Owner Scorecard


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UAA, Under Armour

Textiles & Apparel consumer brand UnprofitableCyclical

Our principal business activities are the design, development, marketing and global distribution of branded performance apparel, footwear and accessories for men, women and youth.

Our performance products are engineered with performance-driven materials and technologies, spanning a wide range of designs and styles for use in diverse climates.

Our products are worn by athletes at all levels, from youth to professional, across multiple sports worldwide as well as by consumers who embrace active and performance-oriented lifestyles.

Latest annual: FY2026 10-K
UAA · Under Armour
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2026
$5.0B
−3.8% YoY · 2% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $5.0B 5-yr avg $5.5B
Gross margin 45% 5-yr avg 47%
Operating margin −3.3% 5-yr avg 2.0%
ROIC −6% 5-yr avg 10%
Owner-earnings margin −3% 5-yr avg 1%
Free cash flow margin −3% 5-yr avg 1%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is led by Apparel (68%) and Footwear (22%), with 2 more lines behind.
Situation
Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 46% and operating margin about 0.6% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from −14% to 8.6% — on a steadier 46% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Inventory runs near 18% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 4%, above 15% in 1 of 10 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Apparel is 68% of revenue, with Footwear the other meaningful line at 22%.

Revenue by product line, FY2026
  • Apparel68%$3.4B
  • Footwear22%$1.1B
  • Accessories8%$414M
  • License2%$107M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212023’232024’242025’252026’26TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$4.8B$5.0B$5.2B$5.3B$4.5B$5.7B$5.9B$5.7B$5.2B$5.0B$5.0BRevenueRevenue
47%45%45%47%48%50%45%46%48%45%45%Gross marginGross mgn
38%42%42%42%49%41%40%42%50%46%46%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$417M$28M($25M)$237M($613M)$475M$264M$230M($185M)($163M)($163M)Operating incomeOp. inc.
8.6%0.6%−0.5%4.5%−13.7%8.4%4.5%4.0%−3.6%−3.3%−3.3%Operating marginOp. mgn
$257M($48M)($46M)$92M($549M)$351M$374M$232M($201M)($496M)($496M)Net incomeNet inc.
34%43%8%11%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$367M$237M$628M$509M$213M$661M($40M)$354M($59M)($75M)($75M)Operating cash flowOp. cash
$145M$174M$182M$186M$165M$141M$135M$143M$136M$110M$110MDepreciationDeprec.
($81M)$72M$451M$181M$555M$125M($587M)($64M)($47M)$265M$265MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$316M$281M$170M$146M$92M$66M$158M$150M$169M$87M$87MCapexCapex
6.5%5.6%3.3%2.8%2.1%1.2%2.7%2.6%3.3%1.8%1.8%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$50M($44M)$458M$363M$121M$595M($198M)$204M($228M)($162M)($162M)Owner earningsOwner earn.
1.0%−0.9%8.8%6.9%2.7%10.5%−3.4%3.6%−4.4%−3.3%−3.3%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$50M($44M)$458M$363M$121M$595M($198M)$204M($228M)($162M)($162M)Free cash flowFCF
