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VISN, Vistance Networks Inc.

Communications Equipment capital-intensive Distress / turnaroundCyclical

We are a leader in digital video and IP television distribution systems, broadband access infrastructure platforms and equipment that delivers data and voice networks to homes.

Our evolution has been driven by technological innovation and strategies that expanded our product offerings and complemented our existing solutions.

Our solutions are complemented by services including technical support, systems design and integration.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

VISN · Vistance Networks Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$1.9B

+39.7% YoY · −26% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $2.0B 5-yr avg $3.5B

Gross margin 49% 5-yr avg 42%

Operating margin 4.3% 5-yr avg −13.5%

Owner-earnings margin 11% 5-yr avg 9%

Free cash flow margin 11% 5-yr avg 9%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is Aurora (64%) and RUCKUS (36%).
Situation: Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has reached 12% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −0.6%) on a 36% gross margin — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. Inventory runs near 13% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Aurora is 64% of revenue, with RUCKUS the other meaningful segment at 36%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025

Aurora64%$1.2B
RUCKUS36%$699M
Corporate and Other0%$0

By geographyUnited States71%EMEA12%Asia Pacific8%Caribbean And Latin America5%Canada4%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$4.9B	$4.6B	$4.6B	$8.3B	$8.4B	$6.7B	$5.8B	$1.9B	$1.4B	$1.9B	$2.0B	RevenueRevenue
41%	37%	36%	29%	33%	36%	34%	48%	44%	49%	49%	Gross marginGross mgn
18%	16%	15%	15%	14%	16%	16%	27%	34%	26%	25%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
4%	4%	4%	7%	8%	8%	8%	17%	18%	15%	14%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$568M	$472M	$450M	($509M)	($52M)	$197M	($935M)	($660M)	($292M)	$48M	$88M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
11.5%	10.3%	9.9%	−6.1%	−0.6%	2.9%	−16.2%	−35.4%	−21.1%	2.5%	4.3%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$223M	$194M	$140M	($930M)	($573M)	($463M)	($1.3B)	($1.5B)	($316M)	$2.3B	$7.0B	Net incomeNet inc.
18%	8%	18%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	-1%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$640M	$586M	$494M	$596M	$436M	$122M	$190M	$297M	$273M	$323M	$283M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$399M	$378M	$358M	$771M	$823M	$786M	$696M	$561M	$371M	$277M	$238M	DepreciationDeprec.
($17M)	($27M)	($49M)	$664M	$71M	($281M)	$720M	$1.2B	$189M	($2.3B)	($7.0B)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$68M	$69M	$82M	$104M	$121M	$131M	$101M	$61M	$25M	$70M	$57M	CapexCapex
1.4%	1.5%	1.8%	1.2%	1.4%	2.0%	1.7%	3.3%	1.8%	3.6%	2.8%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$572M	$518M	$412M	$492M	$315M	($9M)	$89M	$237M	$248M	$253M	$226M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
11.6%	11.3%	9.0%	5.9%	3.7%	−0.1%	1.5%	12.7%	17.9%	13.1%	11.2%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$572M	$518M	$412M	$492M	$315M	($9M)	$89M	$237M	$248M	$253M	$226M	Free cash flowFCF
11.6%	11.3%	9.0%	5.9%	3.7%	−0.1%	1.5%	12.7%	17.9%	13.1%	11.2%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
—	$105M	—	$5.1B	—	—	$0	$0	$45M	$0	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
16%	12%	8%	-111%	-162%	—	—	—	—	—	153%	Return on equityROE
											Balance sheet
$428M	$454M	$458M	$598M	$522M	$360M	$373M	$500M	$404M	$754M	$2.5B	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$952M	$899M	$810M	$1.7B	$1.5B	$1.5B	$1.2B	$582M	$252M	$350M	$377M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$473M	$445M	$473M	$976M	$1.1B	$1.4B	$1.4B	$901M	$403M	$310M	$337M	InventoryInvent.
$416M	$437M	$399M	$1.1B	$1.0B	$1.2B	$684M	$331M	$123M	$213M	$165M	Accounts payablePayables
$1.0B	$907M	$885M	$1.5B	$1.6B	$1.8B	$1.9B	$1.2B	$532M	$448M	$550M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$2.0B	$1.9B	$1.9B	$3.5B	$3.4B	$3.6B	$3.7B	$2.8B	$3.5B	$5.8B	$3.3B	Current assetsCur. assets
$858M	$724M	$691M	$2.0B	$2.0B	$2.2B	$2.1B	$1.4B	$1.2B	$1.5B	$499M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.3×	2.7×	2.7×	1.7×	1.7×	1.6×	1.8×	2.0×	2.8×	3.9×	6.7×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$2.8B	$2.9B	$2.9B	$5.5B	$5.3B	$5.2B	$3.5B	$757M	$760M	$765M	$765M	GoodwillGoodwill
$7.1B	$7.0B	$6.6B	$14.4B	$13.6B	$13.3B	$11.7B	$9.3B	$8.7B	$9.4B	$5.4B	Total assetsAssets
2.0×	1.8×	1.9×	-0.9×	-0.1×	0.4×	-1.6×	-1.0×	-0.4×	—	0.1×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$1.4B	$1.6B	$1.8B	$836M	$355M	($157M)	($1.5B)	($3.0B)	($3.5B)	($1.0B)	$4.6B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.7%	0.9%	1.0%	1.1%	1.4%	1.2%	1.1%	2.5%	2.1%	2.2%	2.0%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
$15M	—	—	$376M	$207M	$14M	$1.1B	$571M	—	—	—	Goodwill written downGW imp.
											Per share
196M	197M	195M	194M	197M	204M	207M	211M	214M	230M	238M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$25.06	$23.17	$23.39	$43.08	$42.87	$33.09	$27.91	$8.84	$6.45	$8.40	$8.47	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.13	$0.98	$0.72	$-4.80	$-2.91	$-2.27	$-6.20	$-7.14	$-1.47	$9.93	$29.46	EPS (diluted)EPS
$2.91	$2.63	$2.11	$2.54	$1.60	$-0.04	$0.43	$1.12	$1.16	$1.10	$0.95	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$2.91	$2.63	$2.11	$2.54	$1.60	$-0.04	$0.43	$1.12	$1.16	$1.10	$0.95	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.35	$0.35	$0.42	$0.54	$0.62	$0.65	$0.49	$0.29	$0.12	$0.31	$0.24	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$7.10	$8.37	$9.00	$4.32	$1.80	$-0.77	$-7.45	$-14.34	$-16.12	$-4.37	$19.31	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	−11.4%/yr	−27.8%/yr
Owner earnings / share	−10.3%/yr	−7.3%/yr
EPS	+27.3%/yr	—
Capital spending / share	−1.4%/yr	−13.1%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

