Share count
318Mpeak FY2025
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CORZ, Core Scientific Inc.
Core Scientific Inc. designs, builds and operates large-scale, purpose-built data centers that support high-density colocation services and digital asset mining for both our own account and to a lesser extent, third- party customers.
As of December 31, 2025, we owned or leased ten data centers across seven U.S. states, representing approximately 1.4 gigawatts ("GW") of gross utility power capacity, or approximately 920 megawatts ("MW") of total leasable customer power capacity.
Through the exercise of several contractual options during 2024 and into early 2025, total leased customer power capacity under the relationship with CoreWeave increased to approximately 590 MW of leased power capacity.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$319M
−37.5% YoY · 40% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM
Cash & investments $1.0B
Gross margin 17%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Capital build-out. Capital spending has surged to 229% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has reached 24% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −28%) on a 16% gross margin — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −31 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 5%, above 15% in 1 of 3 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2020–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||
| $60M | $544M | $640M | $502M | $511M | $319M | $355M | RevenueRevenue |
| 16% | 44% | 1% | 25% | 24% | 12% | 17% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 24% | 11% | 33% | 22% | 22% | 50% | 48% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 9% | 1% | 4% | 1% | 2% | — | 3% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| ($6M) | $131M | ($2.1B) | $9M | ($142M) | ($246M) | ($509M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −10.5% | 24.2% | −329.5% | 1.8% | −27.8% | −77.0% | −143.5% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($12M) | $47M | ($2.1B) | ($246M) | ($1.4B) | ($289M) | ($1.2B) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||
| ($24M) | ($57M) | $205M | $65M | $43M | $278M | $573M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $9M | $33M | $225M | $96M | $113M | $69M | $66M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($24M) | ($176M) | $1.9B | $157M | $1.3B | $400M | $1.6B | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $0 | $0 | $384M | $16M | $95M | $729M | $1.0B | CapexCapex |
| 0.0% | 0.0% | 60.0% | 3.2% | 18.6% | 228.5% | 291.6% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ($24M) | ($57M) | ($179M) | $49M | ($52M) | ($451M) | ($461M) | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −39.4% | −10.4% | −27.9% | 9.7% | −10.2% | −141.3% | −130.0% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($24M) | ($57M) | ($179M) | $49M | ($52M) | ($451M) | ($461M) | Free cash flowFCF |
| −39.4% | −10.4% | −27.9% | 9.7% | −10.2% | −141.3% | −130.0% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| — | — | $32M | $0 | $0 | — | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| -6% | 5% | — | 19% | — | — | — | ROICROIC |
| Balance sheet | |||||||
| $9M | $118M | $16M | $50M | $836M | $311M | $1.0B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $1M | $234K | $1M | $1M | — | $1M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $12M | $54M | $155M | $19M | $126M | $219M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | ($10M) | ($53M) | ($154M) | ($18M) | — | ($218M) | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $757M | $85M | $97M | $904M | $896M | $1.5B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $400 | $320M | $187M | $488M | $135M | $781M | $2.7B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 2.4× | 0.5× | 0.2× | 6.7× | 1.1× | 0.5× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | $1.1B | $0 | $0 | — | — | $0 | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $15K | $2.4B | $808M | $712M | $664M | $2.3B | $3.1B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | $652M | $0 | $684M | $1.1B | $1.1B | $2.1B | Total debtDebt |
| — | $534M | ($16M) | $634M | $238M | $749M | $1.1B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| $89M | $1.3B | ($409M) | ($597M) | ($1.2B) | ($963M) | ($1.3B) | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 5.0% | 7.2% | 28.6% | 11.7% | 10.2% | 30.8% | 28.1% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||
| 105M | 156M | 227M | 253M | 256M | 318M | 323M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $0.57 | $3.50 | $2.82 | $1.98 | $2.00 | $1.00 | $1.10 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-0.12 | $0.30 | $-9.45 | $-0.97 | $-5.62 | $-0.91 | $-3.75 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $-0.23 | $-0.36 | $-0.79 | $0.19 | $-0.20 | $-1.42 | $-1.43 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-0.23 | $-0.36 | $-0.79 | $0.19 | $-0.20 | $-1.42 | $-1.43 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.00 | $0.00 | $1.69 | $0.06 | $0.37 | $2.29 | $3.20 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $0.85 | $8.62 | $-1.80 | $-2.36 | $-4.62 | $-3.03 | $-4.04 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×1.48 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×1.46 into 2022 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
Share counts before 2024 are restated ×1/1.5 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.
The record, charted
FY2020–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.
ROIC
19%low FY2020
Gross margin
12%low FY2022
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
($451M)owner earningsvs.($289M)net incomelow FY2025
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
FY2022FY2025
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business reported a $289M loss but ($451M) of owner earnings: $162M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($289M) | ($1.4B) | ($246M) | ($2.1B) | $47M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$69M | +$113M | +$96M | +$225M | +$33M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$98M | +$52M | +$59M | +$183M | +$39M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$400M | +$1.3B | +$157M | +$1.9B | −$176M |
| Cash from operations | $278M | $43M | $65M | $205M | ($57M) |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$729M | −$95M | −$16M | −$384M | — |
| Owner earnings | ($451M) | ($52M) | $49M | ($179M) | ($57M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | -141% | -10% | 10% | -28% | -10% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $98M), owner earnings is nearer ($549M).
