Share count
105Mpeak FY2025
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HUT, Hut 8 Corp.
Capital Markets & Asset Management capital-intensive UnprofitableDistress / turnaroundCapital build-out
Hut 8: Where Power Unlocks Potential Hut 8 is an energy infrastructure platform that integrates power, digital infrastructure, and compute at scale to fuel next-generation, energy-intensive use cases.
We take a power-first, innovation-driven approach to developing, commercializing, and operating the critical infrastructure that underpins the breakthrough technologies of today and tomorrow.
Our platform consists of three layers: Power, Digital Infrastructure, and Compute.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$235M
+44.8% YoY · 47% 3-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Capital build-out. Capital spending has surged to 86% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has reached 284% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −84%) on a 54% gross margin — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. Capital spending runs about 51% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −8%, above 15% in 1 of 4 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2022–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||
| $74M | $82M | $162M | $235M | $284M | RevenueRevenue |
| 65% | 48% | — | 54% | 60% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 42% | 33% | 45% | 52% | 65% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| ($20M) | ($69M) | $461M | ($322M) | ($545M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −26.9% | −83.6% | 283.6% | −136.9% | −191.6% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($32M) | ($66M) | $332M | ($226M) | ($312M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||
| ($43M) | ($29M) | ($69M) | ($139M) | ($133M) | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $12M | $19M | $48M | $102M | $125M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($32M) | $13M | ($469M) | ($73M) | ($51M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $37M | $3M | $124M | $203M | $176M | CapexCapex |
| 50.6% | 3.8% | 76.4% | 86.3% | 62.0% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ($55M) | ($32M) | ($116M) | ($241M) | ($258M) | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −73.9% | −39.5% | −71.6% | −102.6% | −90.8% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($80M) | ($32M) | ($193M) | ($342M) | ($309M) | Free cash flowFCF |
| −108.8% | −39.5% | −118.6% | −145.5% | −108.6% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| -8% | -8% | 29% | -18% | -28% | ROICROIC |
| -36% | -13% | 34% | -16% | -23% | Return on equityROE |
| −36% | −13% | 34% | −16% | −23% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||
| $21M | $31M | $85M | $45M | $160M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $1M | $3M | $7M | $31M | $7M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $6M | $15M | $11M | $16M | $44M | Accounts payablePayables |
| ($5M) | ($12M) | ($4M) | $15M | ($37M) | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $37M | $62M | $257M | $408M | $217M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $100M | $113M | $154M | $376M | $252M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 0.4× | 0.5× | 1.7× | 1.1× | 0.9× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | $58M | $53M | $210M | $209M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $245M | $741M | $1.5B | $2.8B | $2.6B | Total assetsAssets |
| $128M | $187M | $301M | — | $301M | Total debtDebt |
| $107M | $157M | $216M | — | $141M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| -2.9× | -2.5× | 15.5× | -10.7× | -17.1× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $88M | $488M | $977M | $1.4B | $1.4B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 12.4% | 5.6% | 12.8% | 24.6% | 36.9% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||
| 33.9M | 41.5M | 101M | 105M | 111M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $2.17 | $1.98 | $1.61 | $2.23 | $2.56 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-0.94 | $-1.58 | $3.28 | $-2.15 | $-2.81 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $-1.61 | $-0.78 | $-1.15 | $-2.29 | $-2.32 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-2.37 | $-0.78 | $-1.91 | $-3.25 | $-2.78 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $1.10 | $0.08 | $1.23 | $1.93 | $1.59 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $2.58 | $11.76 | $9.67 | $13.50 | $12.42 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×2.44 into 2024 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 3-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +0.9%/yr | +0.9%/yr (3-yr) |
| Capital spending / share | +20.6%/yr | +20.6%/yr (3-yr) |
| Book value / share | +73.5%/yr | +73.5%/yr (3-yr) |
The record, charted
FY2022–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
−18%low FY2025
Gross margin
54%low FY2023
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
($241M)owner earningsvs.($226M)net incomelow FY2025
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned ($241M) of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $102M it takes just to hold its position. It put $101M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($342M).
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($226M) | $332M | ($66M) | ($32M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$102M | +$48M | +$19M | +$12M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$58M | +$21M | +$5M | +$9M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$73M | −$469M | +$13M | −$32M |
| Cash from operations | ($139M) | ($69M) | ($29M) | ($43M) |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$102M | −$48M | −$3M | −$12M |
| Owner earnings | ($241M) | ($116M) | ($32M) | ($55M) |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −$101M | −$76M | — | −$26M |
| Free cash flow | ($342M) | ($193M) | ($32M) | ($80M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | -103% | -72% | -40% | -74% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $102M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $101M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $58M), owner earnings is nearer ($299M).
