Owner Scorecard


← Japan catalog ← 6504 Manual 6526 → ← 6472 Industrial Machinery 6954 →

6506 · Yaskawa Electric

Robotics & automation Capital-intensive IFRS
Latest filing: FY2026 annual securities report (有価証券報告書) · EDINET

This is a quantitative scorecard. The numbers below are read directly from Yaskawa Electric’s EDINET filing, in yen. The Japanese-language narrative, what the business does, its risks, what changed this year, is not machine-read here, so we do not paraphrase it. Find it on EDINET (code 6506) →

I

The record

What the business has done across the cycle, read straight from the EDINET filing: the multi-year record, and the walk from reported profit to the cash an owner could take out.

The record, 2017–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’252026’26
Income statement
¥394.9B¥448.5B¥474.6B¥411.0B¥389.7B¥479.1B¥556.0B¥575.7B¥537.7B¥542.1BRevenueRevenue
30%30%36%35%Gross marginGross mgn
25%23%26%27%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
¥30.4B¥54.1B¥53.1B¥24.2B¥27.2B¥52.9B¥68.3B¥66.2B¥50.2B¥47.3BOperating incomeOp. inc.
7.7%12.1%11.2%5.9%7.0%11.0%12.3%11.5%9.3%8.7%Operating marginOp. mgn
¥20.4B¥39.7B¥42.5B¥15.6B¥18.9B¥38.4B¥51.8B¥50.7B¥57.0B¥35.2BNet incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
¥33.8B¥46.1B¥34.3B¥21.5B¥39.6B¥49.2B(¥2.2B)¥54.6B¥56.5B¥52.2BOperating cash flowOp. cash
¥12.1B¥12.7B¥14.3BDepreciationDeprec.
¥1.3B(¥6.4B)(¥22.5B)¥5.9B¥20.7B¥10.9B(¥54.0B)¥3.9B(¥482M)¥16.9BWorking capital & otherWC & other
¥15.2B¥17.8B¥23.1B¥22.3B¥8.6B¥24.2B¥21.9B¥31.0B¥37.3B¥46.2BCapexCapex
3.8%4.0%4.9%5.4%2.2%5.1%3.9%5.4%6.9%8.5%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
¥21.7B¥33.4B¥20.0B¥9.1B¥31.0B¥34.8B(¥19.0B)¥37.3B¥40.3B¥35.8BOwner earningsOwner earn.
5.5%7.4%4.2%2.2%8.0%7.3%−3.4%6.5%7.5%6.6%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
¥18.6B¥28.3B¥11.3B(¥845M)¥31.0B¥25.0B(¥24.1B)¥23.6B¥19.2B¥5.9BFree cash flowFCF
4.7%6.3%2.4%−0.2%8.0%5.2%−4.3%4.1%3.6%1.1%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
¥5.3B¥8.0B¥12.2B¥13.6B¥9.9B¥10.0B¥15.2B¥16.8B¥17.3B¥17.7BDividends paidDiv. paid
¥1M¥1.0B¥9.4B¥9.7B¥1M¥3M¥1M¥603M¥9.4B¥2MBuybacksBuybacks
12%19%20%10%10%15%15%12%8%7%ROICROIC
10%17%17%7%8%13%15%13%13%7%Return on equityROE
8%14%12%1%4%10%11%8%9%4%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
¥29.7B¥42.2B¥39.3B¥40.3B¥51.0B¥55.2B¥42.3B¥40.3B¥59.0B¥61.2BCash & investmentsCash+inv
¥129.4B¥142.0B¥37.6B¥30.6B¥32.4B¥42.0B¥43.5B¥40.8B¥35.3B¥41.0BReceivablesReceiv.
¥48.1B¥58.6B¥17.6B¥16.1B¥17.6B¥16.3B¥18.3B¥24.6B¥33.9B¥36.1BInventoryInvent.
¥70.0B¥84.8B¥27.5B¥12.4B¥14.3B¥17.1B¥12.7B¥11.4BAccounts payablePayables
¥107.5B¥115.9B¥27.6B¥34.2B¥35.7B¥41.1B¥49.1B¥54.0B¥69.1B¥77.2BOperating working capitalOper. WC
¥260.3B¥305.0B¥297.4B¥281.2B¥303.4B¥362.4B¥430.9B¥456.1B¥462.8B¥471.5BCurrent assetsCur. assets
¥141.6B¥161.7B¥79.6B¥71.0B¥76.1B¥73.0B¥71.1B¥60.0B¥65.2B¥86.2BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.8×1.9×3.7×4.0×4.0×5.0×6.1×7.6×7.1×5.5×Current ratioCurr. ratio
¥4.1B¥2.9B¥5.7B¥6.4B¥6.6B¥7.3B¥7.6B¥7.3B¥7.1B¥7.4BGoodwillGoodwill
¥387.5B¥449.3B¥464.0B¥450.1B¥487.4B¥559.0B¥653.1B¥702.3B¥743.8B¥812.4BTotal assetsAssets
¥35.8B¥31.5B¥8.6B¥10.1B¥11.5B¥47.5B¥44.5B¥69.7B¥109.5B¥124.9BTotal debtDebt
¥6.1B(¥10.7B)(¥30.7B)(¥30.2B)(¥39.4B)(¥7.6B)¥2.2B¥29.4B¥50.5B¥63.6BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
53.8×91.1×70.2×33.3×49.8×102.8×54.9×44.0×37.0×29.8×Interest coverageInt. cov.
¥200.7B¥232.3B¥244.0B¥228.4B¥246.3B¥291.2B¥347.5B¥399.3B¥431.2B¥483.5BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
267M267M267M267M267M267M267M267M267M267MShares out (diluted)Shares
¥1480.68¥1681.81¥1779.74¥1540.95¥1461.29¥1796.40¥2084.65¥2158.53¥2016.13¥2032.78Revenue / shareRev/sh
¥76.48¥149.05¥159.45¥58.39¥70.97¥143.81¥194.17¥190.06¥213.68¥132.14EPS (diluted)EPS
¥81.28¥125.10¥75.12¥34.07¥116.21¥130.43¥-71.15¥139.71¥151.07¥134.32Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
¥69.74¥106.13¥42.33¥-3.17¥116.21¥93.76¥-90.52¥88.47¥72.00¥22.24Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
¥19.99¥29.99¥45.67¥51.17¥37.24¥37.33¥56.89¥62.86¥64.81¥66.26Dividends / shareDiv/sh
¥56.82¥66.56¥86.46¥83.71¥32.28¥90.84¥82.23¥116.33¥139.88¥173.38Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
¥752.55¥871.24¥914.80¥856.28¥923.42¥1092.03¥1303.01¥1497.39¥1616.81¥1813.12Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+3.6%/yr+6.8%/yr
Owner earnings / share+5.7%/yr+2.9%/yr
EPS+6.3%/yr+13.2%/yr
Dividends / share+14.2%/yr+12.2%/yr
Capital spending / share+13.2%/yr+40.0%/yr
Book value / share+10.3%/yr+14.4%/yr

