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ANF, Abercrombie & Fitch

Abercrombie & Fitch offers a broad assortment of apparel, personal care products and accessories for men, women and kids, which are sold primarily through its Company-owned stores and digital channels, as well as through various third-party arrangements.

Corporate functions and other income and expenses are evaluated on a consolidated basis and are not allocated to the Company's segments and therefore are included as a reconciling item between segment and total operating income.

The Company's brand families include Abercrombie brands and Hollister brands.

Latest annual: FY2026 10-K

ANF · Abercrombie & Fitch

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2026

$5.3B

+6.4% YoY · 11% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $5.3B 5-yr avg $4.4B

Gross margin 73%

Operating margin 13.0% 5-yr avg 10.3%

ROIC 44% 5-yr avg 75%

Owner-earnings margin 10% 5-yr avg 6%

Free cash flow margin 8% 5-yr avg 6%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle: Operating margin has run about 3.5% through the cycle, a thin margin, where volume, cost discipline and the price it gets all bear on the result. The operating margin has swung widely — from −0.7% to 15% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best. Inventory runs near 12% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 12%). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 6% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2018–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	2026’26	TTMTTMMay 2026
										Income statement
$3.5B	$3.6B	$3.6B	$3.1B	$3.7B	$3.7B	$4.3B	$4.9B	$5.3B	$5.3B	RevenueRevenue
—	—	—	—	—	15%	16%	15%	14%	14%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$72M	$127M	$70M	($20M)	$343M	$93M	$485M	$741M	$699M	$686M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
2.1%	3.5%	1.9%	−0.7%	9.2%	2.5%	11.3%	15.0%	13.3%	13.0%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$7M	$75M	$39M	($114M)	$263M	$3M	$328M	$566M	$507M	$494M	Net incomeNet inc.
—	34%	31%	—	13%	—	31%	26%	29%	29%	Effective tax rateTax rate
										Cash flow & returns
$288M	$353M	$301M	$405M	$278M	($2M)	$653M	$710M	$619M	$667M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$195M	$178M	$174M	$166M	$144M	$132M	$141M	$154M	$155M	$159M	DepreciationDeprec.
$64M	$79M	$74M	$334M	($159M)	($166M)	$144M	($48M)	($82M)	($24M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$107M	$152M	$203M	$102M	$97M	$165M	$158M	$183M	$241M	$251M	CapexCapex
3.1%	4.2%	5.6%	3.3%	2.6%	4.5%	3.7%	3.7%	4.6%	4.8%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$181M	$201M	$98M	$303M	$181M	($167M)	$496M	$527M	$464M	$509M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
5.2%	5.6%	2.7%	9.7%	4.9%	−4.5%	11.6%	10.7%	8.8%	9.6%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$181M	$201M	$98M	$303M	$181M	($167M)	$496M	$527M	$378M	$416M	Free cash flowFCF
5.2%	5.6%	2.7%	9.7%	4.9%	−4.5%	11.6%	10.7%	7.2%	7.9%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$54M	$54M	$52M	$13M	$0	$0	—	—	—	$0	Dividends paidDiv. paid
$0	$69M	$64M	$15M	$377M	$126M	$0	$230M	$451M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
4%	12%	8%	-9%	98%	10%	94%	98%	77%	44%	ROICROIC
1%	6%	4%	-12%	32%	0%	32%	42%	36%	37%	Return on equityROE
−4%	2%	−1%	−14%	32%	0%	—	—	—	37%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
										Balance sheet
$676M	$723M	$671M	$1.1B	$823M	$518M	$901M	$889M	$785M	$619M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$80M	$73M	$80M	$84M	$69M	$105M	$78M	$105M	$147M	$146M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$424M	$438M	$434M	$404M	$526M	$506M	$469M	$575M	$601M	$533M	InventoryInvent.
$169M	$227M	$220M	$289M	$375M	$259M	$297M	$365M	$377M	$258M	Accounts payablePayables
$335M	$284M	$295M	$199M	$220M	$351M	$251M	$316M	$371M	$421M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$1.3B	$1.3B	$1.3B	$1.7B	$1.5B	$1.2B	$1.5B	$1.7B	$1.7B	$1.4B	Current assetsCur. assets
$508M	$559M	$815M	$959M	$1.0B	$902M	$967M	$1.1B	$1.1B	$977M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.5×	2.4×	1.6×	1.7×	1.5×	1.4×	1.6×	1.5×	1.5×	1.4×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$2.3B	$2.4B	$3.5B	$3.3B	$2.9B	$2.7B	$3.0B	$3.3B	$3.5B	$3.5B	Total assetsAssets
$250M	$250M	$232M	$344M	$304M	$297M	$222M	$0	—	$350M	Total debtDebt
($426M)	($473M)	($439M)	($761M)	($520M)	($221M)	($679M)	($889M)	—	($269M)	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
3.1×	5.6×	3.5×	-0.6×	9.0×	3.1×	16.0×	—	—	26.2×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$1.3B	$1.2B	$1.1B	$937M	$826M	$695M	$1.0B	$1.3B	$1.4B	$1.3B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.6%	0.6%	0.4%	0.6%	0.8%	0.8%	0.9%	0.8%	0.7%	0.7%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
										Per share
69.4M	69.1M	65.8M	62.6M	62.6M	52.3M	52.7M	53.0M	48.5M	45.7M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$50.32	$51.93	$55.08	$49.97	$59.28	$70.67	$81.19	$93.42	$108.64	$115.66	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.10	$1.08	$0.60	$-1.82	$4.20	$0.05	$6.22	$10.69	$10.46	$10.81	EPS (diluted)EPS
$2.60	$2.90	$1.49	$4.84	$2.89	$-3.19	$9.40	$9.96	$9.57	$11.14	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$2.60	$2.90	$1.49	$4.84	$2.89	$-3.19	$9.40	$9.96	$7.81	$9.11	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.78	$0.78	$0.78	$0.20	$0.00	$0.00	—	—	—	$0.00	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$1.54	$2.20	$3.08	$1.63	$1.55	$3.14	$2.99	$3.45	$4.97	$5.50	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$18.05	$17.49	$16.10	$14.97	$13.19	$13.28	$19.63	$25.21	$28.96	$29.34	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	8-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+10.1%/yr	+16.8%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+17.7%/yr	+14.6%/yr
EPS	+78.3%/yr	—
Capital spending / share	+15.7%/yr	+25.0%/yr
Book value / share	+6.1%/yr	+14.1%/yr

