Owner Scorecard


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ZD, Ziff Davis

Interactive Media & Platforms capital-intensive Serial acquirer

Ziff Davis, Inc. is a vertically focused digital media and internet company whose portfolio includes leading brands in technology, shopping, gaming and entertainment, health and wellness, connectivity, cybersecurity, and martech.

Our digital media businesses specialize in publishing and producing trusted editorial content and tools for users seeking information and advice relating to the technology, shopping, gaming and entertainment, and health and wellness markets, and offer services to consumers and businesses.

Our cybersecurity and marketing technology business provides internet-delivered cloud-based subscription and licensed services to consumers and businesses including cybersecurity, privacy, and digital marketing tools.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
ZD · Ziff Davis
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$1.5B
+3.5% YoY · 5% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $1.4B 5-yr avg $1.4B
Gross margin 85% 5-yr avg 86%
Operating margin 11.9% 5-yr avg 11.3%
Owner-earnings margin 20% 5-yr avg 20%
Free cash flow margin 20% 5-yr avg 20%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 53% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 9 of the record's 10 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 85% and operating margin about 12% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The operating margin has swung widely — from 8.1% to 28% — on a steadier 85% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −235 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. Read this kind of business on subscribers, revenue per user, and network capex. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 5%, above 15% in 0 of 9 years). By owner earnings: roughly 24% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

16% of revenue comes from outside the United States.

