Share count
79Mpeak FY2021
← All companies ← WF Manual WILC → ← UFPI Paper & Forest Products
WFG, West Fraser Timber Co. Ltd
West Fraser is a diversified wood products company with facilities in Canada, the U.S., the U.K. and Europe, manufacturing, marketing, selling, and distributing lumber, engineered wood products, northern bleached softwood kraft pulp, paper, wood chips and other residuals.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$5.5B
−11.5% YoY · 5% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $5.5B 5-yr avg $7.7B
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by Lumber (47%) and NA EWP (39%), with 2 more segments behind.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 30% and operating margin about 0.1% through the cycle, a spread the cycle sets more than the company does. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −22% and 38% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Inventory runs near 13% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 12%). By owner earnings: roughly 10% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 20-F →Revenue spreads across 5 segments, the largest Lumber at 47%.
Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
- Lumber47%$2.6B
- NA EWP39%$2.1B
- Europe EWP9%$493M
- Pulp & Paper6%$325M
- All other-1%($58M)
By geographyUnited States65%Canada20%U.K and Europe9%Asia6%Other Geographical Areas0%
From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2020–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMDec 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||
| $4.4B | $10.5B | $9.7B | $6.5B | $6.2B | $5.5B | $5.5B | RevenueRevenue |
| 41% | 56% | 47% | 27% | 30% | 23% | 23% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| $831M | $3.9B | $2.6B | ($284M) | $7M | ($1.2B) | ($1.2B) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 19.0% | 37.5% | 26.4% | −4.4% | 0.1% | −21.7% | −21.7% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $588M | $2.9B | $2.0B | ($167M) | ($5M) | ($937M) | ($937M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 26% | 24% | 24% | — | — | — | — | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||
| $968M | $3.6B | $2.2B | $525M | $661M | $96M | $96M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $380M | $605M | $232M | $692M | $666M | $1.0B | $1.0B | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $180M | $635M | $477M | $477M | $487M | $411M | $411M | CapexCapex |
| 4.1% | 6.0% | 4.9% | 7.4% | 7.9% | 7.5% | 7.5% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $788M | $2.9B | $1.7B | $48M | $174M | ($315M) | ($315M) | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 18.0% | 27.7% | 17.8% | 0.7% | 2.8% | −5.8% | −5.8% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $788M | $2.9B | $1.7B | $48M | $174M | ($315M) | ($315M) | Free cash flowFCF |
| 18.0% | 27.7% | 17.8% | 0.7% | 2.8% | −5.8% | −5.8% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $41M | $75M | $99M | $100M | $101M | $101M | $101M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| $0 | $1.3B | $2.0B | $129M | $140M | $129M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 25% | 45% | 28% | -3% | 0% | -16% | -16% | ROICROIC |
| 24% | 38% | 26% | -2% | -0% | -16% | -16% | Return on equityROE |
| 22% | 38% | 25% | −4% | −2% | −18% | −18% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||
| $461M | $1.6B | $1.2B | $900M | $641M | $202M | $202M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $277M | $508M | $350M | $311M | $294M | $244M | $244M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $578M | $1.1B | $1.0B | $851M | $844M | $828M | $828M | InventoryInvent. |
| $389M | $848M | $722M | $620M | $604M | $584M | $584M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $466M | $721M | $660M | $542M | $534M | $488M | $488M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $1.3B | $3.2B | $2.7B | $2.4B | $1.8B | $1.4B | $1.4B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $528M | $1.2B | $792M | $1.1B | $934M | $651M | $651M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 2.5× | 2.7× | 3.5× | 2.3× | 2.0× | 2.1× | 2.1× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $559M | $2.0B | $1.9B | $1.9B | $1.9B | $1.5B | $1.5B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $4.2B | $10.4B | $10.0B | $9.4B | $8.8B | $7.6B | $7.6B | Total assetsAssets |
| $500M | $499M | $499M | $199M | $0 | $300M | $300M | Total debtDebt |
| $39M | ($1.1B) | ($663M) | ($701M) | ($641M) | $98M | $98M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 26.0× | 82.2× | 106.6× | -11.8× | 0.3× | -62.5× | -62.5× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $2.5B | $7.7B | $7.6B | $7.2B | $7.0B | $5.8B | $5.8B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||
| 68.7M | 109M | 93.8M | 83.2M | 80.9M | 79.0M | 79.0M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $63.68 | $96.48 | $103.47 | $77.57 | $76.36 | $69.16 | $69.16 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $8.56 | $27.03 | $21.06 | $-2.01 | $-0.06 | $-11.86 | $-11.86 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $11.47 | $26.76 | $18.45 | $0.58 | $2.15 | $-3.99 | $-3.99 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $11.47 | $26.76 | $18.45 | $0.58 | $2.15 | $-3.99 | $-3.99 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.60 | $0.69 | $1.06 | $1.20 | $1.25 | $1.28 | $1.28 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $2.62 | $5.82 | $5.09 | $5.73 | $6.02 | $5.20 | $5.20 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $36.08 | $70.23 | $81.26 | $86.82 | $86.00 | $74.06 | $74.06 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×1.59 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 5-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +1.7%/yr | +1.7%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +16.5%/yr | +16.5%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +14.7%/yr | +14.7%/yr |
| Book value / share | +15.5%/yr | +15.5%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2020–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
−16%low FY2025
Gross margin
23%low FY2025
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
-3.7×peak FY2020
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
($315M)owner earningsvs.($937M)net incomelow FY2025
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
FY2020FY2025
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $937M loss into ($315M) of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($937M) | ($5M) | ($167M) | $2.0B | $2.9B |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$1.0B | +$666M | +$692M | +$232M | +$605M |
| Cash from operations | $96M | $661M | $525M | $2.2B | $3.6B |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$411M | −$487M | −$477M | −$477M | −$635M |
| Owner earnings | ($315M) | $174M | $48M | $1.7B | $2.9B |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | -6% | 3% | 1% | 18% | 28% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 40-F · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -62.5×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($1.2B) ÷ interest expense $19M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net debt against an operating lossCash $202M − debt $300M
What this means
Netting $202M of cash and short-term investments against $300M of debt leaves $98M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- TightDSO 16 + DIO 72 − DPO 51 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle6-yr median, range -16%–45%; -16% latest = NOPAT ($938M) ÷ invested capital $5.9BIndustry peers: median 20%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 6 years (it ran -16% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Thin through the cycle6-yr median margin, range -6%–28%; latest ($315M) = operating cash $96M − maintenance capex $411MIndustry peers: median 9%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -6% of revenue this year, a 3% median across 6 years.