The record, charted

FY2018–2026

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

48Mpeak FY2018

ROIC

77%low FY2021

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$464Mowner earningsvs.$507Mnet incomelow FY2023

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2018FY2026

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2022–FY2026cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business earned $464M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $155M it takes just to hold its position. It put $86M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $378M.

Reported net income$507M

Owner earnings$464M · 9% of revenue

	FY2026	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022
Reported net income	$507M	$566M	$328M	$3M	$263M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$155M	+$154M	+$141M	+$132M	+$144M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$39M	+$39M	+$40M	+$29M	+$29M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$82M	−$48M	+$144M	−$166M	−$159M
Cash from operations	$619M	$710M	$653M	($2M)	$278M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$155M	−$183M	−$158M	−$165M	−$97M
Owner earnings	$464M	$527M	$496M	($167M)	$181M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$86M	—	—	—	—
Free cash flow	$378M	$527M	$496M	($167M)	$181M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	9%	11%	12%	-5%	5%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $155M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $86M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $39M), owner earnings is nearer $425M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 23.0×

Comfortable

Operating income $699M ÷ interest expense $30M

What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$485M

Net cash

Cash $760M + ST investments $25M − debt $299M

What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $485M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 68d

Long (60+ days)

DSO 10 + DIO 156 − DPO 98 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 12%

Solid through the cycle

9-yr median, range -9%–98%; 53% latest = NOPAT $497M ÷ invested capital $944M

Industry peers: median 21%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 53% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 6%

Solid through the cycle

9-yr median margin, range -5%–12%; latest $464M = operating cash $619M − maintenance capex $155M

Industry peers: median 5%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 9% of revenue this year, a 6% median across 9 years. It chose to put $86M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $378M — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $39M of SBC) leaves $425M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 1.22×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $619M ÷ net income $507M

In the filing’s words The filing leans on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings, but the GAAP profit is itself cash-backed — the adjustments are not papering over a cash shortfall here.

