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XPOF, Xponential Fitness Inc.

Casinos & Gaming asset-light UnprofitableDistress / turnaroundCyclical

Fitness LLC, and other subsidiaries, is one of the leading global franchisors of boutique health and wellness brands.

We operate a diversified platform of five brands spanning across verticals including Pilates, barre, stretching, functional training, and yoga.

Prior to the divestitures of the CycleBar and Rumble brands in July 2025, through our ownership of the CycleBar and Rumble brands, we franchised boutique fitness studios dedicated to indoor cycling and boxing disciplines, respectively.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

XPOF · Xponential Fitness Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$315M

−1.7% YoY · 24% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $299M 5-yr avg $270M

Gross margin 84% 5-yr avg 81%

Operating margin 7.8% 5-yr avg −2.8%

Owner-earnings margin −1% 5-yr avg 9%

Free cash flow margin −1% 5-yr avg 9%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is led by Franchise (61%) and Franchise marketing fund revenue (12%), with 3 more lines behind.
Situation: Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has run about 5.5% through the cycle, a thin margin, where volume, cost discipline and the price it gets all bear on the result. The operating margin has swung widely — from −20% to 11% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Franchise is 61% of revenue, with Franchise marketing fund revenue the other meaningful line at 12%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025

Franchise61%$193M
Franchise marketing fund revenue12%$36M
Equipment Revenue11%$35M
Service, Other9%$27M
Merchandise revenue8%$24M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2019–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
								Income statement
$129M	$107M	$155M	$243M	$318M	$320M	$315M	$299M	RevenueRevenue
62%	57%	61%	52%	53%	55%	48%	46%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
($21M)	$8M	($31M)	$13M	$35M	($54M)	$20M	$23M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−16.3%	7.3%	−19.9%	5.5%	11.0%	−16.7%	6.3%	7.8%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($37M)	($14M)	($19M)	$1M	($4M)	($68M)	($39M)	($37M)	Net incomeNet inc.
								Cash flow & returns
$2M	($728K)	$14M	$52M	$33M	$12M	$28M	$811K	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$6M	$8M	$10M	$15M	$17M	$18M	$12M	$11M	DepreciationDeprec.
$30M	$4M	$13M	$6M	$2M	$46M	$42M	$15M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$7M	$2M	$4M	$9M	$7M	$5M	$4M	$4M	CapexCapex
5.6%	1.8%	2.3%	3.7%	2.3%	1.5%	1.1%	1.2%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($6M)	($3M)	$11M	$43M	$25M	$7M	$25M	($3M)	Owner earningsOwner earn.
−4.4%	−2.4%	7.0%	17.7%	8.0%	2.2%	7.9%	−0.9%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($6M)	($3M)	$11M	$43M	$25M	$7M	$25M	($3M)	Free cash flowFCF
−4.4%	−2.4%	7.0%	17.7%	8.0%	2.2%	7.9%	−0.9%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$750K	$0	$44M	$0	$3M	$9M	$0	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
—	—	$0	$0	$50M	$0	$0	—	BuybacksBuybacks
								Balance sheet
—	$11M	$21M	$37M	$37M	$33M	$46M	$21M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
—	$5M	$12M	$26M	$32M	$26M	$18M	$21M	ReceivablesReceiv.
—	$6M	$7M	$11M	$16M	$10M	$2M	$3M	InventoryInvent.
—	$18M	$15M	$16M	$19M	$27M	$26M	$18M	Accounts payablePayables
—	($7M)	$4M	$20M	$29M	$9M	($6M)	$5M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
—	$33M	$51M	$86M	$97M	$84M	$95M	$75M	Current assetsCur. assets
—	$55M	$66M	$73M	$102M	$108M	$116M	$99M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
—	0.6×	0.8×	1.2×	0.9×	0.8×	0.8×	0.8×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
—	$140M	$169M	$166M	$171M	$135M	$128M	$128M	GoodwillGoodwill
—	$323M	$416M	$483M	$530M	$403M	$346M	$322M	Total assetsAssets
—	$182M	$131M	$136M	$324M	$347M	$506M	$505M	Total debtDebt
—	$170M	$110M	$99M	$287M	$314M	$460M	$484M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-1.3×	0.4×	-1.2×	1.0×	0.9×	-1.2×	0.4×	0.4×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$27M	$5M	($654M)	($155M)	($130M)	($217M)	($269M)	($316M)	Shareholders’ equityEquity
1.6%	1.6%	6.3%	11.9%	5.7%	4.8%	4.1%	3.9%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
—	—	—	$3M	$7M	$38M	$7M	$63M	Goodwill written downGW imp.
								Per share
—	—	33.6M	37.9M	39.7M	32.0M	34.8M	37.3M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
—	—	$4.61	$6.41	$8.01	$10.01	$9.05	$8.00	Revenue / shareRev/sh
—	—	$-0.56	$0.03	$-0.10	$-2.11	$-1.11	$-1.00	EPS (diluted)EPS
—	—	$0.32	$1.14	$0.64	$0.22	$0.71	$-0.07	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
—	—	$0.32	$1.14	$0.64	$0.22	$0.71	$-0.07	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
—	—	$0.11	$0.24	$0.19	$0.15	$0.10	$0.10	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
—	—	$-19.47	$-4.08	$-3.27	$-6.77	$-7.73	$-8.48	Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2023 are restated ×1.5 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	6-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+18.3%/yr (4-yr)	+18.3%/yr (4-yr)
Owner earnings / share	+21.9%/yr (4-yr)	+21.9%/yr (4-yr)
Capital spending / share	−1.3%/yr (4-yr)	−1.3%/yr (4-yr)

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

Revenue-1.7%
“Total revenue was $314.9 million in the year ended December 31, 2025, compared to $320.3 million in the year ended December 31, 2024, a decrease of $5.5 million, or 2%. The decrease in total revenue was primarily due to lower equipment revenue due to a decrease in equipment installations and lower in merchandise revenue, partially offset by an increase in franchise revenue and franchise marketing fund revenue.”
✓ figure matches the filed record
Merchandise revenue-12.0%
“Merchandise revenue was $23.9 million in the year ended December 31, 2025, compared to $27.2 million in the year ended December 31, 2024, a decrease of $3.3 million, or 12%. The decrease in merchandise revenue was primarily due to the impact of divested brands and lower overall demand from studios coupled with change in strategy to outsource our retail merchandise inventory compared to the prior period.”
✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2019–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.

