Owner Scorecard


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UZE, Array Digital Infrastructure, Inc.

Telecom Operators capital-intensive Cyclical

Array connects America through digital infrastructure by leasing tower space to tenants and providing ancillary services.

As of December 31, 2025, Array is an 82.0%-owned subsidiary of Telephone and Data Systems, Inc.

Through July 31, 2025, Array provided wireless communication services; these operations and certain wireless spectrum licenses were disposed of on August 1, 2025, as discussed further below.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
UZE · Array Digital Infrastructure, Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$163M
−95.6% YoY · −47% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $188M 5-yr avg $3.1B
Gross margin 55% 5-yr avg 51%
Operating margin 52.1% 5-yr avg −12.2%
ROIC 4% 5-yr avg −1%
Owner-earnings margin 17% 5-yr avg 32%
Free cash flow margin 17% 5-yr avg 32%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 73% and operating margin about 1.2% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −57% and 4.4% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Capital spending runs about 13% of sales, below what it charges for depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on subscribers, revenue per user, and network capex. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on concentrated dependence, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 1%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). By owner earnings: roughly 5% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$4.0B$3.9B$3.9B$3.9B$4.0B$4.0B$4.1B$3.8B$3.7B$163M$188MRevenueRevenue
73%72%51%55%Gross marginGross mgn
37%36%36%36%35%33%35%3%3%52%36%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$48M($304M)$158M$112M$173M$170M$69M($112M)($260M)($93M)$98MOperating incomeOp. inc.
1.2%−7.8%4.1%2.8%4.4%4.2%1.7%−2.9%−7.1%−56.8%52.1%Operating marginOp. mgn
$48M$12M$150M$127M$229M$155M$30M$54M($39M)$49M$208MNet incomeNet inc.
41%25%29%7%11%55%38%9%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$501M$469M$709M$724M$1.2B$802M$832M$867M$882M$201M$65MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$607M$604M$627M$689M$669M$662M$682M$42M$39M$39M$40MDepreciationDeprec.
($180M)($177M)($105M)($133M)$307M($42M)$96M$770M$880M$111M($184M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$443M$465M$512M$650M$989M$724M$602M$41M$18M$27M$34MCapexCapex
11.1%12.0%13.1%16.5%25.0%17.9%14.8%1.1%0.5%16.7%17.8%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$58M$4M$197M$74M$248M$78M$230M$826M$864M$174M$32MOwner earningsOwner earn.
1.5%0.1%5.0%1.9%6.3%1.9%5.6%21.7%23.6%106.6%17.0%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$58M$4M$197M$74M$248M$78M$230M$826M$864M$174M$32MFree cash flowFCF
1.5%0.1%5.0%1.9%6.3%1.9%5.6%21.7%23.6%106.6%17.0%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$5M$0$0$21M$23M$31M$43M$0$54M$21MBuybacksBuybacks
1%-5%2%1%3%2%0%-1%-4%-3%4%ROICROIC
1%0%4%3%5%3%1%1%-1%2%11%Return on equityROE
Balance sheet
$586M$402M$597M$285M$1.3B$156M$273M$150M$144M$113M$254MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$658M$775M$908M$919M$915M$976M$985M$900M$905M$861MReceivablesReceiv.
$138M$138M$142M$162M$146M$173M$261M$199M$179M$126MInventoryInvent.
$309M$302M$304M$296M$377M$346M$344M$241M$27M$28M$26MAccounts payablePayables
$487M$611M$746M$785M$684M$803M$902M$858M$1.1B$961MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$1.6B$1.5B$1.8B$1.6B$2.6B$1.6B$1.7B$1.4B$1.3B$145M$274MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$718M$733M$691M$750M$871M$903M$1.2B$901M$884M$200M$266MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.2×2.0×2.6×2.1×3.0×1.8×1.4×1.6×1.5×0.7×1.0×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$370M$0$0GoodwillGoodwill
$7.1B$6.8B$7.3B$8.2B$9.7B$10.3B$11.1B$10.8B$10.4B$4.7B$4.0BTotal assetsAssets
$1.6B$1.6B$1.6B$1.5B$2.5B$2.7B$3.2B$3.1B$1.2B$674M$674MTotal debtDebt
$1.0B$1.2B$1.0B$1.2B$1.2B$2.6B$2.9B$2.9B$1.1B$561M$421MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
0.4×-2.7×1.4×1.0×1.5×1.0×0.4×-7.7×-21.0×-3.3×3.1×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$3.6B$3.7B$4.1B$4.2B$4.4B$4.5B$4.6B$4.6B$4.6B$2.6B$1.9BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.7%0.8%0.9%1.0%0.8%0.7%0.6%0.0%0.1%1.1%0.5%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
85.0M86.0M87.0M88.0M87.0M87.0M86.0M86.7M85.6M87.3M86.5MShares out (diluted)Shares
$46.94$45.23$44.84$44.86$45.52$46.43$47.40$43.87$42.82$1.87$2.17Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.56$0.14$1.72$1.44$2.63$1.78$0.35$0.63$-0.46$0.56$2.41EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.68$0.05$2.26$0.84$2.85$0.90$2.67$9.53$10.09$1.99$0.37Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.68$0.05$2.26$0.84$2.85$0.90$2.67$9.53$10.09$1.99$0.37Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$5.21$5.41$5.89$7.39$11.37$8.32$7.00$0.47$0.22$0.31$0.39Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$42.75$42.76$46.63$47.69$50.70$52.26$52.95$53.34$53.45$29.41$21.49Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share−30.1%/yr−47.2%/yr
Owner earnings / share+12.6%/yr−6.9%/yr
EPS−0.1%/yr−26.7%/yr
Capital spending / share−26.9%/yr−51.3%/yr
Book value / share−4.1%/yr−10.3%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
87Mpeak FY2019
ROIC
−3%low FY2017
Gross margin
51%low FY2025
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
3.2×peak FY2017

