Owner Scorecard


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ENSG, Ensign Group

Ensign Group is a holding company with independent subsidiaries that provide skilled nursing, senior living and rehabilitative services, as well as other ancillary businesses, in 17 states.

As part of our investment strategy, we also acquire, lease and own healthcare real estate to service the post-acute care continuum through acquisition and investment opportunities in healthcare properties.

The remainder of our revenue is primarily generated from our real estate properties, senior living services and other ancillary services.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
ENSG · Ensign Group
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$5.0B
+18.8% YoY · 16% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $5.2B 5-yr avg $3.7B
Gross margin 20% 5-yr avg 21%
Operating margin 8.6% 5-yr avg 8.7%
ROIC 17% 5-yr avg 19%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 20% and operating margin about 6.9% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. On a spread this thin the operating result swings hard on small moves in cost or volume — it has ranged from 2.7% to 10% over the years, so the cost line is where the needle moves. Read this kind of business on volume, payer mix and reimbursement. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run in the teens (median 17%, above 15% in 6 of 10 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 5% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$1.7B$1.6B$1.8B$2.0B$2.4B$2.6B$3.0B$3.7B$4.2B$5.0B$5.2BRevenueRevenue
19%18%19%20%22%23%22%21%20%20%20%Gross marginGross mgn
4%5%5%5%5%6%5%7%5%5%5%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$92M$43M$85M$129M$223M$260M$297M$255M$358M$425M$449MOperating incomeOp. inc.
5.6%2.7%4.8%6.3%9.3%9.9%9.8%6.9%8.5%8.5%8.6%Operating marginOp. mgn
$50M$40M$92M$111M$170M$195M$225M$209M$298M$344M$363MNet incomeNet inc.
40%26%12%18%21%24%22%23%23%24%24%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$74M$80M$210M$192M$373M$276M$273M$377M$347M$564M$592MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$39M$42M$45M$51M$55M$56M$62M$72M$84M$104M$109MDepreciationDeprec.
($24M)($11M)$65M$19M$134M$6M($37M)$64M($71M)$68M$68MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$66M$54M$51M$72M$72MCapexCapex
4.0%3.4%2.9%3.5%1.4%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$35M$37M$159M$141M$521MOwner earningsOwner earn.
2.1%2.3%9.1%6.9%9.9%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$8M$25M$159M$121M$521MFree cash flowFCF
0.5%1.6%9.1%5.9%9.9%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$64M$78M$0$6M$0$6M$16M$0$157M$323M$158MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$8M$9M$9M$10M$11M$12M$12M$13M$14M$14M$15MDividends paidDiv. paid
$30M$7M$0$6M$25M$10M$30M$0$0$20MBuybacksBuybacks
8%4%9%11%25%22%21%17%18%17%17%ROICROIC
11%8%16%17%21%19%18%14%16%15%15%Return on equityROE
9%6%14%15%20%18%17%13%15%15%15%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$69M$55M$40M$77M$250M$276M$332M$527M$527M$572M$595MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$244M$265M$252M$309M$305M$329M$408M$485M$570M$637M$663MReceivablesReceiv.
$39M$39M$40M$45M$51M$58M$77M$93M$99M$97M$116MAccounts payablePayables
$205M$226M$212M$264M$254M$271M$331M$392M$471M$540M$547MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$334M$368M$348M$411M$583M$640M$781M$1.0B$1.2B$1.3B$1.3BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$212M$226M$269M$343M$562M$523M$582M$735M$743M$894M$848MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.6×1.6×1.3×1.2×1.0×1.2×1.3×1.4×1.6×1.4×1.6×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$46M$53M$50M$54M$54M$60M$77M$77M$98M$98M$98MGoodwillGoodwill
$1.0B$1.1B$1.2B$2.4B$2.5B$2.9B$3.5B$4.2B$4.7B$5.5B$5.6BTotal assetsAssets
$284M$313M$243M$333M$121M$157M$153M$149M$146M$142M$141MTotal debtDebt
$214M$258M$204M$256M($129M)($119M)($179M)($377M)($381M)($431M)($454M)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
12.9×3.2×5.6×8.2×23.8×38.0×33.2×31.6×43.2×53.2×56.9×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$456M$492M$591M$654M$818M$1.0B$1.2B$1.5B$1.8B$2.2B$2.4BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.5%0.5%0.5%0.6%0.6%0.7%0.8%0.8%0.9%1.0%1.0%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
52.1M52.8M54.4M56.0M55.8M56.9M56.9M57.3M58.2M58.9M59.6MShares out (diluted)Shares
$31.74$30.25$32.26$36.38$42.80$46.16$53.20$64.69$72.76$85.47$88.09Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.96$0.77$1.70$1.97$3.06$3.42$3.95$3.65$5.12$5.84$6.10EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.68$0.71$2.93$2.52$8.74Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.16$0.48$2.93$2.16$8.74Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.16$0.17$0.17$0.18$0.19$0.20$0.21$0.22$0.23$0.24$0.25Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$1.26$1.02$0.94$1.28$1.20Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$8.76$9.32$10.86$11.69$14.66$17.93$21.93$26.03$31.54$37.91$39.72Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+11.6%/yr+14.8%/yr
Owner earnings / share+55.1%/yr (3-yr)+55.1%/yr (3-yr)
EPS+22.2%/yr+13.8%/yr
Dividends / share+5.1%/yr+4.7%/yr
Capital spending / share+0.5%/yr (3-yr)+0.5%/yr (3-yr)
Book value / share+17.7%/yr+20.9%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
59Mpeak FY2025
ROIC
17%low FY2017
Gross margin
20%low FY2017

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$141Mowner earningsvs.$111Mnet incomelow FY2016

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2019 the business earned $141M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $51M it takes just to hold its position. It put $20M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $121M.

