Share count
341Mpeak FY2025
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RIOT, Riot Platforms Inc. Common Stock
We are a vertically integrated digital infrastructure company principally engaged in developing and optimizing our large-scale power assets.
Centers on enhancing our electrical infrastructure and deploying it across two complementary platforms: (i) Bitcoin Mining and (ii) scalable data center solutions designed to support non-mining workloads.
In 2025, we began leveraging our core competencies in power optimization, strategic land acquisition, engineering design, and construction execution to begin actively pursuing opportunities to develop and monetize portions of our existing facilities and power pipeline through the provision of data center leasing services.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$647M
+71.9% YoY · 122% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM
Cash & investments $208M
Cash burn · annual $634M
Runway 4 mo
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is Bitcoin Mining (89%) and Engineering (10%).
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has reached 41% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −129%) on a 26% gross margin — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. Capital spending runs about 67% of sales, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −24%, above 15% in 0 of 9 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Bitcoin Mining is 89% of revenue, with Engineering the other meaningful segment at 10%.
Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
- Bitcoin Mining89%$576M
- Engineering10%$65M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2017–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||||
| $270K | $8M | $7M | $12M | $213M | $259M | $281M | $377M | $647M | $653M | RevenueRevenue |
| — | 26% | 11% | 48% | — | — | — | — | — | — | Gross marginGross mgn |
| n/m | 266% | 134% | 724% | 41% | 26% | 36% | 71% | 46% | 46% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| ($13M) | ($59M) | ($9M) | ($16M) | ($30M) | ($513M) | ($63M) | $154M | ($622M) | ($888M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| n/m | −756.7% | −137.7% | −128.7% | −14.0% | −197.8% | −22.5% | 40.8% | −96.1% | −136.0% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($20M) | ($58M) | ($20M) | ($14M) | ($15M) | ($510M) | ($49M) | $109M | ($663M) | ($867M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||||
| ($4M) | ($19M) | ($15M) | ($3M) | ($86M) | $530K | $33M | ($255M) | ($573M) | ($634M) | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $891K | $5M | $119K | $26M | $26M | $106M | $247M | $206M | $343M | $363M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $12M | $29M | $4M | ($18M) | ($165M) | $380M | ($196M) | ($696M) | ($378M) | ($264M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| — | $20M | $5M | $8M | $147M | $148M | $194M | $240M | $201M | $284M | CapexCapex |
| — | 257.4% | 72.5% | 67.4% | 69.0% | 57.3% | 69.0% | 63.8% | 31.1% | 43.5% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| — | ($24M) | ($16M) | ($11M) | ($112M) | ($105M) | ($161M) | ($495M) | ($774M) | ($918M) | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| — | −310.0% | −227.2% | −91.0% | −52.6% | −40.7% | −57.2% | −131.5% | −119.6% | −140.4% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| — | ($39M) | ($20M) | ($11M) | ($233M) | ($148M) | ($161M) | ($495M) | ($774M) | ($918M) | Free cash flowFCF |
| — | −500.3% | −298.0% | −91.0% | −109.4% | −57.1% | −57.2% | −131.5% | −119.6% | −140.4% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| — | $517K | — | — | $41M | — | — | — | — | $41M | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| — | — | — | $446K | $5M | $10M | $14M | $12M | $4M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| -141% | -646% | -40% | -24% | -2% | -44% | -4% | 4% | -14% | -23% | ROICROIC |
| -41% | -1002% | -76% | -5% | -1% | -44% | -3% | 3% | -23% | -36% | Return on equityROE |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||||
| $42M | $225K | $7M | $223M | $337M | $240M | $597M | $278M | $234M | $208M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | — | — | — | $27K | $27M | $25M | $27M | $30M | $67M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $410K | $4M | $717K | $718K | $3M | $18M | $23M | $18M | $23M | $11M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | — | — | — | ($3M) | $8M | $2M | $10M | $6M | $56M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $42M | $2M | $13M | $236M | $272M | $443M | $1.0B | $599M | $449M | $463M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $1M | $7M | $3M | $2M | $7M | $122M | $121M | $160M | $470M | $429M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 40.7× | 0.3× | 3.7× | 98.6× | 36.6× | 3.6× | 8.3× | 3.7× | 1.0× | 1.1× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $1M | — | — | — | $254M | $336M | — | $122M | $122M | $122M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $52M | $14M | $30M | $280M | $372M | $1.3B | $2.1B | $3.9B | $3.9B | $3.4B | Total assetsAssets |