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -10.7×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($322M) ÷ interest expense $30M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net debt against an operating lossCash $45M − debt $301M
What this means
Netting $45M of cash and short-term investments against $301M of debt leaves $256M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Negative, funded by othersDSO 48 + DIO 0 − DPO 53 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle4-yr median, range -18%–29%; -15% latest = NOPAT ($254M) ÷ invested capital $1.7BIndustry peers: median -7%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 4 years (it ran -15% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Consumes cash through the cycle4-yr median margin, range -103%–-40%; latest ($241M) = operating cash ($139M) − maintenance capex $102MIndustry peers: median -55%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -103% of revenue this year, a -74% median across 4 years. It chose to put $101M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ($342M) — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $58M of SBC) leaves ($299M).
- Are earnings backed by cash? ($139M)Loss, and burning cashNet income ($226M) · cash from operations ($139M)
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.99×ExpandingCapex $203M ÷ depreciation $102M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 3 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $235M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.09×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $301M vs $33M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.12/share (latest year $-2.01), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $12.63/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2022–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 1 of 4
What this means
Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 3 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin −55% → 73% (2-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −55% early to 73% lately, median −84% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Worst year 2025 · −136.9% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2025, understand why before trusting the good years.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
In its own filing Named as a competitive risk
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.
“We compete primarily for customers, specialized hardware, and Bitcoin rewards, including through our Hut 8 Canada, American Bitcoin, and Highrise AI brands.”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$217M
- Cash & short-term investments$160M
- Receivables$7M
- Other current assets$49M
Current liabilities$252M
- Debt due within a year$65M
- Accounts payable$44M
- Other current liabilities$144M
Current ratio0.86×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.86×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.63×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($36M)the cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$65M due · $160M cash
covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Cash runway0.5 yrsthe business is consuming cash; this is how long the cash on hand lasts at that rate
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+225.5%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.7× → 0.9×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$1.2Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($703M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$319M$18M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$2Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float
From the company's latest filing.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | Mr. Genoot | $6.0M | $7.7M | ($32M) |
| 2023 | Mr. Genoot | $47k | $6.9M | ($32M) |
| 2024 | Mr. Genoot | $1.5M | −$818k | ($116M) |
| 2024 | Mr. Genoot | $10.3M | $19.6M | ($116M) |
| 2025 | Mr. Genoot | $239.9M | $259.7M | ($241M) |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership10.4%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio2,423:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$58M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 25% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Hut 8 Corp. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2022–2025.
4 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 1 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?−87.1% vs −56.7%
The business ran at a loss early in the record (an owner-earnings margin of −56.7%) and the loss has widened to −87.1% across the last three years, with the latest year at −102.6%. Ask the filing where the widening sits — price, cost, or spending growing faster than revenue — and what would narrow it.
- Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$128M → $301M
Debt rose from $128M to $301M while owner earnings went from about ($68M) to ($130M): the borrowing grew and the earnings that would carry it are not there now. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
- Look hereDid reported profit become cash?-33.66×
Across the record the business reported $8M of net income but generated ($280M) of operating cash, a -33.66-to-one conversion. Profit that does not turn into cash over many years is the classic mark of earnings that are softer than they look. Ask where the gap sits, receivables, inventory, or costs being capitalized rather than expensed.
- Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?2% → 3% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $1M to $7M while revenue grew 286%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (2% of revenue then, 3% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.
And these came back clean
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Stock compensation as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Capital Markets & Asset Management
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CLSKCleanSpark Inc. | $766M | 44% | -114.4% | -12% | -82% |
| RIOTRiot Platforms Inc. Common Stock | $647M | 26% | -128.7% | -24% | -105% |
| IRENIREN Limited | $501M | 53% | -14.5% | -3% | 1% |
| HIVEHIVE Digital Technologies Ltd. | $298M | — | 1.8% | 0% | -42% |
| HUTHut 8 Corp. | $235M | 54% | -55.2% | -8% | -73% |
| CIFRCipher Digital Inc. | $224M | 62% | -108.6% | -7% | -154% |
| CRCLCircle Internet Group Inc. | $110M | — | 1102.0% | -4% | 699% |
| SLNHPSoluna Holdings, Inc. | $30M | 23% | -113.3% | -33% | -55% |
| Group median | — | 49% | -81.9% | -8% | -64% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFHut 8 Corp. is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.
$
The assumptions
Revenue, delivered52%/yr’22→’25
Enter a price to run it.
Owner earnings it must reach—
Margin the price demands—
Owner-earnings margin today−109%
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Hut 8 Corp. (HUT), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/HUT, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← HURN its page in the Manual HVT →
Industry order: ← HTT the Capital Markets & Asset Management chapter IBKR →