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WMB, Williams Companies Inc. (The)

Pipelines & Midstream capital-intensive Cyclical

Williams has operations in 11 supply areas that provide natural gas gathering and processing, transmission and storage services; NGL fractionation, transportation, and storage services; and marketing services to approximately 800 customers.

Williams is an energy company committed to being the leader in providing infrastructure that safely delivers natural gas products to reliably fuel the clean energy economy.

Transco owns and operates an approximately 9,600-mile natural gas pipeline system extending from Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi and the Gulf of America through Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, Pennsylvania and New Jersey to the New York City metropolitan area.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

WMB · Williams Companies Inc. (The)

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$14.9B

+17.9% YoY · 14% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $15.4B 5-yr avg $14.0B

Gross margin 79%

Operating margin 28.7% 5-yr avg 25.6%

ROIC 8% 5-yr avg 7%

Owner-earnings margin 24% 5-yr avg 21%

Free cash flow margin 5% 5-yr avg 18%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is led by Products (43%) and NonRegulated Service Monetary Consideration (29%), with 3 more lines behind.
Situation: Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has run about 21% through the cycle, a solid margin the cost base and competition set as much as the price does. The margin is cyclical, swinging between 8.9% and 36% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Capital spending runs about 21% of sales, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on rate base and the allowed return. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 6%, above 15% in 0 of 8 years). By owner earnings: roughly 20% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 5 lines, the largest Products at 43%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025

Products43%$6.5B
NonRegulated Service Monetary Consideration29%$4.4B
Regulated Service25%$3.7B
NonRegulated Service Commodity Consideration1%$192M
Other Service1%$155M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$7.5B	$8.0B	$8.6B	$8.1B	$7.7B	$12.8B	$17.8B	$12.0B	$12.6B	$14.9B	$15.4B	RevenueRevenue
10%	7%	7%	7%	6%	4%	4%	6%	6%	5%	5%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$689M	$927M	$768M	$1.9B	$2.2B	$2.6B	$3.0B	$4.3B	$3.3B	$4.2B	$4.4B	Operating incomeOp. inc.
9.2%	11.5%	8.9%	23.6%	28.8%	20.6%	17.0%	35.9%	26.4%	28.2%	28.7%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($424M)	$2.2B	($155M)	$850M	$211M	$1.5B	$2.0B	$3.2B	$2.2B	$2.6B	$2.8B	Net incomeNet inc.
—	—	—	28%	27%	25%	17%	24%	22%	25%	25%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$4.2B	$3.1B	$3.3B	$3.7B	$3.5B	$3.9B	$4.9B	$5.9B	$5.0B	$5.9B	$6.1B	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$1.8B	$1.7B	$1.7B	$1.7B	$1.7B	$1.8B	$2.0B	$2.1B	$2.2B	$2.3B	$2.3B	DepreciationDeprec.
$2.7B	($899M)	$1.7B	$1.1B	$1.5B	$505M	$758M	$611M	$431M	$840M	$845M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$2.1B	$2.4B	$3.3B	$2.1B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$2.3B	$2.5B	$2.6B	$4.9B	$5.2B	CapexCapex
27.4%	29.9%	37.8%	25.9%	16.2%	9.7%	12.7%	21.0%	20.4%	32.8%	34.0%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$2.1B	$1.4B	$1.6B	$1.6B	$2.3B	$2.7B	$2.6B	$3.4B	$2.4B	$3.6B	$3.7B	Owner earningsOwner earn.
28.1%	16.8%	18.2%	19.5%	29.5%	21.2%	14.8%	28.5%	19.0%	23.8%	24.1%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$2.1B	$690M	$37M	$1.6B	$2.3B	$2.7B	$2.6B	$3.4B	$2.4B	$1.0B	$828M	Free cash flowFCF
28.1%	8.6%	0.4%	19.5%	29.5%	21.2%	14.8%	28.5%	19.0%	6.7%	5.4%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0	$0	$0	$728M	$0	$151M	$933M	$1.6B	$2.2B	$1M	$1M	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$1.3B	$992M	$1.4B	$1.8B	$1.9B	$2.0B	$2.1B	$2.2B	$2.3B	$2.4B	$2.5B	Dividends paidDiv. paid
—	—	—	—	—	$0	$9M	$130M	$0	$0	—	BuybacksBuybacks
—	3%	2%	4%	—	6%	7%	9%	7%	8%	8%	ROICROIC
-9%	23%	-1%	6%	2%	13%	18%	26%	18%	20%	21%	Return on equityROE
−36%	12%	−11%	−7%	−15%	−4%	−0%	8%	−1%	1%	2%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$170M	$899M	$168M	$289M	$142M	$1.7B	$152M	$2.1B	$60M	$63M	$950M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$938M	$976M	$992M	$996M	$999M	$2.0B	$2.7B	$1.7B	$1.9B	$2.1B	$1.7B	ReceivablesReceiv.
$138M	$113M	$130M	$125M	$136M	$379M	$320M	$274M	$279M	$314M	$262M	InventoryInvent.
$623M	$978M	$662M	$552M	$482M	$1.7B	$2.3B	$1.4B	$1.6B	$2.2B	$2.3B	Accounts payablePayables
$453M	$111M	$460M	$569M	$653M	$611M	$716M	$550M	$529M	$174M	($333M)	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$1.5B	$2.2B	$1.5B	$1.6B	$1.4B	$4.5B	$3.8B	$4.5B	$2.7B	$3.2B	$3.3B	Current assetsCur. assets
$2.9B	$2.6B	$1.8B	$4.0B	$2.3B	$5.0B	$4.9B	$5.8B	$5.3B	$6.1B	$4.0B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.5×	0.8×	0.8×	0.4×	0.6×	0.9×	0.8×	0.8×	0.5×	0.5×	0.8×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
—	$47M	$0	$188M	—	$0	$0	$463M	$466M	$466M	$466M	GoodwillGoodwill
$46.8B	$46.4B	$45.3B	$46.0B	$44.2B	$47.6B	$48.4B	$52.6B	$54.5B	$58.6B	$59.6B	Total assetsAssets
$23.4B	$20.9B	$22.4B	$22.3B	$22.3B	$23.7B	$22.6B	$25.7B	$26.5B	$28.7B	$30.1B	Total debtDebt
$23.2B	$20.0B	$22.2B	$22.0B	$22.2B	$22.0B	$22.4B	$23.6B	$26.4B	$28.6B	$29.1B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
0.6×	0.9×	0.7×	1.6×	1.9×	2.2×	2.6×	3.5×	2.4×	2.9×	3.0×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$4.6B	$9.7B	$14.7B	$13.4B	$11.8B	$11.4B	$11.5B	$12.4B	$12.4B	$12.8B	$13.0B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
1.0%	1.0%	0.6%	0.7%	0.7%	0.6%	0.4%	0.6%	0.8%	0.6%	0.6%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
751M	829M	974M	1.21B	1.22B	1.22B	1.22B	1.22B	1.22B	1.23B	1.23B	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$9.99	$9.69	$8.84	$6.71	$6.30	$10.49	$14.54	$9.81	$10.33	$12.16	$12.59	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.56	$2.62	$-0.16	$0.70	$0.17	$1.25	$1.68	$2.60	$1.82	$2.14	$2.28	EPS (diluted)EPS
$2.80	$1.63	$1.61	$1.30	$1.86	$2.22	$2.16	$2.80	$1.96	$2.90	$3.04	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$2.80	$0.83	$0.04	$1.30	$1.86	$2.22	$2.16	$2.80	$1.96	$0.82	$0.68	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.68	$1.20	$1.42	$1.52	$1.60	$1.64	$1.69	$1.78	$1.89	$1.99	$2.02	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$2.73	$2.90	$3.34	$1.74	$1.02	$1.02	$1.84	$2.06	$2.10	$3.99	$4.27	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$6.19	$11.65	$15.06	$11.01	$9.69	$9.38	$9.39	$10.14	$10.17	$10.45	$10.60	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+2.2%/yr	+14.1%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+0.4%/yr	+9.3%/yr
EPS	—	+65.2%/yr
Dividends / share	+1.9%/yr	+4.5%/yr
Capital spending / share	+4.3%/yr	+31.4%/yr
Book value / share	+6.0%/yr	+1.5%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

