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VIST, Vista Energy S.A.B. de C.V.
An oil and gas business, whose fortunes rise and fall with a price it does not set.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Capital build-out. Capital spending has surged to 64% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run about 32% through the cycle, a wide margin for the work it does — whether that reflects a durable edge or one that can fade is what the record weighs. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −26% and 54% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Capital spending runs about 56% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on the commodity price, and the cost to lift a barrel. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has run in the teens (median 19%, above 15% in 4 of 6 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 32% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2017–2024
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2017’17 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | TTMTTMDec 2024 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||
| $198M | $416M | $274M | $665M | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.6B | $1.6B | RevenueRevenue |
| $21M | $15M | ($70M) | $211M | $529M | $631M | $625M | $625M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 10.4% | 3.5% | −25.6% | 31.6% | 44.6% | 54.0% | 38.0% | 38.0% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $14M | ($33M) | ($103M) | $51M | $270M | $397M | $478M | $478M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 31% | — | — | — | 38% | 27% | 19% | 19% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||
| $46M | $134M | $94M | $401M | $690M | $712M | $959M | $959M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $61M | $153M | $148M | $191M | $235M | $276M | $438M | $438M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($29M) | $14M | $49M | $159M | $185M | $39M | $44M | $44M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $31M | $240M | $153M | $321M | $479M | $688M | $1.1B | $1.1B | CapexCapex |
| 15.9% | 57.8% | 55.9% | 48.3% | 40.3% | 58.9% | 63.9% | 63.9% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $14M | ($19M) | ($59M) | $210M | $455M | $436M | $521M | $521M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 7.3% | −4.5% | −21.7% | 31.6% | 38.3% | 37.3% | 31.6% | 31.6% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $14M | ($106M) | ($59M) | $80M | $211M | $24M | ($94M) | ($94M) | Free cash flowFCF |
| 7.3% | −25.5% | −21.7% | 12.0% | 17.7% | 2.0% | −5.7% | −5.7% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| — | — | — | — | $29M | $0 | $100M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 6% | — | -8% | 15% | 31% | 29% | 22% | 22% | ROICROIC |
| 5% | -5% | -20% | 9% | 32% | 32% | 29% | 29% | Return on equityROE |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||
| $37M | $261M | $203M | $315M | $245M | $213M | $765M | $765M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $56M | $93M | $51M | $46M | $90M | $205M | $281M | $281M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $8M | $19M | $14M | $14M | $13M | $8M | $6M | $6M | InventoryInvent. |
| $21M | $98M | $119M | $138M | $221M | $205M | $487M | $487M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $43M | $14M | ($54M) | ($78M) | ($118M) | $8M | ($199M) | ($199M) | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $101M | $373M | $268M | $375M | $348M | $426M | $1.1B | $1.1B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $32M | $193M | $334M | $386M | $408M | $359M | $1.1B | $1.1B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 3.2× | 1.9× | 0.8× | 1.0× | 0.9× | 1.2× | 1.0× | 1.0× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $0 | $28M | $28M | $28M | $28M | $23M | $23M | $23M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $362M | $1.4B | $1.4B | $1.7B | $2.0B | $2.6B | $4.2B | $4.2B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | $389M | $350M | $448M | $478M | $555M | $1.4B | $1.4B | Total debtDebt |
| — | $128M | $147M | $132M | $232M | $341M | $637M | $637M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 1141.9× | 0.4× | -1.5× | 4.2× | 18.3× | 28.9× | 10.0× | 10.0× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $280M | $604M | $509M | $565M | $844M | $1.2B | $1.6B | $1.6B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||||||
| 95.4M | 80.1M | 87.5M | 88.2M | 87.9M | 93.7M | 95.9M | 95.3M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $2.08 | $5.20 | $3.13 | $7.54 | $13.52 | $12.48 | $17.18 | $17.29 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $0.15 | $-0.41 | $-1.17 | $0.57 | $3.07 | $4.24 | $4.98 | $5.01 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $0.15 | $-0.23 | $-0.68 | $2.38 | $5.18 | $4.65 | $5.44 | $5.47 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $0.15 | $-1.32 | $-0.68 | $0.91 | $2.40 | $0.25 | $-0.97 | $-0.98 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.33 | $3.00 | $1.75 | $3.64 | $5.45 | $7.35 | $10.97 | $11.05 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $2.94 | $7.54 | $5.81 | $6.41 | $9.61 | $13.31 | $16.90 | $17.01 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 7-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +35.3%/yr | +27.0%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +66.8%/yr | — |
| EPS | +65.6%/yr | — |
| Capital spending / share | +65.0%/yr | +29.6%/yr |
| Book value / share | +28.4%/yr | +17.5%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2017–2024Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2024 the business earned $521M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $438M it takes just to hold its position. It put $615M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($94M).
| FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | FY2020 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $478M | $397M | $270M | $51M | ($103M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$438M | +$276M | +$235M | +$191M | +$148M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$44M | +$39M | +$185M | +$159M | +$49M |
| Cash from operations | $959M | $712M | $690M | $401M | $94M |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$438M | −$276M | −$235M | −$191M | −$153M |
| Owner earnings | $521M | $436M | $455M | $210M | ($59M) |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −$615M | −$412M | −$244M | −$130M | — |
| Free cash flow | ($94M) | $24M | $211M | $80M | ($59M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 32% | 37% | 38% | 32% | -22% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $438M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $615M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? 10.0×ComfortableOperating income $625M ÷ interest expense $62M
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $637M · 1.0× operating profitModest net debtCash $764M + ST investments $632K − debt $1.4B
What this means
Netting $765M of cash and short-term investments against $1.4B of debt leaves $637M owed, about 1.0× a year's operating profit (2.2× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- High through the cycle6-yr median, range -8%–31%; 22% latest = NOPAT $505M ÷ invested capital $2.3BIndustry peers: median 8%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 6 years (it ran 22% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- High through the cycle7-yr median margin, range -22%–38%; latest $521M = operating cash $959M − maintenance capex $438MIndustry peers: median 28%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 32% of revenue this year, a 32% median across 7 years. It chose to put $615M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ($94M) — the gap is investment, not weakness.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $959M ÷ net income $478M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks $107M ÷ Owner Earnings $521M
What this means
Of $521M Owner Earnings, $107M (20%) went back to shareholders, $7M dividends, $100M buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 2.40×ExpandingCapex $1.1B ÷ depreciation $438M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size NearRevenue ≥ $2B · $1.6B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 0.99×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $1.4B vs ($5M) WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (7-yr record) · 2 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 1 of 7 yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $4.00/share (latest year $5.01), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $17.00/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2017–2024
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 5 of 7
What this means
Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 4 of 6 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin −4% → 46% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The margin widened even though the filing names price competition — the gain came from volume or cost, not pricing power. Read where.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −4% early to 46% lately, median 32% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 47%
What this means
Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.
- Worst year 2020 · −25.6% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +0.1%/yr
What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.
- Dividend record paid
What this means
Paid a dividend in 1 of the years on record.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2024Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$765M
- Receivables$281M
- Inventory$6M
- Accounts payable$487M
- Other current liabilities$571M
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2017–2024
Over the record, the business generated $3.0B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested$3.0B · 98%
- Dividends$7M · 0%
- Buybacks$129M · 4%
- Returned to owners$136M
9% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $7M as dividends and $129M as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span cash and short-term investments rose $728M.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $129M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count−0.2%
The diluted count barely moved (95M to 95M): buybacks roughly offset the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record$0.07/sh
Paid in 1 of the years on record. It was never cut over the span.
- Return on what it retained52%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($937M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $492M, so each retained $1 added about 0.52 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Vista Energy S.A.B. de C.V. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2024.
None of the 4 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Oil & Gas Producers
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| NOGNorthern Oil and Gas | $2.5B | 81% | 20.3% | 9% | 58% |
| CRKComstock Resources Inc. | $2.2B | — | 16.7% | -0% | 16% |
| TALOTalos Energy Inc. | $1.8B | — | 12.7% | 6% | 5% |
| VISTVista Energy S.A.B. de C.V. | $1.6B | — | 31.6% | 19% | 32% |
| HESMHess Midstream LP | $1.6B | — | 60.4% | — | 48% |
| GPORGulfport Energy | $1.4B | 69% | 0.5% | 7% | 23% |
| VNOMViper Energy | $1.3B | — | 66.4% | 18% | — |
| MGYMagnolia Oil & Gas | $1.3B | — | 41.2% | 19% | 32% |
| Group median | — | — | 26.0% | 9% | 32% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Per the filing's own cover, “Each ADS represents one common”; Vista Energy S.A.B. de C.V. reports in USD, so every figure in this tool is stated per ADS so your dollar quote reconciles exactly. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed.
Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Vista Energy S.A.B. de C.V. has delivered.
Vista Energy S.A.B. de C.V.’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, Vista Energy S.A.B. de C.V. earns about $520M on its 31.6% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 31.6% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow ($94M) on 95M shares outstanding, per the 20-F cover, as of 2023-12-31; net debt $637M. The base opens on the steady-state figure (the latest year is negative on total capex mid-build-out); clear Steady-state to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($1.1B) runs well above depreciation ($438M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $521M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← VIPS its page in the Manual VIV →
Industry order: ← VET the Oil & Gas Producers chapter VNOM →