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TKR, Timken

Industrial Machinery capital-intensive Serial acquirer

Timken designs and manages a portfolio of engineered bearings and industrial motion products, and provides related services.

The Company's growing portfolio features many strong brands, including Timken , GGB , Philadelphia Gear , Cone Drive , CGI , Rollon , Nadella , Rosa Sistemi , Diamond , Drives , Groeneveld , BEKA , Des-Case , Lovejoy , PT Tech , Torsion Control Products and Lagersmit .

Timken remains the world's leading authority on tapered roller bearings and has leveraged that expertise to develop a full portfolio of industry-leading engineered bearings and industrial motion products.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
TKR · Timken
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$4.6B
+0.2% YoY · 5% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $4.7B 5-yr avg $4.5B
Gross margin 31% 5-yr avg 30%
Operating margin 12.1% 5-yr avg 13.0%
ROIC 9% 5-yr avg 11%
Owner-earnings margin 8% 5-yr avg 7%
Free cash flow margin 8% 5-yr avg 7%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Engineered Bearings (66%) and Industrial Motion (34%).
Situation
Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 37% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 7 of the record's 10 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 29% and operating margin about 13% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. That margin has stayed fairly steady relative to where it runs (9.2%–14% over the years), so unit growth and cost discipline, not a moving line, are the lever. Inventory runs near 25% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on the capital-goods cycle and the aftermarket. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 11%). By owner earnings: roughly 7% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Engineered Bearings is 66% of revenue, with Industrial Motion the other meaningful segment at 34%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • Engineered Bearings66%$3.0B
  • Industrial Motion34%$1.6B
By geographyUnited States45%EMEA25%Asia Pacific20%Canada Mexico and South America10%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$2.7B$3.0B$3.6B$3.8B$3.5B$4.1B$4.5B$4.8B$4.6B$4.6B$4.7BRevenueRevenue
26%27%29%30%29%28%30%32%32%30%31%Gross marginGross mgn
16%17%16%16%15%14%14%16%16%16%16%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
1%1%1%1%1%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$244M$300M$455M$516M$455M$513M$607M$657M$611M$541M$565MOperating incomeOp. inc.
9.2%10.0%12.7%13.6%12.9%12.4%13.5%13.8%13.4%11.8%12.1%Operating marginOp. mgn
$141M$203M$303M$362M$285M$369M$407M$394M$353M$288M$308MNet incomeNet inc.
30%22%25%21%27%20%25%24%25%25%26%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$404M$237M$333M$550M$578M$387M$464M$545M$476M$554M$535MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$132M$138M$146M$161M$167M$168M$164M$201M$222M$230M$234MDepreciationDeprec.
$117M($129M)($149M)$300K$103M($170M)($138M)($81M)($125M)$8M($36M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$138M$105M$113M$141M$122M$148M$178M$188M$170M$148M$152MCapexCapex
5.2%3.5%3.1%3.7%3.5%3.6%4.0%3.9%3.7%3.2%3.2%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$266M$132M$220M$410M$456M$239M$285M$357M$306M$406M$383MOwner earningsOwner earn.
10.0%4.4%6.1%10.8%13.0%5.8%6.3%7.5%6.7%8.9%8.2%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$266M$132M$220M$410M$456M$239M$285M$357M$306M$406M$383MFree cash flowFCF
10.0%4.4%6.1%10.8%13.0%5.8%6.3%7.5%6.7%8.9%8.2%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$73M$347M$765M$227M$24M$8M$454M$639M$167M$0$124MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$82M$83M$86M$85M$87M$92M$92M$94M$96M$98M$99MDividends paidDiv. paid
$101M$43M$99M$63M$49M$93M$212M$251M$41M$57MBuybacksBuybacks
10%11%11%12%10%12%12%12%10%9%9%ROICROIC
11%14%19%19%13%16%18%15%12%9%10%Return on equityROE
5%8%14%15%9%12%14%12%9%6%7%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$161M$138M$154M$235M$320M$257M$332M$419M$373M$364M$371MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$438M$525M$547M$545M$581M$626M$700M$672M$665M$689M$809MReceivablesReceiv.
$554M$739M$836M$842M$841M$1.0B$1.2B$1.2B$1.2B$1.2B$1.3BInventoryInvent.
$176M$265M$273M$302M$351M$430M$404M$367M$322M$353M$380MAccounts payablePayables
$816M$999M$1.1B$1.1B$1.1B$1.2B$1.5B$1.5B$1.5B$1.6B$1.7BOperating working capitalOper. WC
$1.2B$1.5B$1.7B$1.9B$2.0B$2.2B$2.5B$2.6B$2.5B$2.6B$2.8BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$453M$672M$686M$737M$848M$897M$1.0B$1.5B$821M$922M$957MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.7×2.2×2.5×2.5×2.4×2.5×2.5×1.8×3.1×2.8×2.9×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$358M$512M$961M$994M$1.0B$1.0B$1.1B$1.4B$1.4B$1.5B$1.5BGoodwillGoodwill
$2.8B$3.4B$4.4B$4.9B$5.0B$5.2B$5.8B$6.5B$6.4B$6.7B$6.9BTotal assetsAssets
$640M$857M$1.6B$1.7B$1.4B$1.4B$1.9B$2.1B$2.1B$1.9B$2.0BTotal debtDebt
$480M$719M$1.5B$1.5B$1.1B$1.2B$1.6B$1.7B$1.7B$1.5B$1.7BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
7.3×8.1×8.8×7.2×6.7×8.7×8.1×5.9×4.9×4.9×5.2×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$1.3B$1.4B$1.6B$1.9B$2.2B$2.3B$2.3B$2.6B$2.8B$3.2B$3.2BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.5%0.8%0.9%0.7%0.7%0.5%0.7%0.6%0.6%0.6%0.6%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
$28M$2M$2MGoodwill written downGW imp.
Per share
79.2M78.9M78.3M76.9M76.4M77.0M74.3M72.1M70.8M70.2M70.2MShares out (diluted)Shares
$33.69$38.07$45.71$49.29$46.00$53.67$60.50$66.16$64.64$65.24$66.56Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.78$2.58$3.87$4.71$3.73$4.79$5.48$5.47$4.99$4.11$4.39EPS (diluted)EPS
$3.36$1.67$2.81$5.33$5.97$3.10$3.84$4.96$4.32$5.78$5.46Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$3.36$1.67$2.81$5.33$5.97$3.10$3.84$4.96$4.32$5.78$5.46Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.03$1.06$1.09$1.10$1.14$1.20$1.23$1.30$1.36$1.40$1.40Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$1.74$1.33$1.44$1.83$1.59$1.93$2.40$2.61$2.40$2.11$2.16Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$16.15$18.28$20.16$24.29$28.19$29.80$30.52$35.83$39.95$45.34$45.69Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+7.6%/yr+7.2%/yr
Owner earnings / share+6.2%/yr−0.6%/yr
EPS+9.8%/yr+2.0%/yr
Dividends / share+3.5%/yr+4.2%/yr
Capital spending / share+2.2%/yr+5.8%/yr
Book value / share+12.2%/yr+10.0%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
70Mpeak FY2016
ROIC
9%low FY2025
Gross margin
30%low FY2016
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
3.8×peak FY2018

