Owner Scorecard


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TU, Telus Corporation

Telecom Operators capital-intensive

Revenue is led by Mobile (45%) and Fixed (31%), with 2 more segments behind.

Latest annual: FY2025 40-F · figures as filed, in CAD
TU · Telus Corporation
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
C$20.5B
+0.6% YoY · 6% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue C$20.5B 5-yr avg C$19.3B
Gross margin 88% 5-yr avg 88%
Operating margin 11.5% 5-yr avg 14.2%
ROIC 4% 5-yr avg 5%
Owner-earnings margin 10% 5-yr avg 9%
Free cash flow margin 10% 5-yr avg 9%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
A telecom carrier, renting access to a network that must be constantly rebuilt.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 87% and operating margin about 16% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. Capital spending runs about 17% of sales, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on subscribers, revenue per user, and network capex. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 7%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). By owner earnings: roughly 10% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 20-F →

Revenue spreads across 4 segments, the largest Mobile at 45%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • Mobile45%C$9.1B
  • Fixed31%C$6.3B
  • TELUS Digital Experience14%C$2.9B
  • TELUS health10%C$2.0B

From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMDec 2025
Income statement
C$12.8BC$13.4BC$14.4BC$14.7BC$15.5BC$17.3BC$18.4BC$20.1BC$20.4BC$20.5BC$20.5BRevenueRevenue
86%85%85%86%87%87%88%88%88%88%88%Gross marginGross mgn
C$2.2BC$2.7BC$2.8BC$3.0BC$2.5BC$3.1BC$3.0BC$2.4BC$2.8BC$2.4BC$2.4BOperating incomeOp. inc.
17.0%20.4%19.7%20.3%16.1%17.8%16.0%11.7%13.8%11.5%11.5%Operating marginOp. mgn
C$1.2BC$1.6BC$1.6BC$1.7BC$1.2BC$1.7BC$1.6BC$841MC$993MC$1.1BC$1.1BNet incomeNet inc.
26%27%26%21%27%26%27%21%23%28%28%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
C$3.2BC$3.9BC$4.1BC$3.9BC$4.6BC$4.4BC$4.8BC$4.5BC$4.8BC$4.9BC$4.9BOperating cash flowOp. cash
C$2.0BC$2.2BC$2.3BC$2.6BC$3.0BC$3.2BC$3.5BC$4.1BC$4.0BC$4.1BC$4.1BDepreciationDeprec.
(C$51M)C$219MC$191M(C$396M)C$355M(C$483M)(C$256M)(C$411M)(C$182M)(C$306M)(C$306M)Working capital & otherWC & other
C$2.4BC$2.5BC$2.4BC$2.8BC$2.7BC$3.2BC$3.3BC$2.6BC$2.6BC$2.7BC$2.7BCapexCapex
18.4%18.5%16.6%18.9%17.3%18.5%17.9%13.0%12.9%13.3%13.3%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
C$861MC$1.5BC$1.7BC$1.2BC$1.9BC$1.2BC$1.5BC$1.9BC$2.2BC$2.1BC$2.1BOwner earningsOwner earn.
6.7%10.9%11.7%7.9%12.3%7.0%8.3%9.3%10.8%10.4%10.4%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
C$861MC$1.5BC$1.7BC$1.2BC$1.9BC$1.2BC$1.5BC$1.9BC$2.2BC$2.1BC$2.1BFree cash flowFCF
6.7%10.9%11.7%7.9%12.3%7.0%8.3%9.3%10.8%10.4%10.4%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
C$1.1BC$1.1BC$1.1BC$1.1BC$930MC$1.0BC$1.2BC$1.3BC$1.6BC$1.6BC$1.6BDividends paidDiv. paid
C$179MC$100MC$40MBuybacksBuybacks
8%10%9%9%6%7%6%5%5%4%4%ROICROIC
15%17%16%17%10%11%10%5%6%7%7%Return on equityROE
2%5%4%6%2%4%3%−3%−4%−3%−3%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
C$432MC$509MC$414MC$535MC$848MC$723MC$974MC$864MC$869MC$2.6BC$2.6BCash & investmentsCash+inv
C$1.5BC$1.5BC$1.6BC$2.0BC$2.4BC$2.7BC$3.3BC$3.6BC$3.7BC$3.8BC$3.8BReceivablesReceiv.
C$2.3BC$2.3BC$2.6BC$2.7BC$3.0BC$3.7BC$4.0BC$3.4BC$3.6BC$3.5BC$3.5BAccounts payablePayables
(C$859M)(C$868M)(C$970M)(C$787M)(C$616M)(C$1.0B)(C$636M)C$206MC$59MC$303MC$303MOperating working capitalOper. WC
C$2.5BC$3.4BC$3.8BC$4.4BC$4.7BC$5.0BC$6.1BC$6.3BC$6.6BC$8.4BC$8.4BCurrent assetsCur. assets
C$5.0BC$4.8BC$4.8BC$5.6BC$5.9BC$8.3BC$8.3BC$9.5BC$9.8BC$9.7BC$9.7BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.5×0.7×0.8×0.8×0.8×0.6×0.7×0.7×0.7×0.9×0.9×Current ratioCurr. ratio
C$3.8BC$3.8BC$4.7BC$5.3BC$7.2BC$7.3BC$9.1BC$10.1BC$10.6BC$10.5BC$10.5BGoodwillGoodwill
C$27.7BC$29.1BC$33.1BC$38.0BC$43.3BC$48.0BC$54.1BC$56.1BC$58.0BC$59.6BC$59.6BTotal assetsAssets
C$11.7BC$11.7BC$13.4BC$17.2BC$19.0BC$18.0BC$22.6BC$23.5BC$26.5BC$28.4BC$28.4BTotal debtDebt
C$11.3BC$11.2BC$13.0BC$16.7BC$18.1BC$17.3BC$21.6BC$22.6BC$25.7BC$25.7BC$25.7BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
4.2×4.8×4.3×4.1×3.2×3.9×4.7×1.9×1.8×2.0×2.0×Interest coverageInt. cov.
C$7.9BC$9.0BC$10.3BC$10.5BC$12.0BC$15.1BC$16.6BC$16.1BC$15.6BC$15.8BC$15.8BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
1.18B1.19B1.19B1.20B1.27B1.35B1.40B1.45B1.49B1.53B1.53BShares out (diluted)Shares
C$10.81C$11.31C$12.03C$12.17C$12.13C$12.82C$13.19C$13.86C$13.70C$13.39C$13.39Revenue / shareRev/sh
C$1.03C$1.31C$1.34C$1.45C$0.95C$1.23C$1.16C$0.58C$0.67C$0.73C$0.73EPS (diluted)EPS
C$0.73C$1.23C$1.40C$0.96C$1.49C$0.89C$1.09C$1.29C$1.48C$1.40C$1.40Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
C$0.73C$1.23C$1.40C$0.96C$1.49C$0.89C$1.09C$1.29C$1.48C$1.40C$1.40Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
C$0.90C$0.91C$0.96C$0.95C$0.73C$0.78C$0.85C$0.91C$1.05C$1.06C$1.03Dividends / shareDiv/sh
C$1.99C$2.10C$2.00C$2.30C$2.10C$2.37C$2.36C$1.81C$1.77C$1.78C$1.78Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
C$6.69C$7.60C$8.59C$8.76C$9.44C$11.23C$11.87C$11.10C$10.50C$10.30C$10.30Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2019 are restated ×2 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+2.4%/yr+2.0%/yr
Owner earnings / share+7.5%/yr−1.3%/yr
EPS−3.8%/yr−5.1%/yr
Dividends / share+1.8%/yr+7.8%/yr
Capital spending / share−1.2%/yr−3.2%/yr
Book value / share+4.9%/yr+1.8%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.

