Owner Scorecard


← All companies ← WINA Manual WK → ← WEN Restaurants YUM →

WING, Wingstop

Restaurants consumer brand

Wingstop is the largest fast casual chicken wings-focused restaurant chain in the world, with more than 3,050 locations worldwide.

We operate in a single segment for reporting purposes and generate revenues by charging royalties, advertising fees, and franchise fees to our franchisees and by operating a number of our own restaurants.

Our approach to becoming a Top 10 Global Restaurant Brand centers around the following key strategic priorities: sustaining long-term same store sales growth; maintaining best-in-class returns; and expanding our global footprint.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
WING · Wingstop
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$697M
+11.4% YoY · 23% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $709M 5-yr avg $485M
Gross margin 87% 5-yr avg 83%
Operating margin 27.0% 5-yr avg 25.7%
ROIC 49% 5-yr avg 51%
Owner-earnings margin 23% 5-yr avg 19%
Free cash flow margin 19% 5-yr avg 14%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 80% and operating margin about 25% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. That margin has stayed fairly steady relative to where it runs (21%–26% over the years), so unit growth and cost discipline, not a moving line, are the lever. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −16 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. Read this kind of business on same-store sales and unit economics. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run high across the record (median 48%, above 15% in 10 of 10 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 19% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$103M$133M$153M$200M$249M$283M$358M$460M$626M$697M$709MRevenueRevenue
76%78%79%79%80%80%82%85%85%87%Gross marginGross mgn
33%26%29%25%25%22%19%21%19%18%19%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$27M$34M$39M$43M$57M$74M$92M$113M$166M$179M$191MOperating incomeOp. inc.
25.8%25.4%25.2%21.5%23.1%26.1%25.7%24.5%26.5%25.7%27.0%Operating marginOp. mgn
$14M$24M$22M$20M$23M$43M$53M$70M$109M$174M$112MNet incomeNet inc.
37%17%19%21%13%28%24%26%26%27%28%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$22M$27M$39M$39M$66M$49M$76M$122M$158M$153M$189MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$3M$3M$4M$5M$8M$8M$11M$13M$19M$25M$26MDepreciationDeprec.
$4M($2M)$9M$6M$26M($11M)$8M$23M$7M($71M)$27MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$2M$3M$4M$22M$6M$28M$24M$41M$52M$47M$57MCapexCapex
2.0%1.9%2.6%11.3%2.4%9.9%6.7%8.9%8.3%6.8%8.1%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$20M$25M$35M$33M$59M$41M$65M$108M$138M$128M$163MOwner earningsOwner earn.
19.2%18.7%22.7%16.6%23.9%14.5%18.3%23.6%22.1%18.4%23.0%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$20M$25M$35M$16M$59M$21M$52M$81M$106M$106M$132MFree cash flowFCF
19.2%18.7%22.7%8.1%23.9%7.4%14.6%17.6%16.9%15.2%18.6%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$1M$7M$5M$8M$11M$14M$19M$19MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$83M$4M$191M$12M$164M$20M$141M$25M$29M$32M$33MDividends paidDiv. paid
$0$0$125M$315M$222MBuybacksBuybacks
25%40%38%36%56%48%51%51%57%48%49%ROICROIC
Balance sheet
$4M$4M$12M$13M$41M$49M$184M$90M$316M$197M$129MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$3M$5M$6M$5M$5M$7M$9M$12M$20M$21M$24MReceivablesReceiv.
$226K$216K$299K$315K$396K$484K$389K$535K$535KInventoryInvent.
$1M$2M$3M$3M$4M$5M$5M$5M$7M$13M$9MAccounts payablePayables
$2M$3M$3M$2M$2M$2M$5M$8M$13M$8M$15MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$11M$16M$30M$30M$73M$70M$227M$144M$396M$267M$217MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$17M$19M$26M$33M$50M$40M$62M$71M$87M$82M$97MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.7×0.8×1.1×0.9×1.4×1.8×3.6×2.0×4.5×3.3×2.2×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$45M$47M$50M$50M$54M$57M$63M$68M$75M$84M$84MGoodwillGoodwill
$112M$120M$140M$166M$212M$249M$424M$378M$716M$693M$649MTotal assetsAssets
$151M$133M$320M$318M$471M$469M$714M$712M$1.2B$1.2B$1.2BTotal debtDebt
$147M$129M$308M$305M$430M$421M$530M$622M$890M$1.0B$1.1BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
($81M)($58M)($225M)($209M)($341M)($310M)($391M)($457M)($676M)($737M)($799M)Shareholders’ equityEquity
1.2%1.4%2.4%3.5%3.4%3.4%1.2%3.4%3.5%3.6%3.4%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
29.0M29.4M29.6M29.7M29.8M29.9M30.0M29.9M29.4M28.1M27.6MShares out (diluted)Shares
$3.56$4.53$5.18$6.73$8.35$9.43$11.93$15.41$21.30$24.82$25.71Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.48$0.81$0.73$0.69$0.78$1.42$1.77$2.35$3.70$6.21$4.05EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.68$0.85$1.18$1.12$2.00$1.37$2.18$3.63$4.70$4.56$5.92Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.68$0.85$1.18$0.54$2.00$0.70$1.75$2.71$3.60$3.76$4.78Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$2.87$0.14$6.45$0.40$5.50$0.66$4.72$0.83$0.98$1.15$1.19Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.07$0.09$0.13$0.76$0.20$0.94$0.80$1.37$1.77$1.69$2.07Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$-2.81$-1.99$-7.60$-7.06$-11.45$-10.34$-13.04$-15.32$-22.99$-26.24$-28.96Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+24.1%/yr+24.4%/yr
Owner earnings / share+23.5%/yr+18.0%/yr
EPS+33.1%/yr+51.3%/yr
Dividends / share−9.6%/yr−26.8%/yr
Capital spending / share+42.2%/yr+52.8%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
28Mpeak FY2022
ROIC
48%low FY2016
Gross margin
85%low FY2016
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
7.9×peak FY2021

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$128Mowner earningsvs.$174Mnet incomelow FY2016

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $128M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $25M it takes just to hold its position. It put $22M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $106M.

