Owner Scorecard


← All companies ← TT Manual TTC → ← TRIP Software TTD →

TTAN, ServiceTitan Inc.

Software asset-light Unprofitable

Our founders, Ara Mahdessian and Vahe Kuzoyan, are the sons of trades business owners and founded ServiceTitan to provide tradespeople, like their parents, with technology that is purpose built to help trades businesses thrive.

ServiceTitan is the operating system that powers the trades.

We are modernizing a large and technologically underserved industry—an industry commonly referred to as the "trades."

Latest annual: FY2026 10-K
TTAN · ServiceTitan Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2026
$961M
+24.5% YoY · 27% 3-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 4-yr average
Revenue $1.0B 4-yr avg $704M
Gross margin 71% 4-yr avg 63%
Operating margin −14.3% 4-yr avg −31.1%
ROIC −10% 4-yr avg −14%
Owner-earnings margin 12% 4-yr avg −8%
Free cash flow margin 12% 4-yr avg −9%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Subscription (74%), Usage (22%) and Professional Services and Other (4%).
Situation
Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run around −30% through the cycle on a 61% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. Stock-based pay runs about 17% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Subscription is 74% of revenue, with Usage the other meaningful line at 22%.

Revenue by product line, FY2026
  • Subscription74%$712M
  • Usage22%$213M
  • Professional Services and Other4%$36M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2023–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2023’232024’242025’252026’26TTMTTMApr 2026
Income statement
$468M$614M$772M$961M$1.0BRevenueRevenue
57%61%65%70%71%Gross marginGross mgn
28%22%28%26%24%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
34%33%34%31%32%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($222M)($183M)($230M)($169M)($145M)Operating incomeOp. inc.
−47.4%−29.8%−29.8%−17.6%−14.3%Operating marginOp. mgn
($270M)($195M)($239M)($160M)($136M)Net incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
($121M)($40M)$37M$110M$123MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$58M$81M$80M$83M$83MDepreciationDeprec.
$27M($28M)$32M($10M)($31M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$74M$28M$4M$5M$4MCapexCapex
15.8%4.6%0.5%0.5%0.4%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($178M)($68M)$33M$105M$119MOwner earningsOwner earn.
−38.1%−11.1%4.3%11.0%11.7%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($195M)($68M)$33M$105M$119MFree cash flowFCF
−41.6%−11.1%4.3%11.0%11.7%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$590M$1M$20M$20MAcquisitionsAcquis.
-16%-12%-10%ROICROIC
-16%-10%-9%Return on equityROE
−16%−10%−9%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$202M$147M$442M$429M$422MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$28M$44M$56M$63MReceivablesReceiv.
$6M$6M$10M$19MAccounts payablePayables
$22M$38M$46M$44MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$249M$573M$591M$601MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$125M$153M$169M$135MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.0×3.7×3.5×4.4×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$831M$831M$846M$860M$860MGoodwillGoodwill
$1.5B$1.8B$1.7B$1.7BTotal assetsAssets
$176M$105M$0$1MTotal debtDebt
$30M($337M)($429M)($420M)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-4.1×-11.1×-14.8×-23.4×-27.1×Interest coverageInt. cov.
($335M)($478M)$1.5B$1.5B$1.6BShareholders’ equityEquity
13.7%16.7%21.2%20.5%20.5%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
30.4M33.3M42.1M92.4M95.0MShares out (diluted)Shares
$15.38$18.47$18.31$10.40$10.67Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-8.86$-5.87$-5.67$-1.73$-1.43EPS (diluted)EPS
$-5.87$-2.05$0.79$1.14$1.25Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-6.40$-2.05$0.79$1.14$1.25Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$2.43$0.85$0.09$0.05$0.04Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$-11.02$-14.36$34.51$16.51$16.43Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×2.19 into 2026 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
3-yr5-yr
Revenue / share−12.2%/yr−12.2%/yr (3-yr)
Capital spending / share−72.4%/yr−72.4%/yr (3-yr)

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Professional Services and Other+9.7%
    “Professional services and other revenue increased by $3.2 million, or 10%, for fiscal 2026, compared to fiscal 2025. This increase was primarily due to a $16.4 million increase in the costs related to the provisioning of our platform services products.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2023–2026

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
92Mpeak FY2026
Gross margin
70%low FY2023

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$105Mowner earningsvs.($160M)net incomelow FY2023

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business turned a $160M loss into $105M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2026FY2025FY2024FY2023
Reported net income($160M)($239M)($195M)($270M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$83M+$80M+$81M+$58M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$197M+$164M+$102M+$64M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$10M+$32M−$28M+$27M
Cash from operations$110M$37M($40M)($121M)
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$5M−$4M−$28M−$58M
Owner earnings$105M$33M($68M)($178M)
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$16M
Free cash flow$105M$33M($68M)($195M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue11%4%-11%-38%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $197M), owner earnings is nearer ($92M).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Material weakness in financial controls
“We have previously identified material weaknesses in our internal control over financial reporting.”

The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income ($169M) ÷ interest expense $7M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • Net cash
    Cash $429M − debt $1M
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $428M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 21 + DIO 0 − DPO 13 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

  • Below average
    NOPAT ($134M) ÷ invested capital $1.1B (debt + equity − cash)
    Industry peers: median -10%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Positive this year, negative across the cycle
    latest $105M = operating cash $110M − maintenance capex $5M (positive this year), after an earlier loss stretch (4-yr median -11%)
    Industry peers: median 11%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 11% of revenue this year, a -11% median across 4 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $197M of SBC) leaves ($92M).

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($160M) · cash from operations $110M

    In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.

    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.06×
    Harvesting
    Capex $5M ÷ depreciation $83M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 3 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $961M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 3.49×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $1M vs $421M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-2.08/share (latest year $-1.68), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $16.05/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2023–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 0 of 4
    What this means

    Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Operating margin −39% → −24% (2-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −39% early to −24% lately, median −30% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Worst year 2023 · −47.4% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2023, understand why before trusting the good years.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2026 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“Moreover, certain trade verticals we explore may already be served by well-established companies, presenting a potential challenge in establishing a foothold within those markets. 26 Additionally, our competitors may make substantial investments in AI, machine learning and GenAI capabilities that may allow them to repl…”

AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Apr 30, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$601M
  • Cash & short-term investments$422M
  • Receivables$63M
  • Other current assets$116M
Current liabilities$135M
  • Debt due within a year$1M
  • Accounts payable$19M
  • Other current liabilities$115M
Current ratio4.44×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio4.44×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio3.11×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$465Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$1M due · $422M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Apr 30, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+24.6%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.8× → 4.4×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$533Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$414MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$52M$51M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$19Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 4-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$1.0B59% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity56%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$611Mover 4 years buying other businesses, against $111M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 4-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

  • Insider ownership28%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$197M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 21% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Peers, Software

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
ALRMAlarm.com$1.0B63%8.7%16%13%
SSentinelOne$1.0B66%-95.4%-20%-47%
TENBTenable$999M81%-9.1%-10%15%
PRGSProgress Software$978M83%16.2%9%29%
TTANServiceTitan Inc.$961M63%-29.8%-12%-3%
GTLBGitLab Inc.$955M88%-49.8%-28%-19%
APPFAppFolio$951M61%2.8%5%11%
WKWorkiva$885M75%-15.1%-18%9%
Group median70%-12.1%-11%10%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what ServiceTitan Inc. has delivered.

$
Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2025+217%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $119M on 95M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net cash $420M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "ServiceTitan Inc. (TTAN), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/TTAN, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← TT its page in the Manual TTC →

Industry order: ← TRIP the Software chapter TTD →