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SPIR, Spire Global Inc.

Spire Global Inc. designs, manufactures, integrates, and operates its own satellites and ground stations to deliver unique end-to-end comprehensive solutions.

As part of the transaction, a portion of the proceeds was used to settle a prior dispute with L3Harris Technologies, Inc.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

SPIR · Spire Global Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$72M

−35.2% YoY · 20% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $64M 5-yr avg $79M

Gross margin 42% 5-yr avg 39%

Operating margin −145.3% 5-yr avg −105.0%

ROIC −114% 5-yr avg −61%

Owner-earnings margin −140% 5-yr avg −89%

Free cash flow margin −172% 5-yr avg −98%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is Subscription Based Contract Member (77%) and Non Subscription Based Contracts (23%).
What moves the needle: Operating margin has run around −111% through the cycle on a 40% gross margin, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −21 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. Read this kind of business on subscribers, revenue per user, and network capex. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −44%, above 15% in 0 of 5 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Subscription Based Contract Member is 77% of revenue, with Non Subscription Based Contracts the other meaningful line at 23%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025

Subscription Based Contract Member77%$55M
Non Subscription Based Contracts23%$16M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2020–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
							Income statement
$28M	$43M	$71M	$98M	$110M	$72M	$64M	RevenueRevenue
64%	57%	24%	40%	36%	41%	42%	Gross marginGross mgn
44%	93%	63%	43%	45%	89%	102%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
73%	73%	31%	28%	26%	51%	58%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($26M)	($68M)	($79M)	($59M)	($69M)	($96M)	($92M)	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−91.3%	−156.4%	−111.5%	−60.2%	−62.7%	−134.1%	−145.3%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($33M)	($38M)	($99M)	($78M)	($103M)	$51M	$49M	Net incomeNet inc.
							Cash flow & returns
($15M)	($58M)	($46M)	($36M)	($18M)	($60M)	($78M)	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$6M	$9M	$18M	$18M	$22M	$12M	$11M	DepreciationDeprec.
$10M	($40M)	$23M	$10M	$43M	($142M)	($155M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$10M	$15M	$21M	$17M	$27M	$33M	$32M	CapexCapex
36.2%	35.6%	29.7%	17.8%	24.1%	45.8%	50.1%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($20M)	($66M)	($67M)	($54M)	($45M)	($72M)	($89M)	Owner earningsOwner earn.
−71.3%	−153.3%	−94.3%	−55.0%	−40.8%	−101.0%	−139.5%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($25M)	($73M)	($67M)	($54M)	($45M)	($93M)	($109M)	Free cash flowFCF
−88.1%	−169.2%	−94.3%	−55.0%	−40.8%	−129.4%	−172.3%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
—	$104M	$0	—	—	—	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
—	-41%	-44%	-38%	-81%	-102%	-114%	ROICROIC
—	-20%	-109%	-205%	—	45%	54%	Return on equityROE
—	−20%	−109%	−205%	—	45%	54%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
							Balance sheet
$16M	$109M	$70M	$41M	$19M	$82M	$49M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$4M	$10M	$14M	$10M	$12M	$4M	$7M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$2M	$6M	$5M	$8M	$12M	$15M	$16M	Accounts payablePayables
$2M	$4M	$9M	$2M	$334K	($11M)	($9M)	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$22M	$132M	$94M	$72M	$92M	$94M	$64M	Current assetsCur. assets
$13M	$25M	$38M	$49M	$152M	$72M	$69M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.7×	5.3×	2.5×	1.5×	0.6×	1.3×	0.9×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$0	$54M	$50M	$51M	$15M	$15M	$15M	GoodwillGoodwill
$44M	$290M	$256M	$239M	$194M	$211M	$183M	Total assetsAssets
$27M	$51M	$98M	$114M	$99M	$0	$0	Total debtDebt
$11M	($58M)	$28M	$73M	$79M	($82M)	($49M)	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-3.8×	-5.9×	-5.7×	-3.1×	-3.4×	-12.9×	-54.7×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
($49M)	$190M	$91M	$38M	($12M)	$113M	$91M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
7.6%	26.8%	16.2%	13.3%	18.1%	26.1%	28.0%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
							Per share
17.6M	62.1M	17.5M	19.6M	24.2M	32.0M	33.3M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$1.62	$0.70	$4.05	$4.99	$4.57	$2.24	$1.91	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-1.85	$-0.61	$-5.66	$-3.96	$-4.28	$1.61	$1.47	EPS (diluted)EPS
$-1.15	$-1.07	$-3.82	$-2.74	$-1.86	$-2.26	$-2.66	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-1.42	$-1.18	$-3.82	$-2.74	$-1.86	$-2.90	$-3.29	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.59	$0.25	$1.20	$0.89	$1.10	$1.03	$0.96	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$-2.77	$3.06	$5.21	$1.93	$-0.48	$3.53	$2.74	Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×3.53 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×1/3.55 into 2022 — shares retired, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	5-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+6.7%/yr	+6.7%/yr
Capital spending / share	+11.9%/yr	+11.9%/yr

The record, charted

FY2020–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

32Mpeak FY2021

ROIC

−102%low FY2025

Gross margin

41%low FY2022

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

($72M)owner earningsvs.$51Mnet incomelow FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned ($72M) of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $12M it takes just to hold its position. It put $20M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($93M).

