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VIPS, Vipshop Holdings Limited
Revenue is Vip.Com (95%) and Shan Shan Outlets (4%).
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- A retailer, earning thin margins on high volume, where inventory turns, unit economics and scale decide the outcome.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 22% and operating margin about 5.1% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. On a spread this thin the operating result swings hard on small moves in cost or volume — it has ranged from 2.9% to 8.5% over the years, so the cost line is where the needle moves. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −30 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on debt terms & refinancing, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has run high across the record (median 41%, above 15% in 8 of 8 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 6% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 20-F →The biggest segment, Vip.Com, is also where the profit is made: 95% of revenue and 88% of segment operating profit.
- Vip.Com95%CN¥101.1B88% of profit
- Shan Shan Outlets4%CN¥4.1B11% of profit
- Other1%CN¥725M1% of profit
From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMDec 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| CN¥56.6B | CN¥72.9B | CN¥84.5B | CN¥93.0B | CN¥101.9B | CN¥117.1B | CN¥103.2B | CN¥112.9B | CN¥108.4B | CN¥105.9B | CN¥105.9B | RevenueRevenue |
| 24% | 22% | 20% | 22% | 21% | 20% | 21% | 23% | 23% | 23% | 23% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| CN¥2.7B | CN¥2.7B | CN¥2.4B | CN¥4.8B | CN¥5.9B | CN¥5.6B | CN¥6.2B | CN¥9.1B | CN¥9.2B | CN¥8.1B | CN¥8.1B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 4.8% | 3.7% | 2.9% | 5.1% | 5.8% | 4.8% | 6.0% | 8.1% | 8.5% | 7.7% | 7.7% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| CN¥2.0B | CN¥1.9B | CN¥2.1B | CN¥4.0B | CN¥5.9B | CN¥4.7B | CN¥6.3B | CN¥8.2B | CN¥7.8B | CN¥7.4B | CN¥7.4B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 23% | 25% | 21% | 20% | 16% | 21% | 22% | 19% | 23% | 20% | 20% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| CN¥2.8B | CN¥981M | CN¥5.7B | CN¥12.3B | CN¥11.8B | CN¥6.7B | CN¥10.5B | CN¥14.4B | CN¥9.1B | CN¥7.5B | CN¥7.5B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| CN¥611M | CN¥721M | CN¥770M | CN¥830M | CN¥970M | CN¥1.1B | CN¥1.2B | CN¥1.3B | CN¥1.4B | CN¥1.5B | CN¥1.5B | DepreciationDeprec. |
| CN¥228M | (CN¥1.6B) | CN¥2.8B | CN¥7.5B | CN¥4.9B | CN¥955M | CN¥3.0B | CN¥4.9B | (CN¥128M) | (CN¥1.5B) | (CN¥1.5B) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| CN¥2.0B | CN¥2.2B | CN¥2.5B | CN¥3.3B | CN¥2.2B | CN¥2.7B | CN¥2.4B | CN¥2.2B | CN¥2.7B | CN¥2.0B | CN¥2.0B | CapexCapex |
| 3.5% | 3.0% | 3.0% | 3.6% | 2.2% | 2.3% | 2.4% | 1.9% | 2.5% | 1.9% | 1.9% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| CN¥2.2B | CN¥260M | CN¥5.0B | CN¥11.5B | CN¥10.9B | CN¥5.6B | CN¥9.3B | CN¥13.1B | CN¥7.7B | CN¥5.9B | CN¥5.9B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 3.9% | 0.4% | 5.9% | 12.3% | 10.7% | 4.8% | 9.0% | 11.6% | 7.1% | 5.6% | 5.6% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| CN¥864M | (CN¥1.2B) | CN¥3.2B | CN¥9.0B | CN¥9.6B | CN¥4.0B | CN¥8.1B | CN¥12.2B | CN¥6.4B | CN¥5.5B | CN¥5.5B | Free cash flowFCF |
| 1.5% | −1.7% | 3.8% | 9.7% | 9.4% | 3.4% | 7.8% | 10.9% | 5.9% | 5.2% | 5.2% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | CN¥1.7B | CN¥1.8B | CN¥1.8B | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| CN¥194M | — | — | — | — | CN¥1.9B | CN¥6.3B | CN¥5.1B | CN¥3.9B | CN¥4.9B | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| — | 47% | — | 25% | 30% | 27% | 45% | 64% | 52% | 36% | 36% | ROICROIC |
| 35% | 13% | 12% | 18% | 21% | 14% | 19% | 22% | 20% | 18% | 18% | Return on equityROE |
| — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 15% | 14% | 14% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| CN¥4.1B | CN¥10.2B | CN¥11.9B | CN¥9.6B | CN¥19.3B | CN¥21.7B | CN¥23.5B | CN¥27.4B | CN¥28.2B | CN¥28.8B | CN¥28.8B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| CN¥2.3B | CN¥4.8B | CN¥5.7B | CN¥1.3B | CN¥335M | CN¥459M | CN¥568M | CN¥779M | CN¥915M | CN¥889M | CN¥889M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| CN¥4.9B | CN¥7.0B | CN¥5.4B | CN¥7.7B | CN¥7.6B | CN¥6.9B | CN¥5.5B | CN¥5.6B | CN¥5.0B | CN¥5.2B | CN¥5.2B | InventoryInvent. |
| CN¥8.3B | CN¥11.4B | CN¥11.6B | CN¥13.8B | CN¥15.2B | CN¥13.1B | CN¥15.0B | CN¥17.3B | CN¥15.2B | CN¥12.5B | CN¥12.5B | Accounts payablePayables |