1.2Bpeak FY2025

ROIC

8%low FY2018

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

8.1×peak FY2017

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$3.6Bowner earningsvs.$2.6Bnet incomelow FY2017

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $3.6B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $2.3B it takes just to hold its position. It put $2.5B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $1.0B.

Reported net income$2.6B

Owner earnings$3.6B · 24% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$2.6B	$2.2B	$3.2B	$2.0B	$1.5B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$2.3B	+$2.2B	+$2.1B	+$2.0B	+$1.8B
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$93M	+$99M	+$77M	+$73M	+$81M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$840M	+$431M	+$611M	+$758M	+$505M
Cash from operations	$5.9B	$5.0B	$5.9B	$4.9B	$3.9B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$2.3B	−$2.6B	−$2.5B	−$2.3B	−$1.2B
Owner earnings	$3.6B	$2.4B	$3.4B	$2.6B	$2.7B
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$2.5B	—	—	—	—
Free cash flow	$1.0B	$2.4B	$3.4B	$2.6B	$2.7B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	24%	19%	29%	15%	21%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $2.3B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $2.5B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $93M), owner earnings is nearer $3.5B.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 2.9×

Adequate

Operating income $4.2B ÷ interest expense $1.4B

What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $28.6B · 6.8× operating profit

Heavy net debt

Cash $63M − debt $28.7B

What this means
Netting $63M of cash and short-term investments against $28.7B of debt leaves $28.6B owed, about 6.8× a year's operating profit. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? -148d

Negative, funded by others

DSO 51 + DIO 33 − DPO 232 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 6%

Below average through the cycle

8-yr median, range 2%–9%; 8% latest = NOPAT $3.2B ÷ invested capital $41.4B

Industry peers: median 5%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years (it ran 8% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 19%

