Owner Scorecard


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KRO, Kronos Worldwide Inc

Industrial Gases capital-intensive Cyclical

We, along with our distributors and agents, sell and provide technical services for our products to approximately 3,000 customers in 100 countries with the majority of our sales in Europe, North America and the Asia Pacific region.

TiO 2 is a white inorganic pigment used in a wide range of products for its exceptional durability and its ability to impart whiteness, brightness and opacity.

TiO 2 is a critical component of everyday applications, such as coatings, plastics and paper, as well as many specialty products such as inks, cosmetics and pharmaceuticals.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
KRO · Kronos Worldwide Inc
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$1.9B
−1.5% YoY · 3% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $1.9B 5-yr avg $1.9B
Gross margin 10% 5-yr avg 17%
Operating margin −3.3% 5-yr avg 3.8%
ROIC −3% 5-yr avg 5%
Owner-earnings margin 1% 5-yr avg 1%
Free cash flow margin 1% 5-yr avg 1%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 20% and operating margin about 7.1% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −3.4% and 20% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Inventory runs near 30% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on the spread and utilization. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 11%). By owner earnings: roughly 3% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$1.4B$1.7B$1.7B$1.7B$1.6B$1.9B$1.9B$1.7B$1.9B$1.9B$1.9BRevenueRevenue
19%33%34%22%21%23%20%10%19%11%10%Gross marginGross mgn
12%12%14%13%13%13%12%13%12%13%13%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
1%1%1%1%1%1%1%1%1%1%1%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$93M$348M$330M$146M$116M$187M$160M($56M)$123M($37M)($62M)Operating incomeOp. inc.
6.8%20.1%19.9%8.4%7.1%9.6%8.3%−3.4%6.5%−2.0%−3.3%Operating marginOp. mgn
$43M$355M$205M$87M$64M$113M$105M($49M)$86M($111M)($134M)Net incomeNet inc.
29%30%28%20%26%22%42%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$90M$276M$189M$160M$103M$207M$82M$6M$73M$3M$54MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$41M$41M$50M$48M$58M$51M$52M$49M$60M$61M$62MDepreciationDeprec.
$6M($120M)($66M)$25M($20M)$42M($75M)$6M($74M)$53M$125MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$53M$64M$56M$55M$63M$59M$63M$47M$30M$43M$43MCapexCapex
3.9%3.7%3.4%3.2%3.8%3.0%3.3%2.8%1.6%2.3%2.3%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$49M$235M$132M$105M$40M$148M$19M($42M)$43M($40M)$11MOwner earningsOwner earn.
3.6%13.6%8.0%6.1%2.4%7.6%1.0%−2.5%2.3%−2.2%0.6%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$37M$212M$132M$105M$40M$148M$19M($42M)$43M($40M)$11MFree cash flowFCF
2.7%12.2%8.0%6.1%2.4%7.6%1.0%−2.5%2.3%−2.2%0.6%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$70M$70M$79M$83M$83M$83M$88M$88M$55M$23M$23MDividends paidDiv. paid
$3M$1M$200K$2M$3MBuybacksBuybacks
10%38%25%12%10%15%12%-4%6%-2%-3%ROICROIC
11%47%24%11%8%13%11%-6%11%-15%-18%Return on equityROE
−7%38%15%0%−2%3%2%−17%4%−18%−21%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$57M$333M$373M$391M$358M$410M$331M$197M$110M$35M$49MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$241M$319M$300M$303M$320M$361M$252M$295M$291M$334MReceivablesReceiv.
$344M$382M$498M$503M$519M$432M$609M$565M$657M$629M$549MInventoryInvent.
$85M$108M$103M$137M$111M$144M$177M$219M$232M$224M$201MAccounts payablePayables
$500M$594M$694M$668M$728M$649M$684M$641M$715M$405M$682MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$650M$1.1B$1.2B$1.2B$1.2B$1.3B$1.2B$1.1B$1.1B$995M$989MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$182M$232M$233M$271M$260M$289M$327M$371M$477M$369M$311MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
3.6×4.6×5.1×4.5×4.7×4.4×3.8×3.0×2.3×2.7×3.2×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$3M$3M$3MGoodwillGoodwill
$1.2B$1.8B$1.9B$2.0B$2.0B$2.0B$1.9B$1.8B$1.9B$1.8B$1.8BTotal assetsAssets
$339M$475M$457M$446M$487M$451M$425M$441M$507M$557M$691MTotal debtDebt
$282M$142M$83M$55M$130M$41M$94M$244M$397M$522M$642MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
4.5×18.3×16.9×7.8×6.1×9.5×9.4×-3.3×2.9×-0.7×-1.1×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$395M$754M$840M$816M$797M$870M$957M$808M$817M$751M$745MShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
116M116M116M116M116M116M116M115M115M115M115MShares out (diluted)Shares
$11.77$14.92$14.34$14.95$14.18$16.79$16.71$14.48$16.41$16.17$16.34Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.37$3.06$1.77$0.75$0.55$0.98$0.90$-0.43$0.75$-0.96$-1.16EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.42$2.03$1.14$0.91$0.34$1.28$0.16$-0.36$0.37$-0.35$0.09Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.32$1.83$1.14$0.91$0.34$1.28$0.16$-0.36$0.37$-0.35$0.09Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.60$0.60$0.68$0.72$0.72$0.72$0.76$0.76$0.48$0.20$0.20Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.46$0.55$0.49$0.48$0.54$0.51$0.55$0.41$0.26$0.37$0.37Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$3.41$6.51$7.25$7.05$6.89$7.53$8.29$7.02$7.10$6.53$6.48Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+3.6%/yr+2.7%/yr
Dividends / share−11.5%/yr−22.6%/yr
Capital spending / share−2.2%/yr−7.2%/yr
Book value / share+7.5%/yr−1.1%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
115Mpeak FY2016
ROIC
−2%low FY2023
Gross margin
11%low FY2023
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
9.2×peak FY2024

