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UAA, Under Armour
Our principal business activities are the design, development, marketing and global distribution of branded performance apparel, footwear and accessories for men, women and youth.
Our performance products are engineered with performance-driven materials and technologies, spanning a wide range of designs and styles for use in diverse climates.
Our products are worn by athletes at all levels, from youth to professional, across multiple sports worldwide as well as by consumers who embrace active and performance-oriented lifestyles.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by Apparel (68%) and Footwear (22%), with 2 more lines behind.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 46% and operating margin about 0.6% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from −14% to 8.6% — on a steadier 46% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Inventory runs near 18% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 4%, above 15% in 1 of 10 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Apparel is 68% of revenue, with Footwear the other meaningful line at 22%.
- Apparel68%$3.4B
- Footwear22%$1.1B
- Accessories8%$414M
- License2%$107M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2026
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | 2026’26 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $4.8B | $5.0B | $5.2B | $5.3B | $4.5B | $5.7B | $5.9B | $5.7B | $5.2B | $5.0B | $5.0B | RevenueRevenue |
| 47% | 45% | 45% | 47% | 48% | 50% | 45% | 46% | 48% | 45% | 45% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 38% | 42% | 42% | 42% | 49% | 41% | 40% | 42% | 50% | 46% | 46% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| $417M | $28M | ($25M) | $237M | ($613M) | $475M | $264M | $230M | ($185M) | ($163M) | ($163M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 8.6% | 0.6% | −0.5% | 4.5% | −13.7% | 8.4% | 4.5% | 4.0% | −3.6% | −3.3% | −3.3% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $257M | ($48M) | ($46M) | $92M | ($549M) | $351M | $374M | $232M | ($201M) | ($496M) | ($496M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 34% | — | — | 43% | — | 8% | — | 11% | — | — | — | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $367M | $237M | $628M | $509M | $213M | $661M | ($40M) | $354M | ($59M) | ($75M) | ($75M) | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $145M | $174M | $182M | $186M | $165M | $141M | $135M | $143M | $136M | $110M | $110M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($81M) | $72M | $451M | $181M | $555M | $125M | ($587M) | ($64M) | ($47M) | $265M | $265M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $316M | $281M | $170M | $146M | $92M | $66M | $158M | $150M | $169M | $87M | $87M | CapexCapex |
| 6.5% | 5.6% | 3.3% | 2.8% | 2.1% | 1.2% | 2.7% | 2.6% | 3.3% | 1.8% | 1.8% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $50M | ($44M) | $458M | $363M | $121M | $595M | ($198M) | $204M | ($228M) | ($162M) | ($162M) | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 1.0% | −0.9% | 8.8% | 6.9% | 2.7% | 10.5% | −3.4% | 3.6% | −4.4% | −3.3% | −3.3% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $50M | ($44M) | $458M | $363M | $121M | $595M | ($198M) | $204M | ($228M) | ($162M) | ($162M) | Free cash flowFCF |
| 1.0% | −0.9% | 8.8% | 6.9% | 2.7% | 10.5% | −3.4% | 3.6% | −4.4% | −3.3% | −3.3% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $40M | $0 | $0 | $0 | $8M | $500K | $500K | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $3M | $0 | $0 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | $0 | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| — | — | — | — | $0 | $0 | $125M | $75M | $90M | $25M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 11% | 1% | -1% | 7% | -42% | 41% | 14% | 10% | -7% | -6% | -6% | ROICROIC |
| 13% | -2% | -2% | 4% | -33% | 17% | 19% | 11% | -11% | -35% | -35% | Return on equityROE |
| 13% | −2% | −2% | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | −35% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $250M | $312M | $557M | $788M | $1.5B | $1.7B | $711M | $859M | $501M | $309M | $309M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $623M | $610M | $653M | $709M | $527M | $569M | $759M | $757M | $676M | $682M | $682M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $917M | $1.2B | $1.0B | $892M | $896M | $811M | $1.2B | $958M | $946M | $915M | $915M | InventoryInvent. |