High through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range 15%–29%; latest $3.6B = operating cash $5.9B − maintenance capex $2.3B

Industry peers: median 18%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 24% of revenue this year, a 19% median across 10 years. It chose to put $2.5B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $1.0B — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $93M of SBC) leaves $3.5B.
Are earnings backed by cash? 2.25×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $5.9B ÷ net income $2.6B

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 69%

Returns about half

Dividends + buybacks $2.4B ÷ Owner Earnings $3.6B

What this means
Of $3.6B Owner Earnings, $2.4B (69%) went back to shareholders, $2.4B dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 2.08×

Expanding

Capex $4.9B ÷ depreciation $2.3B

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $14.9B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.53×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $28.7B vs ($2.9B) WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 2 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Pass

Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Pass

Earnings +33% over the record · +403%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.19/share (latest year $2.14), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $10.47/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 8 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 10% → 30% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 10% early to 30% lately, median 21% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Owner earnings growth +6%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 6% a year over the record.
Worst year 2018 · 8.9% op. margin

What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
Share count +5.6%/yr

What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
Dividend record rising

What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$3.3B

Cash & short-term investments$950M
Receivables$1.7B
Inventory$262M
Other current assets$432M

Current liabilities$4.0B

Debt due within a year$2M
Accounts payable$2.3B
Other current liabilities$1.7B

Current ratio0.83×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.76×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.24×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital($686M)the cushion left after near-term bills

Its current ratio is below 1, which usually reads as strain; here it is likely structural strength. This business collects from customers before it pays suppliers (a negative cash-conversion cycle), so the balance sheet is funded by that float, the way Costco's and Amazon's are. The low ratio can be the edge, not the risk; the cash-conversion cycle and the debt due above say which.

Debt due this year vs. cash$2M due · $950M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−0.6%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters0.5× → 0.8×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$2.7Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Debt incl. operating leases$179M$177M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$170Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Debt maturity

the debt note, SEC EDGAR →

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$1.3B

'27$2.0B

'28$1.4B

'29$1.6B

'30$2.5B

later$19.8B

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$1.3Bthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year

Within two years$3.3Bthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions

Biggest single year$2.5Bin 2030the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest

Total scheduled principal$28.7Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Mar 31, 2026$950M

One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$3.6B

Together, against $1.3B due next year3.3×

Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $4.5B against the $1.3B due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 3.3 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $43.4B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$24.5B · 57%
Dividends$18.4B · 42%
Buybacks$139M · 0%
Retained (debt / cash)$281M · 1%

Returned to owners$18.6B
79% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $18.4B as dividends and $139M as buybacks.
Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $6.6B and cash and short-term investments rose $780M.
Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $139M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
Net change in share count63.3%
The diluted count rose from 751M to 1226M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record$1.99/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 2% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Mr. Armstrong	$13.8M	$32.3M	$2.7B
2022	—	$13.9M	$36.7M	$2.6B
2023	—	$17.5M	$18.5M	$3.4B
2024	—	$16.3M	$44.8M	$2.4B
2025	—	$17.9M	$31.8M	$3.6B
2025	—	$8.7M	$12.4M	$3.6B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years. A dash under the name means the filing tags the figure without naming the officer.

Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
CEO pay ratio61:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Stock-based compensation$93M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 2% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Williams Companies Inc. (The) is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?63.3%
Diluted shares grew 63.3% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $139M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?5 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 5 of the last 10 years, $4.7B in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did debt outgrow the business?
Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
≈$3.1B · 20% of revenue on the largest customers (TTM)
“The three largest customers of this business in 2025 accounted for approximately 20 percent of its total operating revenues.”verify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Pipelines & Midstream

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
LNGCheniere Energy Inc.	$19.5B	45%	25.7%	19%	18%
TRGPTarga Resources Inc.	$17.0B	19%	4.0%	5%	8%
DDominion Energy Inc.	$16.5B	—	23.1%	4%	21%
KMIKinder Morgan Inc.	$15.2B	68%	27.8%	5%	20%
FEFirstEnergy Corp.	$15.1B	—	18.4%	5%	11%
WMBWilliams Companies Inc. (The)	$14.9B	77%	22.1%	6%	20%
ESEversource Energy (D/B/A)	$13.5B	—	20.2%	5%	8%
CQPCheniere Energy Partners LP Common	$10.8B	47%	30.3%	—	20%
Group median	—	47%	22.6%	5%	19%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Williams Companies Inc. (The) has delivered.

Williams Companies Inc. (The)’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Williams Companies Inc. (The) earns about $3.0B on its 20.3% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 23.8% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($3.0B) Net of stock comp (−$85M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($3.7B)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+3%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+2%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $828M on 1223M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-30; net debt $29.1B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($5.2B) runs well above depreciation ($2.3B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $3.7B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh WMB against another business →

The owners of WMB: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Williams Companies Inc. (The) (WMB), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/WMB, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← WM its page in the Manual WMG →

Industry order: ← WES the Pipelines & Midstream chapter