Owner Scorecard


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XPO, XPO Inc.

Hotels & Resorts capital-intensive

XPO, Inc. is a leading provider of freight transportation services, with company-specific avenues for value creation.

We use our proprietary technology to move goods efficiently through supply chains for approximately 55,000 customers in North America and Europe.

XPO has one of the largest LTL networks in North America, with approximately 9% share of the U.S. market, estimated to be $53 billion in 2024.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
XPO · XPO Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$8.2B
+1.1% YoY · 6% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $8.3B 5-yr avg $7.8B
Operating margin 8.2% 5-yr avg 6.2%
ROIC 8% 5-yr avg 9%
Owner-earnings margin 6% 5-yr avg 1%
Free cash flow margin 6% 5-yr avg 1%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 46% and operating margin about 4.3% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from 1.6% to 8.2% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best. Read this kind of business on volume, density and yield. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 7%). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

42% of revenue comes from outside the United States.

Revenue by geography, FY2025
  • United States58%$4.7B
  • France16%$1.3B
  • United Kingdom14%$1.1B
  • Europe, Excluding France And United Kingdom11%$877M
  • North America, Excluding United States1%$106M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$14.6B$15.4B$17.3B$10.7B$6.2B$7.2B$7.7B$7.7B$8.1B$8.2B$8.3BRevenueRevenue
46%47%48%22%Gross marginGross mgn
11%11%11%10%12%10%9%8%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$464M$582M$704M$561M$97M$312M$377M$438M$660M$656M$679MOperating incomeOp. inc.
3.2%3.8%4.1%5.3%1.6%4.3%4.9%5.7%8.2%8.0%8.2%Operating marginOp. mgn
$69M$340M$422M$419M$110M$336M$666M$189M$387M$316M$348MNet incomeNet inc.
24%22%13%3%10%26%18%28%26%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$622M$785M$1.1B$629M$388M$656M$824M$694M$808M$986M$1.0BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$466M$488M$546M$370M$321M$327M$336M$376M$432M$467M$475MDepreciationDeprec.
$32M($122M)$85M($216M)($80M)($38M)($255M)$51M($98M)$126M$129MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$483M$504M$551M$379M$249M$269M$521M$1.5B$789M$657M$569MCapexCapex
3.3%3.3%3.2%3.5%4.0%3.7%6.8%19.8%9.8%8.1%6.9%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$139M$281M$551M$250M$139M$387M$303M($839M)$19M$329M$458MOwner earningsOwner earn.
1.0%1.8%3.2%2.3%2.3%5.4%3.9%−10.8%0.2%4.0%5.5%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$139M$281M$551M$250M$139M$387M$303M($839M)$19M$329M$458MFree cash flowFCF
1.0%1.8%3.2%2.3%2.3%5.4%3.9%−10.8%0.2%4.0%5.5%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$5M$7M$8M$8M$8MDividends paidDiv. paid
$0$0$536M$1.3B$114M$0$0$125MBuybacksBuybacks
5%7%7%6%1%7%11%7%11%10%8%ROICROIC
3%9%12%15%4%30%66%15%24%17%19%Return on equityROE
2%9%12%15%18%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$373M$397M$502M$377M$1.7B$228M$460M$412M$246M$310M$237MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$2.3B$2.7B$2.6B$2.5B$1.7B$908M$954M$973M$977M$1.0B$1.2BReceivablesReceiv.
$1.1B$1.3B$1.3B$1.2B$854M$519M$521M$532M$477M$455M$462MAccounts payablePayables
$1.3B$1.5B$1.3B$1.3B$826M$389M$433M$441M$500M$580M$752MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$3.1B$3.6B$3.7B$3.3B$5.4B$2.7B$1.6B$1.6B$1.5B$1.6B$1.7BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$2.7B$3.0B$3.3B$3.3B$5.2B$2.5B$1.5B$1.6B$1.4B$1.6B$1.7BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.1×1.2×1.1×1.0×1.0×1.1×1.1×1.0×1.1×1.0×1.0×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$4.3B$4.6B$4.5B$2.5B$1.7B$1.6B$1.5B$1.5B$1.5B$1.5B$1.5BGoodwillGoodwill
$11.7B$12.6B$12.3B$14.1B$16.2B$8.7B$6.3B$7.5B$7.7B$8.2B$8.2BTotal assetsAssets
$4.9B$4.7B$4.4B$5.4B$6.7B$3.7B$2.6B$3.5B$3.5B$3.4B$4.5BTotal debtDebt
$4.5B$4.3B$3.9B$5.0B$4.9B$3.5B$2.2B$3.1B$3.2B$3.1B$4.3BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
1.3×2.0×3.2×2.1×0.3×1.5×2.8×2.6×3.0×3.0×3.1×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$2.7B$3.6B$3.6B$2.7B$2.8B$1.1B$1.0B$1.3B$1.6B$1.9B$1.9BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.4%0.5%0.3%0.5%0.6%0.4%1.0%1.0%1.1%0.9%0.9%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
123M128M135M106M92.0M114M116M118M120M119M119MShares out (diluted)Shares
$118.85$120.16$127.99$100.76$67.04$63.18$66.53$65.63$67.27$68.55$69.74Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.56$2.66$3.13$3.95$1.20$2.95$5.74$1.60$3.23$2.66$2.92EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.13$2.20$4.08$2.36$1.51$3.39$2.61$-7.11$0.16$2.76$3.85Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.13$2.20$4.08$2.36$1.51$3.39$2.61$-7.11$0.16$2.76$3.85Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.04$0.05$0.06$0.08$0.07Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$3.93$3.94$4.08$3.58$2.71$2.36$4.49$12.99$6.58$5.52$4.78Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$21.95$28.16$26.48$25.88$30.97$9.98$8.72$10.73$13.34$15.64$15.55Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share−5.9%/yr+0.4%/yr
Owner earnings / share+10.5%/yr+12.8%/yr
EPS+18.9%/yr+17.3%/yr
Dividends / share+22.9%/yr (3-yr)+22.9%/yr (3-yr)
Capital spending / share+3.9%/yr+15.3%/yr
Book value / share−3.7%/yr−12.8%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
119Mpeak FY2018
ROIC
10%low FY2020
Gross margin
22%low FY2019
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
9.4×peak FY2024

