Share count
76Mpeak FY2018
← All companies ← ISTR Manual ITGR → ← ICFI Professional Services LICN →
IT, Gartner Inc.
Revenue is led by Insights (78%) and Conferences (10%), with 2 more segments behind.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$6.5B
+3.7% YoY · 10% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $6.5B 5-yr avg $5.8B
Revenue $1.5B −1.5% vs yr-ago qtr
Operating margin 20.9% yr-ago 18.1%
Net income $222M yr-ago $211M
Net margin 14.7% yr-ago 13.7%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- An asset-light business: the value sits in intellectual property and people, not plant, so the question is how durable the advantage is, not how high the margin.
- Situation
- Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 67% and operating margin about 12% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The operating margin has swung widely — from −0.2% to 21% — on a steadier 67% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has run high across the record (median 40%, above 15% in 7 of 10 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 18% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Insights is 78% of revenue, with Conferences the other meaningful segment at 10%.
Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
- Insights78%$5.1B
- Conferences10%$645M
- Consulting9%$552M
- Other4%$227M
By geographyUnited States and Canada62%Europe Middle East Africa26%Other International12%
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $2.4B | $3.3B | $4.0B | $4.2B | $4.1B | $4.7B | $5.5B | $5.9B | $6.3B | $6.5B | $6.5B | RevenueRevenue |
| 61% | 60% | 63% | 63% | 67% | 69% | 69% | 68% | 68% | 68% | 69% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 45% | 48% | 47% | 50% | 50% | 46% | 45% | 46% | 46% | 47% | 47% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| $305M | ($6M) | $260M | $370M | $490M | $916M | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.0B | $1.1B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 12.5% | −0.2% | 6.5% | 8.7% | 12.0% | 19.3% | 20.1% | 20.9% | 18.4% | 15.8% | 16.4% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $194M | $3M | $122M | $233M | $267M | $794M | $808M | $882M | $1.3B | $729M | $741M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 33% | — | 32% | 15% | 18% | 18% | 21% | 23% | 10% | 25% | 25% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $366M | $255M | $471M | $565M | $903M | $1.3B | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.5B | $1.3B | $1.4B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $62M | $240M | $256M | $212M | $219M | $212M | $192M | $191M | $202M | $200M | $195M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $63M | ($68M) | $27M | $51M | $355M | $208M | $11M | ($48M) | ($126M) | $205M | $281M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $50M | $111M | $127M | $149M | $84M | $60M | $108M | $103M | $102M | $115M | $110M | CapexCapex |
| 2.0% | 3.3% | 3.2% | 3.5% | 2.0% | 1.3% | 2.0% | 1.7% | 1.6% | 1.8% | 1.7% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $316M | $144M | $344M | $416M | $819M | $1.3B | $993M | $1.1B | $1.4B | $1.2B | $1.3B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 12.9% | 4.3% | 8.7% | 9.8% | 20.0% | 26.5% | 18.1% | 17.8% | 22.1% | 18.1% | 19.4% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $316M | $144M | $344M | $416M | $819M | $1.3B | $993M | $1.1B | $1.4B | $1.2B | $1.3B | Free cash flowFCF |
| 12.9% | 4.3% | 8.7% | 9.8% | 20.0% | 26.5% | 18.1% | 17.8% | 22.1% | 18.1% | 19.4% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $48M | $2.6B | $16M | $26M | $0 | $23M | $10M | $4M | $2M | $0 | $0 | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $59M | $41M | $261M | $199M | $176M | $1.7B | $1.0B | $606M | $735M | $2.0B | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 73% | -0% | 6% | 11% | 17% | 36% | 43% | 52% | 55% | 49% | 57% | ROICROIC |
| 318% | 0% | 14% | 25% | 24% | 214% | 355% | 130% | 92% | 228% | 1168% | Return on equityROE |
| 318% | 0% | 14% | 25% | 24% | 214% | 355% | 130% | 92% | 228% | n/m | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $474M | $539M | $156M | $281M | $713M | $756M | $698M | $1.3B | $1.9B | $1.7B | $1.7B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $643M | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.3B | $1.2B | $1.4B | $1.6B | $1.6B | $1.7B | $1.7B | $1.4B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $41M | $49M | $38M | $33M | $39M | $49M | $83M | $63M | $56M | $50M | $862M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $602M | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.5B | $1.5B | $1.6B | $1.6B | $549M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $1.3B | $2.6B | $1.8B | $2.0B | $2.3B | $2.6B | $2.8B | $3.4B | $4.2B | $4.1B | $3.6B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $1.5B | $2.8B | $2.6B | $2.9B | $2.9B | $3.4B | $3.6B | $3.8B | $4.0B | $4.1B | $3.9B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 0.9× | 0.9× | 0.7× | 0.7× | 0.8× | 0.8× | 0.8× | 0.9× | 1.1× | 1.0× | 0.9× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $738M | $3.0B | $2.9B | $2.9B | $2.9B | $3.0B | $2.9B | $2.9B | $2.9B | $2.7B | $2.7B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $2.4B | $7.3B | $6.2B | $7.2B | $7.3B | $7.4B | $7.3B | $7.8B | $8.5B | $8.1B | $7.7B | Total assetsAssets |