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$174Mowner earningsvs.$49Mnet incomelow FY2017

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $49M of profit into $174M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$49M
Owner earnings$174M · 107% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$49M($39M)$54M$30M$155M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$39M+$39M+$42M+$682M+$662M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$2M+$3M+$1M+$24M+$27M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$111M+$880M+$770M+$96M−$42M
Cash from operations$201M$882M$867M$832M$802M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$27M−$18M−$41M−$602M−$724M
Owner earnings$174M$864M$826M$230M$78M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue107%24%22%6%2%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $2M), owner earnings is nearer $172M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income ($93M) ÷ interest expense $28M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • Net debt against an operating loss
    Cash $113M − debt $674M
    What this means

    Netting $113M of cash and short-term investments against $674M of debt leaves $561M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 2027 + DIO 822 − DPO 128 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -5%–3%; -3% latest = NOPAT ($93M) ÷ invested capital $3.1B
    Industry peers: median -0%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -3% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 0%–107%; latest $174M = operating cash $201M − maintenance capex $27M
    Industry peers: median 3%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 107% of revenue this year, a 5% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $2M of SBC) leaves $172M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $201M ÷ net income $49M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returned more than it generated
    Dividends + buybacks $504M ÷ Owner Earnings $174M
    What this means

    The company returned more than it generated: against $174M of Owner Earnings, $504M (290%) went back to shareholders, $482M dividends, $21M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $2M stock comp, the real buyback was about $20M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.70×
    Harvesting
    Capex $27M ÷ depreciation $39M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $163M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.72×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $674M vs ($55M) WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Near
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −70%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.25/share (latest year $0.56), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $29.70/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 9 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin −1% → −22% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about −1% early to −22% lately, median 1% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth +37%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 37% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2025 · −56.8% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2025, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count +0.3%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

  • How management talks about it Owner’s terms
    What this means

    The record and the register agree: capital is compounding and the filing reasons in an owner’s terms — per-share value, return on capital, the long term — not a promoter’s.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$274M
  • Cash & short-term investments$254M
  • Receivables$861M
  • Inventory$126M
Current liabilities$266M
  • Accounts payable$26M
  • Other current liabilities$239M
Current ratio1.03×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.56×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.95×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$8Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+92.8%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.6× → 1.0×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$1.9Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Debt incl. operating leases$527M$527M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $1.2B (annual-report basis)
Deferred revenue$45Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, operating and finance leases together, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

Operating leasesFinance leases
'26$42M
'27$45M
'28$45M
'29$44M
'30$43M
later$796M

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$42Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$1.0Bevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$528Mthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$674M
Lease obligations (present value)$528M
Total fixed claims on the business$1.2B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $1.2B, of which the leases are 44%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $7.2B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$4.5B · 62%
  • Buybacks$198M · 3%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$2.6B · 35%
  • Returned to owners$198M

    7% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $198M as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $198M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count1.8%

    The diluted count rose from 85M to 86M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

  • Return on what it retained87%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($616M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $535M, so each retained $1 added about 0.87 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$102K0% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity0%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$0over 10 years buying other businesses, against $4.5B of capital spent building

$370M written down across 1 year (2017): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$2M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Array Digital Infrastructure, Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 5 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?20% → 525% of sales

    Receivables and inventory grew from $796M to $987M while revenue grew −95%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (20% of revenue then, 525% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Income taxes as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Telecom Operators

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
ATNIATN International Inc.$667M2.5%1%3%
EVCEntravision Communications Corporation$448M70%4.9%4%16%
ADEAAdeia Inc.$443M34.5%13%47%
SHENShenandoah Telecom$358M41%-1.1%-0%-24%
GSATGlobalstar Inc.$273M96%-47.3%-6%10%
NMAXNewsmax Inc.$189M-52.8%-92%-57%
UZEArray Digital Infrastructure, Inc.$163M72%1.4%1%5%
SPIRSpire Global Inc.$72M40%-101.4%-44%-83%
Group median70%0.2%0%4%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Array Digital Infrastructure, Inc. has delivered.

$
Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+35%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+37%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $32M on 86M shares outstanding, the balance-sheet count at 2026-03-31; net debt $421M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($34M) runs well above depreciation ($40M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $38M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Array Digital Infrastructure, Inc. (UZE), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/UZE, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← UZD its page in the Manual UZF →

Industry order: ← UZD the Telecom Operators chapter UZF →