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$51M	($103M)	($78M)	($99M)	($38M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$12M	+$22M	+$18M	+$18M	+$9M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$19M	+$20M	+$13M	+$11M	+$12M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$142M	+$43M	+$10M	+$23M	−$40M
Cash from operations	($60M)	($18M)	($36M)	($46M)	($58M)
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$12M	−$27M	−$17M	−$21M	−$9M
Owner earnings	($72M)	($45M)	($54M)	($67M)	($66M)
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$20M	—	—	—	−$7M
Free cash flow	($93M)	($45M)	($54M)	($67M)	($73M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	-101%	-41%	-55%	-94%	-153%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $12M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $20M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $19M), owner earnings is nearer ($91M).

Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? -12.9×

Does not cover its interest

Operating income ($96M) ÷ interest expense $7M

What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$77M

Net cash

Cash $25M + ST investments $57M − debt $5M

What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $77M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? -107d

Negative, funded by others

DSO 21 + DIO 0 − DPO 128 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital -44%

Below average through the cycle

5-yr median, range -102%–-38%; -97% latest = NOPAT ($90M) ÷ invested capital $93M

Industry peers: median 1%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 5 years (it ran -97% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin -94%

Consumes cash through the cycle

6-yr median margin, range -153%–-41%; latest ($72M) = operating cash ($60M) − maintenance capex $12M

Industry peers: median 7%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -101% of revenue this year, a -94% median across 6 years. It chose to put $20M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ($93M) — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $19M of SBC) leaves ($91M).
Are earnings backed by cash? -1.17×

Thinly cash-backed

Cash from ops ($60M) ÷ net income $51M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Investing or harvesting? 2.64×

Expanding

Capex $33M ÷ depreciation $12M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Miss

Revenue ≥ $2B · $72M

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.30×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Pass

Debt ≤ working capital · $5M vs $21M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (6-yr record) · 5 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-1.30/share (latest year $1.54), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $3.39/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2020–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 1 of 6

What this means
Lost money in 5 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 5 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin −120% → −86% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −120% early to −86% lately, median −111% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Worst year 2021 · −156.4% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2021, understand why before trusting the good years.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“If the recommendations, forecasts, or analyses that AI applications assist in producing are deficient or inaccurate, we could be subjected to competitive harm, potential legal liability, and brand or reputational harm, and our business could be negatively affected.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$64M

Cash & short-term investments$49M
Receivables$7M
Other current assets$8M

Current liabilities$69M

Accounts payable$16M
Other current liabilities$53M

Current ratio0.94×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.94×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.72×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital($4M)the cushion left after near-term bills

Its current ratio is below 1, which usually reads as strain; here it is likely structural strength. This business collects from customers before it pays suppliers (a negative cash-conversion cycle), so the balance sheet is funded by that float, the way Costco's and Amazon's are. The low ratio can be the edge, not the risk; the cash-conversion cycle and the debt due above say which.

Cash runway0.5 yrsthe business is consuming cash; this is how long the cash on hand lasts at that rate

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−33.7%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters0.5× → 0.9×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$67Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($27M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$12M$12M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$48Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 6-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$25M12% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity14%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$104Mover 6 years buying other businesses, against $123M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 6-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$19M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 26% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Spire Global Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2020–2025.

1 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?5 of 6 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 5 of the last 6 years, $15M in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did debt outgrow the business?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Telecom Operators

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
CALXCalix	$1.0B	50%	-0.8%	-2%	3%
CCOICogent Communications Holdings Inc.	$976M	57%	16.1%	17%	14%
GOGOGogo Inc.	$910M	93%	28.4%	5%	7%
IRDMIridium Communications Inc	$872M	95%	10.5%	2%	35%
GSATGlobalstar Inc.	$273M	96%	-47.3%	-6%	10%
NMAXNewsmax Inc.	$189M	—	-52.8%	-92%	-57%
ADArray Digital Infrastructure Inc.	$163M	72%	1.4%	1%	5%
SPIRSpire Global Inc.	$72M	40%	-101.4%	-44%	-83%
Group median	—	72%	0.3%	-1%	6%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Spire Global Inc. is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.

Today’s price $

The assumptions Required return 9% Years to get there 10 Revenue growth 0%

Revenue, delivered25%/yr’20→’25

Mature owner-earnings margin 15%

Enter a price to run it.

Owner earnings it must reach—

Margin the price demands—

Owner-earnings margin today−172%

Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.

Weigh SPIR against another business →

The owners of SPIR: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Spire Global Inc. (SPIR), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/SPIR, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← SPHR its page in the Manual SPNT →

Industry order: ← SKM the Telecom Operators chapter T →