| $410M | $561M | $561M | $618M | $576M | $613M | $648M | $484M | $430M | $420M | $420M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.1B | $983M | $847M | $767M | $1.3B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.2B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $2.0B | $2.3B | $2.6B | $2.7B | $3.2B | $3.3B | $2.9B | $2.9B | $2.3B | $2.7B | $2.7B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $686M | $1.1B | $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.4B | $1.5B | $1.4B | $1.2B | $1.1B | $1.7B | $1.7B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 2.9× | 2.2× | 2.0× | 1.9× | 2.3× | 2.3× | 2.2× | 2.5× | 2.1× | 1.6× | 1.6× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $564M | $556M | $546M | $550M | $502M | $495M | $482M | $478M | $488M | $493M | $493M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $3.6B | $4.0B | $4.2B | $4.8B | $5.0B | $5.0B | $4.8B | $4.8B | $4.3B | $4.4B | $4.4B | Total assetsAssets |
| $817M | $792M | $729M | $593M | $1.0B | $663M | $674M | $676M | $595M | $1.2B | $1.2B | Total debtDebt |
| $567M | $480M | $171M | ($195M) | ($514M) | ($1.0B) | ($36M) | ($183M) | $94M | $881M | $881M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| $2.0B | $2.0B | $2.0B | $2.2B | $1.7B | $2.1B | $2.0B | $2.2B | $1.9B | $1.4B | $1.4B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 1.0% | 0.8% | 0.8% | 0.9% | 0.9% | 0.8% | 0.6% | 0.8% | 1.0% | 0.9% | 0.9% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| — | 441M | 446M | 454M | 454M | 469M | 462M | 451M | 432M | 427M | 427M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| — | $11.32 | $11.65 | $11.59 | $9.85 | $12.13 | $12.79 | $12.64 | $11.95 | $11.64 | $11.64 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| — | $-0.11 | $-0.10 | $0.20 | $-1.21 | $0.75 | $0.81 | $0.51 | $-0.47 | $-1.16 | $-1.16 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| — | $-0.10 | $1.03 | $0.80 | $0.27 | $1.27 | $-0.43 | $0.45 | $-0.53 | $-0.38 | $-0.38 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| — | $-0.10 | $1.03 | $0.80 | $0.27 | $1.27 | $-0.43 | $0.45 | $-0.53 | $-0.38 | $-0.38 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| — | $0.00 | $0.00 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | $0.00 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| — | $0.64 | $0.38 | $0.32 | $0.20 | $0.14 | $0.34 | $0.33 | $0.39 | $0.20 | $0.20 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| — | $4.58 | $4.52 | $4.73 | $3.67 | $4.42 | $4.26 | $4.77 | $4.37 | $3.32 | $3.32 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 10-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +0.3%/yr (9-yr) | −0.8%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | −11.9%/yr (9-yr) | +7.7%/yr |
| Book value / share | −3.5%/yr (9-yr) | −5.6%/yr |
The year, in the company's words
the filing →Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.
- Footwear-10.8%
“Footwear decreased primarily due to lower unit sales and lower average selling prices, partially offset by favorable channel mix and the impacts of foreign exchange rates.”
✓ direction matches the filed record - Accessories+0.9%
“Accessories increased primarily due to higher unit sales, the impact of foreign exchange rates and higher average selling prices, partially offset by unfavorable channel mix.”
✓ direction matches the filed record
The record, charted
FY2016–2026Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2026 the business turned a $496M loss into ($162M) of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2026 | FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($496M) | ($201M) | $232M | $374M | $351M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$110M | +$136M | +$143M | +$135M | +$141M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$46M | +$53M | +$43M | +$37M | +$44M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$265M | −$47M | −$64M | −$587M | +$125M |
| Cash from operations | ($75M) | ($59M) | $354M | ($40M) | $661M |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$87M | −$169M | −$150M | −$158M | −$66M |
| Owner earnings | ($162M) | ($228M) | $204M | ($198M) | $595M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | -3% | -4% | 4% | -3% | 10% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $46M), owner earnings is nearer ($208M).