| $136K | $2M | — | — | — | — | $783K | $585M | $841M | $842M | Total debtDebt |
| ($42M) | $1M | — | — | — | — | ($596M) | $307M | $607M | $634M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| -2.7× | -482.7× | -77.2× | — | -100.9× | — | — | — | — | -3000.5× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $49M | $6M | $26M | $276M | $1.3B | $1.2B | $1.9B | $3.1B | $2.9B | $2.4B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 960.4% | 59.4% | 10.9% | 28.2% | 32.1% | 9.5% | 11.5% | 33.2% | 19.4% | 20.7% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| — | $1M | — | — | — | $336M | — | — | — | $336M | Goodwill written downGW imp. |
| Per share | ||||||||||
| 6.0M | 13.4M | 19.6M | 42.0M | 93.5M | 139M | 175M | 319M | 341M | 348M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $0.04 | $0.59 | $0.35 | $0.29 | $2.28 | $1.86 | $1.60 | $1.18 | $1.90 | $1.88 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-3.30 | $-4.33 | $-1.02 | $-0.34 | $-0.17 | $-3.65 | $-0.28 | $0.34 | $-1.95 | $-2.49 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| — | $-1.81 | $-0.79 | $-0.26 | $-1.20 | $-0.76 | $-0.92 | $-1.55 | $-2.27 | $-2.64 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| — | $-2.93 | $-1.04 | $-0.26 | $-2.50 | $-1.06 | $-0.92 | $-1.55 | $-2.27 | $-2.64 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| — | $1.51 | $0.25 | $0.19 | $1.57 | $1.06 | $1.11 | $0.75 | $0.59 | $0.82 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $8.12 | $0.43 | $1.34 | $6.57 | $14.43 | $8.26 | $10.79 | $9.86 | $8.39 | $6.89 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×2.23 into 2018 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×1.46 into 2019 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×2.14 into 2020 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×2.23 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×1.49 into 2022 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×1.82 into 2024 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 8-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +59.8%/yr | +45.9%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | −12.5%/yr (7-yr) | +25.0%/yr |
| Book value / share | +0.4%/yr | +5.0%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2017–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
−14%low FY2018
Gross margin
48%low FY2019
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
($774M)owner earningsvs.($663M)net incomelow FY2025
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business reported a $663M loss but ($774M) of owner earnings: $111M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($663M) | $109M | ($49M) | ($510M) | ($15M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$343M | +$206M | +$247M | +$106M | +$26M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$126M | +$125M | +$32M | +$25M | +$68M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$378M | −$696M | −$196M | +$380M | −$165M |
| Cash from operations | ($573M) | ($255M) | $33M | $530K | ($86M) |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$201M | −$240M | −$194M | −$106M | −$26M |
| Owner earnings | ($774M) | ($495M) | ($161M) | ($105M) | ($112M) |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | — | — | — | −$43M | −$121M |
| Free cash flow | ($774M) | ($495M) | ($161M) | ($148M) | ($233M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | -120% | -132% | -57% | -41% | -53% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $126M), owner earnings is nearer ($900M).
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -2101.9×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($622M) ÷ interest expense $296K
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net debt against an operating lossCash $234M + ST investments $9M − debt $841M
What this means
Netting $243M of cash and short-term investments against $841M of debt leaves $598M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- How long is cash tied up? -1326dNegative, funded by othersDSO 17 + DIO 24 − DPO 1368 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle9-yr median, range -646%–4%; -14% latest = NOPAT ($492M) ÷ invested capital $3.5BIndustry peers: median -6%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran -14% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Owner-earnings margin -120%Consumes cash through the cycle8-yr median margin, range -310%–-41%; latest ($774M) = operating cash ($573M) − maintenance capex $201MIndustry peers: median -42%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -120% of revenue this year, a -120% median across 8 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $126M of SBC) leaves ($900M).
