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WYFI, WhiteFiber Inc.
We are a leading provider of artificial intelligence infrastructure solutions.
We own high-performance computing ("HPC") data centers and provide cloud-based HPC graphics processing units ("GPU") services, which we term cloud services, for customers such as AI application and machine learning ("ML") developers (the "HPC Business").
Our Tier-3 data centers provide hosting and colocation services.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is Cloud service (87%) and Colocation services (11%).
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand.
- What moves the needle
- Whether the heavy assets earn more than they cost to keep. What decides it: the return on the capital sunk into them, how much of the capex is merely standing still versus growing, and what a downturn does to a fixed-cost base. Here the balance sheet is the defense and cyclicality the enemy. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Cloud service is 87% of revenue, with Colocation services the other meaningful segment at 11%.
- Cloud service87%$69M
- Colocation services11%$9M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned $22M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $23M it takes just to hold its position. It put $245M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($223M).
| FY2025 | FY2024 | |
|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($25M) | $1M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$23M | +$17M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$17M | — |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$30M | +$868K |
| Cash from operations | $46M | $19M |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$23M | −$17M |
| Owner earnings | $22M | $2M |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −$245M | −$63M |
| Free cash flow | ($223M) | ($60M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 28% | 5% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $23M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $245M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $17M), owner earnings is nearer $5M.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- No meaningful interest burdenLittle or no interest expense reported
What this means
Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.
- Net cashCash $114M − debt $785K
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $114M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Below averageNOPAT ($21M) ÷ invested capital $369M (debt + equity − cash)Industry peers: median -8%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- HighOwner earnings $22M = operating cash $46M − maintenance capex $23MIndustry peers: median -55%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 28% of revenue this year. It chose to put $245M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ($223M) — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $17M of SBC) leaves $5M.
- Loss, but cash-generativeNet income ($25M) · cash from operations $46M
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? 11.45×ExpandingCapex $268M ÷ depreciation $23M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 3 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $79M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 2.03×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · $785K vs $85M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.30/share (latest year $-0.64), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $12.49/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.
“Further, there have been recent advancements in AI technology, including open-source AI models, that may lead to compute and other efficiencies that may impact the demand for AI services, including our platform, solutions, and services, which may adversely impact our revenue and profitability.…”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$76M
- Receivables$92M
- Other current assets$28M
- Accounts payable$8M
- Other current liabilities$63M
From the company's latest filing.
Management, ownership & pay
From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.
- Stock-based compensation$17M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 21% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Peers, Capital Markets & Asset Management
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IRENIREN Limited | $501M | 53% | -14.5% | -3% | 1% |
| CORZCore Scientific Inc. | $319M | 20% | -19.2% | 5% | -19% |
| HUTHut 8 Corp. | $235M | 54% | -55.2% | -8% | -73% |
| CIFRCipher Digital Inc. | $224M | 62% | -108.6% | -7% | -154% |
| WULFTeraWulf Inc. | $168M | 34% | -27.9% | -8% | -20% |
| BTBTBit Digital Inc. | $114M | — | -58.9% | -10% | -64% |
| WYFIWhiteFiber Inc. | $79M | — | -33.9% | -6% | 28% |
| SLNHPSoluna Holdings, Inc. | $30M | 23% | -113.3% | -33% | -55% |
| Group median | — | — | -44.6% | -7% | -37% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what WhiteFiber Inc. has delivered.
WhiteFiber Inc.’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow ($336M) on 39M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-12; net debt $147M. The base opens on the steady-state figure (the latest year is negative on total capex mid-build-out); clear Steady-state to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($387M) runs well above depreciation ($26M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $28M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← WY its page in the Manual WYNN →
Industry order: ← WULF the Capital Markets & Asset Management chapter XP →