Owner Scorecard


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TRU, TransUnion

Financial Exchanges & Data asset-light Serial acquirer

TransUnion is a leading global information and insights company that makes trust possible between businesses and consumers, helping people around the world access opportunities that can lead to a higher quality of life.

That trust is built on TransUnion's ability to deliver safe, innovative solutions with credibility and consistency.

We use our OneTru solution enablement platform to centralize data management, identity resolution and Artificial Intelligence ("AI") powered analytics, enabling more persistent identity resolution with sharper, more contextualized insights.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
TRU · TransUnion
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$4.6B
+9.4% YoY · 13% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $4.7B 5-yr avg $3.9B
Operating margin 17.9% 5-yr avg 15.4%
ROIC 7% 5-yr avg 6%
Owner-earnings margin 15% 5-yr avg 11%
Free cash flow margin 15% 5-yr avg 11%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 75% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 6 of the record's 10 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 66% and operating margin about 19% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The operating margin has swung widely — from 3.4% to 24% — on a steadier 66% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −12 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. Read this kind of business on recurring subscriptions and the data moat. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 7%). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 16% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$1.7B$1.9B$2.3B$2.5B$2.5B$3.0B$3.7B$3.8B$4.2B$4.6B$4.7BRevenueRevenue
66%67%66%65%82%Gross marginGross mgn
33%30%31%32%33%31%32%31%30%28%28%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$301M$465M$513M$542M$500M$652M$626M$129M$667M$858M$848MOperating incomeOp. inc.
17.6%24.0%22.1%22.0%19.8%22.0%16.9%3.4%15.9%18.7%17.9%Operating marginOp. mgn
$121M$441M$277M$347M$343M$1.4B$266M($206M)$284M$455M$704MNet incomeNet inc.
38%16%17%20%9%31%26%28%18%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$390M$466M$556M$777M$788M$808M$297M$645M$833M$988M$1.0BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$265M$238M$307M$339M$347M$377M$519M$524M$538M$575M$588MDepreciationDeprec.
($20M)($247M)($86M)$43M$53M($1.0B)($571M)$227M($111M)($188M)($426M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$124M$135M$180M$188M$206M$224M$298M$311M$316M$326M$323MCapexCapex
7.3%7.0%7.8%7.6%8.1%7.6%8.0%8.1%7.5%7.1%6.8%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$266M$331M$376M$589M$582M$584M($1M)$335M$517M$662M$697MOwner earningsOwner earn.
15.6%17.1%16.2%23.9%23.0%19.7%−0.0%8.7%12.4%14.5%14.7%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$266M$331M$376M$589M$582M$584M($1M)$335M$517M$662M$697MFree cash flowFCF
15.6%17.1%16.2%23.9%23.0%19.7%−0.0%8.7%12.4%14.5%14.7%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$357M$343M$1.8B$22M$58M$3.6B$508M$0$0$56M$634MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$0$0$42M$57M$58M$70M$78M$82M$83M$91M$93MDividends paidDiv. paid
$700K$134M$0$0$0$0$302MBuybacksBuybacks
5%11%7%8%7%7%5%6%7%7%ROICROIC
9%26%15%15%14%36%6%-5%7%10%15%Return on equityROE
9%26%12%13%11%34%5%−7%5%8%13%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$198M$132M$202M$277M$496M$1.8B$588M$479M$682M$856M$745MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$278M$327M$457M$444M$393M$558M$602M$723M$799M$905M$1.0BReceivablesReceiv.
$114M$131M$170M$176M$188M$270M$250M$251M$295M$350M$379MAccounts payablePayables
$164M$195M$287M$268M$204M$288M$352M$472M$504M$555M$668MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$550M$589M$842M$888M$1.5B$2.6B$1.5B$1.5B$1.8B$2.0B$2.0BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$373M$458M$549M$571M$670M$1.4B$906M$1.0B$1.1B$1.2B$1.0BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.5×1.3×1.5×1.6×2.2×1.9×1.6×1.5×1.7×1.7×1.9×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$2.2B$2.4B$3.3B$3.1B$3.2B$5.5B$5.6B$5.2B$5.1B$5.3B$5.8BGoodwillGoodwill
$4.8B$5.1B$7.0B$7.1B$7.3B$12.6B$11.7B$11.1B$11.0B$11.1B$12.0BTotal assetsAssets
$2.4B$2.5B$4.0B$3.7B$3.5B$6.4B$5.7B$5.4B$5.2B$5.3B$5.6BTotal debtDebt
$2.2B$2.3B$3.8B$3.4B$3.0B$4.5B$5.1B$5.0B$4.5B$4.4B$4.9BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
3.5×5.3×3.7×3.1×4.0×5.8×2.7×0.4×2.5×3.6×3.5×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$1.4B$1.7B$1.9B$2.2B$2.5B$3.9B$4.2B$4.0B$4.2B$4.4B$4.8BShareholders’ equityEquity
1.4%1.7%2.5%2.0%1.8%2.3%2.2%2.6%2.9%3.2%3.2%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
185M190M191M192M192M193M193M193M197M197M195MShares out (diluted)Shares
$9.24$10.18$12.14$12.84$13.17$15.34$19.21$19.81$21.27$23.28$24.30Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.65$2.32$1.45$1.81$1.79$7.20$1.38$-1.07$1.45$2.32$3.62EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.44$1.74$1.97$3.07$3.03$3.03$-0.01$1.73$2.63$3.37$3.58Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.44$1.74$1.97$3.07$3.03$3.03$-0.01$1.73$2.63$3.37$3.58Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.00$0.00$0.22$0.30$0.30$0.36$0.40$0.42$0.42$0.46$0.48Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.67$0.71$0.94$0.98$1.07$1.16$1.54$1.61$1.61$1.66$1.66Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$7.38$9.10$9.90$11.71$13.22$20.25$21.59$20.72$21.44$22.58$24.44Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+10.8%/yr+12.1%/yr
Owner earnings / share+9.9%/yr+2.1%/yr
EPS+15.1%/yr+5.3%/yr
Dividends / share+9.0%/yr
Capital spending / share+10.6%/yr+9.2%/yr
Book value / share+13.2%/yr+11.3%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Revenue+9.4%
    “Revenue For 2025, revenue increased $392.6 million, or 9.4%, compared with 2024, due primarily to growth in both segments, partially offset by a decrease of 0.1% due to the impact of foreign currencies, as further discussed in the Segment Results of Operations section below.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
197Mpeak FY2024
ROIC
7%low FY2022
Gross margin
65%low FY2019
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
6.7×peak FY2023