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$329Mowner earningsvs.$316Mnet incomelow FY2023

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $316M of profit into $329M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$316M
Owner earnings$329M · 4% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$316M$387M$189M$666M$336M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$467M+$432M+$376M+$336M+$327M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$77M+$87M+$78M+$77M+$31M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$126M−$98M+$51M−$255M−$38M
Cash from operations$986M$808M$694M$824M$656M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$657M−$789M−$1.5B−$521M−$269M
Owner earnings$329M$19M($839M)$303M$387M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue4%0%-11%4%5%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $77M), owner earnings is nearer $252M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Adequate
    Operating income $656M ÷ interest expense $219M
    What this means

    Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $3.3B · 5.0× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $310M − debt $3.6B
    What this means

    Netting $310M of cash and short-term investments against $3.6B of debt leaves $3.3B owed, about 5.0× a year's operating profit (5.5× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 46 + DIO 2 − DPO 21 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 1%–11%; 9% latest = NOPAT $474M ÷ invested capital $5.2B
    Industry peers: median 5%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 9% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Thin through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -11%–5%; latest $329M = operating cash $986M − maintenance capex $657M
    Industry peers: median 9%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 4% of revenue this year, a 2% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $77M of SBC) leaves $252M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $986M ÷ net income $316M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $133M ÷ Owner Earnings $329M
    What this means

    Of $329M Owner Earnings, $133M (40%) went back to shareholders, $8M dividends, $125M buybacks. Net of $77M stock comp, the real buyback was about $48M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.41×
    Expanding
    Capex $657M ÷ depreciation $467M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $8.2B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.05×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $3.6B vs $75M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 4 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Near
    Earnings +33% over the record · +7%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.53/share (latest year $2.69), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $15.85/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 4% → 7% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The record and the words agree: the margin widened and the filing attributes the gain to its own pricing, not volume alone.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 4% early to 7% lately, median 4% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth −2%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings shrank about 2% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2020 · 1.6% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −0.4%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.7B
  • Cash & short-term investments$237M
  • Receivables$1.2B
  • Inventory$51M
  • Other current assets$224M
Current liabilities$1.7B
  • Debt due within a year$64M
  • Accounts payable$462M
  • Other current liabilities$1.2B
Current ratio0.99×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.96×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.14×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($16M)the cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$64M due · $237M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+7.3%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.0× → 1.0×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$24Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Debt incl. operating leases$4.0B$755M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $4.6B (annual-report basis)
Deferred revenue$47Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$0
'27$0
'28$1.4B
'29$0
'30$0
later$1.7B

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$0the first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$0the near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$1.4Bin 2028the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Total scheduled principal$3.1Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the balance-sheet debt.

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, operating and finance leases together, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

Operating leasesFinance leases
'26$266M
'27$247M
'28$191M
'29$141M
'30$106M
later$283M

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$266Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$1.2Bevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$1.0Bthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$3.6B
Lease obligations (present value)$1.0B
Total fixed claims on the business$4.6B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $4.6B, of which the leases are 22%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $7.5B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$5.9B · 79%
  • Dividends$28M · 0%
  • Buybacks$2.1B · 28%
  • Returned to owners$2.1B

    138% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $28M as dividends and $2.1B as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−$591M

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $591M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: cash and short-term investments drew down $136M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $2.1B over the span, but a stock split in the window left the reported buyback-share counts on a basis the diluted-share count doesn't match, so a comparable average price can't be drawn.

  • Net change in share count−3.3%

    The diluted count fell from 123M to 119M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$0.08/sh

    Paid in 4 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 23% a year. It was never cut over the span.

  • Return on what it retained−44%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($1.1B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell $487M, so each retained $1 gave back about 0.44 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$1.9B23% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity83%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$0over 10 years buying other businesses, against $5.9B of capital spent building

$64M written down across 1 year (2022): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Mario Harik$22.0M$22.0M$387M
2022Mario Harik$47.0M$66.9M$303M
2022Mario Harik$9.0M$19.7M$303M
2023Mario Harik$12.4M$75.0M($839M)
2024Mario Harik$14.0M$67.2M$19M
2025Mario Harik$12.0M$21.5M$329M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio185:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$77M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 12% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why XPO Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

None of the 6 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.

Each test came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Income taxes, Acquisitions, Insurance reserves as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Hotels & Resorts

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
XPOXPO Inc.$8.2B47%4.6%7%2%
GATXGatx Corp$1.7B31.6%4%11%
VRRMVerra Mobility Corporation$979M20.9%6%18%
LINDLindblad Expeditions Holdings Inc.$771M45%3.7%6%7%
SPCEVirgin Galactic Holdings Inc.$2M47%-7907.9%-59%-7151%
Group median47%4.6%6%7%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what XPO Inc. has delivered.

$
Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−16%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25−2%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $458M on 117M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-24; net debt $4.3B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "XPO Inc. (XPO), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/XPO, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← XPER its page in the Manual XPOF →

Industry order: ← XHR the Hotels & Resorts chapter YTRA →