Owner Scorecard


← All companies ← VREX Manual VRRM → ← VIA Software VTEX →

VRNS, Varonis

Software asset-light Unprofitable

Varonis is a data security company focused on protecting what matters most to organizations: their data.

Modern enterprises run on data that is created, copied, shared and accessed across cloud services, SaaS applications and on-premises environments, often faster than security teams can see, understand or control.

Cloud transformation and artificial intelligence ("AI") initiatives are pushing data into more systems, across more environments and making it accessible to more users, applications and AI agents.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
VRNS · Varonis
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$624M
+13.2% YoY · 16% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $660M 5-yr avg $507M
Gross margin 78% 5-yr avg 83%
Operating margin −22.3% 5-yr avg −23.8%
ROIC −16% 5-yr avg −110%
Owner-earnings margin 18% 5-yr avg 10%
Free cash flow margin 18% 5-yr avg 10%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is SaaS (74%), Term license subscriptions (18%) and Maintenance (8%).
Situation
Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run around −23% through the cycle on a 85% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. Stock-based pay runs about 21% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −22%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 5% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

SaaS is 74% of revenue, with Term license subscriptions the other meaningful line at 18%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025
  • SaaS74%$463M
  • Term license subscriptions18%$110M
  • Maintenance8%$51M
By geographyUnited States71%EMEA21%Rest of World8%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$166M$215M$270M$254M$293M$390M$474M$499M$551M$624M$660MRevenueRevenue
91%90%90%86%85%85%85%86%83%79%78%Gross marginGross mgn
12%12%12%17%16%16%15%17%16%16%15%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
22%22%26%32%34%35%38%37%36%38%38%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($12M)($13M)($29M)($76M)($78M)($99M)($121M)($117M)($118M)($147M)($147M)Operating incomeOp. inc.
−7.2%−6.2%−10.8%−29.9%−26.8%−25.3%−25.6%−23.5%−21.4%−23.5%−22.3%Operating marginOp. mgn
($14M)($14M)($29M)($79M)($94M)($117M)($125M)($101M)($96M)($129M)($130M)Net incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
$7M$16M$24M($11M)($6M)$7M$12M$59M$115M$147M$134MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$2M$3M$4M$6M$10M$11M$12M$12M$11M$12M$14MDepreciationDeprec.
$6M$7M$13M$16M$9M$3M($19M)$9M$73M$134M$119MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$4M$5M$10M$25M$10M$10M$11M$5M$7M$13M$15MCapexCapex
2.3%2.5%3.5%10.0%3.5%2.7%2.4%1.0%1.2%2.0%2.3%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$5M$13M$19M($17M)($16M)($3M)$475K$54M$109M$135M$119MOwner earningsOwner earn.
3.1%6.0%7.2%−6.7%−5.5%−0.8%0.1%10.9%19.7%21.6%18.1%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$4M$11M$14M($36M)($16M)($3M)$475K$54M$109M$135M$119MFree cash flowFCF
2.1%5.1%5.2%−14.2%−5.5%−0.8%0.1%10.9%19.7%21.6%18.1%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$0$29M$0$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$0$0$56M$44M$0$115MBuybacksBuybacks
-20%-18%-30%-244%-79%-482%-25%-18%-10%-14%-16%ROICROIC
-15%-12%-23%-84%-100%-20%-25%-21%-21%-22%-29%Return on equityROE
−15%−12%−23%−84%−100%−20%−25%−21%−21%−22%−29%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$114M$97M$119M$110M$268M$806M$604M$695M$1.2B$1.1B$861MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$54M$76M$83M$75M$94M$117M$136M$169M$193M$243M$157MReceivablesReceiv.
$1M$635K$3M$997K$850K$5M$3M$672K$4M$6M$11MAccounts payablePayables
$53M$75M$81M$74M$93M$112M$133M$168M$189M$237M$146MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$171M$226M$259M$215M$420M$959M$906M$767M$878M$1.3B$1.1BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$88M$117M$146M$160M$183M$212M$229M$307M$710M$659M$639MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.9×1.9×1.8×1.3×2.3×4.5×4.0×2.5×1.2×2.0×1.7×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$0$23M$23M$23M$23M$23M$135M$217MGoodwillGoodwill
$182M$246M$285M$318M$555M$1.1B$1.0B$1.1B$1.7B$1.8B$1.6BTotal assetsAssets
$0$218M$225M$249M$250M$701M$452M$453MTotal debtDebt
($110M)($50M)($580M)($355M)($445M)($487M)($619M)($408M)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
$96M$115M$125M$94M$94M$597M$502M$490M$456M$599M$454MShareholders’ equityEquity
7.8%9.2%12.9%18.2%23.4%28.1%30.2%28.0%23.0%20.9%20.0%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
79.2M82.4M87.1M90.8M94.3M105M109M109M112M114M116MShares out (diluted)Shares
$2.09$2.61$3.10$2.80$3.10$3.70$4.33$4.57$4.93$5.45$5.70Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.18$-0.17$-0.33$-0.87$-1.00$-1.11$-1.14$-0.92$-0.86$-1.13$-1.13EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.07$0.16$0.22$-0.19$-0.17$-0.03$0.00$0.50$0.97$1.18$1.03Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.04$0.13$0.16$-0.40$-0.17$-0.03$0.00$0.50$0.97$1.18$1.03Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.05$0.06$0.11$0.28$0.11$0.10$0.10$0.05$0.06$0.11$0.13Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$1.21$1.39$1.44$1.03$1.00$5.67$4.59$4.49$4.08$5.23$3.92Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2019 are restated ×3 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+11.2%/yr+11.9%/yr
Owner earnings / share+37.9%/yr
Capital spending / share+9.6%/yr+0.6%/yr
Book value / share+17.7%/yr+39.3%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.

