ROIC
19%low FY2020
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TTE, TotalEnergies SE
Oil & Gas Producers capital-intensive
Revenue is led by Refining & Chemicals (43%) and Marketing & Services (39%), with 3 more segments behind.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$201.2B
−6.2% YoY · 7% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- An oil and gas business, whose fortunes rise and fall with a price it does not set.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 35% and operating margin about 7.7% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from −4.5% to 18% — on a steadier 35% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Read this kind of business on the commodity price, and the cost to lift a barrel. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on concentrated dependence, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 7%). This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 20-F →Revenue spreads across 6 segments, the largest Refining & Chemicals at 43%.
Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
- Refining & Chemicals43%$87.2B
- Marketing & Services39%$78.7B
- Integrated Power10%$19.6B
- Integrated LNG5%$10.1B
- Exploration & Production3%$5.6B
- Corporate0%$8M
By geographyRest of Europe45%France23%Rest of the world15%Africa10%North America7%
From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMDec 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $127.9B | $149.1B | $209.4B | $200.3B | $140.7B | $205.9B | $281.0B | $237.1B | $214.6B | $201.2B | $201.2B | RevenueRevenue |
| 35% | 33% | 40% | 42% | — | — | — | — | — | — | 52% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| $5.5B | $7.8B | $16.0B | $16.3B | ($6.3B) | $24.8B | $50.6B | — | — | — | $40.2B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 4.3% | 5.2% | 7.7% | 8.1% | −4.5% | 12.1% | 18.0% | — | — | — | 20.0% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $6.2B | $8.6B | $11.4B | $11.3B | ($7.2B) | $16.0B | $20.5B | $21.4B | $15.8B | $13.1B | $13.1B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 14% | 26% | 36% | 34% | — | 37% | 52% | 38% | 41% | 41% | 41% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $16.5B | $22.3B | $24.7B | $24.7B | $14.8B | $30.4B | $47.4B | $40.7B | $30.9B | $27.3B | $27.3B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| — | $16.1B | $14.0B | $15.7B | — | — | — | — | — | — | $23.8B | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $10.3B | ($2.4B) | ($735M) | ($2.3B) | $22.0B | $14.4B | $26.8B | $19.3B | $15.1B | $14.2B | ($9.6B) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $2.7B | $2.6B | $4.9B | $6.6B | $6.7B | $8.2B | $10.0B | $7.5B | $7.7B | $8.1B | $8.1B | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| — | — | $4.3B | $2.8B | $611M | $1.8B | $7.7B | $9.2B | $8.0B | $7.7B | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 4% | 5% | 7% | 7% | -3% | 10% | 19% | — | — | — | — | ROICROIC |
| 6% | 8% | 10% | 10% | -7% | 14% | 18% | 18% | 13% | 11% | 11% | Return on equityROE |
| 4% | 5% | 6% | 4% | −13% | 7% | 9% | 12% | 7% | 4% | 4% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $29.1B | $36.6B | $31.6B | $31.3B | $35.9B | $33.7B | $41.8B | $33.8B | $32.8B | $29.5B | $29.5B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $12.2B | $14.9B | $17.3B | $18.5B | $14.1B | $22.0B | $24.4B | $23.4B | $19.3B | $18.6B | $18.6B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $15.2B | $16.5B | $14.9B | $17.1B | $14.7B | $20.0B | $22.9B | $19.3B | $18.9B | $16.7B | $16.7B | InventoryInvent. |
| $27.5B | $31.4B | $32.1B | $35.6B | $28.8B | $41.9B | $47.3B | $42.8B | $38.1B | $35.2B | $35.2B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $72.5B | $84.9B | $79.8B | $85.3B | $79.7B | $111.1B | $125.7B | $99.5B | $96.6B | $89.5B | $89.5B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $54.7B | $56.7B | $62.2B | $70.2B | $64.7B | $95.1B | $109.8B | $88.8B | $88.0B | $92.6B | $92.6B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.3× | 1.5× | 1.3× | 1.2× | 1.2× | 1.2× | 1.1× | 1.1× | 1.1× | 1.0× | 1.0× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $1.2B | $1.4B | $8.2B | $8.3B | $8.8B | $8.8B | $8.7B | $10.0B | $11.3B | $12.5B | $12.5B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $231.0B | $242.6B | $256.8B | $273.3B | $266.1B | $293.5B | $303.9B | $283.7B | $285.5B | $291.1B | $291.1B | Total assetsAssets |
| $52.5B | $47.7B | $48.4B | $56.5B | $71.5B | $58.4B | $54.3B | $42.9B | $48.0B | $56.6B | $56.6B | Total debtDebt |
| $23.4B | $11.2B | $16.9B | $25.1B | $35.6B | $24.7B | $12.5B | $9.0B | $15.2B | $27.1B | $27.1B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 4.9× | 5.6× | 8.3× | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 20.9× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $98.7B | $111.6B | $115.6B | $116.8B | $103.7B | $111.7B | $111.7B | $116.8B | $117.9B | $114.9B | $114.9B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Gross margin