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

($40M)owner earningsvs.($111M)net incomelow FY2023

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $111M loss into ($40M) of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($111M)$86M($49M)$105M$113M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$61M+$60M+$49M+$52M+$51M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$53M−$74M+$6M−$75M+$42M
Cash from operations$3M$73M$6M$82M$207M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$43M−$30M−$47M−$63M−$59M
Owner earnings($40M)$43M($42M)$19M$148M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue-2%2%-3%1%8%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income ($37M) ÷ interest expense $53M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • Net debt against an operating loss
    Cash $33M + ST investments $21M − debt $636M
    What this means

    Netting $54M of cash and short-term investments against $636M of debt leaves $582M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. It also holds $2M in longer-dated marketable securities; counting those, it sits at $580M of net debt. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 57 + DIO 139 − DPO 50 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -4%–38%; -2% latest = NOPAT ($29M) ÷ invested capital $1.4B
    Industry peers: median 10%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -2% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Thin through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -3%–14%; latest ($40M) = operating cash $3M − maintenance capex $43M
    Industry peers: median 4%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -2% of revenue this year, a 2% median across 10 years.

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($111M) · cash from operations $3M
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • No surplus to allocate
    What this means

    The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.71×
    Harvesting
    Capex $43M ÷ depreciation $61M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Near
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.9B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.70×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Near
    Debt ≤ working capital · $636M vs $626M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 2 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −112%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.21/share (latest year $-0.96), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $6.53/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 8 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 16% → 0% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 16% early to 0% lately, median 7% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC
    What this means

    The reinvested base moved too little against the change in profit to read a reliable return on it here — the figure would be a small-denominator artifact, not a moat. Judge this one on the owner-earnings record and the cash it returns instead.

  • Owner earnings growth −41%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings shrank about 41% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2023 · −3.4% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2023, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count −0.1%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

  • Dividend record paid
    What this means

    Paid a dividend in 10 of the years on record.

  • How management talks about it Owner’s terms
    What this means

    Returns have thinned, but the filing discusses it in an owner’s vocabulary rather than selling past it — candor about a hard stretch counts for more than an adjective.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$989M
  • Cash & short-term investments$47M
  • Receivables$334M
  • Inventory$549M
  • Other current assets$58M
Current liabilities$311M
  • Debt due within a year$88M
  • Accounts payable$201M
  • Other current liabilities$22M
Current ratio3.18×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.41×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.15×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$678Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$88M due · $47M cash cash alone won't cover the maturities; it leans on refinancing or operating cash · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+4.1%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters3.6× → 3.2×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$742Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Debt incl. operating leases$709M$19M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $1.2B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

  • Reinvested$533M · 45%
  • Dividends$721M · 61%
  • Buybacks$9M · 1%
  • Returned to owners$731M

    106% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $721M as dividends and $9M as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−$78M

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $78M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $339M to $691M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $9M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count−0.8%

    The diluted count barely moved (116M to 115M): buybacks roughly offset the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$0.20/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend shrinking about 11% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

  • Return on what it retained−91%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($167M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell $152M, so each retained $1 gave back about 0.91 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021James M. Buch$3.7M$3.7M$148M
2022James M. Buch$4.6M$4.6M$19M
2022James M. Buch$1.8M$1.8M$19M
2023James M. Buch$2.1M$2.1M($42M)
2024James M. Buch$2.2M$2.2M$43M
2025James M. Buch$2.3M$2.3M($40M)

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio23:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Kronos Worldwide Inc is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?−0.8% vs 8.4%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 8.4% early in the record and −0.8% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$339M → $691M

    Debt rose from $339M to $691M while owner earnings went from about $139M to ($13M): the borrowing grew and the earnings that would carry it are not there now. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Pension & retirement, Income taxes, Acquisitions as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Industrial Gases

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
TROXTronox Holdings$2.9B23%7.7%3%4%
VHIValhi Inc.$2.1B22%10.1%3%
MTXMinerals Technologies Inc.$2.1B25%12.2%9%7%
HXLHexcel$1.9B24%11.6%11%9%
KROKronos Worldwide Inc$1.9B21%7.7%11%3%
OECOrion S.A.$1.8B25%10.0%10%3%
IOSPInnospec$1.8B30%9.3%10%6%
LXULSB Industries Inc.$615M5%-2.7%-1%-3%
Group median24%9.6%10%3%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Kronos Worldwide Inc has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Kronos Worldwide Inc earns about $56M on its 3.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s −2.2% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−65%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25−40%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $11M on 115M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-01; net debt $642M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Kronos Worldwide Inc (KRO), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/KRO, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← KRNY its page in the Manual KRP →

Industry order: ← APD the Industrial Gases chapter LIN →