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VSEC, VSE Corporation
History and Organization VSE Corporation, through its subsidiaries is a leading provider of aftermarket distribution and maintenance, repair and overhaul services for air transportation assets for commercial and government markets.
Purpose, Vision and Core Values Purpose and Vision Statement We deliver trusted solutions to inspire the performance of tomorrow.
VSE Corporation is focused on enhancing the productivity and longevity of its customer's high-value, business-critical assets.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is Products (63%) and Services (37%).
- Situation
- Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 46% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 5 of the record's 10 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run about 7.5% through the cycle, a thin margin, where volume, cost discipline and the price it gets all bear on the result. The operating margin has swung widely — from −0.6% to 9.2% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −69 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 6%, above 15% in 0 of 9 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Products is 63% of revenue, with Services the other meaningful line at 37%.
- Products63%$704M
- Services37%$408M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $692M | $760M | $697M | $753M | $662M | $481M | $669M | $544M | $786M | $1.1B | $1.2B | RevenueRevenue |
| 60% | 62% | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 75% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 1% | 0% | 1% | 1% | 0% | 1% | 1% | 1% | 2% | 1% | 1% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| $52M | $54M | $54M | $60M | $14M | ($3M) | $54M | $50M | $59M | $90M | $98M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 7.4% | 7.1% | 7.8% | 8.0% | 2.1% | −0.6% | 8.0% | 9.2% | 7.5% | 8.1% | 8.3% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $27M | $39M | $35M | $37M | ($5M) | $8M | $28M | $39M | $15M | $12M | $50M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 36% | 13% | 22% | 20% | — | — | 24% | 10% | 22% | 57% | 27% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $47M | $50M | $19M | $18M | $36M | ($18M) | $8M | ($22M) | ($31M) | $27M | $11M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $26M | $26M | $25M | $27M | $24M | $25M | $25M | $23M | $29M | $40M | $43M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($8M) | ($18M) | ($44M) | ($49M) | $14M | ($54M) | ($49M) | ($92M) | ($83M) | ($37M) | ($95M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $7M | $4M | $3M | $10M | $4M | $11M | $11M | $19M | $21M | $21M | $25M | CapexCapex |
| 0.9% | 0.5% | 0.4% | 1.3% | 0.7% | 2.2% | 1.7% | 3.4% | 2.6% | 1.9% | 2.1% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $41M | $47M | $16M | $8M | $31M | ($28M) | ($3M) | ($40M) | ($52M) | $6M | ($14M) | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 5.9% | 6.1% | 2.3% | 1.1% | 4.7% | −5.8% | −0.5% | −7.4% | −6.6% | 0.5% | −1.1% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $41M | $47M | $16M | $8M | $31M | ($28M) | ($3M) | ($40M) | ($52M) | $6M | ($14M) | Free cash flowFCF |
| 5.9% | 6.1% | 2.3% | 1.1% | 4.7% | −5.8% | −0.5% | −7.4% | −6.6% | 0.5% | −1.1% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $63K | $0 | $0 | $113M | $0 | $53M | $0 | $219M | $283M | $394M | $400M | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $2M | $3M | $3M | $4M | $4M | $4M | $5M | $5M | $7M | $8M | $9M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| 7% | 10% | 9% | 8% | 1% | -0% | 6% | 4% | 3% | — | 4% | ROICROIC |
| 10% | 13% | 11% | 10% | -1% | 2% | 6% | 6% | 2% | 1% | 2% | Return on equityROE |
| 10% | 12% | 10% | 9% | −3% | 1% | 5% | 5% | 1% | 0% | 2% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $428K | $624K | $162K | $734K | $378K | $518K | $305K | $8M | $30M | $69M | $1.2B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $101M | $56M | $60M | $71M | $55M | $77M | $91M | $128M | $158M | $191M | $217M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $94M | $66M | $57M | $68M | $73M | $115M | $129M | $173M | $145M | $155M | $148M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $7M | ($10M) | $3M | $3M | ($17M) | ($38M) | ($38M) | ($45M) | $13M | $36M | $69M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $258M | $249M | $281M | $355M | $355M | $464M | $549M | $774M | $965M | $893M | $2.2B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $148M | $114M | $105M | $164M | $139M | $180M | $225M | $287M | $299M | $238M | $246M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.7× | 2.2× | 2.7× | 2.2× | 2.5× | 2.6× | 2.4× | 2.7× | 3.2× | 3.8× | 8.8× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $199M | $199M | $199M | $276M | $238M | $217M | $217M | $289M | $428M | $641M | $639M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $662M | $629M | $639M | $846M | $780M | $919M | $1000M | $1.4B | $1.7B | $2.0B | $3.3B | Total assetsAssets |