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
“As previously disclosed, we identified material weaknesses in our internal control over financial reporting as of March 31, 2024 and March 31, 2025 and as a result, we also determined that our disclosure controls and procedures were ineffective as of March…”
The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →
Will it survive?
- Interest expense not tagged in the data
What this means
No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.
- Net debt against an operating lossCash $309M − debt $1.2B
What this means
Netting $309M of cash and short-term investments against $1.2B of debt leaves $881M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 50 + DIO 123 − DPO 57 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle10-yr median, range -42%–41%; -6% latest = NOPAT ($129M) ÷ invested capital $2.3BIndustry peers: median 18%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -6% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Thin through the cycle10-yr median margin, range -4%–10%; latest ($162M) = operating cash ($75M) − maintenance capex $87MIndustry peers: median 9%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -3% of revenue this year, a 1% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $46M of SBC) leaves ($208M).
- Are earnings backed by cash? ($75M)Loss, and burning cashNet income ($496M) · cash from operations ($75M)
In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.
How is the cash used?
- No surplus to allocate
What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.79×HarvestingCapex $87M ÷ depreciation $110M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $5.0B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity NearCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.62×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt NearDebt ≤ working capital · $1.2B vs $1.0B WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 5 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 1 of 10 yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −386%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.36/share (latest year $-1.16), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $3.32/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2026
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 5 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 5 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 3% → −1% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The filing claims pricing power in its strongest form — price raised, volume held — yet the margin here has not widened to match. The claim leads the record; weigh them together.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 3% early to −1% lately, median 1% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Worst year 2020 · −13.7% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count −0.3%/yr
What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.
- Dividend record paid
What this means
Paid a dividend in 1 of the years on record.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$309M
- Receivables$682M
- Inventory$915M
- Other current assets$813M
- Debt due within a year$600M
- Accounts payable$420M
- Other current liabilities$657M
From the company's latest filing.
Lease obligations
the lease note, SEC EDGAR →Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.
Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.
True leverage: debt plus leases
Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $1.9B, of which the leases are 39%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.
Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Mar 31, 2026 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.
How the cash was used, 2016–2026
Over the record, the business generated $2.8B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested$1.6B · 59%
- Dividends$3M · 0%
- Buybacks$315M · 11%
- Retained (debt / cash)$840M · 30%
- Returned to owners$318M
27% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $3M as dividends and $315M as buybacks.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $315M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count−3.2%
The diluted count fell from 441M to 427M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record$0.00/sh
Paid in 1 of the years on record. It was never cut over the span.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
$80M written down across 2 years (2017, 2020): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.
- Insider ownership15.6%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$46M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Under Armour is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2026.
3 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?−1.4% vs 3.0%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 3.0% early in the record and −1.4% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
- Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$817M → $1.2B
Debt rose from $817M to $1.2B while owner earnings went from about $155M to ($62M): the borrowing grew and the earnings that would carry it are not there now. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
- Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?9 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 9 of the last 10 years, $865M in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Textiles & Apparel
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| LULUlululemon athletica inc. | $11.1B | 56% | 20.6% | 58% | 14% |
| LEVILevi Strauss & Co | $6.3B | 58% | 9.8% | 23% | 5% |
| UAAUnder Armour | $5.0B | 46% | 2.3% | 4% | 2% |
| COLMColumbia Sportswear | $3.4B | 50% | 10.7% | 18% | 10% |
| KTBKontoor Brands Inc. Common Stock | $3.2B | 42% | 12.1% | 16% | 12% |
| GESGuess | $3.0B | 38% | 5.4% | 14% | 4% |
| GIIIG-III Apparel | $3.0B | 36% | 6.3% | 9% | 4% |
| CRICarter's | $2.9B | 43% | 11.0% | 24% | 9% |
| Group median | — | 45% | 10.3% | 17% | 7% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Under Armour has delivered.
Under Armour’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, a cyclical trough. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, Under Armour earns about $93M on its 1.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s −3.3% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
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9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings ($162M) on 427M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net debt $881M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits off the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← UA its page in the Manual UAL →
Industry order: ← UA the Textiles & Apparel chapter VFC →