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- Interest expense not tagged in the data
What this means
No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.
- Net debt against an operating lossCash $311M − debt $1.1B
What this means
Netting $311M of cash and short-term investments against $1.1B of debt leaves $749M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Negative, funded by othersDSO 1 + DIO 0 − DPO 164 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)
Is it a good business?
- Not meaningful hereInvested capital ($214M) = debt $1.1B + equity ($963M) − cashIndustry peers: median -7%
What this means
Invested capital is near zero or negative, usually years of buybacks pulling equity down. ROIC explodes or flips sign and stops meaning anything. Judge this one on Owner Earnings instead.
- Consumes cash through the cycle6-yr median margin, range -141%–10%; latest ($451M) = operating cash $278M − maintenance capex $729MIndustry peers: median -64%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -141% of revenue this year, a -28% median across 6 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $98M of SBC) leaves ($549M).
- Loss, but cash-generativeNet income ($289M) · cash from operations $278M
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- No surplus to allocate
What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
- Investing or harvesting? 10.58×ExpandingCapex $729M ÷ depreciation $69M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $319M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.15×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $1.1B vs $114M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (6-yr record) · 5 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-2.07/share (latest year $-0.91), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $-3.03/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2020–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 1 of 6
What this means
Lost money in 5 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Operating margin −105% → −34% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −105% early to −34% lately, median −28% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Worst year 2022 · −329.5% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2022, understand why before trusting the good years.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$1.5B
- Cash & short-term investments$1.0B
- Receivables$1M
- Other current assets$449M
Current liabilities$2.7B
- Debt due within a year$994M
- Accounts payable$219M
- Other current liabilities$1.4B
Current ratio0.55×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.55×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.38×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($1.2B)the cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$994M due · $1.0B cash
covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+44.9%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.6× → 0.5×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($1.3B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($2.9B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$2.2B$99M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$654Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2020–2025
Over the record, the business generated $511M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested$1.2B · 240%
- Buybacks$32M · 6%
- Returned to owners$32M
$0 as dividends and $32M as buybacks.
- Source of funding−$745M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $745M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $32M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count207.3%
The diluted count rose from 105M to 323M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 6-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
Goodwill & intangibles$2M0% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity—goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$0over 6 years buying other businesses, against $1.2B of capital spent building
$1.1B written down across 1 year (2022): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 6-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | Mr. Sullivan | $5.8M | −$107.0M | ($179M) |
| 2022 | Mr. Sullivan | $5.8M | −$107.0M | ($179M) |
| 2023 | Mr. Sullivan | $60k | −$219.0M | $49M |
| 2023 | Mr. Sullivan | $891k | $891k | $49M |
| 2024 | Mr. Sullivan | $41.9M | $58.4M | ($52M) |
| 2024 | Mr. Sullivan | $41.9M | $58.4M | ($52M) |
| 2025 | Mr. Sullivan | $22.9M | $74.8M | ($451M) |
| 2025 | Mr. Sullivan | $22.9M | $74.8M | ($451M) |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership1.7%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio171:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$98M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 31% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Core Scientific Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2020–2025.
2 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 1 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?−47.2% vs −25.9%
The business ran at a loss early in the record (an owner-earnings margin of −25.9%) and the loss has widened to −47.2% across the last three years, with the latest year at −141.3%. Ask the filing where the widening sits — price, cost, or spending growing faster than revenue — and what would narrow it.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?207.3%
Diluted shares grew 207.3% over 2020–2025, even as the company spent $32M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
And these came back clean
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Stock compensation as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Capital Markets & Asset Management
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RIOTRiot Platforms Inc. Common Stock | $647M | 26% | -128.7% | -24% | -105% |
| IRENIREN Limited | $501M | 53% | -14.5% | -3% | 1% |
| CORZCore Scientific Inc. | $319M | 20% | -19.2% | 5% | -19% |
| HIVEHIVE Digital Technologies Ltd. | $298M | — | 1.8% | 0% | -42% |
| HUTHut 8 Corp. | $235M | 54% | -55.2% | -8% | -73% |
| CIFRCipher Digital Inc. | $224M | 62% | -108.6% | -7% | -154% |
| BTBTBit Digital Inc. | $114M | — | -58.9% | -10% | -64% |
| WYFIWhiteFiber Inc. | $79M | — | -33.9% | -6% | 28% |
| Group median | — | 53% | -44.6% | -6% | -53% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFCore Scientific Inc. is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.
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The assumptions
Revenue, delivered25%/yr’20→’25
Enter a price to run it.
Owner earnings it must reach—
Margin the price demands—
Owner-earnings margin today−130%
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Core Scientific Inc. (CORZ), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/CORZ, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← CORT its page in the Manual CORZW →
Industry order: ← COIN the Capital Markets & Asset Management chapter CORZW →