| $215M | $173M | $161M | $270M | $251M | $285M | $286M | $429M | $430M | $293M | $361M | Total debtDebt |
| $214M | $172M | $160M | $269M | $251M | $284M | $286M | $422M | $401M | $223M | ($878M) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 1.6× | 1.7× | 4.4× | 4.8× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $255M | $293M | $328M | $363M | $356M | $417M | $450M | $617M | $988M | $1.4B | $2.7B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 0.3% | 0.4% | 0.4% | 0.4% | 0.4% | 0.8% | 0.7% | 1.4% | 1.1% | 1.2% | 1.2% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 10.8M | 10.9M | 10.9M | 11.0M | 11.0M | 12.6M | 12.8M | 14.2M | 18.0M | 21.2M | 27.8M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $63.89 | $69.94 | $63.75 | $68.14 | $59.96 | $38.11 | $52.19 | $38.35 | $43.74 | $52.37 | $42.42 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $2.47 | $3.60 | $3.21 | $3.35 | $-0.47 | $0.63 | $2.19 | $2.76 | $0.85 | $0.55 | $1.79 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $3.75 | $4.29 | $1.44 | $0.76 | $2.84 | $-2.23 | $-0.25 | $-2.85 | $-2.88 | $0.27 | $-0.49 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $3.75 | $4.29 | $1.44 | $0.76 | $2.84 | $-2.23 | $-0.25 | $-2.85 | $-2.88 | $0.27 | $-0.49 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.23 | $0.26 | $0.30 | $0.34 | $0.36 | $0.35 | $0.40 | $0.38 | $0.39 | $0.39 | $0.31 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $0.60 | $0.34 | $0.29 | $0.87 | $0.40 | $0.83 | $0.87 | $1.32 | $1.15 | $1.00 | $0.89 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $23.57 | $26.97 | $30.03 | $32.88 | $32.29 | $33.04 | $35.04 | $43.48 | $54.97 | $67.74 | $95.79 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | −2.2%/yr | −2.7%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | −25.4%/yr | −37.6%/yr |
| EPS | −15.4%/yr | — |
| Dividends / share | +6.1%/yr | +1.6%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +5.8%/yr | +20.1%/yr |
| Book value / share | +12.4%/yr | +16.0%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business reported $12M of profit but $6M of owner earnings: $6M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $12M | $15M | $39M | $28M | $8M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$40M | +$29M | +$23M | +$25M | +$25M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$13M | +$8M | +$8M | +$4M | +$4M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$37M | −$83M | −$92M | −$49M | −$54M |
| Cash from operations | $27M | ($31M) | ($22M) | $8M | ($18M) |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$21M | −$21M | −$19M | −$11M | −$11M |
| Owner earnings | $6M | ($52M) | ($40M) | ($3M) | ($28M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 1% | -7% | -7% | 0% | -6% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $13M), owner earnings is nearer ($7M).
Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- AdequateOperating income $90M ÷ interest expense $21M
What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $223M · 2.5× operating profitMeaningful net debtCash $69M − debt $293M
What this means
Netting $69M of cash and short-term investments against $293M of debt leaves $223M owed, about 2.5× a year's operating profit (3.3× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Negative, funded by othersDSO 63 + DIO 0 − DPO 193 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle9-yr median, range -0%–10%; the latest year is left out — large non-operating charges put its operating line well above pretax profitIndustry peers: median 14%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years, so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Thin through the cycle10-yr median margin, range -7%–6%; latest $6M = operating cash $27M − maintenance capex $21MIndustry peers: median 11%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 1% of revenue this year, a 1% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $13M of SBC) leaves ($7M).
