Owner Scorecard


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HURN, Huron Consulting

Professional Services asset-light CyclicalSerial acquirer

Huron is a global professional services firm that partners with clients to put possible into practice by creating sound strategies, optimizing operations, accelerating digital transformation, and empowering businesses to own their future.

Accelerating Growth in Healthcare and Education: Huron holds leading market positions in healthcare and education, providing comprehensive offerings to the largest health systems, academic medical centers, colleges and universities, and research institutes in the United States and abroad.

Huron's commercial industry focus has increased the diversification of the Company's portfolio and end markets while expanding the range of capabilities it can deliver to clients, providing new avenues for growth and an important balance to its healthcare and education focus.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
HURN · Huron Consulting
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$1.7B
+11.7% YoY · 14% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $1.7B 5-yr avg $1.3B
Gross margin 62% 5-yr avg 29%
Operating margin 10.4% 5-yr avg 9.0%
ROIC 11% 5-yr avg 11%
Owner-earnings margin 7% 5-yr avg 8%
Free cash flow margin 7% 5-yr avg 8%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Healthcare (49%), Education (29%) and Commercial (19%).
Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power. Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 56% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 5 of the record's 10 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 34% and operating margin about 6.6% through the cycle, a spread the cycle sets more than the company does. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −26% and 11% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 6%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 11% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 3 segments, the largest Healthcare at 49%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • Healthcare49%$838M
  • Education29%$500M
  • Commercial19%$325M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$798M$808M$878M$965M$871M$927M$1.2B$1.4B$1.5B$1.7B$1.7BRevenueRevenue
34%44%41%40%28%29%62%Gross marginGross mgn
20%22%21%21%20%19%18%18%19%19%19%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$74M($207M)$52M$64M($29M)$53M$100M$125M$169M$179M$182MOperating incomeOp. inc.
9.3%−25.7%5.9%6.6%−3.3%5.7%8.6%9.0%11.1%10.5%10.4%Operating marginOp. mgn
$38M($170M)$14M$42M($24M)$63M$76M$62M$117M$105M$104MNet incomeNet inc.
34%45%20%21%30%26%24%22%26%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$129M$100M$102M$132M$137M$18M$85M$135M$201M$193M$138MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$47M$50M$39M$34M$30M$26M$27M$25M$25M$32M$35MDepreciationDeprec.
$28M$205M$30M$32M$106M($97M)($48M)$2M$14M$9M($48M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$14M$24M$9M$13M$8M$11M$13M$9M$9M$10M$14MCapexCapex
1.7%3.0%1.0%1.4%0.9%1.2%1.1%0.7%0.6%0.6%0.8%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$115M$75M$93M$119M$129M$7M$73M$126M$193M$183M$124MOwner earningsOwner earn.
14.4%9.3%10.6%12.3%14.8%0.8%6.3%9.0%12.7%10.8%7.1%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$115M$75M$93M$119M$129M$7M$73M$126M$193M$183M$124MFree cash flowFCF
14.4%9.3%10.6%12.3%14.8%0.8%6.3%9.0%12.7%10.8%7.1%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$69M$107M$215K$3M$9M$45M$3M$2M$50M$112M$105MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$0$13M$27M$65M$120M$123M$123M$167MBuybacksBuybacks
5%-20%4%7%-3%5%8%11%14%14%11%ROICROIC
6%-34%3%7%-4%11%14%12%21%20%26%Return on equityROE
6%−34%3%7%−4%11%14%12%21%20%26%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$17M$17M$33M$12M$67M$21M$12M$12M$22M$25M$26MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$94M$102M$110M$117M$88M$122M$148M$163M$198M$187M$209MReceivablesReceiv.
$7M$9M$10M$8M$648K$14M$14M$10M$12M$12M$12MAccounts payablePayables
$87M$93M$100M$109M$87M$109M$134M$152M$186M$174M$197MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$180M$191M$233M$225M$231M$258M$328M$400M$409M$449M$515MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$136M$139M$418M$205M$187M$205M$246M$303M$339M$383M$232MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.3×1.4×0.6×1.1×1.2×1.3×1.3×1.3×1.2×1.2×2.2×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$800M$646M$645M$647M$594M$621M$625M$626M$679M$787M$787MGoodwillGoodwill
$1.2B$1.0B$1.0B$1.1B$1.1B$1.1B$1.2B$1.3B$1.3B$1.5B$1.6BTotal assetsAssets
$292M$343M$297M$209M$203M$233M$290M$324M$357M$510M$855MTotal debtDebt
$275M$326M$264M$197M$136M$212M$278M$312M$335M$485M$828MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
$648M$503M$541M$585M$552M$572M$552M$533M$561M$529M$397MShareholders’ equityEquity
2.1%1.8%2.1%2.5%2.8%2.8%2.7%3.3%3.0%2.7%2.7%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
21.4M21.4M22.1M22.5M21.9M21.8M20.7M19.6M18.6M18.0M17.4MShares out (diluted)Shares
$37.25$37.68$39.80$42.90$39.81$42.50$55.86$71.36$81.76$94.44$100.35Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.76$-7.93$0.62$1.85$-1.09$2.89$3.64$3.19$6.27$5.84$5.96EPS (diluted)EPS
$5.38$3.52$4.20$5.29$5.88$0.33$3.51$6.42$10.35$10.17$7.11Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$5.38$3.52$4.20$5.29$5.88$0.33$3.51$6.42$10.35$10.17$7.11Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.65$1.14$0.41$0.59$0.37$0.50$0.60$0.48$0.46$0.58$0.82Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$30.25$23.48$24.51$26.01$25.22$26.22$26.61$27.19$30.16$29.38$22.83Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+10.9%/yr+18.9%/yr
Owner earnings / share+7.3%/yr+11.6%/yr
EPS+14.3%/yr
Capital spending / share−1.3%/yr+9.3%/yr
Book value / share−0.3%/yr+3.1%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
18Mpeak FY2019
ROIC
14%low FY2017
Gross margin
29%low FY2020
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
2.7×peak FY2021