42%low FY2017
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
FY2016FY2025
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? 20.9×ComfortableOperating income $40.2B ÷ interest expense $1.9B
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $27.1B · 0.7× operating profitModest net debtCash $26.2B + ST investments $3.3B − debt $56.6B
What this means
Netting $29.5B of cash and short-term investments against $56.6B of debt leaves $27.1B owed, about 0.7× a year's operating profit (1.4× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle7-yr median, range -3%–19%; the latest year is left out — large non-operating charges put its operating line well above pretax profitIndustry peers: median 7%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 7 years, so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median 20%
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $27.3B ÷ net income $13.1B
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? —Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $201.2B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 0.97×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $56.6B vs ($3.1B) WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability NearA profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +91%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $7.59/share (latest year $5.95), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $52.06/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 9 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 7 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 6% → 9% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 6% early to 9% lately, median 8% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Worst year 2020 · −4.5% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$89.5B
- Cash & short-term investments$29.5B
- Receivables$18.6B
- Inventory$16.7B
- Other current assets$24.7B
Current liabilities$92.6B
- Debt due within a year$7.6B
- Other current liabilities$84.9B
Current ratio0.97×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.79×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.32×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($3.1B)the cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$7.6B due · $29.5B cash
covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Dec 31, 2025 balance sheet
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$102.4Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Debt incl. operating leases$66.5B$9.9B of it operating leases
From the company's latest filing.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why TotalEnergies SE is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
None of the 3 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.
Each test came back clean
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Oil & Gas Producers
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| TTETotalEnergies SE | $201.2B | 37% | 7.7% | 7% | — |
| SLBSLB Limited | $35.7B | 77% | 13.1% | 13% | 12% |
| EOGEOG Resources Inc. | $22.6B | — | 27.0% | 15% | 25% |
| OXYOccidental Petroleum Corporation | $21.6B | 86% | 17.9% | 7% | 21% |
| DVNDevon Energy Corporation | $16.8B | 53% | 20.7% | 12% | 20% |
| FANGDiamondback Energy Inc. | $15.0B | — | 43.6% | 7% | 47% |
| EXEExpand Energy Corporation | $12.1B | — | -0.9% | -0% | 5% |
| SOCSable Offshore Corp. | $0 | — | — | -74% | — |
| Group median | — | 65% | 17.9% | 7% | — |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the home-market price, not the US ADR quote. TotalEnergies SE reports in USD, and every figure here (owner earnings, book value, the share count) is on that ordinary-share basis. Enter the price on the same basis: the local-exchange quote per ordinary share. A US ADR price in dollars bundles the ADR-to-ordinary ratio, so it will not reconcile with these figures and would throw the multiple off.
TotalEnergies SE is profitable, but its owner-earnings base could not be formed from this filing’s tagged data (operating cash flow or capital spending is missing), so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.
$
The assumptions
Revenue, delivered5%/yr’20→’25
Enter a price to run it.
Owner earnings it must reach—
Margin the price demands—
Owner-earnings margin today—
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "TotalEnergies SE (TTE), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/TTE, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← TTAM its page in the Manual TU →
Industry order: ← TPL the Oil & Gas Producers chapter TTI →