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VRRM, Verra Mobility Corporation

Hotels & Resorts capital-intensive Capital build-outCyclical

We are a leading provider of smart mobility technology solutions, principally operating throughout the United States, Australia, Europe, and Canada.

We make transportation safer, smarter, and more connected through our integrated, data-driven solutions, including toll and violations management, title and registration services, automated safety and traffic enforcement, and commercial parking management.

We bring together vehicles, hardware, software, data, and people to solve transportation challenges for customers around the world, including commercial fleet owners such as RACs, Direct Fleets, and FMCs, as well as governments, universities, parking operators, healthcare facilities, transportation hubs, and violation-issuing authorities.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

VRRM · Verra Mobility Corporation

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$979M

+11.4% YoY · 20% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $979M 5-yr avg $794M

Operating margin 23.8% 5-yr avg 21.1%

ROIC 12% 5-yr avg 8%

Owner-earnings margin 11% 5-yr avg 21%

Free cash flow margin 11% 5-yr avg 21%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Capital build-out. Capital spending has surged to 12% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has run about 20% through the cycle, a solid margin the cost base and competition set as much as the price does. The margin is cyclical, swinging between 4.3% and 24% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Read this kind of business on volume, density and yield. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on concentrated dependence, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 6%, above 15% in 0 of 7 years). By owner earnings: roughly 18% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2018–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
									Income statement
$370M	$449M	$394M	$551M	$742M	$817M	$879M	$979M	$979M	RevenueRevenue
36%	19%	23%	22%	22%	24%	22%	22%	21%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$16M	$96M	$38M	$112M	$165M	$189M	$136M	$238M	$233M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
4.3%	21.5%	9.6%	20.3%	22.2%	23.1%	15.5%	24.4%	23.8%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($51M)	$17M	($5M)	$41M	$92M	$57M	$31M	$137M	$131M	Net incomeNet inc.
—	44%	—	39%	27%	34%	—	30%	31%	Effective tax rateTax rate
									Cash flow & returns
$49M	$134M	$47M	$193M	$218M	$206M	$224M	$256M	$234M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$103M	$116M	$117M	$117M	$139M	$113M	$109M	$114M	$116M	DepreciationDeprec.
($5M)	($9M)	($78M)	$21M	($29M)	$19M	$61M	($20M)	($39M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$27M	$30M	$24M	$25M	$48M	$57M	$71M	$119M	$129M	CapexCapex
7.2%	6.6%	6.2%	4.5%	6.5%	7.0%	8.1%	12.2%	13.2%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$23M	$104M	$23M	$168M	$170M	$149M	$153M	$137M	$105M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
6.1%	23.2%	5.8%	30.5%	22.9%	18.2%	17.4%	14.0%	10.7%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$23M	$104M	$23M	$168M	$170M	$149M	$153M	$137M	$105M	Free cash flowFCF
6.1%	23.2%	5.8%	30.5%	22.9%	18.2%	17.4%	14.0%	10.7%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$537M	$26M	—	$451M	$0	$0	—	—	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
—	—	—	$100M	$125M	$100M	$200M	$133M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
—	5%	2%	5%	9%	9%	6%	13%	12%	ROICROIC
-18%	6%	-1%	16%	40%	14%	12%	47%	48%	Return on equityROE
−18%	6%	−1%	16%	40%	14%	12%	47%	48%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
									Balance sheet
$65M	$132M	$120M	$101M	$105M	$136M	$78M	$65M	$53M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$88M	$94M	$169M	$161M	$164M	$198M	$207M	$234M	$222M	ReceivablesReceiv.
—	—	$113K	$12M	$19M	$18M	$16M	$21M	$28M	InventoryInvent.
$45M	$51M	$35M	$68M	$80M	$79M	$91M	$102M	$114M	Accounts payablePayables
$42M	$43M	$134M	$106M	$103M	$137M	$131M	$153M	$135M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$185M	$272M	$328M	$348M	$363M	$440M	$394M	$441M	$439M	Current assetsCur. assets
$69M	$105M	$64M	$175M	$187M	$215M	$200M	$210M	$232M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.7×	2.6×	5.1×	2.0×	1.9×	2.0×	2.0×	2.1×	1.9×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$565M	$584M	$586M	$839M	$833M	$836M	$736M	$742M	$741M	GoodwillGoodwill
$1.3B	$1.4B	$1.4B	$1.8B	$1.8B	$1.8B	$1.6B	$1.6B	$1.7B	Total assetsAssets
$869M	$866M	$842M	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.0B	$1.0B	$1.0B	$1.1B	Total debtDebt
$804M	$735M	$722M	$1.1B	$1.1B	$902M	$957M	$963M	$1.0B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
0.2×	1.6×	0.9×	2.5×	2.4×	2.2×	1.8×	3.7×	3.7×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$289M	$310M	$316M	$260M	$231M	$421M	$265M	$293M	$272M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.6%	2.2%	3.2%	2.5%	2.2%	2.1%	2.6%	2.6%	2.6%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
									Per share
175M	160M	162M	164M	159M	160M	168M	161M	154M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$2.12	$2.80	$2.44	$3.36	$4.66	$5.11	$5.24	$6.07	$6.37	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.29	$0.11	$-0.03	$0.25	$0.58	$0.36	$0.19	$0.85	$0.85	EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.13	$0.65	$0.14	$1.03	$1.07	$0.93	$0.91	$0.85	$0.68	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.13	$0.65	$0.14	$1.03	$1.07	$0.93	$0.91	$0.85	$0.68	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.15	$0.19	$0.15	$0.15	$0.30	$0.36	$0.42	$0.74	$0.84	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$1.65	$1.93	$1.95	$1.59	$1.45	$2.63	$1.58	$1.82	$1.77	Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2019 are restated ×2 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	7-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+16.2%/yr	+20.0%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+30.7%/yr	+43.3%/yr
Capital spending / share	+25.3%/yr	+37.5%/yr
Book value / share	+1.4%/yr	−1.4%/yr

The record, charted

FY2018–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.