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$406Mowner earningsvs.$288Mnet incomelow FY2017

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $288M of profit into $406M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$288M
Owner earnings$406M · 9% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$288M$353M$394M$407M$369M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$230M+$222M+$201M+$164M+$168M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$28M+$26M+$31M+$30M+$20M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$8M−$125M−$81M−$138M−$170M
Cash from operations$554M$476M$545M$464M$387M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$148M−$170M−$188M−$178M−$148M
Owner earnings$406M$306M$357M$285M$239M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue9%7%7%6%6%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $28M), owner earnings is nearer $378M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Adequate
    Operating income $541M ÷ interest expense $110M
    What this means

    Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $1.5B · 2.8× operating profit
    Meaningful net debt
    Cash $364M + ST investments $26M − debt $1.9B
    What this means

    Netting $390M of cash and short-term investments against $1.9B of debt leaves $1.5B owed, about 2.8× a year's operating profit (3.5× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 55 + DIO 142 − DPO 40 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 9%–12%; 9% latest = NOPAT $403M ÷ invested capital $4.7B
    Industry peers: median 8%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 9% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 4%–13%; latest $406M = operating cash $554M − maintenance capex $148M
    Industry peers: median 10%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 9% of revenue this year, a 7% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $28M of SBC) leaves $378M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $554M ÷ net income $288M

    In the filing’s words The filing leans on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings, but the GAAP profit is itself cash-backed — the adjustments are not papering over a cash shortfall here.

