Owner Scorecard


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STUB, StubHub Holdings Inc.

Casinos & Gaming diversified UnprofitableDistress / turnaround

We operate the largest global secondary ticketing marketplace for live events.

We connect fans around the world with sellers who use our marketplace to reach passionate fans and price tickets efficiently.

In building our marketplace, we created and scaled core capabilities required to succeed in secondary ticketing: Technology : End-to-end functionality capable of handling all types of events.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
STUB · StubHub Holdings Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$1.7B
−1.4% YoY
Vital signs · TTM, with 3-yr average
Revenue $1.8B 3-yr avg $1.6B
Operating margin −75.0% 3-yr avg −16.9%
ROIC −69% 3-yr avg −35%
Owner-earnings margin 18% 3-yr avg 16%
Free cash flow margin 18% 3-yr avg 16%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run about 7.8% through the cycle, a thin margin, where volume, cost discipline and the price it gets all bear on the result. The operating margin has swung widely — from −77% to 19% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2023–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$1.4B$1.8B$1.7B$1.8BRevenueRevenue
20%22%98%98%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$253M$138M($1.3B)($1.3B)Operating incomeOp. inc.
18.5%7.8%−77.0%−75.0%Operating marginOp. mgn
$405M($3M)($1.9B)($1.8B)Net incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
$307M$261M$193M$333MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$23M$25M$26M$27MDepreciationDeprec.
($155M)$232M$625M$668MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$2M$2M$1M$1MCapexCapex
0.1%0.1%0.1%0.1%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$306M$260M$191M$332MOwner earningsOwner earn.
22.3%14.7%11.0%18.5%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$306M$260M$191M$332MFree cash flowFCF
22.3%14.7%11.0%18.5%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$1M$0$1MBuybacksBuybacks
3%-73%-69%ROICROIC
46%-0%-161%-117%Return on equityROE
46%−0%−161%−117%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$776M$1.0B$1.2B$1.5BCash & investmentsCash+inv
$5M$7M$10MReceivablesReceiv.
$16M$9M$9MInventoryInvent.
$113M$71M$64MAccounts payablePayables
($91M)($55M)($46M)Operating working capitalOper. WC
$1.1B$1.3B$1.6BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$1.1B$1.3B$1.5BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.9×1.0×1.1×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$2.7B$2.7B$2.7BGoodwillGoodwill
$5.1B$5.1B$5.4BTotal assetsAssets
$2.3B$1.5B$1.5BTotal debtDebt
$1.3B$265M($30M)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
1.6×0.8×-9.6×-11.7×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$890M$881M$1.2B$1.6BShareholders’ equityEquity
2.6%0.4%83.0%82.1%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
308M304M319M378MShares out (diluted)Shares
$4.44$5.82$5.47$4.74Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.32$-0.01$-5.97$-4.85EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.99$0.85$0.60$0.88Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.99$0.85$0.60$0.88Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.01$0.01$0.00$0.00Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$2.89$2.89$3.71$4.13Book value / shareBVPS

The record, charted

FY2023–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
319Mpeak FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$191Mowner earningsvs.($1.9B)net incomelow FY2025

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2023FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $1.9B loss into $191M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2025FY2024FY2023
Reported net income($1.9B)($3M)$405M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$26M+$25M+$23M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$1.4B+$8M+$35M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$625M+$232M−$155M
Cash from operations$193M$261M$307M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$1M−$2M−$2M
Owner earnings$191M$260M$306M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue11%15%22%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $1.4B), owner earnings is nearer ($1.3B).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Material weakness in financial controls
“We have identified material weaknesses in our internal control over financial reporting.”

The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income ($1.3B) ÷ interest expense $140M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • Net debt against an operating loss
    Cash $1.2B − debt $1.5B
    What this means

    Netting $1.2B of cash and short-term investments against $1.5B of debt leaves $265M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average
    NOPAT ($1.1B) ÷ invested capital $1.4B (debt + equity − cash)
    Industry peers: median 12%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    3-yr median margin, range 11%–22%; latest $191M = operating cash $193M − maintenance capex $1M
    Industry peers: median 6%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 11% of revenue this year, a 15% median across 3 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $1.4B of SBC) leaves ($1.3B).

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($1.9B) · cash from operations $193M

    In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.

    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $1M ÷ Owner Earnings $191M
    What this means

    Of $191M Owner Earnings, $1M (1%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $1M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($1.4B SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.05×
    Harvesting
    Capex $1M ÷ depreciation $26M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 3 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Near
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.7B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.04×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $1.5B vs $44M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-1.39/share (latest year $-5.30), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $3.29/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“If we cannot use AI/ML or that use is restricted, our business may be less efficient, or we may be at a competitive disadvantage.”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.6B
  • Cash & short-term investments$1.5B
  • Receivables$10M
  • Inventory$9M
  • Other current assets$78M
Current liabilities$1.5B
  • Accounts payable$64M
  • Other current liabilities$1.4B
Current ratio1.10×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.10×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio1.04×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$150Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+12.2%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters0.9× → 1.1×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($2.0B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($1.7B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$1.5Bno operating-lease liability tagged this quarter, so debt alone
Deferred revenue$1.1Bcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 3-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$3.6B71% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth
Cash spent acquiring$0over 3 years buying other businesses, against $5M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 3-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$1.4B

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 83% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Inventory, Stock compensation as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Casinos & Gaming

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
WMGWarner Music$6.7B47%9.2%13%9%
DKNGDraftKings Inc.$6.1B38%-44.5%-79%-15%
TKOTKO Group Holdings Inc.$4.7B17.6%
STUBStubHub Holdings Inc.$1.7B7.8%-73%15%
ACELAccel Entertainment Inc.$1.3B7.7%14%7%
RSIRush Street Interactive Inc.$1.1B32%-19.3%-1%
OSWOneSpaWorld Holdings Limited$961M7.2%12%6%
SEGSeaport Entertainment Group Inc.$130M-91.7%-18%
Group median7.5%-3%7%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what StubHub Holdings Inc. has delivered.

$
Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2023−21%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $332M on 359M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net cash $30M. The if-converted diluted count is 378M, 5% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "StubHub Holdings Inc. (STUB), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/STUB, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← STTK its page in the Manual STWD →

Industry order: ← SGHC the Casinos & Gaming chapter XPOF →