- Are earnings backed by cash? ($573M)Loss, and burning cashNet income ($663M) · cash from operations ($573M)
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.
How is the cash used?
- No surplus to allocate
What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.59×HarvestingCapex $201M ÷ depreciation $343M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $647M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 0.96×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $841M vs ($21M) WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (9-yr record) · 8 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 1 of 9 yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.53/share (latest year $-1.75), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $7.56/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2017–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 1 of 9
What this means
Lost money in 8 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 5 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin −1924% → −26% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −1924% early to −26% lately, median −129% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −5%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
- Worst year 2017 · −4878.2% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2017, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Dividend record paid
What this means
Paid a dividend in 1 of the years on record.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$463M
- Cash & short-term investments$208M
- Receivables$67M
- Inventory$416K
- Other current assets$188M
Current liabilities$429M
- Debt due within a year$255M
- Accounts payable$11M
- Other current liabilities$164M
Current ratio1.08×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.08×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.48×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$33Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$255M due · $208M cash
cash alone won't cover the maturities; it leans on refinancing or operating cash · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Cash runway0.2 yrsthe business is consuming cash; this is how long the cash on hand lasts at that rate
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+3.6%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters7.6× → 1.1×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$2.2Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($581M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$877M$35M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$65Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float
From the company's latest filing.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 9-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
Goodwill & intangibles$153M4% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity4%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$41Mover 9 years buying other businesses, against $964M of capital spent building
$337M written down across 2 years (2018, 2022): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 9-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Jason Les | $21.9M | $23.3M | ($112M) |
| 2021 | Jason Les | $18.2M | $10.6M | ($112M) |
| 2022 | Jason Les | $21.5M | $5.0M | ($105M) |
| 2023 | Jason Les | $13.5M | $42.8M | ($161M) |
| 2024 | Jason Les | $83.5M | $55.4M | ($495M) |
| 2025 | Jason Les | $3.5M | $19.5M | ($774M) |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership7.8%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$126M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 19% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Riot Platforms Inc. Common Stock is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2025.
All 3 tests turned up something to look into. A record that trips every wire is one to understand slowly.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?−102.8% vs −61.4%
The business ran at a loss early in the record (an owner-earnings margin of −61.4%) and the loss has widened to −102.8% across the last three years, with the latest year at −119.6%. Ask the filing where the widening sits — price, cost, or spending growing faster than revenue — and what would narrow it.
- Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$136K → $842M
Debt rose from $136K to $842M while owner earnings went from about ($17M) to ($477M): the borrowing grew and the earnings that would carry it are not there now. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
- Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?6 of 9 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 6 of the last 9 years, $747M in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Acquisitions, Stock compensation, Contingencies as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Capital Markets & Asset Management
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AFRMAffirm Holdings | $1.1B | — | -89.3% | -13% | -29% |
| CLSKCleanSpark Inc. | $766M | 44% | -114.4% | -12% | -82% |
| RIOTRiot Platforms Inc. Common Stock | $647M | 26% | -128.7% | -24% | -105% |
| IRENIREN Limited | $501M | 53% | -14.5% | -3% | 1% |
| HIVEHIVE Digital Technologies Ltd. | $298M | — | 1.8% | 0% | -42% |
| HUTHut 8 Corp. | $235M | 54% | -55.2% | -8% | -73% |
| CRCLCircle Internet Group Inc. | $110M | — | 1102.0% | -4% | 699% |
| DGXXDigi Power X Inc. | $34M | — | — | — | -95% |
| Group median | — | 49% | -55.2% | -8% | -57% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFRiot Platforms Inc. Common Stock is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.
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The assumptions
Revenue, delivered30%/yr’20→’25
Enter a price to run it.
Owner earnings it must reach—
Margin the price demands—
Owner-earnings margin today−140%
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Riot Platforms Inc. Common Stock (RIOT), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/RIOT, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← RILYZ its page in the Manual RITM →
Industry order: ← RILYZ the Capital Markets & Asset Management chapter RJF →