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 97%

Returns most of it

Dividends + buybacks $451M ÷ Owner Earnings $464M

What this means
Of $464M Owner Earnings, $451M (97%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $451M buybacks. Net of $39M stock comp, the real buyback was about $412M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 1.55×

Expanding

Capex $241M ÷ depreciation $155M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $5.3B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.49×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Pass

Debt ≤ working capital · $299M vs $544M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Near

A profit every year (9-yr record) · 1 loss year

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · 4 of 9 yrs

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Pass

Earnings +33% over the record · +1058%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $10.51/share (latest year $11.41), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $31.60/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2018–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 8 of 9

What this means
Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 8 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 3% → 13% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 3% early to 13% lately, median 4% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Owner earnings growth +13%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 13% a year over the record.
Worst year 2021 · −0.7% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2021, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count −4.4%/yr

What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
Dividend record paid

What this means
Paid a dividend in 4 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, May 2, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.4B

Cash & short-term investments$619M
Receivables$146M
Inventory$533M
Other current assets$117M

Current liabilities$977M

Accounts payable$258M
Other current liabilities$719M

Current ratio1.45×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.90×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.63×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$438Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+1.5%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.4× → 1.4×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$1.3Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Debt incl. operating leases$1.3B$1.3B of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $1.5B (annual-report basis)

From the company's latest filing.

Lease obligations

the lease note, SEC EDGAR →

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

'26$312M

'27$287M

'28$240M

'29$184M

'30$118M

later$281M

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$312Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year

Total lease payments$1.4Bevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take

On the balance sheet$1.2Bthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$299M

Lease obligations (present value)$1.2B

Total fixed claims on the business$1.5B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $1.5B, of which the leases are 80%, more than the debt itself. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Jan 31, 2026 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2018–2026

Over the record, the business generated $3.6B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

Reinvested$1.4B · 39%
Dividends$172M · 5%
Buybacks$1.3B · 37%
Retained (debt / cash)$694M · 19%

Returned to owners$1.5B
66% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $172M as dividends and $1.3B as buybacks.
Average price paid for buybacks$1.00
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 79M shares were bought for $79M, about $1.00 each.
Net change in share count−34.2%
The diluted count fell from 69M to 46M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record$0.00/sh
Paid in 4 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.
Return on what it retained197%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($170M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $336M, so each retained $1 added about 1.97 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2022	Fran Horowitz	$12.9M	$35.6M	$181M
2023	Fran Horowitz	$11.0M	−$2.4M	($167M)
2024	Fran Horowitz	$15.0M	$99.2M	$496M
2025	Fran Horowitz	$17.0M	$40.8M	$527M
2026	Fran Horowitz	$13.3M	−$11.6M	$464M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership2.3%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$39M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 6% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Abercrombie & Fitch is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2018–2026.

1 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 5 came back clean.

Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?9 of 9 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 9 of the last 9 years, $179M in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did the share count rise anyway?
Did debt outgrow the business?
Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2026

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Income taxes as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Specialty Retail

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
ROSTRoss Stores Inc.	$22.8B	28%	12.1%	67%	10%
GAPGap Inc. (The)	$15.4B	38%	6.1%	28%	4%
JWNNordstrom	$15.0B	—	4.2%	15%	4%
URBNUrban Outfitters	$6.2B	33%	7.9%	16%	7%
AEOAmerican Eagle	$5.5B	37%	6.7%	21%	5%
ANFAbercrombie & Fitch	$5.3B	73%	3.5%	12%	6%
LELands' End Inc.	$1.3B	42%	2.9%	6%	1%
BKEBuckle	$1.3B	49%	19.2%	113%	17%
Group median	—	38%	6.4%	19%	5%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Abercrombie & Fitch has delivered.

Abercrombie & Fitch’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Abercrombie & Fitch earns about $294M on its 5.6% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 8.8% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($294M) Net of stock comp (−$39M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($512M)

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The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’22→’26+191%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’18→’26+11%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $416M on 44M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-29; net cash $269M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($251M) runs well above depreciation ($159M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $512M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh ANF against another business →

The owners of ANF: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Abercrombie & Fitch (ANF), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/ANF, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← ANET its page in the Manual ANGO →

Industry order: ← AEO the Specialty Retail chapter ARHS →