Owner Scorecard


← All companies ← VOYA Manual VPG → ← TXT Aerospace & Defense

VOYG, Voyager Technologies Inc.

Aerospace & Defense capital-intensive UnprofitableDistress / turnaround

We are a purpose-built, innovation-driven defense technology and space solutions company focused on delivering mission-critical solutions across national security, space exploration and infrastructure and commercial space markets.

Was purpose-built to address some of the most complex and consequential challenges facing the defense and space sectors, where technological leadership, operational execution and long-term resilience are essential.

We design, develop and operate advanced systems and infrastructure that support defense, intelligence, civil and commercial missions.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
VOYG · Voyager Technologies Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$166M
+15.4% YoY
Vital signs · TTM, with 3-yr average
Revenue $167M 3-yr avg $149M
Gross margin 14% 3-yr avg 21%
Operating margin −75.9% 3-yr avg −36.4%
ROIC −27% 3-yr avg −25%
Owner-earnings margin −62% 3-yr avg −30%
Free cash flow margin −153% 3-yr avg −74%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run around −34% through the cycle on a 20% gross margin, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. Capital spending runs about 57% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on the backlog and program execution. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2023–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$136M$144M$166M$167MRevenueRevenue
20%24%18%14%Gross marginGross mgn
40%43%70%73%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
14%9%11%13%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($14M)($48M)($108M)($127M)Operating incomeOp. inc.
−10.4%−33.6%−65.2%−75.9%Operating marginOp. mgn
($25M)($62M)($105M)($122M)Net incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
($15M)($26M)($61M)($86M)Operating cash flowOp. cash
$10M$14M$13M$17MDepreciationDeprec.
($3M)$19M$12M($3M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$17M$83M$145M$169MCapexCapex
12.6%57.4%86.9%101.0%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($26M)($39M)($74M)($103M)Owner earningsOwner earn.
−18.9%−27.1%−44.7%−61.7%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($33M)($108M)($206M)($255M)Free cash flowFCF
−24.0%−75.0%−123.6%−152.6%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$0$152M$152MAcquisitionsAcquis.
-25%-27%ROICROIC
-27%-34%Return on equityROE
−27%−34%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$30M$56M$491M$429MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$15M$30M$12MReceivablesReceiv.
$2M$4M$6MInventoryInvent.
$23M$27M$20MAccounts payablePayables
($6M)$6M($2M)Operating working capitalOper. WC
$102M$581M$509MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$87M$133M$111MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.2×4.4×4.6×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$47M$158M$158MGoodwillGoodwill
$248M$1.1B$1.0BTotal assetsAssets
$57M$448M$448MTotal debtDebt
$1M($44M)$19MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
-1.3×-4.0×-15.9×-20.4×Interest coverageInt. cov.
($93M)($70M)$384M$357MShareholders’ equityEquity
2.0%2.6%11.4%12.7%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
12.8M12.7M40.2M58.3MShares out (diluted)Shares
$10.67$11.31$4.14$2.87Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-1.99$-4.87$-2.61$-2.09EPS (diluted)EPS
$-2.01$-3.07$-1.85$-1.77Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-2.56$-8.49$-5.11$-4.37Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.35$6.49$3.60$2.89Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$-7.26$-5.47$9.54$6.12Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×3.15 into 2025 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×1.45 into TTM — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The record, charted

FY2023–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
40Mpeak FY2025
Gross margin
18%low FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

($74M)owner earningsvs.($105M)net incomelow FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned ($74M) of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $13M it takes just to hold its position. It put $131M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($206M).

FY2025FY2024FY2023
Reported net income($105M)($62M)($25M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$13M+$14M+$10M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$19M+$4M+$3M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$12M+$19M−$3M
Cash from operations($61M)($26M)($15M)
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$13M−$14M−$10M
Owner earnings($74M)($39M)($26M)
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$131M−$69M−$7M
Free cash flow($206M)($108M)($33M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue-45%-27%-19%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $13M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $131M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $19M), owner earnings is nearer ($93M).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Material weakness in financial controls
“In connection with the preparation of our consolidated financial statements for the year ended December 31, 2021, we identified material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting.”

The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income ($108M) ÷ interest expense $7M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • Net cash
    Cash $491M − debt $448M
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $44M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 65 + DIO 10 − DPO 73 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average
    NOPAT ($86M) ÷ invested capital $340M (debt + equity − cash)
    Industry peers: median -28%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Consumes cash through the cycle
    3-yr median margin, range -45%–-19%; latest ($74M) = operating cash ($61M) − maintenance capex $13M
    Industry peers: median -40%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -45% of revenue this year, a -27% median across 3 years. It chose to put $131M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ($206M) — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $19M of SBC) leaves ($93M).

  • Loss, and burning cash
    Net income ($105M) · cash from operations ($61M)

    In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.

    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.

How is the cash used?

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • Investing or harvesting? 10.78×
    Expanding
    Capex $145M ÷ depreciation $13M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 3 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $166M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 4.37×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $448M vs $448M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-1.10/share (latest year $-1.80), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $6.58/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“Any such changes at the federal level, together with the enactment of any new state laws regulating artificial intelligence technologies, could require us to expend significant resources to modify our products, services, or operations to ensure compliance or remain competitive.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$509M
  • Cash & short-term investments$429M
  • Receivables$12M
  • Inventory$6M
  • Other current assets$61M
Current liabilities$111M
  • Accounts payable$20M
  • Other current liabilities$91M
Current ratio4.57×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio4.52×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio3.86×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$397Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Cash runway1.7 yrsthe business is consuming cash; this is how long the cash on hand lasts at that rate
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+2.1%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.2× → 4.6×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$105Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($111M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$43M$43M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$25Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 3-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$257M24% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity41%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$154Mover 3 years buying other businesses, against $245M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 3-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

  • Insider ownership14.9%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$19M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 11% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Acquisitions, Contingencies as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Aerospace & Defense

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
KTOSKratos Defense & Security Solutions Inc.$1.3B26%2.8%2%1%
RKLBRocket Lab Corporation$602M15%-68.4%-28%-59%
LOARLoar Holdings Inc.$496M49%21.8%5%
RDWRedwire Corporation$335M18%-51.0%-59%-22%
MCFTMasterCraft Boat Holdings Inc.$284M26%14.7%37%10%
VOYGVoyager Technologies Inc.$166M20%-33.6%-25%-27%
FLYFirefly Aerospace Inc.$160M19%-238.8%-30%-178%
JOBYJoby Aviation Inc.$53M-45745.5%-49%-33375%
Group median20%-42.3%-27%-27%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Voyager Technologies Inc. is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.

$
The assumptions

Enter a price to run it.

Owner earnings it must reach
Margin the price demands
Owner-earnings margin today−153%

Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Voyager Technologies Inc. (VOYG), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/VOYG, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← VOYA its page in the Manual VPG →

Industry order: ← TXT the Aerospace & Defense chapter