Share count

161Mpeak FY2018

ROIC

13%low FY2020

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

7.0×peak FY2018

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$137Mowner earningsvs.$137Mnet incomelow FY2020

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2018FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $137M of profit into $137M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$137M

Owner earnings$137M · 14% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$137M	$31M	$57M	$92M	$41M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$114M	+$109M	+$113M	+$139M	+$117M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$25M	+$23M	+$17M	+$17M	+$14M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$20M	+$61M	+$19M	−$29M	+$21M
Cash from operations	$256M	$224M	$206M	$218M	$193M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$119M	−$71M	−$57M	−$48M	−$25M
Owner earnings	$137M	$153M	$149M	$170M	$168M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	14%	17%	18%	23%	31%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $25M), owner earnings is nearer $112M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 3.7×

Adequate

Operating income $238M ÷ interest expense $65M

What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $963M · 4.0× operating profit

Heavy net debt

Cash $65M − debt $1.0B

What this means
Netting $65M of cash and short-term investments against $1.0B of debt leaves $963M owed, about 4.0× a year's operating profit (4.3× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 6%

Below average through the cycle

7-yr median, range 2%–13%; 13% latest = NOPAT $167M ÷ invested capital $1.3B

Industry peers: median 5%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 7 years (it ran 13% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 17%

High through the cycle

8-yr median margin, range 6%–31%; latest $137M = operating cash $256M − maintenance capex $119M

Industry peers: median 5%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 14% of revenue this year, a 17% median across 8 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $25M of SBC) leaves $112M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 1.87×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $256M ÷ net income $137M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 98%

Returns most of it

Dividends + buybacks $133M ÷ Owner Earnings $137M

What this means
Of $137M Owner Earnings, $133M (98%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $133M buybacks. Net of $25M stock comp, the real buyback was about $108M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 1.04×

Maintaining

Capex $119M ÷ depreciation $114M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Miss

Revenue ≥ $2B · $979M

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Pass

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.09×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $1.0B vs $230M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (8-yr record) · 2 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.49/share (latest year $0.90), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $1.93/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2018–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 6 of 8

What this means
Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 8 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 12% → 21% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The margin widened even though the filing names price competition — the gain came from volume or cost, not pricing power. Read where.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 12% early to 21% lately, median 20% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Owner earnings growth +13%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 13% a year over the record.
Worst year 2018 · 4.3% op. margin

What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$439M

Cash & short-term investments$53M
Receivables$222M
Inventory$28M
Other current assets$136M

Current liabilities$232M

Debt due within a year$34M
Accounts payable$114M
Other current liabilities$84M

Current ratio1.89×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.77×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.23×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$207Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$34M due · $53M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−13.1%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters2.6× → 1.9×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value($623M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($945M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$1.1B$46M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$24Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2018–2025

Over the record, the business generated $1.3B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

Reinvested$401M · 30%
Buybacks$658M · 50%
Retained (debt / cash)$268M · 20%

Returned to owners$658M
71% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $658M as buybacks.
Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $658M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
Net change in share count−12.0%
The diluted count fell from 175M to 154M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 8-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$910M55% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth

Cash spent acquiring$1.0Bover 8 years buying other businesses, against $401M of capital spent building

$97M written down across 1 year (2024): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 8-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	David M. Roberts	$3.5M	$5.2M	$168M
2022	David M. Roberts	$4.3M	$4.0M	$170M
2023	David M. Roberts	$9.2M	$17.2M	$149M
2024	David M. Roberts	$5.6M	$4.4M	$153M
2025	David M. Roberts	$6.0M	$1.5M	$137M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership1.3%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$25M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 3% of revenue, equal to 11% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Verra Mobility Corporation is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2018–2025.

None of the 6 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.

Each test came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did the share count rise anyway?
Did debt outgrow the business?
Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Does management own its misses?
2 plain admissions in this year's filing
“We evaluated the refinancing transactions on a lender-by-lender basis and accounted accordingly for debt extinguishment and debt modification costs (for the portion of the transactions that did not meet the accounting criteria for debt extinguishment).”verify →
Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Credit & receivables as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Hotels & Resorts

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
XPOXPO Inc.	$8.2B	47%	4.6%	7%	2%
GATXGatx Corp	$1.7B	—	31.6%	4%	11%
VRRMVerra Mobility Corporation	$979M	—	20.9%	6%	18%
LINDLindblad Expeditions Holdings Inc.	$771M	45%	3.7%	6%	7%
SPCEVirgin Galactic Holdings Inc.	$2M	47%	-7907.9%	-59%	-7151%
Group median	—	—	4.6%	6%	7%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Verra Mobility Corporation has delivered.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Verra Mobility Corporation earns about $174M on its 17.8% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 14.0% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($174M) Net of stock comp (−$26M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−4%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’18→’25+13%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $105M on 152M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-31; net debt $1.0B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh VRRM against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Verra Mobility Corporation (VRRM), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/VRRM, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← VRNS its page in the Manual VRSK →

Industry order: ← TOUR the Hotels & Resorts chapter WH →