Share count
110Mpeak FY2023
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BMBL, Bumble Inc.
Bumble app is a leader in the online dating sector across several countries, including the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada.
Our platform of apps enables people to connect and build healthy and equitable relationships on their own terms.
Our platform is designed to help women feel safer and more empowered and, in turn, provide a better environment for everyone.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$966M
−9.9% YoY · 15% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $931M 5-yr avg $951M
Revenue $212M −14.1% vs yr-ago qtr
Operating margin 30.7% yr-ago 18.1%
Net income $53M yr-ago $20M
Net margin 24.8% yr-ago 8.0%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is Bumble App (81%) and Badoo App and Other (19%).
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has reached 19% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −18%) on a 71% gross margin — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −6%, above 15% in 0 of 5 years). This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Bumble App is 81% of revenue, with Badoo App and Other the other meaningful line at 19%.
Revenue by product line, FY2025
- Bumble App81%$783M
- Badoo App and Other19%$183M
By geographyInternational56%United States44%
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2019–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2019’19 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||
| $489M | $761M | $904M | $1.1B | $1.1B | $966M | $931M | RevenueRevenue |
| 71% | 73% | 72% | 71% | 70% | 71% | 72% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 14% | 34% | 18% | 21% | 12% | 14% | 16% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| $93M | ($135M) | ($103M) | $53M | ($700M) | ($806M) | ($785M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 19.1% | −17.7% | −11.4% | 5.1% | −65.4% | −83.4% | −84.3% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $66M | $310M | ($80M) | ($4M) | ($557M) | ($693M) | ($661M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||
| $101M | $105M | $133M | $182M | $123M | $250M | $284M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $7M | $107M | $90M | $68M | $71M | $26M | $21M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $26M | ($436M) | $12M | $14M | $584M | $886M | $887M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $0 | $0 | $70M | $10M | $0 | $0 | $0 | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $23M | $0 | $0 | — | — | — | $0 | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| $0 | $1.0B | $0 | $113M | $192M | $29M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| — | -6% | -4% | 1% | -45% | -65% | -65% | ROICROIC |
| 223% | 19% | -5% | -0% | -68% | -122% | -107% | Return on equityROE |
| 144% | 19% | −5% | — | — | — | −107% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||
| $57M | $369M | $403M | $356M | $204M | $176M | $246M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $48M | $67M | $103M | $100M | $83M | $66M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $19M | $3M | $5M | $7M | $9M | $2M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | $28M | $64M | $98M | $93M | $74M | $64M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $469M | $501M | $493M | $342M | $305M | $357M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $176M | $212M | $245M | $139M | $138M | $293M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 2.7× | 2.4× | 2.0× | 2.5× | 2.2× | 1.2× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | $1.5B | $1.6B | $1.6B | $1.4B | $733M | $733M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | $3.8B | $3.7B | $3.6B | $2.5B | $1.4B | $1.5B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | $629M | $625M | $621M | $617M | $588M | $587M | Total debtDebt |
| — | $260M | $222M | $265M | $413M | $413M | $342M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| $30M | $1.6B | $1.6B | $1.6B | $825M | $570M | $617M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 0.4% | 16.3% | 12.3% | 9.9% | 2.4% | 3.2% | 4.1% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| — | $26M | $167M | $167M | $197M | $656M | $656M | Goodwill written downGW imp. |
| Per share | |||||||
| — | 128M | 129M | 135M | 121M | 110M | 130M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| — | $5.92 | $6.98 | $7.79 | $8.87 | $8.77 | $7.17 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| — | $2.41 | $-0.62 | $-0.03 | $-4.61 | $-6.29 | $-5.09 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| — | $0.00 | $0.00 | — | — | — | $0.00 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| — | $12.52 | $12.58 | $12.12 | $6.82 | $5.18 | $4.75 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Share counts before 2022 are restated ×1/1.5 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 6-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +10.3%/yr (4-yr) | +10.3%/yr (4-yr) |
| Book value / share | −19.8%/yr (4-yr) | −19.8%/yr (4-yr) |
The record, charted
FY2019–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.