    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $156M ÷ Owner Earnings $406M
    What this means

    Of $406M Owner Earnings, $156M (38%) went back to shareholders, $98M dividends, $57M buybacks. Net of $28M stock comp, the real buyback was about $29M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.64×
    Harvesting
    Capex $148M ÷ depreciation $230M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 5 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $4.6B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.82×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Near
    Debt ≤ working capital · $1.9B vs $1.7B WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +60%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $4.97/share (latest year $4.15), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $45.83/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 11% → 13% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The words confirm the number: the filing says price increases held their volume, and the margin widened with them — Buffett’s strongest mark of pricing power.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 11% early to 13% lately, median 13% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 10%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Owner earnings growth +7%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 7% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2016 · 9.2% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −1.3%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

  • How management talks about it Owner’s terms
    What this means

    The record and the register agree: capital is compounding and the filing reasons in an owner’s terms — per-share value, return on capital, the long term — not a promoter’s.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“Uncertainties with respect to the use of AI in our business may negatively impact our results from operations, reputation, and competitiveness.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$2.8B
  • Cash & short-term investments$371M
  • Receivables$809M
  • Inventory$1.3B
  • Other current assets$302M
Current liabilities$957M
  • Debt due within a year$14M
  • Accounts payable$380M
  • Other current liabilities$563M
Current ratio2.88×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.55×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.39×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$1.8Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$14M due · $371M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+8.0%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters2.9× → 2.9×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$655Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($147M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$2.2B$133M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$49Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$15M
'27$311M
'28$523M
'29$3M
'30$2M
later$1.1B

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$15Mthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$326Mthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$523Min 2028the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Total scheduled principal$1.9Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Mar 31, 2026$371M
One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$406M
Together, against $15M due next year53.2×

Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $777M against the $15M due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 53 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the balance-sheet debt.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $4.5B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$1.4B · 32%
  • Dividends$895M · 20%
  • Buybacks$1.0B · 22%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$1.2B · 26%
  • Returned to owners$1.9B

    62% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $895M as dividends and $1.0B as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $1.4B and cash and short-term investments rose $210M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $1.0B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count−11.4%

    The diluted count fell from 79M to 70M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$1.40/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 3% a year. It was never cut over the span.

  • Return on what it retained12%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($1.2B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $150M, so each retained $1 added about 0.12 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$2.5B37% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity47%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$2.7Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $1.4B of capital spent building

$30M written down across 2 years (2023, 2024): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

  • Insider ownership8.1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio243:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$28M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 5% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Timken is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$640M → $2.0B

    Debt rose from $640M to $2.0B while owner earnings went from about $206M to $356M — about 3.1 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 5.7 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

  • Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?10 of 10 years

    Management took an impairment or write-down in 10 of the last 10 years, $118M in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Pension & retirement, Income taxes, Acquisitions as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Industrial Machinery

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
RRXRegal Rexnord Corporation$5.9B27%9.9%7%9%
ZBRAZebra Technologies$5.4B47%13.7%13%15%
FLSFlowserve$4.7B30%7.7%7%6%
TKRTimken$4.6B29%12.8%11%7%
ITTITT Inc.$3.9B32%15.1%18%10%
DCIDonaldson$3.7B34%13.6%21%10%
GTESGates Industrial$3.4B39%12.9%7%9%
RBCRBC Bearings$1.9B40%19.5%8%15%
Group median33%13.2%9%10%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Timken has delivered.

Timken’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, Timken earns about $325M on its 7.1% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 8.9% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+8%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+7%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $383M on 69M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-30; net debt $1.7B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Timken (TKR), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/TKR, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← TKO its page in the Manual TLN →

Industry order: ← SYM the Industrial Machinery chapter TNC →