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business earned ¥35.8B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the ¥16.3B it takes just to hold its position. It put ¥29.9B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ¥5.9B.

Reported net income¥35.2B
Owner earnings¥35.8B · 7% of revenue
FY2026FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022
Reported net income¥35.2B¥57.0B¥50.7B¥51.8B¥38.4B
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+¥16.9B−¥482M+¥3.9B−¥54.0B+¥10.9B
Cash from operations¥52.2B¥56.5B¥54.6B(¥2.2B)¥49.2B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−¥16.3B−¥16.2B−¥17.4B−¥16.8B−¥14.4B
Owner earnings¥35.8B¥40.3B¥37.3B(¥19.0B)¥34.8B
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−¥29.9B−¥21.1B−¥13.7B−¥5.2B−¥9.8B
Free cash flow¥5.9B¥19.2B¥23.6B(¥24.1B)¥25.0B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue7%7%6%-3%7%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about ¥16.3B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other ¥29.9B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

II

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, and stewardship. The same checks the US pages run, in yen.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 Annual securities report · source on EDINET →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income ¥47.3B ÷ interest expense ¥1.6B
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? ¥63.6B · 1.3× operating profit
    Modest net debt
    Cash ¥61.2B − debt ¥124.9B
    What this means

    Netting ¥61.2B of cash and short-term investments against ¥124.9B of debt leaves ¥63.6B owed, about 1.3× a year's operating profit (2.6× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 7%–20%; 7% latest = NOPAT ¥37.4B ÷ invested capital ¥547.2B
    Industry peers: median 8%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 7% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -3%–8%; latest ¥35.8B = operating cash ¥52.2B − maintenance capex ¥16.3B
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 7% of revenue this year, a 6% median across 10 years. It chose to put ¥29.9B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ¥5.9B — the gap is investment, not weakness.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops ¥52.2B ÷ net income ¥35.2B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks ¥17.7B ÷ Owner Earnings ¥35.8B
    What this means

    Of ¥35.8B Owner Earnings, ¥17.7B (49%) went back to shareholders, ¥17.7B dividends, ¥2M buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting?
    Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Durability & moat, 2017–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 10% → 10% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 10% early, 10% lately, median 9%.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 3%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Owner earnings growth +4%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 4% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2020 · 5.9% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count +0.0%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

How the cash was used, 2017–2026

Over the record, the business generated ¥385.6B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested¥247.6B · 64%
  • Dividends¥125.9B · 33%
  • Buybacks¥30.1B · 8%
  • Returned to owners¥156.1B

    64% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, ¥125.9B as dividends and ¥30.1B as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−¥18.1B

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran ¥18.1B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from ¥35.8B to ¥124.9B.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran ¥30.1B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count0.0%

    The diluted count barely moved (267M to 267M): buybacks roughly offset the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record¥66.26/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 14% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

  • Return on what it retained6%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (¥214.1B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew ¥12.8B, so each retained ¥1 added about 0.06 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Yaskawa Electric is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.

1 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?¥35.8B → ¥124.9B

    Debt rose from ¥35.8B to ¥124.9B while owner earnings went from about ¥25.0B to ¥37.8B — about 1.4 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 3.3 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

III

The price

What a price would have to assume, set against the record above.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Yaskawa Electric has delivered.

¥

Through the cycle, Yaskawa Electric earns about ¥35.5B on its 6.5% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 6.6% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’22→’26+48%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’26−7%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow ¥5.9B on 267M diluted shares; net debt ¥63.6B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex (¥46.2B) runs well above depreciation (—), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ¥35.8B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Figures from EDINET, the Financial Services Agency’s disclosure system, the same kind of filing the US pages draw from EDGAR. A separate pool: these names never pass through the US industry classifier.

Manual order: ← 6504 its page in the Manual 6526 →

Industry order: ← 6472 the Industrial Machinery chapter 6954 →