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BKD, Brookdale Senior Living Inc.

Health Care Providers & Services capital-intensive UnprofitableDistress / turnaround

We are the nation's premier operator of senior living communities, operating and managing 584 communities in 41 states as of December 31, 2025, with the ability to serve approximately 51,000 residents.

We offer our residents access to a broad continuum of services across the most attractive sectors of the senior living industry.

Our senior living communities and our comprehensive network help to provide seniors with care, connection, and services in an environment that feels like home.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

BKD · Brookdale Senior Living Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$3.2B

+2.2% YoY · −2% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $3.1B 5-yr avg $3.0B

Operating margin 1.1% 5-yr avg −1.4%

Owner-earnings margin 0% 5-yr avg −4%

Free cash flow margin 0% 5-yr avg −4%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has run around −1.5% through the cycle, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. Read this kind of business on volume, payer mix and reimbursement. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −1%, above 15% in 0 of 8 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$5.0B	$4.7B	$4.5B	$4.1B	$3.5B	$2.8B	$2.8B	$3.0B	$3.1B	$3.2B	$3.1B	RevenueRevenue
6%	6%	6%	5%	6%	7%	6%	6%	6%	6%	6%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
($31M)	($270M)	($594M)	($44M)	($98M)	($217M)	($43M)	$18M	$47M	$13M	$36M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−0.6%	−5.7%	−13.1%	−1.1%	−2.8%	−7.9%	−1.5%	0.6%	1.5%	0.4%	1.1%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($404M)	($571M)	($528M)	($268M)	$82M	($99M)	($238M)	($189M)	($202M)	($263M)	($205M)	Net incomeNet inc.
											Cash flow & returns
$374M	$378M	$204M	$216M	$206M	($95M)	$3M	$163M	$166M	$218M	$216M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$530M	$495M	$456M	$384M	$365M	$345M	$354M	$350M	$368M	$370M	$353M	DepreciationDeprec.
$216M	$427M	$251M	$78M	($263M)	($357M)	($127M)	($10M)	($14M)	$98M	$56M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$334M	$214M	$225M	$304M	$186M	$177M	$197M	$233M	$201M	$202M	$206M	CapexCapex
6.7%	4.5%	5.0%	7.5%	5.3%	6.4%	7.0%	7.7%	6.4%	6.3%	6.6%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$40M	$164M	($22M)	($88M)	$20M	($271M)	($194M)	($70M)	($35M)	$17M	$9M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
0.8%	3.5%	−0.5%	−2.2%	0.6%	−9.8%	−6.9%	−2.3%	−1.1%	0.5%	0.3%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$40M	$164M	($22M)	($88M)	$20M	($271M)	($194M)	($70M)	($35M)	$17M	$9M	Free cash flowFCF
0.8%	3.5%	−0.5%	−2.2%	0.6%	−9.8%	−6.9%	−2.3%	−1.1%	0.5%	0.3%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$12M	$5M	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	$33M	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$10M	$0	$4M	$24M	$18M	$0	$0	—	—	—	—	BuybacksBuybacks
-0%	-4%	-11%	-1%	-2%	-4%	-1%	—	—	0%	—	ROICROIC
-19%	-37%	-52%	-38%	10%	-14%	-41%	-47%	-95%	—	—	Return on equityROE
−19%	−37%	−52%	−38%	10%	−14%	−41%	−47%	−95%	—	—	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$216M	$514M	$413M	$309M	$553M	$529M	$448M	$308M	$329M	$279M	$270M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$142M	$129M	$134M	$134M	$109M	$51M	$56M	$48M	$52M	$68M	$64M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$77M	$92M	$95M	$105M	$71M	$76M	$71M	$67M	$66M	$75M	$84M	Accounts payablePayables
$64M	$37M	$39M	$29M	$38M	($25M)	($15M)	($18M)	($14M)	($7M)	($20M)	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$620M	$902M	$774M	$596M	$774M	$699M	$637M	$478M	$513M	$554M	$553M	Current assetsCur. assets
$731M	$1.1B	$773M	$1.0B	$691M	$632M	$641M	$600M	$580M	$568M	$535M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.8×	0.8×	1.0×	0.6×	1.1×	1.1×	1.0×	0.8×	0.9×	1.0×	1.0×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$705M	$506M	$154M	$154M	$154M	$154M	$27M	$27M	$27M	$27M	$27M	GoodwillGoodwill
$9.2B	$7.7B	$6.5B	$7.2B	$6.9B	$6.4B	$5.9B	$5.6B	$6.3B	$6.0B	$5.9B	Total assetsAssets
$5.8B	$4.5B	$3.6B	$3.6B	$3.9B	$3.8B	$3.9B	$3.7B	$4.1B	$4.3B	$4.3B	Total debtDebt
$5.6B	$4.0B	$3.2B	$3.2B	$3.4B	$3.3B	$3.4B	$3.4B	$3.7B	$4.0B	$4.0B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-0.1×	-0.8×	-2.1×	-0.2×	-0.5×	-1.1×	-0.2×	0.1×	0.2×	—	0.1×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$2.1B	$1.5B	$1.0B	$696M	$800M	$697M	$583M	$404M	$212M	($45M)	($56M)	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.6%	0.6%	0.6%	0.6%	0.6%	0.6%	0.5%	0.4%	0.5%	0.4%	0.4%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
$249M	$410M	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	$371M	Goodwill written downGW imp.
											Per share
186M	186M	187M	186M	184M	185M	190M	225M	228M	235M	238M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$26.81	$25.50	$24.17	$21.82	$19.20	$14.91	$14.83	$13.39	$13.74	$13.58	$13.21	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-2.18	$-3.07	$-2.82	$-1.44	$0.44	$-0.54	$-1.25	$-0.84	$-0.89	$-1.12	$-0.86	EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.22	$0.88	$-0.11	$-0.47	$0.11	$-1.47	$-1.02	$-0.31	$-0.15	$0.07	$0.04	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.22	$0.88	$-0.11	$-0.47	$0.11	$-1.47	$-1.02	$-0.31	$-0.15	$0.07	$0.04	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.80	$1.15	$1.20	$1.64	$1.01	$0.96	$1.03	$1.04	$0.88	$0.86	$0.87	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$11.19	$8.22	$5.44	$3.75	$4.34	$3.77	$3.06	$1.79	$0.93	$-0.19	$-0.23	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	−7.3%/yr	−6.7%/yr
Owner earnings / share	−11.7%/yr	−8.1%/yr
Capital spending / share	−7.9%/yr	−3.2%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