| (CN¥1.1B) | CN¥319M | (CN¥587M) | (CN¥4.8B) | (CN¥7.2B) | (CN¥5.8B) | (CN¥8.9B) | (CN¥10.8B) | (CN¥9.2B) | (CN¥6.5B) | (CN¥6.5B) | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| CN¥14.6B | CN¥25.9B | CN¥27.3B | CN¥23.0B | CN¥31.2B | CN¥32.8B | CN¥33.7B | CN¥37.6B | CN¥37.8B | CN¥39.6B | CN¥39.6B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| CN¥14.6B | CN¥19.3B | CN¥25.9B | CN¥23.9B | CN¥26.6B | CN¥25.8B | CN¥28.5B | CN¥30.6B | CN¥29.9B | CN¥30.9B | CN¥30.9B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.0× | 1.3× | 1.1× | 1.0× | 1.2× | 1.3× | 1.2× | 1.2× | 1.3× | 1.3× | 1.3× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| CN¥367M | CN¥367M | CN¥367M | CN¥237M | CN¥594M | CN¥589M | CN¥755M | CN¥755M | CN¥755M | CN¥755M | CN¥755M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| CN¥25.1B | CN¥38.0B | CN¥43.6B | CN¥48.6B | CN¥58.9B | CN¥62.3B | CN¥65.5B | CN¥72.3B | CN¥74.9B | CN¥78.8B | CN¥78.8B | Total assetsAssets |
| 31.8× | 32.6× | 15.2× | 55.5× | 87.0× | 386.0× | 255.5× | 397.0× | 159.0× | 90.4× | 90.4× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| CN¥5.7B | CN¥14.3B | CN¥17.3B | CN¥21.8B | CN¥28.5B | CN¥32.6B | CN¥32.8B | CN¥37.0B | CN¥40.0B | CN¥41.0B | CN¥41.0B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 126M | 126M | 140M | 136M | 138M | 139M | 128M | 113M | 108M | 102M | 112M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| CN¥449.79 | CN¥579.98 | CN¥603.38 | CN¥683.37 | CN¥737.91 | CN¥843.70 | CN¥804.89 | CN¥1002.70 | CN¥1005.24 | CN¥1034.53 | CN¥948.54 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| CN¥15.84 | CN¥15.05 | CN¥15.23 | CN¥29.29 | CN¥42.88 | CN¥33.82 | CN¥49.25 | CN¥72.87 | CN¥72.68 | CN¥72.37 | CN¥66.36 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| CN¥17.65 | CN¥2.07 | CN¥35.52 | CN¥84.21 | CN¥78.61 | CN¥40.71 | CN¥72.48 | CN¥116.52 | CN¥71.49 | CN¥57.90 | CN¥53.08 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| CN¥6.87 | CN¥-9.68 | CN¥23.03 | CN¥66.04 | CN¥69.43 | CN¥28.92 | CN¥63.12 | CN¥108.81 | CN¥59.39 | CN¥53.41 | CN¥48.97 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | CN¥15.62 | CN¥17.54 | CN¥16.08 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| CN¥15.64 | CN¥17.48 | CN¥17.99 | CN¥24.27 | CN¥16.21 | CN¥19.69 | CN¥18.97 | CN¥19.25 | CN¥25.25 | CN¥19.40 | CN¥17.78 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| CN¥45.56 | CN¥113.71 | CN¥123.23 | CN¥160.40 | CN¥206.45 | CN¥235.20 | CN¥255.56 | CN¥328.39 | CN¥370.58 | CN¥400.50 | CN¥367.21 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +9.7%/yr | +7.0%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +14.1%/yr | −5.9%/yr |
| EPS | +18.4%/yr | +11.0%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +12.3%/yr (1-yr) | +12.3%/yr (1-yr) |
| Capital spending / share | +2.4%/yr | +3.7%/yr |
| Book value / share | +27.3%/yr | +14.2%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned CN¥5.9B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the CN¥1.5B it takes just to hold its position. It put CN¥459M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was CN¥5.5B.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | CN¥7.4B | CN¥7.8B | CN¥8.2B | CN¥6.3B | CN¥4.7B |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +CN¥1.5B | +CN¥1.4B | +CN¥1.3B | +CN¥1.2B | +CN¥1.1B |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −CN¥1.5B | −CN¥128M | +CN¥4.9B | +CN¥3.0B | +CN¥955M |
| Cash from operations | CN¥7.5B | CN¥9.1B | CN¥14.4B | CN¥10.5B | CN¥6.7B |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −CN¥1.5B | −CN¥1.4B | −CN¥1.3B | −CN¥1.2B | −CN¥1.1B |
| Owner earnings | CN¥5.9B | CN¥7.7B | CN¥13.1B | CN¥9.3B | CN¥5.6B |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −CN¥459M | −CN¥1.3B | −CN¥868M | −CN¥1.2B | −CN¥1.6B |
| Free cash flow | CN¥5.5B | CN¥6.4B | CN¥12.2B | CN¥8.1B | CN¥4.0B |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 6% | 7% | 12% | 9% | 5% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about CN¥1.5B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other CN¥459M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? 90.4×ComfortableOperating income CN¥8.1B ÷ interest expense CN¥90M
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +CN¥28.7BNet cashCash CN¥23.0B + ST investments CN¥5.8B − debt CN¥65M
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by CN¥28.7B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Negative, funded by othersDSO 3 + DIO 23 − DPO 56 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.