Reported net income$174M
Owner earnings$128M · 18% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$174M$109M$70M$53M$43M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$25M+$19M+$13M+$11M+$8M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$25M+$22M+$16M+$4M+$10M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$71M+$7M+$23M+$8M−$11M
Cash from operations$153M$158M$122M$76M$49M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$25M−$19M−$13M−$11M−$8M
Owner earnings$128M$138M$108M$65M$41M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$22M−$32M−$28M−$13M−$20M
Free cash flow$106M$106M$81M$52M$21M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue18%22%24%18%14%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $25M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $22M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $25M), owner earnings is nearer $103M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Interest expense not tagged in the data
    What this means

    No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $1.0B · 5.6× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $197M − debt $1.2B
    What this means

    Netting $197M of cash and short-term investments against $1.2B of debt leaves $1.0B owed, about 5.6× a year's operating profit (6.7× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Negative, funded by others
    DSO 11 + DIO 2 − DPO 51 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.

Is it a good business?

  • Very high (≥25%) through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 25%–57%; 48% latest = NOPAT $132M ÷ invested capital $276M
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 48% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • High through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 14%–24%; latest $128M = operating cash $153M − maintenance capex $25M
    Industry peers: median 6%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 18% of revenue this year, a 19% median across 10 years. It chose to put $22M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $106M — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $25M of SBC) leaves $103M.

  • Mostly cash-backed
    Cash from ops $153M ÷ net income $174M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returned more than it generated
    Dividends + buybacks $254M ÷ Owner Earnings $128M
    What this means

    The company returned more than it generated: against $128M of Owner Earnings, $254M (199%) went back to shareholders, $32M dividends, $222M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $25M stock comp, the real buyback was about $197M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.89×
    Expanding
    Capex $47M ÷ depreciation $25M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $697M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 3.26×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $1.2B vs $186M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +494%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $4.32/share (latest year $6.40), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $-27.05/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 10 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 25% → 26% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 25% early, 26% lately, median 25%.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC
    What this means

    The reinvested base moved too little against the change in profit to read a reliable return on it here — the figure would be a small-denominator artifact, not a moat. Judge this one on the owner-earnings record and the cash it returns instead.

  • Owner earnings growth +22%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 22% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2019 · 21.5% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −0.4%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

  • Dividend record paid
    What this means

    Paid a dividend in 10 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 28, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$217M
  • Cash & short-term investments$129M
  • Receivables$24M
  • Inventory$535K
  • Other current assets$64M
Current liabilities$97M
  • Accounts payable$9M
  • Other current liabilities$87M
Current ratio2.24×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio2.24×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio1.33×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$120Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+7.4%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.9× → 2.2×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($940M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($1.2B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$1.3B$61M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$58Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $750M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

  • Reinvested$229M · 31%
  • Dividends$701M · 94%
  • Buybacks$662M · 88%
  • Returned to owners$1.4B

    209% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $701M as dividends and $662M as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−$842M

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $842M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $151M to $1.2B.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$256.05

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 3M shares were bought for $662M, about $256.05 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $182.09 (2025) to $436.55 (2024), and 2024, near the top of that range, was also its heaviest buyback year ($315M).

  • Net change in share count−4.8%

    The diluted count fell from 29M to 28M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$1.15/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend shrinking about 10% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$141M20% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equitygoodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$64Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $229M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Mr. Morrison$5.0M$15.0M$41M
2022Mr. Morrison$2.9M−$20.4M$65M
2022Mr. Skipworth$4.1M$6.5M$65M
2023Mr. Skipworth$6.8M$24.7M$108M
2024Mr. Skipworth$9.3M$16.4M$138M
2025Mr. Skipworth$35.3M$33.4M$128M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio1,590:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$25M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 4% of revenue, equal to 14% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Wingstop is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$151M → $1.2B

    Debt rose from $151M to $1.2B while owner earnings went from about $27M to $125M — about 5.7 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 9.7 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Restaurants

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
FWRGFirst Watch Restaurant Group Inc.$1.2B2.3%2%4%
CAVACAVA Group$1.2B0.6%10%7%
DINDine Brands Global Inc.$879M63%17.1%9%12%
PTLOPortillo's Inc.$732M8.2%7%6%
WINGWingstop$697M80%25.6%48%19%
SGSweetgreen Inc.$679M-30.2%-43%-16%
LOCOEl Pollo Loco Holdings Inc.$490M8.5%8%6%
BHBiglari Holdings Inc.$395M57%5.8%3%16%
Group median63%7.0%8%7%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Wingstop has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Wingstop earns about $132M on its 18.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 18.4% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+26%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+19%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $132M on 27M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-28; net debt $1.1B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($57M) runs well above depreciation ($26M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $164M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Wingstop (WING), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/WING, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← WINA its page in the Manual WK →

Industry order: ← WEN the Restaurants chapter YUM →