235Mpeak FY2025

ROIC

0%low FY2018

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

243.2×peak FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$17Mowner earningsvs.($263M)net incomelow FY2021

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $263M loss into $17M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	($263M)	($202M)	($189M)	($238M)	($99M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$370M	+$368M	+$350M	+$354M	+$345M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$12M	+$14M	+$12M	+$14M	+$16M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$98M	−$14M	−$10M	−$127M	−$357M
Cash from operations	$218M	$166M	$163M	$3M	($95M)
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$202M	−$201M	−$233M	−$197M	−$177M
Owner earnings	$17M	($35M)	($70M)	($194M)	($271M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	1%	-1%	-2%	-7%	-10%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $12M), owner earnings is nearer $5M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 0.1×

Does not cover its interest

Operating income $13M ÷ interest expense $253M

What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $4.0B · 297.3× operating profit

Heavy net debt

Cash $279M − debt $4.3B

What this means
Netting $279M of cash and short-term investments against $4.3B of debt leaves $4.0B owed, about 297.3× a year's operating profit (318.0× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital -2%

Below average through the cycle

8-yr median, range -11%–0%; the latest year is left out — large non-operating charges put its operating line well above pretax profit

Industry peers: median 5%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years, so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 1%

Positive this year, negative across the cycle

latest $17M = operating cash $218M − maintenance capex $202M (positive this year), after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median -1%)

Industry peers: median 7%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 1% of revenue this year, a -1% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $12M of SBC) leaves $5M.
Are earnings backed by cash? $218M

