Owner Scorecard


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KMI, Kinder Morgan Inc.

Pipelines & Midstream capital-intensive

Revenue is Natural Gas Pipelines (72%), Products Pipelines (18%) and CO2 (8%).

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
KMI · Kinder Morgan Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$15.2B
+12.7% YoY · 9% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $15.8B 5-yr avg $15.3B
Gross margin 41% 5-yr avg 54%
Operating margin 31.8% 5-yr avg 27.1%
ROIC 5% 5-yr avg 5%
Owner-earnings margin 20% 5-yr avg 24%
Free cash flow margin 20% 5-yr avg 24%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
A regulated utility, earning a set return on the capital it sinks into its network.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 68% and operating margin about 27% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −38 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. Read this kind of business on rate base and the allowed return. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 5%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). By owner earnings: roughly 20% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Natural Gas Pipelines is 72% of revenue, with Products Pipelines the other meaningful segment at 18%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • Natural Gas Pipelines72%$11.0B
  • Products Pipelines18%$2.7B
  • CO28%$1.2B

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$13.1B$13.7B$13.3B$12.1B$10.1B$16.2B$18.1B$13.6B$13.5B$15.2B$15.8BRevenueRevenue
74%68%67%73%75%60%49%41%Gross marginGross mgn
5%5%5%5%6%4%4%5%5%5%5%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$3.5B$3.5B$3.8B$4.9B$1.6B$2.9B$4.1B$4.3B$4.4B$4.7B$5.0BOperating incomeOp. inc.
27.1%25.7%28.5%40.3%15.5%18.1%22.4%31.2%32.5%31.1%31.8%Operating marginOp. mgn
$708M$183M$1.6B$2.2B$119M$1.8B$2.5B$2.4B$2.6B$3.1B$3.3BNet incomeNet inc.
56%27%30%17%22%23%21%21%22%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$4.8B$4.6B$5.0B$4.7B$4.5B$5.7B$5.0B$6.5B$5.6B$5.9B$6.2BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$2.2B$2.3B$2.3B$2.4B$2.2B$2.1B$2.2B$2.3B$2.4B$2.5B$2.5BDepreciationDeprec.
$1.8B$2.2B$1.1B$147M$2.3B$1.8B$233M$1.9B$668M$408M$455MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$2.9B$3.2B$2.9B$2.3B$1.7B$1.3B$1.6B$2.3B$2.6B$3.0B$3.1BCapexCapex
22.1%23.3%21.8%18.8%16.9%7.9%8.9%17.0%19.5%19.9%19.4%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$1.9B$1.4B$2.1B$2.5B$2.8B$4.4B$3.3B$4.2B$3.0B$2.9B$3.2BOwner earningsOwner earn.
14.4%10.3%16.1%20.5%28.2%27.4%18.5%30.6%22.3%19.0%20.2%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$1.9B$1.4B$2.1B$2.5B$2.8B$4.4B$3.3B$4.2B$3.0B$2.9B$3.2BFree cash flowFCF
14.4%10.3%16.1%20.5%28.2%27.4%18.5%30.6%22.3%19.0%20.2%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$333M$4M$39M$79M$16M$16MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$1.1B$1.1B$1.6B$2.2B$2.4B$2.4B$2.5B$2.5B$2.6B$2.6B$2.6BDividends paidDiv. paid
$0$250M$273M$2M$50M$0$368M$522M$7M$0BuybacksBuybacks
2%2%4%5%1%4%5%5%6%6%5%ROICROIC
2%1%5%6%0%6%8%8%9%10%11%Return on equityROE
−1%−3%−0%0%−7%−2%0%−0%0%1%2%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$684M$264M$3.3B$1.1B$1.2B$1.1B$745M$83M$88M$63M$72MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$1.4B$1.4B$1.5B$1.4B$1.2BReceivablesReceiv.
$357M$424M$385M$371M$348M$562M$634M$525M$555M$574M$593MInventoryInvent.
$1.3B$1.3B$1.3B$914M$837M$1.3B$1.4B$1.4B$1.4B$1.4B$1.4BAccounts payablePayables
$470M$532M$546M$827M($489M)($697M)($810M)($841M)($840M)($834M)$413MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$3.2B$2.7B$5.7B$3.2B$3.2B$3.8B$3.8B$2.5B$2.5B$2.8B$2.7BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$5.9B$6.2B$7.6B$5.1B$5.1B$5.8B$6.9B$7.2B$5.1B$4.3B$5.2BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.5×0.4×0.8×0.6×0.6×0.7×0.5×0.4×0.5×0.6×0.5×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$22.2B$22.2B$22.0B$21.5B$19.9B$19.9B$20.0B$20.1B$20.1B$20.1B$20.1BGoodwillGoodwill
$80.3B$79.1B$78.9B$74.2B$72.0B$70.4B$70.1B$71.0B$71.4B$72.7B$73.1BTotal assetsAssets
$40.0B$37.8B$37.3B$34.4B$34.7B$33.3B$31.8B$32.1B$31.9B$32.0B$40.2BTotal debtDebt
$39.4B$37.6B$34.0B$33.3B$33.5B$32.2B$31.0B$32.0B$31.8B$31.9B$40.2BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
$34.4B$33.6B$33.7B$33.7B$31.4B$30.8B$30.7B$30.3B$30.5B$31.2B$31.3BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
2.23B2.23B2.22B2.26B2.26B2.27B2.26B2.23B2.22B2.22B2.23BShares out (diluted)Shares
$5.86$6.15$6.01$5.34$4.46$7.13$8.03$6.11$6.07$6.84$7.10Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.32$0.08$0.73$0.97$0.05$0.79$1.13$1.07$1.18$1.37$1.49EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.84$0.63$0.97$1.09$1.26$1.95$1.48$1.87$1.35$1.30$1.43Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.84$0.63$0.97$1.09$1.26$1.95$1.48$1.87$1.35$1.30$1.43Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.50$0.50$0.73$0.96$1.04$1.08$1.11$1.13$1.15$1.17$1.18Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$1.29$1.43$1.31$1.00$0.75$0.57$0.72$1.04$1.18$1.36$1.38Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$15.44$15.08$15.20$14.90$13.89$13.60$13.61$13.57$13.75$14.02$14.08Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+1.7%/yr+8.9%/yr
Owner earnings / share+5.0%/yr+0.7%/yr
EPS+17.7%/yr+92.1%/yr
Dividends / share+9.9%/yr+2.3%/yr
Capital spending / share+0.6%/yr+12.5%/yr
Book value / share−1.1%/yr+0.2%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
2.2Bpeak FY2021
ROIC
6%low FY2020
Gross margin
49%low FY2022
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
11.0×peak FY2017