Share count
114Mpeak FY2025
ROIC
−14%low FY2021
Gross margin
79%low FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$135Mowner earningsvs.($129M)net incomelow FY2019

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $129M loss into $135M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($129M)($96M)($101M)($125M)($117M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$12M+$11M+$12M+$12M+$11M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$130M+$127M+$140M+$143M+$110M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$134M+$73M+$9M−$19M+$3M
Cash from operations$147M$115M$59M$12M$7M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$13M−$7M−$5M−$11M−$10M
Owner earnings$135M$109M$54M$475K($3M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue22%20%11%0%-1%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $130M), owner earnings is nearer $5M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income ($147M) ÷ interest expense $86K
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • Net cash
    Cash $202M + ST investments $681M − debt $452M
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $431M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. It also holds $187M in longer-dated marketable securities; counting those, it sits at net cash of $619M. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 142 + DIO 0 − DPO 16 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -482%–-10%; -14% latest = NOPAT ($116M) ÷ invested capital $848M
    Industry peers: median -6%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -14% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • High, recently turned positive
    latest $135M = operating cash $147M − maintenance capex $13M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median 3%)
    Industry peers: median 10%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 22% of revenue this year, a 3% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $130M of SBC) leaves $5M.

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($129M) · cash from operations $147M
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $115M ÷ Owner Earnings $135M
    What this means

    Of $135M Owner Earnings, $115M (85%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $115M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($130M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.03×
    Maintaining
    Capex $13M ÷ depreciation $12M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $624M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Near
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.97×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $452M vs $640M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 10 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.95/share (latest year $-1.13), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $5.21/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 0 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 10 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 7 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin −8% → −23% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about −8% early to −23% lately, median −23% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −12%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.

  • Owner earnings growth +33%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 33% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2019 · −29.9% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2019, understand why before trusting the good years.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“AI technologies, including generative AI, are complex and rapidly evolving, and we face competition from other companies as well as an evolving regulatory landscape.”

AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.1B
  • Cash & short-term investments$748M
  • Receivables$157M
  • Other current assets$177M
Current liabilities$639M
  • Accounts payable$11M
  • Other current liabilities$628M
Current ratio1.69×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.69×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio1.17×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$442Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+26.9%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters2.4× → 1.7×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$180Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Debt incl. operating leases$69M$69M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$439Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $372M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash builder, a large share of cash simply built up on the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$101M · 27%
  • Buybacks$215M · 58%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$56M · 15%
  • Returned to owners$215M

    72% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $215M as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span cash and short-term investments rose $634M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$19.37

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 3M shares were bought for $56M, about $19.37 each.

  • Net change in share count46.2%

    The diluted count rose from 79M to 116M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Yakov Faitelson$10.4M$12.7M($3M)
2022Yakov Faitelson$9.6M−$8.9M$475K
2023Yakov Faitelson$14.1M$51.0M$54M
2024Yakov Faitelson$14.5M$20.3M$109M
2025Yakov Faitelson$14.4M−$3.7M$135M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership3%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio89:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$130M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 21% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Varonis is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?46.2%

    Diluted shares grew 46.2% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $215M on buybacks. The repurchases were a treadmill: stock issued to staff outran them, so owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Acquisitions as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Software

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
NTSKNetskope Inc.$709M65%-76.9%-107%-27%
BLBlackLine$700M76%-9.4%-3%11%
QLYSQualys$669M78%24.5%25%40%
MQMarqeta Inc.$625M45%-28.0%-57%10%
FSLYFastly Inc.$624M54%-30.9%-13%-21%
VRNSVaronis$624M85%-23.5%-22%5%
NCNOnCino$595M59%-20.4%-6%2%
EVCMEverCommerce$589M-4.9%-1%16%
Group median65%-21.9%-9%8%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Varonis has delivered.

Varonis’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, Varonis earns about $29M on its 4.6% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 21.6% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+37%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $119M on 115M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-24; net cash $408M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($15M) runs well above depreciation ($14M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $122M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Varonis (VRNS), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/VRNS, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← VREX its page in the Manual VRRM →

Industry order: ← VIA the Software chapter VTEX →