Owner Scorecard


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PYPL, PayPal Holdings Inc.

PayPal runs a payments network that lets people and merchants send, receive, and accept money online and in person, mainly through its PayPal and Venmo wallets. It sits between the two sides of a transaction and takes a fee when money moves. Its customers are spread across consumers and sellers in many countries, so a large share of what it earns comes from outside the United States.

We operate a global, two-sided network at scale that connects consumers and merchants with 439 million active accounts across approximately 200 markets as of December 31, 2025.

We provide consumers with digital wallets and other solutions that allow them to shop and pay with PayPal and Venmo — both online and in-person — manage their finances (including saving and buying and selling cryptocurrencies), and send and receive money between friends and family.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
PYPL · PayPal Holdings Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$33.2B
+4.3% YoY · 9% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $33.7B 5-yr avg $29.5B
Operating margin 17.9% 5-yr avg 16.5%
ROIC 21% 5-yr avg 17%
Owner-earnings margin 16% 5-yr avg 18%
Free cash flow margin 16% 5-yr avg 18%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
The question that decides this business is whether a two-sided network of accounts is a real moat or a rail that competitors can underprice. The tests to watch: does having both consumers and merchants on the same network keep each side from leaving, and does that let PayPal hold its take rate, or does the filing's own description of a "highly competitive, dynamic, innovative" payments industry win out and grind the fee down. Two further levers sit alongside price — the cost of moving each transaction, and a regulated business spread across many markets, where one regime's decision can reach a meaningful slice of revenue. The bad case is a commodity rail with fees competed down and a regulator's thumb on the scale; the figures for margin, returns, and the debt load are in the record below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run in the teens (median 16%, above 15% in 6 of 10 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 19% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.

Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

43% of revenue comes from outside the United States.

Revenue by geography, FY2025
  • United States57%$18.9B
  • International43%$14.3B