ROIC
−65%low FY2025
Gross margin
71%low FY2024
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
FY2019FY2025
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- Interest expense not tagged in the data
What this means
No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.
- Net debt against an operating lossCash $176M − debt $588M
What this means
Netting $176M of cash and short-term investments against $588M of debt leaves $413M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- TightDSO 31 + DIO 0 − DPO 12 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle5-yr median, range -65%–1%; -65% latest = NOPAT ($637M) ÷ invested capital $983MIndustry peers: median -12%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 5 years (it ran -65% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median 10%
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Loss, but cash-generativeNet income ($693M) · cash from operations $250M
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? —Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $966M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 2.21×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $588M vs $167M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (6-yr record) · 4 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 1 of 6 yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −523%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-3.22/share (latest year $-5.33), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $4.39/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2019–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 2 of 6
What this means
Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 5 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin −3% → −48% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about −3% early to −48% lately, median −18% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Worst year 2025 · −83.4% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2025, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count −8.9%/yr
What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
- Dividend record paid
What this means
Paid a dividend in 1 of the years on record.
- How management talks about it Owner’s terms
What this means
Returns have thinned, but the filing discusses it in an owner’s vocabulary rather than selling past it — candor about a hard stretch counts for more than an adjective.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Elevated contestabilityThe product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.
In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“In addition, any latency, disruption, or failure in our AI systems or infrastructure could result in delays or errors in our products and services.”
AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$357M
- Cash & short-term investments$246M
- Receivables$66M
- Other current assets$45M
Current liabilities$293M
- Debt due within a year$159M
- Accounts payable$2M
- Other current liabilities$133M
Current ratio1.22×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.22×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.84×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$64Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$159M due · $246M cash
covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−14.1%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters2.4× → 1.2×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($468M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($381M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$597M$10M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$35Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float
From the company's latest filing.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 6-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
Goodwill & intangibles$1.1B76% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth
Cash spent acquiring$80Mover 6 years buying other businesses
$1.2B written down across 5 years (2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 6-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Net income |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | $1.1M | $75.1M | $310M |
| 2022 | $16.2M | −$41.1M | ($80M) |
| 2023 | $7.0M | −$15.6M | ($4M) |
| 2024 | $6.0M | −$6.5M | ($557M) |
| 2024 | $23.5M | $12.1M | ($557M) |
| 2025 | $7.6M | $3.3M | ($693M) |
| 2025 | $192k | −$7.8M | ($693M) |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Net income is the whole business's, as filed, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership1.6%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio43:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$31M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 3% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Income taxes, Acquisitions, Stock compensation as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Interactive Media & Platforms
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| TRIPTripAdvisor Inc. | $1.9B | 93% | 6.9% | 9% | 10% |
| TEMTempus AI Inc. | $1.3B | — | -59.8% | -210% | -37% |
| BMBLBumble Inc. | $966M | 71% | -14.5% | -6% | — |
| TTANServiceTitan Inc. | $961M | 63% | -29.8% | -12% | -3% |
| DOCNDigitalOcean | $901M | 60% | -2.6% | -0% | 15% |
| DVDoubleVerify | $748M | 83% | 12.5% | 7% | 18% |
| MGNIMagnite Inc. | $714M | 62% | -18.6% | -13% | 18% |
| EVEREverQuote Inc. | $693M | 94% | -3.7% | -34% | 1% |
| Group median | — | 71% | -9.1% | -9% | — |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFThe owner-earnings base could not be formed from this filing’s tagged data (operating cash flow or capital spending is missing), so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.
$
The assumptions
Revenue, delivered14%/yr’19→’25
Enter a price to run it.
Owner earnings it must reach—
Margin the price demands—
Owner-earnings margin today—
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Bumble Inc. (BMBL), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/BMBL, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← BLZE its page in the Manual BMI →
Industry order: ← 4751 the Interactive Media & Platforms chapter ZD →