Revenue by geography, FY2025
  • United States84%$1.2B
  • International16%$232M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$874M$1.1B$1.2B$1.1B$1.2B$1.4B$1.4B$1.4B$1.4B$1.5B$1.4BRevenueRevenue
83%85%83%82%85%87%87%86%86%86%85%Gross marginGross mgn
27%29%31%38%36%32%13%14%15%14%15%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
4%4%4%4%5%6%5%5%5%4%4%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$243M$246M$244M$88M$138M$167M$199M$133M$114M$183M$172MOperating incomeOp. inc.
27.7%22.0%20.2%8.4%11.9%11.8%14.3%9.7%8.1%12.6%11.9%Operating marginOp. mgn
$152M$139M$129M$219M$151M$497M$64M$42M$63M$47M$45MNet incomeNet inc.
28%30%26%6%20%-3%48%37%40%35%35%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$282M$264M$401M$413M$480M$517M$336M$320M$390M$407M$416MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$122M$162M$187M$232M$229M$258M$233M$237M$212M$229M$223MDepreciationDeprec.
($6M)($60M)$57M($62M)$77M($264M)$13M$10M$74M$86M$102MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$25M$40M$56M$71M$93M$114M$106M$109M$107M$119M$127MCapexCapex
2.8%3.5%4.7%6.7%8.0%8.0%7.6%8.0%7.6%8.2%8.8%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$258M$225M$345M$342M$388M$403M$230M$211M$284M$288M$290MOwner earningsOwner earn.
29.5%20.1%28.6%32.6%33.4%28.4%16.6%15.5%20.2%19.8%20.0%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$258M$225M$345M$342M$388M$403M$230M$211M$284M$288M$290MFree cash flowFCF
29.5%20.1%28.6%32.6%33.4%28.4%16.6%15.5%20.2%19.8%20.0%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$581M$175M$312M$415M$482M$141M$104M$9M$218M$67M$28MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$66M$73M$83M$44M$0$0$0Dividends paidDiv. paid
$56M$10M$47M$21M$276M$78M$78M$109M$185M$174MBuybacksBuybacks
13%10%10%4%4%7%5%4%3%ROICROIC
17%14%12%17%12%25%3%2%3%3%3%Return on equityROE
9%6%4%13%12%25%3%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$124M$351M$209M$576M$177M$924M$711M$765M$506M$607M$520MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$200M$234M$222M$262M$310M$316M$305M$338M$660M$667M$397MReceivablesReceiv.
$178M$170M$167M$238M$198M$131M$121M$123M$164M$151M$122MAccounts payablePayables
$22M$64M$55M$24M$112M$185M$184M$214M$496M$516M$276MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$348M$620M$460M$887M$623M$1.3B$1.1B$1.2B$1.3B$1.4B$1.4BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$454M$265M$307M$833M$883M$497M$432M$432M$900M$1.1B$864MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.8×2.3×1.5×1.1×0.7×2.6×2.5×2.8×1.4×1.3×1.7×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$1.1B$1.2B$1.4B$1.3B$1.5B$1.5B$1.6B$1.5B$1.6B$1.6B$1.3BGoodwillGoodwill
$2.1B$2.5B$2.6B$3.5B$3.7B$3.8B$3.5B$3.5B$3.7B$3.7B$3.4BTotal assetsAssets
$602M$1.0B$1.0B$1.4B$1.6B$1.1B$999M$1.0B$864M$867M$1.5BTotal debtDebt
$478M$651M$804M$873M$1.4B$167M$288M$237M$358M$259M$943MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
5.7×4.2×3.8×3.4×2.4×2.1×5.4×3.2×3.2×4.9×4.6×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$915M$1.0B$1.0B$1.3B$1.2B$2.0B$1.9B$1.9B$1.8B$1.8B$1.7BShareholders’ equityEquity
1.6%2.0%2.3%2.3%2.1%1.8%1.9%2.3%2.9%3.1%3.2%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
$33M$27M$57M$85M$18M$18MGoodwill written downGW imp.
Per share
48.0M48.7M48.9M49.0M47.1M47.9M47.0M46.5M44.5M41.1M37.6MShares out (diluted)Shares
$18.23$22.97$24.68$21.43$24.60$29.60$29.58$29.36$31.48$35.31$38.46Revenue / shareRev/sh
$3.18$2.86$2.63$4.46$3.20$10.38$1.36$0.89$1.42$1.15$1.21EPS (diluted)EPS
$5.37$4.62$7.05$6.97$8.23$8.42$4.90$4.55$6.37$7.00$7.71Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$5.37$4.62$7.05$6.97$8.23$8.42$4.90$4.55$6.37$7.00$7.71Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.37$1.51$1.69$0.90$0.00$0.00$0.00Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.52$0.81$1.15$1.44$1.96$2.38$2.26$2.34$2.40$2.90$3.37Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$19.07$20.96$21.17$26.75$25.70$41.11$40.25$40.74$40.68$42.67$45.79Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+7.6%/yr+7.5%/yr
Owner earnings / share+3.0%/yr−3.2%/yr
EPS−10.7%/yr−18.5%/yr
Capital spending / share+21.1%/yr+8.1%/yr
Book value / share+9.4%/yr+10.7%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
41Mpeak FY2019
ROIC
3%low FY2024
Gross margin
86%low FY2019
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
0.9×peak FY2020

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$288Mowner earningsvs.$47Mnet incomelow FY2023

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $47M of profit into $288M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$47M
Owner earnings$288M · 20% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$47M$63M$42M$64M$497M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$229M+$212M+$237M+$233M+$258M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$45M+$41M+$32M+$27M+$25M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$86M+$74M+$10M+$13M−$264M
Cash from operations$407M$390M$320M$336M$517M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$119M−$107M−$109M−$106M−$114M
Owner earnings$288M$284M$211M$230M$403M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue20%20%15%17%28%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $45M), owner earnings is nearer $243M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Material weakness in financial controls
“We have previously identified a material weakness in our internal controls, which we subsequently remediated.”

The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →

Will it survive?