Share count
1.5Bpeak FY2025
ROIC
4%low FY2025
Gross margin
88%low FY2017
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
12.0×peak FY2019

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

C$2.1Bowner earningsvs.C$1.1Bnet incomelow FY2016

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned C$1.1B of profit into C$2.1B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net incomeC$1.1B
Owner earningsC$2.1B · 10% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net incomeC$1.1BC$993MC$841MC$1.6BC$1.7B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+C$4.1B+C$4.0B+C$4.1B+C$3.5B+C$3.2B
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−C$306M−C$182M−C$411M−C$256M−C$483M
Cash from operationsC$4.9BC$4.8BC$4.5BC$4.8BC$4.4B
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−C$2.7B−C$2.6B−C$2.6B−C$3.3B−C$3.2B
Owner earningsC$2.1BC$2.2BC$1.9BC$1.5BC$1.2B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue10%11%9%8%7%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 40-F · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Adequate
    Operating income C$2.4B ÷ interest expense C$1.2B
    What this means

    Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? C$25.7B · 10.9× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash C$2.6B − debt C$28.4B
    What this means

    Netting C$2.6B of cash and short-term investments against C$28.4B of debt leaves C$25.7B owed, about 10.9× a year's operating profit (12.0× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Negative, funded by others
    DSO 68 + DIO 0 − DPO 531 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 4%–10%; 4% latest = NOPAT C$1.7B ÷ invested capital C$41.5B
    Industry peers: median 5%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 4% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 7%–12%; latest C$2.1B = operating cash C$4.9B − maintenance capex C$2.7B
    Industry peers: median 10%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 10% of revenue this year, a 9% median across 10 years.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops C$4.9B ÷ net income C$1.1B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks C$1.6B ÷ Owner Earnings C$2.1B
    What this means