| $694M | $3.3B | $2.3B | $2.2B | $2.0B | $2.5B | $2.5B | $2.5B | $2.5B | $3.0B | $3.0B | Total debtDebt |
| $220M | $2.7B | $2.1B | $1.9B | $1.3B | $1.7B | $1.8B | $1.1B | $527M | $1.3B | $1.3B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 11.1× | -0.0× | 2.0× | 3.6× | 4.2× | 7.7× | 8.7× | 9.3× | 8.8× | 8.2× | 8.0× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $61M | $983M | $851M | $939M | $1.1B | $371M | $228M | $681M | $1.4B | $320M | $63M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 1.9% | 2.4% | 1.7% | 1.6% | 1.5% | 2.1% | 1.7% | 2.2% | 2.5% | 2.4% | 2.3% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 83.8M | 89.8M | 92.1M | 91.0M | 90.0M | 86.2M | 81.1M | 79.7M | 78.3M | 75.6M | 70.0M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $29.16 | $36.88 | $43.15 | $46.67 | $45.54 | $54.93 | $67.55 | $74.13 | $80.00 | $85.94 | $92.53 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $2.31 | $0.04 | $1.33 | $2.56 | $2.96 | $9.21 | $9.96 | $11.08 | $16.00 | $9.65 | $10.59 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $3.77 | $1.60 | $3.74 | $4.58 | $9.10 | $14.54 | $12.25 | $13.21 | $17.66 | $15.54 | $17.98 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $3.77 | $1.60 | $3.74 | $4.58 | $9.10 | $14.54 | $12.25 | $13.21 | $17.66 | $15.54 | $17.98 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.59 | $1.23 | $1.38 | $1.64 | $0.93 | $0.69 | $1.33 | $1.29 | $1.30 | $1.52 | $1.57 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $0.73 | $10.95 | $9.24 | $10.32 | $12.11 | $4.31 | $2.81 | $8.54 | $17.35 | $4.23 | $0.91 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +12.8%/yr | +13.5%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +17.1%/yr | +11.3%/yr |
| EPS | +17.2%/yr | +26.6%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +11.0%/yr | +10.3%/yr |
| Book value / share | +21.6%/yr | −19.0%/yr |
The year, in the company's words
the filing →Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.
- Insights+5.0%
“Insights revenues increased by $243.5 million during 2025 compared to 2024, or 5% on a reported basis and 4% excluding the foreign currency impact. The increase in revenues during 2025 was primarily due to Insights contract value growth in 2024.”
✓ figure matches the filed record - Consulting-1.1%
“Consulting revenues decreased by $6.0 million during 2025 compared to 2024, or 1% on a reported basis and 2% excluding the foreign currency impact. The decrease in revenues on a reported basis was due to a 5% decrease in labor-based consulting, partially offset by a 11% increase in contract optimization.”
✓ figure matches the filed record
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
49%low FY2017
Gross margin
68%low FY2017
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
1.1×peak FY2017
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
$1.2Bowner earningsvs.$729Mnet incomelow FY2017
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
FY2016FY2025
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned $729M of profit into $1.2B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $729M | $1.3B | $882M | $808M | $794M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$200M | +$202M | +$191M | +$192M | +$212M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$156M | +$155M | +$130M | +$91M | +$99M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$205M | −$126M | −$48M | +$11M | +$208M |
| Cash from operations | $1.3B | $1.5B | $1.2B | $1.1B | $1.3B |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$115M | −$102M | −$103M | −$108M | −$60M |
| Owner earnings | $1.2B | $1.4B | $1.1B | $993M | $1.3B |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 18% | 22% | 18% | 18% | 26% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $156M), owner earnings is nearer $1.0B.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- ComfortableOperating income $1.0B ÷ interest expense $125M
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $1.3B · 1.2× operating profitModest net debtCash $1.7B − debt $3.0B
What this means
Netting $1.7B of cash and short-term investments against $3.0B of debt leaves $1.3B owed, about 1.2× a year's operating profit (2.9× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 95 + DIO 0 − DPO 9 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)
Is it a good business?