  • Adequate
    Operating income $183M ÷ interest expense $38M
    What this means

    Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $841M · 4.6× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $607M − debt $1.4B
    What this means

    Netting $607M of cash and short-term investments against $1.4B of debt leaves $841M owed, about 4.6× a year's operating profit (7.9× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Negative, funded by others
    DSO 168 + DIO 0 − DPO 267 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    9-yr median, range 3%–13%; the latest year is left out — large non-operating charges put its operating line well above pretax profit
    Industry peers: median 10%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years, so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • High through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 15%–33%; latest $288M = operating cash $407M − maintenance capex $119M
    Industry peers: median 12%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 20% of revenue this year, a 20% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $45M of SBC) leaves $243M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $407M ÷ net income $47M

    In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.

    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $174M ÷ Owner Earnings $288M
    What this means

    Of $288M Owner Earnings, $174M (60%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $174M buybacks. Net of $45M stock comp, the real buyback was about $129M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.52×
    Harvesting
    Capex $119M ÷ depreciation $229M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Near
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.5B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.27×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $1.4B vs $295M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 4 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −64%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.37/share (latest year $1.29), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $47.61/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 23% → 10% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 23% early to 10% lately, median 12% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth +2%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 2% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2024 · 8.1% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −1.7%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record paid
    What this means

    Paid a dividend in 4 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“Our Digital Media Businesses face competition from online media companies as well as from social networking sites, mobile applications, traditional print and broadcast media, general purpose and search engines, generative AI, and various e-commerce sites.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.4B
  • Cash & short-term investments$520M
  • Receivables$397M
  • Other current assets$518M
Current liabilities$864M
  • Debt due within a year$149M
  • Accounts payable$122M
  • Other current liabilities$593M
Current ratio1.66×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.66×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.60×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$572Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$149M due · $520M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−1.9%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.9× → 1.7×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$64Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($237M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$892M$25M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$138Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $3.8B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$838M · 22%
  • Dividends$266M · 7%
  • Buybacks$1.0B · 27%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$1.7B · 44%
  • Returned to owners$1.3B

    44% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $266M as dividends and $1.0B as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $861M and cash and short-term investments rose $396M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$15.80

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 4M shares were bought for $66M, about $15.80 each.

  • Net change in share count−21.6%

    The diluted count fell from 48M to 38M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$0.00/sh

    Paid in 4 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.

  • Return on what it retained−7%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($203M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell $15M, so each retained $1 gave back about 0.07 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$2.0B53% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity92%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$2.5Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $838M of capital spent building

$220M written down across 5 years (2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Vivek Shah$16.5M$35.8M$403M
2022Vivek Shah$1.5M−$16.7M$230M
2023Vivek Shah$1.7M−$6.9M$211M
2024Vivek Shah$12.7M$5.2M$284M
2025Vivek Shah$11.8M$2.9M$288M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership3.4%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$45M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 3% of revenue, equal to 25% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Ziff Davis is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

3 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?18.5% vs 26.1%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 26.1% early in the record and 18.5% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$602M → $1.5B

    Debt rose from $602M to $1.5B while owner earnings went from about $276M to $261M — about 2.2 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 5.6 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

  • Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?6 of 10 years

    Management took an impairment or write-down in 6 of the last 10 years, $223M in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Interactive Media & Platforms

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
AMCXAMC Global Media Inc.$2.3B51%15.8%13%12%
CABOCable One$1.5B27.3%10%19%
ZDZiff Davis$1.5B85%12.3%5%24%
IDTIDT Corporation$1.2B24%2.8%75%2%
CALXCalix$1.0B50%-0.8%-2%3%
CCOICogent Communications Holdings Inc.$976M57%16.1%17%14%
GOGOGogo Inc.$910M93%28.4%5%7%
IRDMIridium Communications Inc$872M95%10.5%2%35%
Group median57%14.0%7%13%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Ziff Davis has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Ziff Davis earns about $353M on its 24.3% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 19.8% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−3%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+2%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $290M on 37M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-04; net debt $943M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Ziff Davis (ZD), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/ZD, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← ZBRA its page in the Manual ZETA →

Industry order: ← BMBL the Interactive Media & Platforms chapter