    Of C$2.1B Owner Earnings, C$1.6B (76%) went back to shareholders, C$1.6B dividends, C$40M buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.67×
    Harvesting
    Capex C$2.7B ÷ depreciation C$4.1B
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size
    Revenue ≥ $2B (a dollar floor) · C$20.5B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's floor is a dollar figure — about $2B of revenue as a conservative modern stand-in. This company reports in its home currency and we carry no exchange rate, so we show the figure and leave the size bar for you to apply rather than convert it with a number we don't have.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.86×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · C$28.4B vs (C$1.3B) WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −33%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are C$0.63/share (latest year C$0.72), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is C$10.19/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 19% → 12% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices but names price competition too — and the margin slipped, so the pressure is winning here.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 19% early to 12% lately, median 16% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 0%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Owner earnings growth +7%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 7% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2025 · 11.5% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Framed as a capability

The filing positions AI as something the company uses, not something it fears.

“For 2024, includes fees for Sustainability Reporting Advisory, Technology Due Diligence, Electronics Recycling Process Improvements and AI/GenAI Capabilities Assessment and Benchmarking. 16.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assetsC$8.4B
  • Cash & short-term investmentsC$2.6B
  • ReceivablesC$3.8B
  • Other current assetsC$2.0B
Current liabilitiesC$9.7B
  • Debt due within a yearC$920M
  • Accounts payableC$3.5B
  • Other current liabilitiesC$5.3B
Current ratio0.86×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.86×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.27×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital(C$1.3B)the cushion left after near-term bills

Its current ratio is below 1, which usually reads as strain; here it is likely structural strength. This business collects from customers before it pays suppliers (a negative cash-conversion cycle), so the balance sheet is funded by that float, the way Costco's and Amazon's are. The low ratio can be the edge, not the risk; the cash-conversion cycle and the debt due above say which.

Debt due this year vs. cashC$920M due · C$2.6B cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Dec 31, 2025 balance sheet
Deeper floors
Tangible book value(C$15.0B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value(C$34.7B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leasesC$31.7BC$3.3B of it operating leases
Deferred revenueC$893Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated C$43.1B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • ReinvestedC$27.1B · 63%
  • DividendsC$12.1B · 28%
  • BuybacksC$319M · 1%
  • Retained (debt / cash)C$3.6B · 8%
  • Returned to ownersC$12.4B

    78% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, C$12.1B as dividends and C$319M as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose C$16.7B and cash and short-term investments rose C$2.2B.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran C$319M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count29.3%

    The diluted count rose from 1184M to 1531M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend recordC$1.06/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 2% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

  • Return on what it retained

    Not read here: owner earnings are negative over the span, or the company returned nearly all its earnings rather than retaining them, so there is too little retained to measure a return on.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangiblesC$30.8B52% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity66%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiringC$0over 10 years buying other businesses, against C$27.1B of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Telus Corporation is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

3 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?29.3%

    Diluted shares grew 29.3% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent C$319M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?C$11.7B → C$28.4B

    Debt rose from C$11.7B to C$28.4B while owner earnings went from about C$1.3B to C$2.1B — about 8.8 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 14 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

  • Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?11% → 19% of sales

    Receivables and inventory grew from C$1.5B to C$3.8B while revenue grew 60%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (11% of revenue then, 19% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Pension & retirement, Income taxes, Credit & receivables, Inventory as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Telecom Operators

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
TMUST-Mobile US Inc.$88.3B87%12.1%8%1%
WBDWarner Bros. Discovery, Inc.$37.3B63%13.4%5%20%
PARAParamount Global$29.2B17.8%13%6%
PSKYParamount Skydance Corporation$29.2B-18.0%-19%2%
TUTelus CorporationC$20.5B87%16.5%7%10%
FOXFox Corporation$16.3B20.9%13%15%
ECHOEchoStar Corporation$15.0B99%3.0%1%13%
LUMNLumen Technologies$11.3B52%3.3%2%10%
Group median87%12.8%6%10%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Enter the home-market price, not the US ADR quote. Telus Corporation reports in CAD, and every figure here (owner earnings, book value, the share count) is on that CAD, ordinary-share basis. Enter the price on the same basis: the local-exchange quote per ordinary share in CAD. A US ADR price in dollars bundles the ADR-to-ordinary ratio and the exchange rate, so it will not reconcile with these figures and would throw the multiple off.

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Telus Corporation has delivered.

C$

Through the cycle, Telus Corporation earns about C$2.0B on its 9.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 10.4% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+12%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+7%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings C$2.1B on 1549M shares outstanding, per the 40-F cover, as of 2025-12-31; net debt C$25.7B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Telus Corporation (TU), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/TU, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← TTE its page in the Manual TUYA →

Industry order: ← TSAT the Telecom Operators chapter UCL →