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$10.8B$13.1B$15.5B$17.8B$21.5B$25.4B$27.5B$29.8B$31.8B$33.2B$33.7BRevenueRevenue
9%10%10%10%10%8%8%7%7%6%6%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
8%7%7%3%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$1.6B$2.1B$2.2B$2.7B$3.3B$4.3B$3.8B$5.0B$5.3B$6.1B$6.0BOperating incomeOp. inc.
14.6%16.2%14.2%15.3%15.3%16.8%13.9%16.9%16.7%18.3%17.9%Operating marginOp. mgn
$1.4B$1.8B$2.1B$2.5B$4.2B$4.2B$2.4B$4.2B$4.1B$5.2B$5.1BNet incomeNet inc.
14%18%13%18%17%-2%28%22%22%17%17%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$3.2B$2.5B$5.5B$4.1B$6.2B$5.8B$5.8B$4.8B$7.5B$6.4B$6.4BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$724M$805M$776M$912M$1.2B$1.3B$1.3B$1.1B$1.0B$963M$956MDepreciationDeprec.
$595M($802M)$1.8B($321M)($548M)($1.0B)$816M($1.9B)$1.0B($782M)($637M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$669M$667M$823M$704M$866M$908M$706M$623M$683M$852M$887MCapexCapex
6.2%5.1%5.3%4.0%4.0%3.6%2.6%2.1%2.1%2.6%2.6%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$2.5B$1.9B$4.7B$3.4B$5.4B$4.9B$5.1B$4.2B$6.8B$5.6B$5.5BOwner earningsOwner earn.
23.0%14.2%30.1%18.9%25.0%19.3%18.6%14.2%21.3%16.8%16.3%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$2.5B$1.9B$4.7B$3.4B$5.4B$4.9B$5.1B$4.2B$6.8B$5.6B$5.5BFree cash flowFCF
23.0%14.2%30.1%18.9%25.0%19.3%18.6%14.2%21.3%16.8%16.3%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$19M$323M$2.1B$70M$3.6B$2.8B$0$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$0$0$130M$130MDividends paidDiv. paid
$995M$1.0B$3.5B$1.4B$1.6B$3.4B$4.2B$5.0B$6.0B$6.1BBuybacksBuybacks
10%13%19%15%11%17%12%18%18%23%21%ROICROIC
10%11%13%15%21%19%12%20%20%26%25%Return on equityROE
20%20%25%25%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$5.0B$5.7B$9.1B$10.8B$13.1B$9.5B$10.9B$14.1B$10.9B$10.4B$9.3BCash & investmentsCash+inv
$214M$283M$313M$435M$577M$800M$963M$1.1B$984M$840M$843MReceivablesReceiv.
$192M$257M$281M$232M$252M$197M$126M$139M$227M$240M$162MAccounts payablePayables
$22M$26M$32M$203M$325M$603M$837M$930M$757M$600M$681MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$25.7B$32.6B$33.0B$38.5B$51.0B$52.6B$57.4B$62.6B$58.2B$59.8B$60.0BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$16.9B$22.9B$25.9B$26.9B$38.4B$43.0B$45.0B$48.5B$45.5B$46.4B$47.6BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.5×1.4×1.3×1.4×1.3×1.2×1.3×1.3×1.3×1.3×1.3×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$4.1B$4.3B$4M$6.2B$9.1B$11.5B$11.2B$11.0B$10.8B$10.9B$10.9BGoodwillGoodwill
$33.1B$40.8B$43.3B$51.3B$70.4B$75.8B$78.6B$82.2B$78.7B$80.2B$80.5BTotal assetsAssets
$2.0B$5.0B$8.9B$9.0B$10.4B$9.7B$9.9B$10.0B$10.3BTotal debtDebt
($7.1B)($5.8B)($4.1B)($500M)($451M)($4.4B)($1.0B)($435M)$958MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
528.7×303.9×28.5×23.6×15.7×18.4×12.6×14.5×13.9×13.8×13.4×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$14.7B$16.0B$15.4B$16.9B$20.0B$21.7B$20.3B$21.1B$20.4B$20.3B$20.0BShareholders’ equityEquity
4.0%5.6%5.5%5.7%6.4%5.4%4.6%5.0%3.9%3.0%3.0%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
1.22B1.22B1.20B1.19B1.19B1.19B1.16B1.11B1.04B968M920MShares out (diluted)Shares
$8.90$10.72$12.84$14.96$18.07$21.39$23.76$26.89$30.60$34.27$36.67Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.15$1.47$1.71$2.07$3.54$3.52$2.09$3.84$3.99$5.41$5.50EPS (diluted)EPS
$2.04$1.53$3.87$2.83$4.51$4.12$4.41$3.81$6.51$5.75$5.98Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$2.04$1.53$3.87$2.83$4.51$4.12$4.41$3.81$6.51$5.75$5.98Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.00$0.00$0.13$0.14Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.55$0.55$0.68$0.59$0.73$0.77$0.61$0.56$0.66$0.88$0.96Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$12.08$13.10$12.79$14.21$16.87$18.32$17.51$19.02$19.65$20.93$21.77Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+16.2%/yr+13.6%/yr
Owner earnings / share+12.2%/yr+5.0%/yr
EPS+18.8%/yr+8.8%/yr
Capital spending / share+5.4%/yr+3.8%/yr
Book value / share+6.3%/yr+4.4%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Revenue+4.3%
    “Net revenues increased $1.4 billion, or 4%, in 2025 compared to 2024 driven primarily by growth in total payment volume (“TPV”, as defined below under “Key Metrics”) of 7% and an increase in interest and fee revenue earned on our loans receivable portfolio, partially offset by the unfavorable impact of hedging activities.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record
  • Operating income+13.9%
    “Operating income increased $740 million, or 14%, in 2025 compared to 2024 due to the increase in net revenues, partially offset by the increase in operating expenses.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record
  • Revenues From Other Value Added Services+14.2%
    “Revenues from other value added services increased $419 million, or 14%, in 2025 compared to 2024 due primarily to an approximately $350 million increase in interest and fee revenue earned from our loans receivable portfolios as well as an increase of approximately $160 million from revenue earned from an independent chartered financial institution (“partner institution”).”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
968Mpeak FY2017
ROIC
23%low FY2016
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
-0.1×peak FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$5.6Bowner earningsvs.$5.2Bnet incomelow FY2017

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $5.2B of profit into $5.6B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$5.2B
Owner earnings$5.6B · 17% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$5.2B$4.1B$4.2B$2.4B$4.2B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$963M+$1.0B+$1.1B+$1.3B+$1.3B
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$1.0B+$1.2B+$1.5B+$1.3B+$1.4B
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$782M+$1.0B−$1.9B+$816M−$1.0B
Cash from operations$6.4B$7.5B$4.8B$5.8B$5.8B
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$852M−$683M−$623M−$706M−$908M
Owner earnings$5.6B$6.8B$4.2B$5.1B$4.9B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue17%21%14%19%19%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $1.0B), owner earnings is nearer $4.6B.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $6.1B ÷ interest expense $441M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • Net cash
    Cash $8.0B + ST investments $2.4B − debt $10.0B
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $435M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • High through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 10%–23%; 23% latest = NOPAT $5.0B ÷ invested capital $22.2B
    Industry peers: median 14%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 23% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • High through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 14%–30%; latest $5.6B = operating cash $6.4B − maintenance capex $852M
    Industry peers: median 14%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 17% of revenue this year, a 19% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $1.0B of SBC) leaves $4.6B.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $6.4B ÷ net income $5.2B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returned more than it generated
    Dividends + buybacks $6.2B ÷ Owner Earnings $5.6B
    What this means

