Owner Scorecard


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APPF, AppFolio

Software asset-light Cyclical

AppFolio is a technology leader powering the future of real estate.

We provide a cloud-based platform, the AppFolio Platform, on which our customers operate their businesses.

Our primary customers are property management companies who manage a variety of property types, including single family, multifamily, affordable, commercial, student, and community associations.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
APPF · AppFolio
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$951M
+19.7% YoY · 25% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $995M 5-yr avg $639M
Operating margin 17.1% 5-yr avg 2.9%
ROIC 39% 5-yr avg 5%
Owner-earnings margin 24% 5-yr avg 14%
Free cash flow margin 24% 5-yr avg 14%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Value Added Services (76%), Subscription Services (22%) and Other (2%).
Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 60% and operating margin about 2.5% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The operating margin has swung widely — from −15% to 17% — on a steadier 60% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 5%, above 15% in 3 of 10 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 11% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Value Added Services is 76% of revenue, with Subscription Services the other meaningful line at 22%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025
  • Value Added Services76%$722M
  • Subscription Services22%$211M
  • Other2%$18M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$106M$144M$190M$256M$310M$359M$472M$620M$794M$951M$995MRevenueRevenue
58%62%61%60%62%60%86%Gross marginGross mgn
17%15%13%13%15%16%21%15%11%10%10%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
12%12%13%15%16%18%24%24%20%20%20%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($8M)$9M$20M$6M$10M($12M)($72M)$963K$136M$153M$170MOperating incomeOp. inc.
−8.0%6.5%10.3%2.5%3.2%−3.3%−15.3%0.2%17.1%16.1%17.1%Operating marginOp. mgn
($8M)$10M$20M$36M$158M$1M($68M)$3M$204M$141M$152MNet incomeNet inc.
1%2%20%41%13%14%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$12M$29M$36M$39M$48M$35M$25M$60M$188M$242M$238MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$10M$13M$15M$22M$27M$29M$31M$29M$20M$23M$21MDepreciationDeprec.
$6M$860K($5M)($28M)($147M)($12M)$19M($24M)($96M)$8M($8M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$4M$2M$2M$8M$19M$8M$7M$9M$2M$3M$3MCapexCapex
4.0%1.5%1.1%3.2%6.1%2.3%1.4%1.5%0.3%0.3%0.3%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$7M$27M$34M$31M$29M$27M$19M$51M$186M$239M$235MOwner earningsOwner earn.
6.9%18.9%18.0%12.0%9.4%7.6%4.0%8.3%23.4%25.1%23.6%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$7M$27M$34M$31M$29M$27M$19M$51M$186M$239M$235MFree cash flowFCF
6.9%18.9%18.0%12.0%9.4%7.6%4.0%8.3%23.4%25.1%23.6%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$0$14M$54M$0$0$0$0$77M$906K$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$0$0$22M$0$4M$0$0$0$0$146MBuybacksBuybacks
-11%13%28%4%5%-3%-29%0%28%31%39%ROICROIC
-12%11%22%27%55%0%-26%1%39%26%32%Return on equityROE
−12%11%22%27%55%0%−26%1%39%26%32%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$53M$68M$74M$16M$140M$58M$71M$50M$43M$107M$207MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$3M$3M$6M$8M$10M$13M$17M$21M$24M$37M$44MReceivablesReceiv.
$937K$610K$1M$2M$1M$2M$2M$1M$2M$4M$4MAccounts payablePayables
$2M$3M$4M$6M$9M$11M$14M$20M$22M$33M$40MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$32M$54M$108M$62M$199M$159M$201M$272M$335M$353M$255MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$21M$24M$28M$47M$50M$53M$61M$70M$63M$107M$72MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.5×2.3×3.8×1.3×4.0×3.0×3.3×3.9×5.3×3.3×3.5×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$7M$7M$16M$58M$56M$56M$56M$56M$96M$96M$96MGoodwillGoodwill
$93M$110M$176M$260M$389M$408M$381M$409M$627M$689M$581MTotal assetsAssets
$0$50M$49M$0$49MTotal debtDebt
($68M)($24M)$33M($140M)($158M)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
$70M$85M$92M$132M$286M$297M$266M$297M$519M$543M$470MShareholders’ equityEquity
4.1%4.2%3.3%3.2%3.3%4.8%9.2%8.4%7.6%7.4%7.3%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
33.6M35.2M35.6M35.6M35.7M35.7M35.0M36.4M36.8M36.3M35.8MShares out (diluted)Shares
$3.15$4.09$5.34$7.20$8.68$10.07$13.48$17.04$21.59$26.17$27.79Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.25$0.28$0.56$1.02$4.44$0.03$-1.95$0.07$5.55$3.88$4.24EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.22$0.77$0.96$0.87$0.82$0.76$0.54$1.41$5.06$6.58$6.56Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.22$0.77$0.96$0.87$0.82$0.76$0.54$1.41$5.06$6.58$6.56Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.13$0.06$0.06$0.23$0.53$0.23$0.19$0.25$0.05$0.09$0.09Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$2.08$2.42$2.58$3.71$8.01$8.33$7.58$8.16$14.12$14.94$13.13Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+26.5%/yr+24.7%/yr
Owner earnings / share+46.1%/yr+51.7%/yr
EPS−2.6%/yr
Capital spending / share−4.1%/yr−30.4%/yr
Book value / share+24.5%/yr+13.3%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
36Mpeak FY2024
ROIC
31%low FY2022
Gross margin
60%low FY2016