Is it a good business?
- Very high (≥25%) through the cycle8-yr median, range 25%–64%; 36% latest = NOPAT CN¥6.5B ÷ invested capital CN¥18.1BIndustry peers: median 15%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years (it ran 36% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median margin, range 0%–12%; latest CN¥5.9B = operating cash CN¥7.5B − maintenance capex CN¥1.5BIndustry peers: median 2%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 6% of revenue this year, a 6% median across 10 years.
- Cash-backedCash from ops CN¥7.5B ÷ net income CN¥7.4B
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returned more than it generatedDividends + buybacks CN¥6.7B ÷ Owner Earnings CN¥5.9B
What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against CN¥5.9B of Owner Earnings, CN¥6.7B (114%) went back to shareholders, CN¥1.8B dividends, CN¥4.9B buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.30×ExpandingCapex CN¥2.0B ÷ depreciation CN¥1.5B
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size —Revenue ≥ $2B (a dollar floor) · CN¥105.9B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's floor is a dollar figure — about $2B of revenue as a conservative modern stand-in. This company reports in its home currency and we carry no exchange rate, so we show the figure and leave the size bar for you to apply rather than convert it with a number we don't have.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.28×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · CN¥65M vs CN¥8.7B WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability PassA profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 2 of 10 yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +290%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are CN¥76.35/share (latest year CN¥72.37), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is CN¥400.50/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 10 of 10
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Operating margin 4% → 8% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 4% early to 8% lately, median 5% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Owner earnings growth +21%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 21% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2018 · 2.9% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count −2.3%/yr
What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investmentsCN¥28.8B
- ReceivablesCN¥889M
- InventoryCN¥5.2B
- Other current assetsCN¥4.8B
- Accounts payableCN¥12.5B
- Other current liabilitiesCN¥18.3B
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated CN¥81.9B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash builder, a large share of cash simply built up on the balance sheet.
- ReinvestedCN¥24.3B · 30%
- DividendsCN¥3.5B · 4%
- BuybacksCN¥22.3B · 27%
- Retained (debt / cash)CN¥31.9B · 39%
- Returned to ownersCN¥25.8B
36% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, CN¥3.5B as dividends and CN¥22.3B as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span cash and short-term investments rose CN¥24.7B.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran CN¥22.3B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count−11.2%
The diluted count fell from 126M to 112M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend recordCN¥17.54/sh
Paid in 2 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 12% a year. It was never cut over the span.
- Return on what it retained26%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (CN¥24.6B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew CN¥6.4B, so each retained CN¥1 added about 0.26 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Vipshop Holdings Limited is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
None of the 4 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, E-Commerce & Marketplaces
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AMZNAmazon.com Inc. | $716.9B | 42% | 5.3% | 22% | 8% |
| CVSCVS Health Corporation | $402.1B | 39% | 4.2% | 7% | 4% |
| VIPSVipshop Holdings Limited | CN¥105.9B | 22% | 5.4% | 41% | 6% |
| CPNGCoupang Inc. | $34.5B | 23% | -0.5% | — | 2% |
| CDWCDW Corp. | $22.4B | 17% | 6.6% | 17% | 5% |
| CHWYChewy Inc. | $12.6B | 27% | -0.8% | — | 2% |
| WWayfair | $12.5B | 28% | -5.4% | — | 1% |
| NSITInsight Enterprises | $8.2B | 15% | 3.4% | 13% | 2% |
| Group median | — | 25% | 3.8% | 17% | 3% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Per the filing's own cover, “American depositary shares , each representing 0.2 Class”; Vipshop Holdings Limited reports in CNY, so every figure in this tool is stated per ADS and translated at CNY 1 = $0.147 (2026-07-17, reference rate) so your dollar quote reconciles exactly. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed, in CNY.
Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Vipshop Holdings Limited has delivered.
Through the cycle, Vipshop Holdings Limited earns about $1.0B on its 6.5% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 5.6% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow $807M on 512M shares outstanding (a weighted average, the only count this filer tags); net cash $4.2B. The if-converted diluted count is 558M, 9% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($293M) runs well above depreciation ($225M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $874M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← VIOT its page in the Manual VIST →
Industry order: ← UZX the E-Commerce & Marketplaces chapter W →