Owner Scorecard


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AHCO, AdaptHealth Corp.

Health Care Providers & Services capital-intensive UnprofitableCyclicalSerial acquirer

AdaptHealth Corp. and subsidiaries is a national leader in providing patient-centered, healthcare-at-home solutions including home medical equipment, medical supplies, and related services.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
AHCO · AdaptHealth Corp.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$3.2B
−0.5% YoY · 25% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $3.3B 5-yr avg $3.0B
Gross margin 18% 5-yr avg 19%
Operating margin 2.2% 5-yr avg 1.6%
ROIC 2% 5-yr avg 0%
Owner-earnings margin 6% 5-yr avg 4%
Free cash flow margin 6% 5-yr avg 4%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is led by Sleep Health (42%) and Respiratory Health (21%), with 2 more segments behind.
Situation
Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power. Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 61% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 4 of the record's 8 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 18% and operating margin about 6.4% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −19% and 9.2% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Capital spending runs about 8.3% of sales, below what it charges for depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on volume, payer mix and reimbursement. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 4%, above 15% in 1 of 6 years). By owner earnings: roughly 7% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 4 segments, the largest Sleep Health at 42%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • Sleep Health42%$1.4B
  • Respiratory Health21%$691M
  • Diabetes Health18%$592M
  • Wellness at Home18%$583M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2018–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$345M$530M$1.1B$2.5B$3.0B$3.2B$3.3B$3.2B$3.3BRevenueRevenue
15%17%15%18%20%20%21%19%18%Gross marginGross mgn
5%11%8%7%11%10%11%12%12%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$31M$29M$71M$226M$190M($598M)$264M$91M$73MOperating incomeOp. inc.
9.0%5.5%6.8%9.2%6.4%−18.7%8.1%2.8%2.2%Operating marginOp. mgn
$23M($21M)($162M)$156M$69M($679M)$90M($71M)($80M)Net incomeNet inc.
-10%17%26%31%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$68M$60M$196M$276M$374M$481M$542M$602M$600MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$48M$63M$82M$258M$351M$383M$365M$382M$394MDepreciationDeprec.
($4M)$8M$256M($164M)($69M)$754M$71M$269M$262MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$10M$21M$40M$203M$391M$337M$306M$382M$408MCapexCapex
2.9%4.0%3.8%8.3%13.2%10.5%9.4%11.8%12.4%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$58M$39M$156M$72M($18M)$143M$236M$219M$192MOwner earningsOwner earn.
16.9%7.4%14.8%2.9%−0.6%4.5%7.2%6.8%5.8%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$58M$39M$156M$72M($18M)$143M$236M$219M$192MFree cash flowFCF
16.9%7.4%14.8%2.9%−0.6%4.5%7.2%6.8%5.8%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$86M$64M$769M$1.6B$19M$20M$10M$42M$127MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$20M$0$0$14M$29M$0$0BuybacksBuybacks
22%5%3%-13%5%2%2%ROICROIC
465%-46%8%3%-47%6%-5%-5%Return on equityROE
465%−46%8%3%−47%6%−5%−5%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$947K$77M$100M$150M$46M$77M$110M$106M$48MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$53M$79M$171M$360M$359M$389M$408M$371M$392MReceivablesReceiv.
$8M$13M$59M$123M$128M$114M$140M$151M$159MInventoryInvent.
$71M$79M$191M$248M$223M$212M$282M$352M$432MAccounts payablePayables
($10M)$13M$39M$235M$264M$291M$266M$170M$119MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$91M$181M$363M$670M$585M$649M$756M$729M$687MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$136M$154M$422M$500M$456M$537M$567M$712M$743MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.7×1.2×0.9×1.3×1.3×1.2×1.3×1.0×0.9×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$202M$267M$999M$3.5B$3.5B$2.7B$2.7B$2.5B$2.6BGoodwillGoodwill
$369M$547M$1.8B$5.3B$5.2B$4.5B$4.5B$4.3B$4.4BTotal assetsAssets
$134M$397M$785M$2.2B$2.2B$2.1B$2.0B$1.7B$1.8BTotal debtDebt
$133M$320M$685M$2.1B$2.1B$2.1B$1.9B$1.6B$1.8BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
4.2×0.7×1.7×2.4×1.7×-4.6×0.6×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$5M($39M)$355M$2.1B$2.2B$1.5B$1.6B$1.5B$1.5BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.3%2.1%1.8%1.0%0.8%0.7%0.5%0.7%0.7%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
$831M$13M$128M$128MGoodwill written downGW imp.
Per share
11.9M22.6M52.5M133M139M134M136M135M136MShares out (diluted)Shares
$29.02$23.48$20.13$18.45$21.37$23.81$24.06$24.01$24.21Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.95$-0.95$-3.08$1.17$0.50$-5.05$0.67$-0.52$-0.59EPS (diluted)EPS
$4.91$1.73$2.97$0.54$-0.13$1.07$1.74$1.62$1.41Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$4.91$1.73$2.97$0.54$-0.13$1.07$1.74$1.62$1.41Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.84$0.95$0.76$1.53$2.82$2.51$2.26$2.83$3.00Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$0.42$-1.72$6.76$15.50$15.48$10.85$11.59$11.24$11.10Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×1.9 into 2019 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×2.33 into 2020 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×2.53 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
7-yr5-yr
Revenue / share−2.7%/yr+3.6%/yr
Owner earnings / share−14.6%/yr−11.4%/yr
Capital spending / share+19.0%/yr+30.2%/yr
Book value / share+59.9%/yr+10.7%/yr