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$239Mowner earningsvs.$141Mnet incomelow FY2016

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $141M of profit into $239M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$141M
Owner earnings$239M · 25% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$141M$204M$3M($68M)$1M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$23M+$20M+$29M+$31M+$29M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$71M+$60M+$52M+$43M+$17M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$8M−$96M−$24M+$19M−$12M
Cash from operations$242M$188M$60M$25M$35M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$3M−$2M−$9M−$7M−$8M
Owner earnings$239M$186M$51M$19M$27M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue25%23%8%4%8%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $71M), owner earnings is nearer $168M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $153M ÷ interest expense $800K
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • Net cash
    Cash $107M + ST investments $30M − debt $47M
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $89M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. It also holds $22M in longer-dated marketable securities; counting those, it sits at net cash of $112M. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 14 + DIO 0 − DPO 10 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -29%–31%; 28% latest = NOPAT $134M ÷ invested capital $483M
    Industry peers: median -12%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 28% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 4%–25%; latest $239M = operating cash $242M − maintenance capex $3M
    Industry peers: median 9%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 25% of revenue this year, a 9% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $71M of SBC) leaves $168M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $242M ÷ net income $141M

    In the filing’s words The filing leans on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings, but the GAAP profit is itself cash-backed — the adjustments are not papering over a cash shortfall here.

    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $146M ÷ Owner Earnings $239M
    What this means

    Of $239M Owner Earnings, $146M (61%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $146M buybacks. Net of $71M stock comp, the real buyback was about $75M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.14×
    Harvesting
    Capex $3M ÷ depreciation $23M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $951M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 3.31×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $47M vs $246M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 2 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +1525%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $3.25/share (latest year $3.95), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $15.20/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 8 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 4 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 3% → 11% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 3% early to 11% lately, median 3% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth +32%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 32% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2022 · −15.3% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2022, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count +0.9%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“Further, we expect to face more competition as AI continues to advance and be integrated into the markets in which we compete.”

AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$255M
  • Cash & short-term investments$185M
  • Receivables$44M
  • Other current assets$26M
Current liabilities$72M
  • Accounts payable$4M
  • Other current liabilities$69M
Current ratio3.52×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio3.52×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio2.55×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$183Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+20.4%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters5.5× → 3.5×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$338Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$145MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$84M$37M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$1Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $716M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$65M · 9%
  • Buybacks$171M · 24%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$480M · 67%
  • Returned to owners$171M

    26% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $171M as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span cash and short-term investments rose $159M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$87.37

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 0M shares were bought for $4M, about $87.37 each.

  • Net change in share count6.7%

    The diluted count rose from 34M to 36M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

  • Return on what it retained42%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($325M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $136M, so each retained $1 added about 0.42 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$135M20% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity18%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$147Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $65M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Mr. Jason Randall$1.5M$1.5M$27M
2022Mr. Jason Randall$1.0M$1.0M$19M
2023Mr. Jason Randall$15.1M$15.1M$51M
2023Mr. Trigg$17.7M$30.1M$51M
2024Mr. Trigg$5.0M$20.2M$186M
2025Mr. Trigg$5.4M$2.7M$239M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership0.4%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$71M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 7% of revenue, equal to 46% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why AppFolio is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?6.7%

    Diluted shares grew 6.7% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $171M on buybacks. The repurchases were a treadmill: stock issued to staff outran them, so owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

  • Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?2% → 4% of sales

    Receivables and inventory grew from $3M to $44M while revenue grew 843%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (2% of revenue then, 4% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Acquisitions, Contingencies as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Software

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
ALRMAlarm.com$1.0B63%8.7%16%13%
SSentinelOne$1.0B66%-95.4%-20%-47%
TENBTenable$999M81%-9.1%-10%15%
PRGSProgress Software$978M83%16.2%9%29%
TTANServiceTitan Inc.$961M63%-29.8%-12%-3%
GTLBGitLab Inc.$955M88%-49.8%-28%-19%
APPFAppFolio$951M61%2.8%5%11%
WKWorkiva$885M75%-15.1%-18%9%
Group median70%-12.1%-11%10%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what AppFolio has delivered.

AppFolio’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, AppFolio earns about $102M on its 10.7% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 25.1% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+74%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+32%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $235M on 36M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net cash $158M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "AppFolio (APPF), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/APPF, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← APP its page in the Manual APPN →

Industry order: ← APP the Software chapter APPN →