- Very high (≥25%) through the cycle10-yr median, range -0%–73%; 49% latest = NOPAT $773M ÷ invested capital $1.6BIndustry peers: median 14%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 49% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- High through the cycle10-yr median margin, range 4%–26%; latest $1.2B = operating cash $1.3B − maintenance capex $115MIndustry peers: median 7%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 18% of revenue this year, a 18% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $156M of SBC) leaves $1.0B.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $1.3B ÷ net income $729M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returned more than it generatedDividends + buybacks $2.0B ÷ Owner Earnings $1.2B
What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $1.2B of Owner Earnings, $2.0B (169%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $2.0B buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $156M stock comp, the real buyback was about $1.8B. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.57×HarvestingCapex $115M ÷ depreciation $200M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $6.5B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.00×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $3.0B vs ($6M) WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability PassA profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +797%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $14.27/share (latest year $10.89), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $4.78/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 10 of 10
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 7 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 6% → 18% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 6% early to 18% lately, median 12% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Owner earnings growth +21%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 21% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2017 · −0.2% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2017, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count −1.1%/yr
What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
- How management talks about it Promotional
What this means
The record is compounding, but the filing leans on a promoter’s vocabulary rather than the per-share, return-on-capital terms an owner uses. The results back the talk here; the register is still worth noting.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Elevated contestabilityThe product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.
In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“For example, disruptive technologies such as machine learning and other AI technologies may significantly alter the market for our offerings in unpredictable ways and reduce customer demand.”
The moat the record shows, a high return on capital held across years, was earned before AI collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$3.6B
- Cash & short-term investments$1.7B
- Receivables$1.4B
- Other current assets$570M
Current liabilities$3.9B
- Debt due within a year$5M
- Accounts payable$862M
- Other current liabilities$3.0B
Current ratio0.94×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.94×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.43×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($238M)the cushion left after near-term bills
Its current ratio is below 1, which usually reads as strain; here it is likely structural strength. What it owes in the near term is money to suppliers and customers (payables and deferred revenue), not to lenders, so the balance sheet is funded by operating float, the way Costco's and Amazon's are. The low ratio can be the edge, not the risk; the cash-conversion cycle and the debt due above say which.
Debt due this year vs. cash$5M due · $1.7B cash
covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−1.5%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters0.9× → 0.9×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($3.0B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($3.9B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$3.4B$372M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $3.3B (annual-report basis)
Deferred revenue$3.1Bcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float
From the company's latest filing.
Lease obligations
the lease note, SEC EDGAR →Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.
Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.
Due in the next 12 months$109Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$431Mevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$366Mthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability
True leverage: debt plus leases
On-balance-sheet debt$3.0B
Lease obligations (present value)$366M
Total fixed claims on the business$3.3B
Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $3.3B, of which the leases are 11%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.
Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $8.9B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.
- Reinvested$1.0B · 11%
- Buybacks$6.8B · 76%
- Retained (debt / cash)$1.1B · 13%
- Returned to owners$6.8B
86% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $6.8B as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $2.3B and cash and short-term investments rose $1.2B.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $6.8B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count−16.5%
The diluted count fell from 84M to 70M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
Goodwill & intangibles$3.1B38% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth
Cash spent acquiring$2.8Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $1.0B of capital spent building
$150M written down across 1 year (2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Mr. Hall | $14.1M | $80.4M | $1.3B |
| 2022 | Mr. Hall | $15.5M | $16.0M | $993M |
| 2023 | Mr. Hall | $16.3M | $40.0M | $1.1B |
| 2024 | Mr. Hall | $18.4M | $26.0M | $1.4B |
| 2025 | Mr. Hall | $19.2M | −$7.0M | $1.2B |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Stock-based compensation$156M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 2% of revenue, equal to 15% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Gartner Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
None of the 6 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.
Each test came back clean
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did debt outgrow the business?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Stock compensation as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Professional Services
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BAHBooz Allen Hamilton Holding Corporation | $11.2B | 54% | 9.0% | 21% | 6% |
| ITGartner Inc. | $6.5B | 67% | 14.1% | 40% | 18% |
| TTEKTetra Tech | $5.4B | 83% | 7.7% | 14% | 7% |
| PAYXPaychex Inc. | $5.4B | 70% | 39.7% | 41% | 32% |
| INCYIncyte | $5.1B | 95% | 15.0% | 24% | 22% |
| ASTHAstrana Health Inc. | $3.2B | 23% | 9.5% | 11% | 5% |
| HURNHuron Consulting | $1.7B | 37% | 7.6% | 6% | 11% |
| VSECVSE Corporation | $1.1B | 74% | 7.6% | 6% | 1% |
| Group median | — | 69% | 9.2% | 17% | 9% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Gartner Inc. has delivered.
$
Through the cycle, Gartner Inc. earns about $1.2B on its 18.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 18.1% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
Base
—
The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+3%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+21%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+21%/yr
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Owner earnings $1.3B on 67M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-01; net debt $1.3B. The if-converted diluted count is 70M, 5% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Gartner Inc. (IT), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/IT, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← ISTR its page in the Manual ITGR →
Industry order: ← ICFI the Professional Services chapter LICN →