The record, charted

FY2018–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
135Mpeak FY2022
ROIC
2%low FY2023
Gross margin
19%low FY2020
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
7.4×peak FY2021

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$219Mowner earningsvs.($71M)net incomelow FY2022

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2018FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $71M loss into $219M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($71M)$90M($679M)$69M$156M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$382M+$365M+$383M+$351M+$258M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$22M+$15M+$22M+$22M+$25M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$269M+$71M+$754M−$69M−$164M
Cash from operations$602M$542M$481M$374M$276M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$382M−$306M−$337M−$391M−$203M
Owner earnings$219M$236M$143M($18M)$72M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue7%7%4%-1%3%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $22M), owner earnings is nearer $198M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income $91M ÷ interest expense $130M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $1.6B · 17.9× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $106M − debt $1.7B
    What this means

    Netting $106M of cash and short-term investments against $1.7B of debt leaves $1.6B owed, about 17.9× a year's operating profit (19.1× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 42 + DIO 21 − DPO 49 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    6-yr median, range -13%–22%; 2% latest = NOPAT $72M ÷ invested capital $3.1B
    Industry peers: median 5%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 6 years (it ran 2% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    8-yr median margin, range -1%–17%; latest $219M = operating cash $602M − maintenance capex $382M
    Industry peers: median 5%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 7% of revenue this year, a 7% median across 8 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $22M of SBC) leaves $198M.

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($71M) · cash from operations $602M
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $0 ÷ Owner Earnings $219M
    What this means

    Of $219M Owner Earnings, $0 (0%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.00×
    Maintaining
    Capex $382M ÷ depreciation $382M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $3.2B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.02×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $1.7B vs $17M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (8-yr record) · 4 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-1.62/share (latest year $-0.52), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $11.16/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2018–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 4 of 8
    What this means

    Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 8 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 7% → −3% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words Input costs rose and the filing says it could not fully pass them on — which is where this margin compressed.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 7% early to −3% lately, median 6% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −4%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.

  • Owner earnings growth +25%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 25% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2023 · −18.7% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2023, understand why before trusting the good years.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“Our existing competitors, new entrants, technology companies or other third parties may leverage AI to the benefit of their business or operations or may incorporate AI into their products and services more quickly or more effectively than we do, which could cause competitive harm and negatively impact our results of o…”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$687M
  • Cash & short-term investments$48M
  • Receivables$392M
  • Inventory$159M
  • Other current assets$88M
Current liabilities$743M
  • Debt due within a year$24M
  • Accounts payable$432M
  • Other current liabilities$287M
Current ratio0.92×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.71×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.06×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($56M)the cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$24M due · $48M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+5.4%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.2× → 0.9×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($1.1B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($2.2B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$2.0B$128M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$60Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2018–2025

Over the record, the business generated $2.6B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$1.7B · 65%
  • Buybacks$63M · 2%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$843M · 32%
  • Returned to owners$63M

    7% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $63M as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $1.7B and cash and short-term investments rose $47M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $63M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count1041.0%

    The diluted count rose from 12M to 136M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 8-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$2.6B61% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth
Cash spent acquiring$2.6Bover 8 years buying other businesses, against $1.7B of capital spent building

$972M written down across 3 years (2023, 2024, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 37% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 8-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Mr. Griggs$3.9M$2.7M$72M
2021Mr. McGee$8.1M−$21.0M$72M
2022Mr. Griggs$4.7M$4.3M($18M)
2023Mr. Barasch$2.3M$2.0M$143M
2023Mr. Griggs$10.4M$1.9M$143M
2024Mr. Barasch$2.1M$2.1M$236M
2024Ms. Foster$8.4M$8.3M$236M
2025Ms. Foster$10.3M$9.6M$219M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership2%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$22M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 24% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why AdaptHealth Corp. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2018–2025.

4 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 1 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?6.2% vs 13.0%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 13.0% early in the record and 6.2% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?1041.0%

    Diluted shares grew 1041.0% over 2018–2025, even as the company spent $63M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$134M → $1.8B

    Debt rose from $134M to $1.8B while owner earnings went from about $84M to $199M — about 1.6 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 9.1 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

  • Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?4 of 8 years

    Management took an impairment or write-down in 4 of the last 8 years, $977M in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Pension & retirement, Contingencies as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Health Care Providers & Services

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
EHCEncompass Health$5.9B15.0%10%13%
PACSPACS Group Inc.$5.3B6.3%21%5%
ENSGEnsign Group$5.0B20%7.7%17%5%
ACHCAcadia Healthcare Company Inc.$3.3B13.1%5%11%
AHCOAdaptHealth Corp.$3.2B18%6.6%4%7%
BKDBrookdale Senior Living Inc.$3.2B-1.3%-1%-1%
HIMSHims & Hers Health$2.3B75%-10.2%-9%9%
RDNTRadNet$2.0B13%4.9%4%5%
Group median19%6.4%5%6%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what AdaptHealth Corp. has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, AdaptHealth Corp. earns about $227M on its 7.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 6.8% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+70%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’18→’25+25%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $192M on 136M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-01; net debt $1.8B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "AdaptHealth Corp. (AHCO), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/AHCO, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← AGYS its page in the Manual AHR →

Industry order: ← AGL the Health Care Providers & Services chapter AIRS →