Revenue+39.7%
“Net sales Year Ended December 31, % 2025 2024 Change Change (dollars in millions) Net sales $ 1,931.6 $ 1,382.6 $ 549.0 39.7 % Domestic 1,380.7 922.5 458.2 49.7 International 550.9 460.1 90.8 19.7 Net sales in 2025 increased $549.0 million, or 39.7%, compared to the prior year primarily driven by increased sales volumes, partially offset by lower pricing and unfavorable product mix.”
✓ figure matches the filed record
RUCKUS+27.9%
“RUCKUS Net sales for the RUCKUS segment increased in 2025 compared to the prior year primarily due to higher sales volumes and pricing.”
✓ direction matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

230Mpeak FY2025

Gross margin

49%low FY2019

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$253Mowner earningsvs.$2.3Bnet incomelow FY2021

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business reported $2.3B of profit but $253M of owner earnings: $2.0B less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

Reported net income$2.3B

Owner earnings$253M · 13% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$2.3B	($316M)	($1.5B)	($1.3B)	($463M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$277M	+$371M	+$561M	+$696M	+$786M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$43M	+$29M	+$47M	+$61M	+$80M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$2.3B	+$189M	+$1.2B	+$720M	−$281M
Cash from operations	$323M	$273M	$297M	$190M	$122M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$70M	−$25M	−$61M	−$101M	−$131M
Owner earnings	$253M	$248M	$237M	$89M	($9M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	13%	18%	13%	2%	0%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $43M), owner earnings is nearer $210M.

Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 0.1×

Does not cover its interest

Operating income $48M ÷ interest expense $687M

What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $6.5B · 136.7× operating profit

Heavy net debt

Cash $754M − debt $7.3B

What this means
Netting $754M of cash and short-term investments against $7.3B of debt leaves $6.5B owed, about 136.7× a year's operating profit (152.5× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 103d

Long (60+ days)

DSO 66 + DIO 116 − DPO 80 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital -0%

Below average through the cycle

9-yr median, range -10%–8%; 1% latest = NOPAT $48M ÷ invested capital $5.5B

Industry peers: median 7%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 1% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 9%

Solid through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range -0%–18%; latest $253M = operating cash $323M − maintenance capex $70M

Industry peers: median 9%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 13% of revenue this year, a 9% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $43M of SBC) leaves $210M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 0.14×

Thinly cash-backed

Cash from ops $323M ÷ net income $2.3B

In the filing’s words And the filing leans heavily on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings — steering you off the GAAP figure just where the cash is not backing it. Read the reconciliation in the notes before taking the adjusted number.

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 283%

Returned more than it generated

Dividends + buybacks $714M ÷ Owner Earnings $253M

What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $253M of Owner Earnings, $714M (283%) went back to shareholders, $539M dividends, $175M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $43M stock comp, the real buyback was about $132M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
Investing or harvesting? 0.25×

Harvesting

Capex $70M ÷ depreciation $277M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Near

Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.9B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Pass

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 3.88×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $7.3B vs $4.3B WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 6 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Miss

Earnings +33% over the record · −17%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.68/share (latest year $10.12), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $-4.45/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 4 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 6 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Operating margin 11% → −18% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 11% early to −18% lately, median −1% — competition or costs are biting in.
Owner earnings growth −8%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 8% a year over the record.
Worst year 2023 · −35.4% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2023, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count +1.8%/yr

What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$3.3B

Cash & short-term investments$2.5B
Receivables$377M
Inventory$337M
Other current assets$100M

Current liabilities$499M

Accounts payable$165M
Other current liabilities$334M

Current ratio6.67×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio5.99×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio5.03×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$2.8Bthe cushion left after near-term bills

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+21.6%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.0× → 6.7×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$3.0Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value$2.5BGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$66M$66M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$122Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $4.0B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a deleverager, a meaningful share of cash went to paying down debt.

Reinvested$834M · 21%
Buybacks$175M · 4%
Retained (debt / cash)$3.0B · 75%

Returned to owners$175M
6% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $175M as buybacks.
Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt fell $4.5B and cash and short-term investments rose $2.1B.
Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $175M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
Net change in share count21.1%
The diluted count rose from 196M to 238M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$1.6B17% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity—goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$5.2Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $834M of capital spent building

$2.3B written down across 6 years (2016, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 44% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Charles L. Treadway	$2.9M	$570k	($9M)
2022	Charles L. Treadway	$10.6M	$5.0M	$89M
2023	Charles L. Treadway	$12.3M	$441k	$237M
2024	Charles L. Treadway	$20.1M	$29.6M	$248M
2025	Charles L. Treadway	$15.4M	$78.5M	$253M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership3.5%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
CEO pay ratio121:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Stock-based compensation$43M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 2% of revenue, equal to 90% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Vistance Networks Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?21.1%
Diluted shares grew 21.1% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $175M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?8 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 8 of the last 10 years, $5.3B in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
≈$705M · 35% of revenue on the largest customers (TTM)
“For the year ended December 31, 2025, we derived approximately 35% of our consolidated net sales from our top direct customer.”verify →
Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Inventory, Contingencies as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Communications Equipment

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
FNFabrinet	$3.4B	12%	7.9%	17%	7%
UIUbiquiti Inc.	$2.6B	45%	33.0%	152%	26%
BEBloom Energy Corporation	$2.0B	5%	-19.7%	-40%	-21%
VISNVistance Networks Inc.	$1.9B	37%	0.9%	-0%	10%
HELEHelen of Troy	$1.8B	43%	11.8%	11%	12%
LITELumentum Holdings Inc.	$1.6B	32%	3.0%	3%	9%
ESEESCO Technologies Inc.	$1.1B	39%	12.2%	7%	11%
ADTNADTRAN Holdings Inc.	$1.1B	39%	-4.9%	-5%	-1%
Group median	—	38%	5.4%	5%	10%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Vistance Networks Inc. has delivered.

Today’s price $

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($246M) Net of stock comp (−$41M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+58%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25−8%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $226M on 226M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-20; net cash $2.5B. The if-converted diluted count is 238M, 5% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh VISN against another business →

The owners of VISN: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Vistance Networks Inc. (VISN), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/VISN, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← VIRT its page in the Manual VITL →

Industry order: ← UTSI the Communications Equipment chapter WLDSW →