1.0%−0.9%8.8%6.9%2.7%10.5%−3.4%3.6%−4.4%−3.3%−3.3%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$0$0$0$40M$0$0$0$8M$500K$500KAcquisitionsAcquis.
$3M$0$0$0Dividends paidDiv. paid
$0$0$125M$75M$90M$25MBuybacksBuybacks
11%1%-1%7%-42%41%14%10%-7%-6%-6%ROICROIC
13%-2%-2%4%-33%17%19%11%-11%-35%-35%Return on equityROE
13%−2%−2%−35%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$250M$312M$557M$788M$1.5B$1.7B$711M$859M$501M$309M$309MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$623M$610M$653M$709M$527M$569M$759M$757M$676M$682M$682MReceivablesReceiv.
$917M$1.2B$1.0B$892M$896M$811M$1.2B$958M$946M$915M$915MInventoryInvent.
$410M$561M$561M$618M$576M$613M$648M$484M$430M$420M$420MAccounts payablePayables
$1.1B$1.2B$1.1B$983M$847M$767M$1.3B$1.2B$1.2B$1.2B$1.2BOperating working capitalOper. WC
$2.0B$2.3B$2.6B$2.7B$3.2B$3.3B$2.9B$2.9B$2.3B$2.7B$2.7BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$686M$1.1B$1.3B$1.4B$1.4B$1.5B$1.4B$1.2B$1.1B$1.7B$1.7BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.9×2.2×2.0×1.9×2.3×2.3×2.2×2.5×2.1×1.6×1.6×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$564M$556M$546M$550M$502M$495M$482M$478M$488M$493M$493MGoodwillGoodwill
$3.6B$4.0B$4.2B$4.8B$5.0B$5.0B$4.8B$4.8B$4.3B$4.4B$4.4BTotal assetsAssets
$817M$792M$729M$593M$1.0B$663M$674M$676M$595M$1.2B$1.2BTotal debtDebt
$567M$480M$171M($195M)($514M)($1.0B)($36M)($183M)$94M$881M$881MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
$2.0B$2.0B$2.0B$2.2B$1.7B$2.1B$2.0B$2.2B$1.9B$1.4B$1.4BShareholders’ equityEquity
1.0%0.8%0.8%0.9%0.9%0.8%0.6%0.8%1.0%0.9%0.9%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
441M446M454M454M469M462M451M432M427M427MShares out (diluted)Shares
$11.32$11.65$11.59$9.85$12.13$12.79$12.64$11.95$11.64$11.64Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.11$-0.10$0.20$-1.21$0.75$0.81$0.51$-0.47$-1.16$-1.16EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.10$1.03$0.80$0.27$1.27$-0.43$0.45$-0.53$-0.38$-0.38Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.10$1.03$0.80$0.27$1.27$-0.43$0.45$-0.53$-0.38$-0.38Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.00$0.00$0.00Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.64$0.38$0.32$0.20$0.14$0.34$0.33$0.39$0.20$0.20Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$4.58$4.52$4.73$3.67$4.42$4.26$4.77$4.37$3.32$3.32Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
10-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+0.3%/yr (9-yr)−0.8%/yr
Capital spending / share−11.9%/yr (9-yr)+7.7%/yr
Book value / share−3.5%/yr (9-yr)−5.6%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Footwear-10.8%
    “Footwear decreased primarily due to lower unit sales and lower average selling prices, partially offset by favorable channel mix and the impacts of foreign exchange rates.”
    ✓ direction matches the filed record
  • Accessories+0.9%
    “Accessories increased primarily due to higher unit sales, the impact of foreign exchange rates and higher average selling prices, partially offset by unfavorable channel mix.”
    ✓ direction matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2026