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$2.9Bowner earningsvs.$3.1Bnet incomelow FY2017

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business reported $3.1B of profit but $2.9B of owner earnings: $165M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

Reported net income$3.1B
Owner earnings$2.9B · 19% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$3.1B$2.6B$2.4B$2.5B$1.8B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$2.5B+$2.4B+$2.3B+$2.2B+$2.1B
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$408M+$668M+$1.9B+$233M+$1.8B
Cash from operations$5.9B$5.6B$6.5B$5.0B$5.7B
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$3.0B−$2.6B−$2.3B−$1.6B−$1.3B
Owner earnings$2.9B$3.0B$4.2B$3.3B$4.4B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue19%22%31%18%27%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Adequate
    Operating income $4.7B ÷ interest expense $1.8B
    What this means

    Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $40.2B · 8.5× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $63M − debt $40.2B
    What this means

    Netting $63M of cash and short-term investments against $40.2B of debt leaves $40.2B owed, about 8.5× a year's operating profit. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 33 + DIO 23 − DPO 56 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 1%–6%; 5% latest = NOPAT $3.7B ÷ invested capital $71.3B
    Industry peers: median 6%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 5% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • High through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 10%–31%; latest $2.9B = operating cash $5.9B − maintenance capex $3.0B
    Industry peers: median 18%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 19% of revenue this year, a 19% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $0 of SBC) leaves $2.9B.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $5.9B ÷ net income $3.1B

    In the filing’s words The filing leans on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings, but the GAAP profit is itself cash-backed — the adjustments are not papering over a cash shortfall here.