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$662Mowner earningsvs.$455Mnet incomelow FY2022

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $455M of profit into $662M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$455M
Owner earnings$662M · 14% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$455M$284M($206M)$266M$1.4B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$575M+$538M+$524M+$519M+$377M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$146M+$121M+$100M+$83M+$69M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$188M−$111M+$227M−$571M−$1.0B
Cash from operations$988M$833M$645M$297M$808M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$326M−$316M−$311M−$298M−$224M
Owner earnings$662M$517M$335M($1M)$584M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue14%12%9%0%20%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $146M), owner earnings is nearer $516M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Adequate
    Operating income $858M ÷ interest expense $236M
    What this means

    Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $4.4B · 5.2× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $854M + ST investments $3M − debt $5.3B
    What this means

    Netting $856M of cash and short-term investments against $5.3B of debt leaves $4.4B owed, about 5.2× a year's operating profit (6.2× on the gross debt, before the cash). It also holds $12M in longer-dated marketable securities; counting those, it sits at $4.4B of net debt. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Negative, funded by others
    DSO 72 + DIO 0 − DPO 146 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    9-yr median, range 5%–11%; 7% latest = NOPAT $622M ÷ invested capital $8.9B
    Industry peers: median 9%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 7% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • High through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -0%–24%; latest $662M = operating cash $988M − maintenance capex $326M
    Industry peers: median 31%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 14% of revenue this year, a 16% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $146M of SBC) leaves $516M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $988M ÷ net income $455M

    In the filing’s words The filing leans on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings, but the GAAP profit is itself cash-backed — the adjustments are not papering over a cash shortfall here.