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
427Mpeak FY2021
ROIC
−6%low FY2020
Gross margin
45%low FY2023
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
-0.9×peak FY2016

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

($162M)owner earningsvs.($496M)net incomelow FY2025

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2024

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business turned a $496M loss into ($162M) of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2026FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2021
Reported net income($496M)($201M)$232M$374M$351M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$110M+$136M+$143M+$135M+$141M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$46M+$53M+$43M+$37M+$44M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$265M−$47M−$64M−$587M+$125M
Cash from operations($75M)($59M)$354M($40M)$661M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$87M−$169M−$150M−$158M−$66M
Owner earnings($162M)($228M)$204M($198M)$595M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue-3%-4%4%-3%10%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $46M), owner earnings is nearer ($208M).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Material weakness in financial controls
“As previously disclosed, we identified material weaknesses in our internal control over financial reporting as of March 31, 2024 and March 31, 2025 and as a result, we also determined that our disclosure controls and procedures were ineffective as of March…”

The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →

Will it survive?

  • Interest expense not tagged in the data
    What this means

    No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.

  • Net debt against an operating loss
    Cash $309M − debt $1.2B
    What this means

    Netting $309M of cash and short-term investments against $1.2B of debt leaves $881M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 50 + DIO 123 − DPO 57 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -42%–41%; -6% latest = NOPAT ($129M) ÷ invested capital $2.3B
    Industry peers: median 18%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -6% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Thin through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -4%–10%; latest ($162M) = operating cash ($75M) − maintenance capex $87M
    Industry peers: median 9%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -3% of revenue this year, a 1% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $46M of SBC) leaves ($208M).

  • Loss, and burning cash
    Net income ($496M) · cash from operations ($75M)

    In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.

    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.

How is the cash used?

  • No surplus to allocate
    What this means

    The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.79×
    Harvesting
    Capex $87M ÷ depreciation $110M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $5.0B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Near
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.62×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Near
    Debt ≤ working capital · $1.2B vs $1.0B WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 5 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 1 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −386%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.36/share (latest year $-1.16), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $3.32/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 5 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 5 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 3% → −1% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing claims pricing power in its strongest form — price raised, volume held — yet the margin here has not widened to match. The claim leads the record; weigh them together.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 3% early to −1% lately, median 1% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Worst year 2020 · −13.7% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count −0.3%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

  • Dividend record paid
    What this means

    Paid a dividend in 1 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$2.7B
  • Cash & short-term investments$309M
  • Receivables$682M
  • Inventory$915M
  • Other current assets$813M
Current liabilities$1.7B
  • Debt due within a year$600M
  • Accounts payable$420M
  • Other current liabilities$657M
Current ratio1.62×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.08×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.18×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$1.0Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$600M due · $309M cash cash alone won't cover the maturities; it leans on refinancing or operating cash · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Cash runway1.9 yrsthe business is consuming cash; this is how long the cash on hand lasts at that rate
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−5.2%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.7× → 1.6×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$917Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($283M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$1.9B$749M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $1.9B (annual-report basis)

From the company's latest filing.

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

'27$183M
'28$164M
'29$123M
'30$97M
'31$68M
later$228M

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$183Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$864Mevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$749Mthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$1.2B
Lease obligations (present value)$749M
Total fixed claims on the business$1.9B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $1.9B, of which the leases are 39%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Mar 31, 2026 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2016–2026

Over the record, the business generated $2.8B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$1.6B · 59%
  • Dividends$3M · 0%
  • Buybacks$315M · 11%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$840M · 30%
  • Returned to owners$318M

    27% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $3M as dividends and $315M as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $315M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count−3.2%

    The diluted count fell from 441M to 427M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$0.00/sh

    Paid in 1 of the years on record. It was never cut over the span.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$497M11% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity35%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$49Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $1.6B of capital spent building

$80M written down across 2 years (2017, 2020): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

  • Insider ownership15.6%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$46M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Under Armour is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2026.

3 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?−1.4% vs 3.0%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 3.0% early in the record and −1.4% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$817M → $1.2B

    Debt rose from $817M to $1.2B while owner earnings went from about $155M to ($62M): the borrowing grew and the earnings that would carry it are not there now. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

  • Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?9 of 10 years

    Management took an impairment or write-down in 9 of the last 10 years, $865M in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Textiles & Apparel

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
LULUlululemon athletica inc.$11.1B56%20.6%58%14%
LEVILevi Strauss & Co$6.3B58%9.8%23%5%
UAAUnder Armour$5.0B46%2.3%4%2%
COLMColumbia Sportswear$3.4B50%10.7%18%10%
KTBKontoor Brands Inc. Common Stock$3.2B42%12.1%16%12%
GESGuess$3.0B38%5.4%14%4%
GIIIG-III Apparel$3.0B36%6.3%9%4%
CRICarter's$2.9B43%11.0%24%9%
Group median45%10.3%17%7%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Under Armour has delivered.

Under Armour’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, a cyclical trough. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, Under Armour earns about $93M on its 1.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s −3.3% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth, delivered
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings ($162M) on 427M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net debt $881M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits off the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Under Armour (UAA), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/UAA, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← UA its page in the Manual UAL →

Industry order: ← UA the Textiles & Apparel chapter VFC →