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WULF, TeraWulf Inc.

Capital Markets & Asset Management capital-intensive UnprofitableDistress / turnaroundCapital build-out

We are a vertically integrated owner, developer, and operator of large-scale digital infrastructure in the United States, purpose-built to support high-performance computing workloads, including artificial intelligence, machine learning, and advanced cloud applications.

By controlling land use through ownership or long-term ground leases, together with interconnection rights, electrical and cooling infrastructure, and, where applicable, on-site generation, we deliver resilient, cost-efficient capacity to hyperscale and enterprise customers through long-term hosting arrangements.

Our platform is differentiated by long-term control of utility-scale infrastructure, deep in-house power and grid expertise, and a scalable development model supported by long-term, credit-enhanced customer contracts.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

WULF · TeraWulf Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$168M

+20.3% YoY · 57% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM

Cash & investments $2.6B

Cash burn · annual $197M

Runway 10+ yrs

Gross margin 64%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Capital build-out. Capital spending has surged to 629% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has run around −42% through the cycle on a 33% gross margin, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. Inventory runs near 12% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −8%, above 15% in 0 of 7 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
									Income statement
$17M	$18M	$18M	$13M	$15M	$69M	$140M	$168M	$168M	RevenueRevenue
33%	34%	31%	29%	26%	61%	55%	51%	64%	Gross marginGross mgn
32%	29%	31%	37%	151%	—	—	—	15%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
4%	4%	5%	5%	—	—	—	—	0%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($465K)	$226K	($957K)	($2M)	($44M)	($29M)	($76M)	($186M)	($289M)	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−2.7%	1.2%	−5.4%	−13.3%	−291.0%	−42.5%	−54.4%	−110.5%	−171.8%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($226K)	$139K	($814K)	($439K)	($91M)	($73M)	($72M)	($661M)	($1.0B)	Net incomeNet inc.
									Cash flow & returns
$205K	$1M	($477K)	($399K)	($34M)	$4M	($24M)	($123M)	($197M)	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$837K	$759K	$640K	$662K	$7M	$28M	$60M	$89M	$102M	DepreciationDeprec.
($430K)	$313K	($312K)	($643K)	$48M	$43M	($43M)	$399M	$615M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$230K	$543K	$478K	$150K	$61M	$75M	$268M	$1.1B	$1.5B	CapexCapex
1.3%	3.0%	2.7%	1.1%	406.5%	108.6%	191.3%	629.4%	886.3%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($25K)	$682K	($955K)	($549K)	($41M)	($24M)	($84M)	($212M)	($299M)	Owner earningsOwner earn.
−0.1%	3.7%	−5.4%	−4.1%	−271.0%	−34.8%	−60.1%	−125.7%	−177.8%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($25K)	$682K	($955K)	($549K)	($95M)	($71M)	($292M)	($1.2B)	($1.7B)	Free cash flowFCF
−0.1%	3.7%	−5.4%	−4.1%	−633.2%	−102.4%	−208.8%	−702.5%	n/m	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
—	—	—	—	—	$0	$0	$22M	$223M	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$300K	—	$50K	—	$0	$0	$118M	$33M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
-2%	1%	-5%	-13%	-14%	-8%	-13%	—	-58%	ROICROIC
-2%	1%	-7%	-4%	-77%	-33%	-30%	-471%	—	Return on equityROE
									Balance sheet
$4M	$4M	$3M	$4M	$1M	$54M	$274M	$3.3B	$2.6B	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$2M	$2M	$2M	$2M	—	—	$475K	$1M	$6M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$2M	$2M	$2M	$2M	—	—	—	—	$2M	InventoryInvent.
$322K	$648K	$762K	$460K	$22M	$15M	$24M	$65M	$228M	Accounts payablePayables
$4M	$4M	$4M	$3M	—	—	($24M)	($64M)	($220M)	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$8M	$9M	$9M	$8M	$14M	$63M	$281M	$3.5B	$2.9B	Current assetsCur. assets
$876K	$1M	$2M	$4M	$126M	$155M	$52M	$1.7B	$2.4B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
9.4×	6.9×	4.5×	2.2×	0.1×	0.4×	5.4×	2.0×	1.2×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
—	—	—	—	—	—	$0	$55M	$55M	GoodwillGoodwill
$17M	$17M	$17M	$15M	$318M	$378M	$788M	$6.6B	$7.0B	Total assetsAssets
$3M	$3M	$3M	$3M	$125M	$124M	$488M	$3.1B	$3.1B	Total debtDebt
($747K)	($1M)	($347K)	($1M)	$124M	$69M	$213M	($168M)	$474M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-5.6×	2.5×	-10.6×	-20.6×	-1.8×	-0.8×	-3.9×	-2.3×	-2.0×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$13M	$13M	$12M	$12M	$118M	$222M	$244M	$140M	($79M)	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.2%	10.4%	8.5%	22.1%	30.2%	67.6%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
									Per share
2.0M	2.0M	2.0M	2.0M	111M	210M	351M	398M	423M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$8.59	$9.18	$8.90	$6.80	$0.14	$0.33	$0.40	$0.42	$0.40	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.11	$0.07	$-0.41	$-0.22	$-0.82	$-0.35	$-0.21	$-1.66	$-2.43	EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.01	$0.34	$-0.48	$-0.28	$-0.37	$-0.11	$-0.24	$-0.53	$-0.71	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.01	$0.34	$-0.48	$-0.28	$-0.86	$-0.34	$-0.83	$-2.98	$-3.99	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.11	$0.27	$0.24	$0.08	$0.55	$0.36	$0.76	$2.67	$3.52	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$6.45	$6.61	$6.19	$5.99	$1.06	$1.06	$0.70	$0.35	$-0.19	Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×55.98 into 2022 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×1.9 into 2023 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×1.67 into 2024 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	8-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	−31.4%/yr	−42.6%/yr
Capital spending / share	+48.2%/yr	+103.8%/yr
Book value / share	−30.5%/yr	−43.2%/yr