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$183Mowner earningsvs.$105Mnet incomelow FY2021

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $105M of profit into $183M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$105M
Owner earnings$183M · 11% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$105M$117M$62M$76M$63M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$32M+$25M+$25M+$27M+$26M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$47M+$45M+$46M+$31M+$26M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$9M+$14M+$2M−$48M−$97M
Cash from operations$193M$201M$135M$85M$18M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$10M−$9M−$9M−$13M−$11M
Owner earnings$183M$193M$126M$73M$7M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue11%13%9%6%1%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $47M), owner earnings is nearer $136M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Interest expense not tagged in the data
    What this means

    No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $485M · 2.7× operating profit
    Meaningful net debt
    Cash $25M − debt $510M
    What this means

    Netting $25M of cash and short-term investments against $510M of debt leaves $485M owed, about 2.7× a year's operating profit (2.9× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 40 + DIO 0 − DPO 7 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -20%–14%; 14% latest = NOPAT $139M ÷ invested capital $1.0B
    Industry peers: median 14%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 14% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 1%–15%; latest $183M = operating cash $193M − maintenance capex $10M
    Industry peers: median 6%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 11% of revenue this year, a 11% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $47M of SBC) leaves $136M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $193M ÷ net income $105M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $167M ÷ Owner Earnings $183M
    What this means

    Of $183M Owner Earnings, $167M (91%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $167M buybacks. Net of $47M stock comp, the real buyback was about $120M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.32×
    Harvesting
    Capex $10M ÷ depreciation $32M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Near
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.7B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.17×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $510M vs $65M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 2 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $5.84/share (latest year $6.48), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $32.61/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 8 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin −3% → 10% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −3% early to 10% lately, median 7% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth +8%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 8% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2017 · −25.7% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2017, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count −1.9%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“If, as a result of new technologies or AI functionality, our clients demand new services and products, we may be less competitive in these new areas or we may need to make significant investment in our portfolio of software products to meet that demand.”

AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$515M
  • Cash & short-term investments$26M
  • Receivables$209M
  • Other current assets$279M
Current liabilities$232M
  • Debt due within a year$20M
  • Accounts payable$12M
  • Other current liabilities$200M
Current ratio2.22×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio2.22×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.11×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$283Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$20M due · $26M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+12.1%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.9× → 2.2×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($458M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Debt incl. operating leases$887M$33M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$32Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $1.2B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$121M · 10%
  • Buybacks$638M · 52%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$475M · 39%
  • Returned to owners$638M

    57% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $638M as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $563M and cash and short-term investments rose $9M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $638M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count−18.8%

    The diluted count fell from 21M to 17M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$860M56% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth
Cash spent acquiring$398Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $121M of capital spent building

$313M written down across 2 years (2017, 2020): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 79% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearPay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021$3.6M$1.4M$7M
2022$6.1M$8.8M$73M
2023$5.7M$10.2M$126M
2024$6.5M$10.5M$193M
2025$7.2M$14.3M$183M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$47M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 3% of revenue, equal to 26% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Huron Consulting is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$292M → $855M

    Debt rose from $292M to $855M while owner earnings went from about $94M to $167M — about 3.1 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 5.1 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

  • Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?7 of 10 years

    Management took an impairment or write-down in 7 of the last 10 years, $338M in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Acquisitions, Contingencies as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Professional Services

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
BAHBooz Allen Hamilton Holding Corporation$11.2B54%9.0%21%6%
ITGartner Inc.$6.5B67%14.1%40%18%
TTEKTetra Tech$5.4B83%7.7%14%7%
INCYIncyte$5.1B95%15.0%24%22%
ASTHAstrana Health Inc.$3.2B23%9.5%11%5%
HURNHuron Consulting$1.7B37%7.6%6%11%
VSECVSE Corporation$1.1B74%7.6%6%1%
BWMNBowman Consulting Group Ltd.$490M51%0.8%2%4%
Group median61%8.3%12%7%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Huron Consulting has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Huron Consulting earns about $181M on its 10.7% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 10.8% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+47%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+8%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $124M on 16M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-28; net debt $828M. The if-converted diluted count is 17M, 7% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($14M) runs well above depreciation ($35M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $128M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Huron Consulting (HURN), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/HURN, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← HUN its page in the Manual HUT →

Industry order: ← GRNQ the Professional Services chapter ICFI →