    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $393M ÷ Owner Earnings $662M
    What this means

    Of $662M Owner Earnings, $393M (59%) went back to shareholders, $91M dividends, $302M buybacks. Net of $146M stock comp, the real buyback was about $156M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.57×
    Harvesting
    Capex $326M ÷ depreciation $575M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $4.6B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Near
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.75×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $5.3B vs $862M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Near
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 8 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −36%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.92/share (latest year $2.36), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $23.02/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 9 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 21% → 13% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 21% early to 13% lately, median 19% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 1%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Owner earnings growth +8%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 8% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2023 · 3.4% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count +0.7%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$2.0B
  • Cash & short-term investments$733M
  • Receivables$1.0B
  • Other current assets$237M
Current liabilities$1.0B
  • Debt due within a year$205M
  • Accounts payable$379M
  • Other current liabilities$462M
Current ratio1.93×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.93×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.70×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$972Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$205M due · $733M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+13.7%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.7× → 1.9×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($4.6B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($5.1B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$5.7B$77M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$148Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$197M
'27$109M
'28$109M
'29$1.1B
'30$38M
later$3.6B

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$197Mthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$306Mthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$1.1Bin 2029the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Total scheduled principal$5.1Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Mar 31, 2026$733M
One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$662M
Together, against $197M due next year7.1×

Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $1.4B against the $197M due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 7.1 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the balance-sheet debt.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $6.5B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$2.3B · 35%
  • Dividends$559M · 9%
  • Buybacks$436M · 7%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$3.2B · 50%
  • Returned to owners$995M

    23% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $559M as dividends and $436M as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $3.2B and cash and short-term investments rose $548M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$1.00

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 134M shares were bought for $134M, about $1.00 each.

  • Net change in share count5.4%

    The diluted count rose from 185M to 195M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$0.46/sh

    Paid in 8 of the years on record. It was never cut over the span.

  • Return on what it retained7%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($2.7B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $180M, so each retained $1 added about 0.07 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$8.4B75% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth
Cash spent acquiring$6.8Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $2.3B of capital spent building

$414M written down across 1 year (2023): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Christopher A. Cartwright$11.8M$24.7M$584M
2022Christopher A. Cartwright$10.5M−$8.4M($1M)
2023Christopher A. Cartwright$18.6M$18.0M$335M
2024Christopher A. Cartwright$15.4M$31.6M$517M
2025Christopher A. Cartwright$16.7M$14.9M$662M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio356:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$146M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 3% of revenue, equal to 17% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why TransUnion is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

4 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?11.8% vs 16.3%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 16.3% early in the record and 11.8% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?5.4%

    Diluted shares grew 5.4% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $436M on buybacks. The repurchases were a treadmill: stock issued to staff outran them, so owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$2.4B → $5.6B

    Debt rose from $2.4B to $5.6B while owner earnings went from about $324M to $504M — about 7.3 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 11 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

  • Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?16% → 22% of sales

    Receivables and inventory grew from $278M to $1.0B while revenue grew 177%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (16% of revenue then, 22% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Income taxes, Contingencies as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Financial Exchanges & Data

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
SPGIS&P Global Inc.$15.3B70%44.4%91%33%
MCOMoody's Corporation$7.7B72%41.7%27%32%
RBLXRoblox Corporation$4.9B76%-28.8%-247%18%
CRWDCrowdStrike Holdings Inc.$4.8B74%-9.8%31%
SNOWSnowflake Inc.$4.7B64%-49.7%-20%16%
TRUTransUnion$4.6B66%19.3%7%16%
CPAYCorpay Inc.$4.5B98%43.9%11%37%
PLTRPalantir Technologies Inc.$4.5B78%-17.6%7%16%
Group median73%4.7%7%24%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what TransUnion has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, TransUnion earns about $728M on its 15.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 14.5% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+19%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+8%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $697M on 193M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-03-31; net debt $4.9B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "TransUnion (TRU), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/TRU, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← TRTX its page in the Manual TRUP →

Industry order: ← SPGI the Financial Exchanges & Data chapter