The record, charted

FY2017–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

398Mpeak FY2025

ROIC

−13%low FY2022

Gross margin

51%low FY2022

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

($212M)owner earningsvs.($661M)net incomelow FY2025

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2017FY2023

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2020–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned ($212M) of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $89M it takes just to hold its position. It put $972M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($1.2B).

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2020
Reported net income	($661M)	($72M)	($73M)	($91M)	($439K)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$89M	+$60M	+$28M	+$7M	+$662K
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$51M	+$31M	+$6M	+$2M	+$22K
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$399M	−$43M	+$43M	+$48M	−$643K
Cash from operations	($123M)	($24M)	$4M	($34M)	($399K)
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$89M	−$60M	−$28M	−$7M	−$150K
Owner earnings	($212M)	($84M)	($24M)	($41M)	($549K)
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$972M	−$208M	−$47M	−$54M	—
Free cash flow	($1.2B)	($292M)	($71M)	($95M)	($549K)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	-126%	-60%	-35%	-271%	-4%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $89M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $972M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $51M), owner earnings is nearer ($263M).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? -2.3×

Does not cover its interest

Operating income ($186M) ÷ interest expense $80M

What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$168M

Net cash

Cash $3.3B − debt $3.1B

What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $168M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? -278d

Negative, funded by others

DSO 3 + DIO 7 − DPO 288 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital —

Not meaningful here

Invested capital ($27M) = debt $3.1B + equity $140M − cash

Industry peers: median -7%

What this means
Invested capital is near zero or negative, usually years of buybacks pulling equity down. ROIC explodes or flips sign and stops meaning anything. Judge this one on Owner Earnings instead.
Owner-earnings margin -35%