Share count

35Mpeak FY2023

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

18.6×peak FY2024

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$25Mowner earningsvs.($39M)net incomelow FY2019

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2019FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $39M loss into $25M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	($39M)	($68M)	($4M)	$1M	($19M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$12M	+$18M	+$17M	+$15M	+$10M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$13M	+$15M	+$18M	+$29M	+$10M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$42M	+$46M	+$2M	+$6M	+$13M
Cash from operations	$28M	$12M	$33M	$52M	$14M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$4M	−$5M	−$7M	−$9M	−$4M
Owner earnings	$25M	$7M	$25M	$43M	$11M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	8%	2%	8%	18%	7%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $13M), owner earnings is nearer $12M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Material weakness in financial controls

“Update to Previously Reported Material Weakness 132 Xponential Fitness, Inc.”

The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 0.4×

Does not cover its interest

Operating income $20M ÷ interest expense $49M

What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $460M · 23.2× operating profit

Heavy net debt

Cash $46M − debt $506M

What this means
Netting $46M of cash and short-term investments against $506M of debt leaves $460M owed, about 23.2× a year's operating profit (25.5× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? -168d

Negative, funded by others

DSO 21 + DIO 17 − DPO 207 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital —

Not enough data

Industry peers: median 4%

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Owner-earnings margin 7%

Solid through the cycle

7-yr median margin, range -4%–18%; latest $25M = operating cash $28M − maintenance capex $4M

Industry peers: median 17%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 8% of revenue this year, a 7% median across 7 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $13M of SBC) leaves $12M.
Are earnings backed by cash? $28M

Loss, but cash-generative

Net income ($39M) · cash from operations $28M

In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 0%

Reinvests most of it

Dividends + buybacks $0 ÷ Owner Earnings $25M

What this means
Of $25M Owner Earnings, $0 (0%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 0.30×

Harvesting

Capex $4M ÷ depreciation $12M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Miss

Revenue ≥ $2B · $315M

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.82×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $506M vs ($21M) WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (7-yr record) · 6 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.99/share (latest year $-1.04), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $-7.21/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2019–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 1 of 7

What this means
Lost money in 6 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 4 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin −10% → 0% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −10% early to 0% lately, median 5% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Worst year 2021 · −19.9% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2021, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count +7.6%/yr

What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“Our competitive environment includes boutique fitness studios, personal trainers, large-scale health and fitness clubs, at-home fitness solutions, digital wellness platforms, and AI-driven fitness applications.”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$75M

Cash & short-term investments$21M
Receivables$21M
Inventory$3M
Other current assets$30M

Current liabilities$99M

Debt due within a year$5M
Accounts payable$18M
Other current liabilities$76M

Current ratio0.76×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.73×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.22×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital($24M)the cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$5M due · $21M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−17.4%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters0.9× → 0.8×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value($510M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($619M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$523M$18M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$89Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2019–2025

Over the record, the business generated $140M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

Reinvested$37M · 27%
Buybacks$50M · 36%
Retained (debt / cash)$52M · 37%

Returned to owners$50M
49% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $50M as buybacks.
Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $50M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
Net change in share count11.0%
The diluted count rose from 34M to 37M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 7-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$194M56% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity—goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$56Mover 7 years buying other businesses, against $37M of capital spent building

$55M written down across 4 years (2022, 2023, 2024, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 99% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 7-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

Insider ownership14%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$13M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 4% of revenue, equal to 65% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Xponential Fitness Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2019–2025.

2 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 1 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?11.0%
Diluted shares grew 11.0% over 2019–2025, even as the company spent $50M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?5 of 7 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 5 of the last 7 years, $172M in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Acquisitions, Stock compensation, Contingencies as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, nearest by economic model

No close industry peers in the catalog yet, so these are the nearest by economic model (asset-light compounder), compared on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
TCMDTactile Systems Technology Inc.	$330M	71%	4.3%	9%	3%
AGYSAgilysys	$319M	61%	-2.5%	-14%	17%
DOMODomo, Inc.	$319M	73%	-34.5%	—	-8%
XPOFXponential Fitness Inc.	$315M	85%	5.5%	—	7%
RPAYRepay Holdings Corporation	$309M	76%	-20.6%	-4%	24%
VPGVishay Precision Group Inc.	$307M	39%	8.7%	9%	5%
HSTMHealthStream Inc.	$304M	86%	5.8%	4%	18%
RSVRReservoir Media Inc.	$176M	61%	21.8%	3%	25%
Group median	—	72%	4.9%	—	12%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Xponential Fitness Inc. has delivered.

Xponential Fitness Inc.’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, a cyclical trough. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Xponential Fitness Inc. earns about $22M on its 7.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 7.9% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($22M) Net of stock comp (−$12M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−12%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · since FY2021+23%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings ($3M) on 37M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net debt $484M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits off the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh XPOF against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Xponential Fitness Inc. (XPOF), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/XPOF, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← XPO its page in the Manual XPRO →

Industry order: ← STUB the Casinos & Gaming chapter