Loss, but cash-generative

Net income ($263M) · cash from operations $218M

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 0%

Reinvests most of it

Dividends + buybacks $0 ÷ Owner Earnings $17M

What this means
Of $17M Owner Earnings, $0 (0%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 0.54×

Harvesting

Capex $202M ÷ depreciation $370M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $3.2B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.98×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $4.3B vs ($14M) WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 9 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.91/share (latest year $-1.10), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $-0.19/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 1 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 9 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin −6% → 1% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −6% early to 1% lately, median −2% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Worst year 2018 · −13.1% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2018, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count +2.7%/yr

What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
How management talks about it Owner’s terms

What this means
The record and the register agree: capital is compounding and the filing reasons in an owner’s terms — per-share value, return on capital, the long term — not a promoter’s.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“Further, our competitors or other third parties may incorporate advanced technology, including artificial intelligence, into their business operations or services more quickly or more successfully than us, which could impair our ability to compete effectively.”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$553M

Cash & short-term investments$270M
Receivables$64M
Other current assets$218M

Current liabilities$535M

Debt due within a year$83M
Accounts payable$84M
Other current liabilities$368M

Current ratio1.03×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.03×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.51×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$18Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$83M due · $270M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−6.0%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters0.8× → 1.0×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value($117M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($5.4B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$5.5B$1.2B of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $5.5B (annual-report basis)

Deferred revenue$66Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Lease obligations

the lease note, SEC EDGAR →

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, operating and finance leases together, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

Operating leasesFinance leases

'26$192M

'27$194M

'28$191M

'29$193M

'30$186M

later$929M

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$192Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year

Total lease payments$1.9Bevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take

On the balance sheet$1.2Bthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$4.3B

Lease obligations (present value)$1.2B

Total fixed claims on the business$5.5B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $5.5B, of which the leases are 22%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $1.8B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$2.3B · 124%
Buybacks$56M · 3%

Returned to owners$56M
$0 as dividends and $56M as buybacks.
Source of funding−$495M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $495M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.
Average price paid for buybacks$6.88
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 8M shares were bought for $56M, about $6.88 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $3.32 (2018) to $12.85 (2016); its heaviest year, 2019, paid $7.97 ($24M).
Net change in share count28.3%
The diluted count rose from 186M to 238M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$61M1% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity—goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$17Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $2.3B of capital spent building

$658M written down across 2 years (2016, 2017): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$12M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 88% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Brookdale Senior Living Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

3 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?−1.0% vs 1.3%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 1.3% early in the record and −1.0% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?28.3%
Diluted shares grew 28.3% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $56M on buybacks. The repurchases were a treadmill: stock issued to staff outran them, so owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?10 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 10 of the last 10 years, $2.1B in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean

Did debt outgrow the business?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Stock compensation as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Health Care Providers & Services

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
PACSPACS Group Inc.	$5.3B	—	6.3%	21%	5%
ENSGEnsign Group	$5.0B	20%	7.7%	17%	5%
ACHCAcadia Healthcare Company Inc.	$3.3B	—	13.1%	5%	11%
AHCOAdaptHealth Corp.	$3.2B	18%	6.6%	4%	7%
BKDBrookdale Senior Living Inc.	$3.2B	—	-1.3%	-1%	-1%
HIMSHims & Hers Health	$2.3B	75%	-10.2%	-9%	9%
RDNTRadNet	$2.0B	13%	4.9%	4%	5%
NHCNational HealthCare Corporation	$1.5B	—	5.3%	6%	7%
Group median	—	—	5.8%	5%	6%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Brookdale Senior Living Inc. has delivered.

Today’s price $

Base Normalize · through-cycle (($30M)) Net of stock comp (−$12M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth, delivered—

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $9M on 239M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-05; net debt $4.0B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh BKD against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Brookdale Senior Living Inc. (BKD), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/BKD, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← BK its page in the Manual BKE →

Industry order: ← AVAH the Health Care Providers & Services chapter BTSG →