Consumes cash through the cycle

8-yr median margin, range -271%–4%; latest ($212M) = operating cash ($123M) − maintenance capex $89M

Industry peers: median -64%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -126% of revenue this year, a -35% median across 8 years. It chose to put $972M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ($1.2B) — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $51M of SBC) leaves ($263M).
Are earnings backed by cash? ($123M)

Loss, and burning cash

Net income ($661M) · cash from operations ($123M)

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? —

No surplus to allocate

What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
Investing or harvesting? 11.97×

Expanding

Capex $1.1B ÷ depreciation $89M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Miss

Revenue ≥ $2B · $168M

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Pass

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.00×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $3.1B vs $1.7B WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (8-yr record) · 7 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.54/share (latest year $-1.33), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $0.28/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 1 of 8

What this means
Lost money in 7 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 7 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin −2% → −69% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about −2% early to −69% lately, median −42% — competition or costs are biting in.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −24%

What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
Worst year 2022 · −291.0% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2022, understand why before trusting the good years.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$2.9B

Cash & short-term investments$2.6B
Receivables$6M
Inventory$2M
Other current assets$230M

Current liabilities$2.4B

Debt due within a year$44M
Accounts payable$228M
Other current liabilities$2.1B

Current ratio1.20×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.20×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio1.10×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$483Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$44M due · $2.6B cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Cash runway1.6 yrsthe business is consuming cash; this is how long the cash on hand lasts at that rate

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−62.2%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.2× → 1.2×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value($134M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($4.2B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$3.1B$24M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$687Kcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Paul Prager	$625k	$625k	—
2021	Paul Prager	$964k	$820k	—
2022	Paul Prager	$2.4M	$2.4M	($41M)
2023	Paul Prager	$2.4M	$2.4M	($24M)
2024	Paul Prager	$6.9M	$13.4M	($84M)
2025	Paul Prager	$39.4M	$60.3M	($212M)
2025	Paul Prager	$39.4M	$60.3M	($212M)

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership15.9%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$51M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 30% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why TeraWulf Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2025.

2 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?−73.6% vs −0.6%
The business ran at a loss early in the record (an owner-earnings margin of −0.6%) and the loss has widened to −73.6% across the last three years, with the latest year at −125.7%. Ask the filing where the widening sits — price, cost, or spending growing faster than revenue — and what would narrow it.
Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$3M → $3.1B
Debt rose from $3M to $3.1B while owner earnings went from about ($100K) to ($107M): the borrowing grew and the earnings that would carry it are not there now. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean

Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Acquisitions, Stock compensation as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Capital Markets & Asset Management

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
IRENIREN Limited	$501M	53%	-14.5%	-3%	1%
CORZCore Scientific Inc.	$319M	20%	-19.2%	5%	-19%
HUTHut 8 Corp.	$235M	54%	-55.2%	-8%	-73%
CIFRCipher Digital Inc.	$224M	62%	-108.6%	-7%	-154%
WULFTeraWulf Inc.	$168M	34%	-27.9%	-8%	-20%
BTBTBit Digital Inc.	$114M	—	-58.9%	-10%	-64%
WYFIWhiteFiber Inc.	$79M	—	-33.9%	-6%	28%
MARAMARA Holdings Inc.	$59M	—	-291.5%	-15%	-625%
Group median	—	53%	-44.6%	-7%	-42%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

TeraWulf Inc. is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.

Today’s price $

The assumptions Required return 9% Years to get there 10 Revenue growth 0%

Revenue, delivered76%/yr’19→’25

Mature owner-earnings margin 15%

Enter a price to run it.

Owner earnings it must reach—

Margin the price demands—

Owner-earnings margin today−1004%

Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.

Weigh WULF against another business →

The owners of WULF: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "TeraWulf Inc. (WULF), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/WULF, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← WU its page in the Manual WVE →

Industry order: ← WTF the Capital Markets & Asset Management chapter WYFI →