Reported net income$111M
Owner earnings$141M · 7% of revenue
FY2019FY2018FY2017FY2016
Reported net income$111M$92M$40M$50M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$51M+$45M+$42M+$39M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$11M+$8M+$8M+$9M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$19M+$65M−$11M−$24M
Cash from operations$192M$210M$80M$74M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$51M−$51M−$42M−$39M
Owner earnings$141M$159M$37M$35M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$20M−$12M−$27M
Free cash flow$121M$159M$25M$8M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue7%9%2%2%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $51M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $20M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $11M), owner earnings is nearer $130M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $425M ÷ interest expense $8M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • Net cash
    Cash $504M + ST investments $69M − debt $142M
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $431M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 46 + DIO 0 − DPO 9 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

  • High through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 4%–25%; 17% latest = NOPAT $321M ÷ invested capital $1.9B
    Industry peers: median 5%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 17% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Thin through the cycle
    4-yr median margin, range 2%–9%; latest $493M = operating cash $564M − maintenance capex $72M
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 10% of revenue this year, a 2% median across 4 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $48M of SBC) leaves $444M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $564M ÷ net income $344M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $34M ÷ Owner Earnings $493M
    What this means

    Of $493M Owner Earnings, $34M (7%) went back to shareholders, $14M dividends, $20M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($48M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.69×
    Harvesting
    Capex $72M ÷ depreciation $104M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 5 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $5.0B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.42×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $142M vs $378M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +366%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $4.86/share (latest year $5.89), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $38.18/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 6 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 4% → 8% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The margin widened even though the filing names price competition — the gain came from volume or cost, not pricing power. Read where.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 4% early to 8% lately, median 7% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 28%
    What this means

    Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.

  • Owner earnings growth +61%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 61% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2017 · 2.7% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count +1.4%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.3B
  • Cash & short-term investments$595M
  • Receivables$663M
  • Other current assets$62M
Current liabilities$848M
  • Debt due within a year$4M
  • Accounts payable$116M
  • Other current liabilities$728M
Current ratio1.56×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.56×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.70×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$472Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$4M due · $595M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+18.4%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.5× → 1.6×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$2.3Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($1.9B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$2.2B$2.1B of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $2.2B (annual-report basis)
Deferred revenue$15Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

'26$238M
'27$238M
'28$237M
'29$232M
'30$226M
later$1.9B

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$238Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$3.1Bevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$2.1Bthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$142M
Lease obligations (present value)$2.1B
Total fixed claims on the business$2.2B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $2.2B, of which the leases are 94%, more than the debt itself. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2016–2019

Over the record, the business generated $556M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a deleverager, a meaningful share of cash went to paying down debt.

  • Reinvested$242M · 44%
  • Dividends$36M · 7%
  • Buybacks$44M · 8%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$234M · 42%
  • Returned to owners$80M

    21% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $36M as dividends and $44M as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt fell $143M and cash and short-term investments rose $526M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $44M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count14.3%

    The diluted count rose from 52M to 60M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$0.18/sh

    Paid in 4 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 5% a year. It was never cut over the span.

  • Return on what it retained17%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($213M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $35M, so each retained $1 added about 0.17 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Net income
2021Mr. Port$7.4M$7.5M$195M
2022Mr. Port$8.0M$8.0M$225M
2023Mr. Port$11.0M$9.7M$209M
2024Mr. Port$11.0M$11.5M$298M
2025Mr. Port$13.8M$16.3M$344M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Net income is the whole business's, as filed, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership4%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$48M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 11% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Ensign Group is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?14.3%

    Diluted shares grew 14.3% over 2016–2019, even as the company spent $44M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

  • Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?6 of 10 years

    Management took an impairment or write-down in 6 of the last 10 years, $22M in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Health Care Providers & Services

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
EHCEncompass Health$5.9B15.0%10%13%
PACSPACS Group Inc.$5.3B6.3%21%5%
ENSGEnsign Group$5.0B20%7.7%17%5%
ACHCAcadia Healthcare Company Inc.$3.3B13.1%5%11%
AHCOAdaptHealth Corp.$3.2B18%6.6%4%7%
BKDBrookdale Senior Living Inc.$3.2B-1.3%-1%-1%
HIMSHims & Hers Health$2.3B75%-10.2%-9%9%
NHCNational HealthCare Corporation$1.5B5.3%6%7%
Group median20%6.4%6%7%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Ensign Group has delivered.

Ensign Group’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, Ensign Group earns about $349M on its 6.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 9.8% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’19+103%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $521M on 58M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-27; net cash $454M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Ensign Group (ENSG), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/ENSG, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← ENS its page in the Manual ENTA →

Industry order: ← EHC the Health Care Providers & Services chapter EUDA →