- Loss, but cash-generativeNet income ($937M) · cash from operations $96M
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- No surplus to allocate
What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
- Investing or harvesting? —Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $5.5B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 2.13×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · $300M vs $736M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (6-yr record) · 3 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (6)
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −120%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-4.68/share (latest year $-11.86), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $74.06/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2020–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 3 of 6
What this means
Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 6 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 28% → −9% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices but names price competition too — and the margin slipped, so the pressure is winning here.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 28% early to −9% lately, median 0% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Worst year 2025 · −21.7% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2025, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +2.8%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
- How management talks about it Promotional
What this means
The returns have faded, yet the filing reaches for a promoter’s vocabulary — world-class, best-in-class, disruptive — more than an owner’s. When the words sell harder than the results deliver, the gap is the thing to weigh.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
In its own filing Framed as a capability
The filing positions AI as something the company uses, not something it fears.
“Artificial Intelligence (AI) Adoption, Utilization and Governance Artificial intelligence technologies are rapidly transforming business operations, competitive dynamics, and customer expectations.”
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$1.4B
- Cash & short-term investments$202M
- Receivables$244M
- Inventory$828M
- Other current assets$113M
Current liabilities$651M
- Accounts payable$584M
- Other current liabilities$67M
Current ratio2.13×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.86×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.31×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$736Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$4.4Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($384M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$300Mno operating-lease liability tagged this quarter, so debt alone
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2020–2025
Over the record, the business generated $8.0B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$2.7B · 33%
- Dividends$517M · 6%
- Buybacks$3.7B · 46%
- Retained (debt / cash)$1.1B · 14%
- Returned to owners$4.2B
79% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $517M as dividends and $3.7B as buybacks.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $3.7B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count15.0%
The diluted count rose from 69M to 79M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record$1.28/sh
Paid in 6 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 16% a year. It was never cut over the span.
- Return on what it retained—
Not read here: owner earnings are negative over the span, or the company returned nearly all its earnings rather than retaining them, so there is too little retained to measure a return on.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why West Fraser Timber Co. Ltd is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2020–2025.
2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?−0.7% vs 21.2%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 21.2% early in the record and −0.7% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?15.0%
Diluted shares grew 15.0% over 2020–2025, even as the company spent $3.7B on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
And these came back clean
- Did debt outgrow the business?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Pension & retirement, Acquisitions as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Paper & Forest Products
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| UFPIUFP Industries | $6.3B | 16% | 6.2% | 16% | 6% |
| WFGWest Fraser Timber Co. Ltd | $5.5B | 36% | 9.6% | 12% | 10% |
| FBINFortune Brands | $4.5B | 41% | 13.1% | 12% | 9% |
| LPXLouisiana-Pacific Corporation | $2.7B | 27% | 18.3% | 29% | 11% |
| SKYChampion Homes Inc. | $2.7B | 22% | 8.2% | 22% | 8% |
| CVCOCavco Industries, Inc. | $2.2B | 22% | 9.1% | 20% | 9% |
| KOPKoppers Holdings Inc. | $1.9B | 20% | 8.0% | 9% | 4% |
| TREXTrex Company, Inc. | $1.2B | 41% | 25.1% | 37% | 18% |
| Group median | — | 25% | 9.3% | 18% | 9% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. West Fraser Timber Co. Ltd's US listing is the ordinary share itself. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed.
Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what West Fraser Timber Co. Ltd has delivered.
West Fraser Timber Co. Ltd’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, a cyclical trough. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
$
Through the cycle, West Fraser Timber Co. Ltd earns about $564M on its 10.3% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s −5.8% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
Base
—
The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth, delivered—
Owner-earnings growth, delivered—
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Owner earnings ($315M) on 79M shares outstanding (a weighted average, the only count this filer tags); net debt $98M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits off the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "West Fraser Timber Co. Ltd (WFG), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/WFG, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← WF its page in the Manual WILC →
Industry order: ← UFPI the Paper & Forest Products chapter