M$540M$631M$377M$290M$266M$289M$331MReceivablesReceiv.
$499M$473M$479M$1.1B$1.1B$1.0B$1.3B$1.4B$1.6B$1.7B$1.6BInventoryInvent.
$136M$165M$133M$342M$356M$438M$486M$461M$499M$481M$419MAccounts payablePayables
$641M$636M$663M$1.3B$1.3B$1.2B$1.2B$1.3B$1.3B$1.5B$1.5BOperating working capitalOper. WC
$2.7B$2.6B$2.5B$2.1B$2.5B$2.0B$2.0B$2.1B$2.2B$2.3B$2.2BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$564M$353M$300M$702M$805M$822M$850M$753M$874M$919M$895MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
4.9×7.5×8.5×3.0×3.1×2.5×2.3×2.8×2.5×2.5×2.4×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$5.0B$4.9B$4.6B$5.3B$6.6B$6.0B$6.3B$6.1B$6.0B$6.2B$6.1BTotal assetsAssets
$2.9B$3.2B$3.2B$3.1B$3.4B$2.6B$2.5B$2.8B$2.8B$3.2B$3.2BTotal debtDebt
$2.7B$2.1B$2.2B$2.8B$2.7B$2.4B$2.4B$2.6B$2.7B$3.0B$3.1BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
-0.3×0.8×1.0×0.5×1.4×3.7×3.7×1.2×1.3×-1.3×-1.2×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$1.0B$829M$683M$748M$1.7B$2.0B$2.4B$1.9B$1.8B$1.4B$1.3BShareholders’ equityEquity
1.8%1.8%−0.1%0.1%0.1%0.1%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
116M120M123M140M145M158M157M156M158M158M159MShares out (diluted)Shares
$11.27$14.21$14.80$18.89$19.03$22.62$21.98$18.22$19.48$18.29$18.38Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.53$-2.38$-0.06$-0.78$6.69$1.81$3.16$-2.02$-0.30$-2.97$-2.91EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.02$0.62$0.43$1.53$1.10$2.96$2.09$-0.49$0.10$-1.77$-1.72Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.02$0.62$0.43$1.53$1.10$2.96$1.08$-0.49$-0.44$-1.77$-1.72Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.40$0.19$0.19$0.19$0.28$0.41$0.55$0.57$0.51$0.30$0.35Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.74$0.76$0.95$1.42$1.35$1.72$2.72$1.67$2.34$2.15$1.88Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$8.69$6.94$5.56$5.35$11.72$12.62$15.00$12.38$11.16$8.95$8.11Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+5.5%/yr−0.8%/yr
Dividends / share−2.9%/yr+1.9%/yr
Capital spending / share+12.6%/yr+9.8%/yr
Book value / share+0.3%/yr−5.3%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Zircon-14.9%
    “Zircon revenues decreased $48 million primarily due to a 14% decrease in average selling prices including mix and a 1% decrease in sales volumes.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
158Mpeak FY2025
ROIC
−5%low FY2025
Gross margin
27%low FY2016
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
178.3×peak FY2024

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

($281M)owner earningsvs.($470M)net incomelow FY2025

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $470M loss into ($281M) of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($470M)($48M)($316M)$497M$286M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$302M+$285M+$275M+$269M+$297M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$4M+$3M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$228M+$63M+$221M−$168M+$154M
Cash from operations$60M$300M$184M$598M$740M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$341M−$285M−$261M−$269M−$272M
Owner earnings($281M)$15M($77M)$329M$468M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$85M−$159M
Free cash flow($281M)($70M)($77M)$170M$468M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue-10%0%-3%10%13%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income ($253M) ÷ interest expense $189M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • Net debt against an operating loss
    Cash $199M − debt $3.2B
    What this means

    Netting $199M of cash and short-term investments against $3.2B of debt leaves $3.0B owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 36 + DIO 456 − DPO 133 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    8-yr median, range -5%–11%; -5% latest = NOPAT ($200M) ÷ invested capital $4.4B
    Industry peers: median 8%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years (it ran -5% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Thin through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -10%–13%; latest ($281M) = operating cash $60M − maintenance capex $341M
    Industry peers: median 5%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -10% of revenue this year, a 3% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $4M of SBC) leaves ($285M).

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($470M) · cash from operations $60M
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • No surplus to allocate
    What this means

    The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.13×
    Maintaining
    Capex $341M ÷ depreciation $302M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $2.9B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.46×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $3.2B vs $1.3B WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 7 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-1.74/share (latest year $-2.95), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $8.89/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 3 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 7 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 5% → 2% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 5% early to 2% lately, median 7% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −4%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.

  • Worst year 2025 · −8.7% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2025, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count +3.5%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

  • Dividend record paid
    What this means

    Paid a dividend in 10 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$2.2B
  • Cash & short-term investments$126M
  • Receivables$331M
  • Inventory$1.6B
  • Other current assets$132M
Current liabilities$895M
  • Debt due within a year$39M
  • Accounts payable$419M
  • Other current liabilities$437M
Current ratio2.42×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.66×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.14×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$1.3Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$39M due · $126M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+3.0%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters3.0× → 2.4×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$1.0Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($2.6B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$3.1B$168M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$1Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$39M
'27$37M
'28$31M
'29$1.8B
'30$415M
later$859M

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$39Mthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$76Mthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$1.8Bin 2029the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Total scheduled principal$3.2Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Mar 31, 2026$126M
Together, against $39M due next year3.2×

Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 comes to $126M against the $39M due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 3.2 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $3.1B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$2.4B · 77%
  • Dividends$528M · 17%
  • Buybacks$338M · 11%
  • Returned to owners$866M

    91% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $528M as dividends and $338M as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−$157M

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $157M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $2.9B to $3.2B, and cash and short-term investments drew down $122M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$32.82

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 10M shares were bought for $338M, about $32.82 each.

  • Net change in share count36.8%

    The diluted count rose from 116M to 159M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$0.30/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend shrinking about 3% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

  • CEO pay ratio70:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$4M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Tronox Holdings is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?−4.0% vs 2.4%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 2.4% early in the record and −4.0% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?36.8%

    Diluted shares grew 36.8% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $338M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Pension & retirement, Income taxes as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Industrial Gases

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
AVNTAvient$3.3B27%6.5%7%5%
TROXTronox Holdings$2.9B23%7.7%3%4%
NEUNewMarket Corp$2.7B29%15.5%20%11%
ESIElement Solutions Inc.$2.6B42%12.6%5%9%
VHIValhi Inc.$2.1B22%10.1%3%
MTXMinerals Technologies Inc.$2.1B25%12.2%9%7%
KROKronos Worldwide Inc$1.9B21%7.7%11%3%
LXULSB Industries Inc.$615M5%-2.7%-1%-3%
Group median24%8.9%7%5%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Tronox Holdings has delivered.

Tronox Holdings’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, a cyclical trough. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, Tronox Holdings earns about $105M on its 3.6% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s −9.7% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth, delivered
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings ($274M) on 160M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-20; net debt $3.1B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits off the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Tronox Holdings (TROX), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/TROX, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← TROW its page in the Manual TRS →

Industry order: ← MTX the Industrial Gases chapter VHI →