- Cash-backedCash from ops $27M ÷ net income $12M
In the filing’s words Read against the cash, reported earnings have run ahead of the operating cash the business generated over the record, and a manipulation screen of eight balance-sheet ratios trips on it. For an inventory- or content-heavy grower that can be cash tied up in real assets as it expands; elsewhere it can mean the earnings lean on accounting estimates — the cash-flow statement against the income statement is where to tell which.
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returned more than it generatedDividends + buybacks $8M ÷ Owner Earnings $6M
What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $6M of Owner Earnings, $8M (145%) went back to shareholders, $8M dividends, $0 buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.53×HarvestingCapex $21M ÷ depreciation $40M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size NearRevenue ≥ $2B · $1.1B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 3.76×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · $293M vs $656M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability NearA profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −34%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.79/share (latest year $0.42), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $51.28/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 9 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 7% → 8% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 7% early, 8% lately, median 7%.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 0%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
- Worst year 2021 · −0.6% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2021, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“In addition, rapid technological changes and digital disruption, including the increasing adoption of artificial intelligence and data-driven platforms by competitors, customers, suppliers, and other market participants, as well as the development and introduction of new aircraft components, advanced replacement parts,…”
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$1.2B
- Receivables$217M
- Other current assets$705M
- Debt due within a year$30M
- Accounts payable$148M
- Other current liabilities$68M
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $135M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested$110M · 81%
- Dividends$47M · 35%
- Returned to owners$47M
187% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $47M as dividends and $0 as buybacks.
- Source of funding−$22M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $22M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $215M to $361M.
- Net change in share count157.1%
The diluted count rose from 11M to 28M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record$0.39/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 6% a year. It was never cut over the span.
- Return on what it retained−34%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($188M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell $63M, so each retained $1 gave back about 0.34 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
$31M written down across 1 year (2020): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Mr. Cuomo | $2.3M | $3.1M | ($28M) |
| 2022 | Mr. Cuomo | $3.6M | $3.2M | ($3M) |
| 2023 | Mr. Cuomo | $4.6M | $8.1M | ($40M) |
| 2024 | Mr. Cuomo | $4.9M | $10.5M | ($52M) |
| 2025 | Mr. Cuomo | $9.0M | $21.7M | $6M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership1.8%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$13M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 14% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why VSE Corporation is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
5 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 1 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?−4.5% vs 4.8%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 4.8% early in the record and −4.5% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?157.1%
Diluted shares grew 157.1% over 2016–2025. Owners were diluted on net; each share owns less of the business than it did. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$215M → $361M
Debt rose from $215M to $361M while owner earnings went from about $34M to ($29M): the borrowing grew and the earnings that would carry it are not there now. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
- Look hereDid reported profit become cash?0.57×
Across the record the business reported $235M of net income but generated $135M of operating cash, a 0.57-to-one conversion. Profit that does not turn into cash over many years is the classic mark of earnings that are softer than they look. Ask where the gap sits, receivables, inventory, or costs being capitalized rather than expensed.
- Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?15% → 18% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $101M to $217M while revenue grew 71%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (15% of revenue then, 18% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Inventory, Acquisitions as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Construction & Engineering
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ITGartner Inc. | $6.5B | 67% | 14.1% | 40% | 18% |
| TTEKTetra Tech | $5.4B | 83% | 7.7% | 14% | 7% |
| PAYXPaychex Inc. | $5.4B | 70% | 39.7% | 41% | 32% |
| INCYIncyte | $5.1B | 95% | 15.0% | 24% | 22% |
| ASTHAstrana Health Inc. | $3.2B | 23% | 9.5% | 11% | 5% |
| HURNHuron Consulting | $1.7B | 37% | 7.6% | 6% | 11% |
| VSECVSE Corporation | $1.1B | 74% | 7.6% | 6% | 1% |
| BWMNBowman Consulting Group Ltd. | $490M | 51% | 0.8% | 2% | 4% |
| Group median | — | 69% | 8.6% | 12% | 9% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what VSE Corporation has delivered.
VSE Corporation’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, below the record’s own through-cycle owner earnings. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, VSE Corporation earns about $9M on its 0.8% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 0.5% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow ($14M) on 28M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-05; net cash $878M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits off the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($25M) runs well above depreciation ($43M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ($10M), the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← VSCO its page in the Manual VSECU →
Industry order: ← TTEK the Construction & Engineering chapter VSECU →