    The company returned more than it generated: against $5.6B of Owner Earnings, $6.2B (111%) went back to shareholders, $130M dividends, $6.1B buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $1.0B stock comp, the real buyback was about $5.0B. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.88×
    Maintaining
    Capex $852M ÷ depreciation $963M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $33.2B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.29×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $10.0B vs $13.3B WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 1 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +159%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $5.15/share (latest year $5.93), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $22.96/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 6 of 8 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 15% → 17% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 15% early to 17% lately, median 15% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 43%
    What this means

    Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.

  • Owner earnings growth +12%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 12% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2022 · 13.9% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −2.5%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record paid
    What this means

    Paid a dividend in 1 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“We expect that new technologies applicable to the industries in which we operate, including the development, adoption, and use of generative AI technologies and autonomous AI agents, will continue to emerge and may be superior to, or render obsolete, the technologies we currently use in our products and services.…”

The moat the record shows, a high return on capital held across years, was earned before AI collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$60.0B
  • Cash & short-term investments$9.3B
  • Receivables$843M
  • Other current assets$49.8B
Current liabilities$47.6B
  • Accounts payable$162M
  • Other current liabilities$47.5B
Current ratio1.26×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.26×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.20×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$12.4Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+7.2%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.2× → 1.3×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$8.9Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($527M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$10.1B$652M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$1.4B
'27$1.1B
'28$1.1B
'29$1.5B
'30$1.0B
later$5.3B

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$1.4Bthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$2.5Bthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$1.5Bin 2029the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Total scheduled principal$11.5Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Mar 31, 2026$9.3B
One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$5.6B
Together, against $1.4B due next year10.7×

Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $14.9B against the $1.4B due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 11 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $51.8B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

  • Reinvested$7.5B · 14%
  • Dividends$130M · 0%
  • Buybacks$33.2B · 64%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$10.9B · 21%
  • Returned to owners$33.4B

    75% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $130M as dividends and $33.2B as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$85.59

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 247M shares were bought for $21.1B, about $85.59 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $36.85 (2016) to $224.87 (2021); its heaviest year, 2023, paid $67.59 ($5.0B).

  • Net change in share count−24.5%

    The diluted count fell from 1218M to 920M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$0.13/sh

    Paid in 1 of the years on record. It was never cut over the span.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Mr. Schulman$32.1M$13.5M$4.9B
2022Mr. Schulman$22.0M−$87.0M$5.1B
2023Mr. Chriss$41.9M$46.4M$4.2B
2023Mr. Schulman$22.1M$19.0M$4.2B
2024Mr. Chriss$6.7M$35.2M$6.8B
2025Mr. Chriss$25.2M−$7.5M$5.6B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio221:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$1.0B

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 3% of revenue, equal to 17% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why PayPal Holdings Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?17.4% vs 22.4%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 22.4% early in the record and 17.4% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?2% → 2% of sales

    Receivables and inventory grew from $214M to $843M while revenue grew 211%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (2% of revenue then, 2% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Credit & receivables as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Commercial Services & Supplies

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
ACNAccenture PLC$69.7B32%14.6%54%14%
UBERUber Technologies Inc.$52.0B-22.0%-12%-4%
VVisa Inc.$40.0B64.4%28%53%
PYPLPayPal Holdings Inc.$33.2B15.8%16%19%
MAMastercard Incorporated$32.8B53.2%81%42%
MELIMercadoLibre Inc.$20.3B36%11.0%14%23%
AMTMAmentum Holdings Inc.$14.4B10%2.5%3%1%
DASHDoorDash Inc.$13.7B-12.2%-14%8%
Group median12.8%15%17%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what PayPal Holdings Inc. has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, PayPal Holdings Inc. earns about $6.3B on its 19.1% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 16.8% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+5%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+12%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $5.5B on 882M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-29; net debt $958M. The if-converted diluted count is 920M, 4% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "PayPal Holdings Inc. (PYPL), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/PYPL, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← PWR its page in the Manual PZZA →

Industry order: ← PSFE the Commercial Services & Supplies chapter QH →