    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $2.6B ÷ Owner Earnings $2.9B
    What this means

    Of $2.9B Owner Earnings, $2.6B (90%) went back to shareholders, $2.6B dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.23×
    Expanding
    Capex $3.0B ÷ depreciation $2.5B
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $15.2B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.64×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $40.2B vs ($1.6B) WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +222%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.21/share (latest year $1.37), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $14.01/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 27% → 32% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 27% early to 32% lately, median 27% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth +7%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 7% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2020 · 15.5% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −0.0%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

  • How management talks about it Owner’s terms
    What this means

    The record and the register agree: capital is compounding and the filing reasons in an owner’s terms — per-share value, return on capital, the long term — not a promoter’s.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$2.7B
  • Cash & short-term investments$72M
  • Receivables$1.2B
  • Inventory$593M
  • Other current assets$856M
Current liabilities$5.2B
  • Debt due within a year$2.2B
  • Accounts payable$1.4B
  • Other current liabilities$1.6B
Current ratio0.52×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.41×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.01×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($2.5B)the cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$2.2B due · $72M cash cash alone won't cover the maturities; it leans on refinancing or operating cash · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+13.8%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters0.4× → 0.5×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$9.6Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($37.8B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$32.3B$216M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$297Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$1.2B
'27$942M
'28$1.9B
'29$1.8B
'30$2.4B
later$23.6B

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$1.2Bthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$2.2Bthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$2.4Bin 2030the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Total scheduled principal$31.8Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Mar 31, 2026$72M
One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$2.9B
Together, against $1.2B due next year2.4×

Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $3.0B against the $1.2B due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 2.4 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $52.4B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$23.8B · 45%
  • Dividends$21.0B · 40%
  • Buybacks$1.5B · 3%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$6.1B · 12%
  • Returned to owners$22.5B

    79% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $21.0B as dividends and $1.5B as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $1.5B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count−0.2%

    The diluted count barely moved (2230M to 2225M): buybacks roughly offset the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$1.17/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 10% a year. It was never cut over the span.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$21.8B30% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity64%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$471Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $23.8B of capital spent building

$1.6B written down across 1 year (2020): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Mr. Kean$18.0M$21.0M$4.4B
2022Mr. Kean$1,462$3.4M$3.3B
2023Mr. Kean$9,414$487k$4.2B
2023Ms. Dang$12.4M$13.4M$4.2B
2024Ms. Dang$11.5M$26.8M$3.0B
2025Ms. Dang$12.3M$14.3M$2.9B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Stock-based compensation$0

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 0% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Kinder Morgan Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

None of the 6 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.

Each test came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Pipelines & Midstream

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
EPDEnterprise Products Partners L.P.$52.6B27%14.4%12%
LNGCheniere Energy Inc.$19.5B45%25.7%19%18%
TRGPTarga Resources Inc.$17.0B19%4.0%5%8%
KMIKinder Morgan Inc.$15.2B68%27.8%5%20%
FEFirstEnergy Corp.$15.1B18.4%5%11%
WMBWilliams Companies Inc. (The)$14.9B77%22.1%6%20%
CQPCheniere Energy Partners LP Common$10.8B47%30.3%20%
WESWestern Midstream Partners LP Common$3.8B73%43.1%38%
Group median47%23.9%5%19%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Kinder Morgan Inc. has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Kinder Morgan Inc. earns about $3.0B on its 19.8% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 19.0% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−7%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+7%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $3.2B on 2225M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-23; net debt $40.2B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Kinder Morgan Inc. (KMI), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/KMI, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← KMB its page in the Manual KMPB →

Industry order: ← KGS the Pipelines & Midstream chapter KNTK →