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ARHS, Arhaus Inc.

Arhaus Inc. is a premium home furnishings brand built on a simple idea: furniture and d cor should be responsibly sourced, lovingly made, and built to last.

We operate a vertically integrated model, designing and sourcing products directly from skilled artisans and carefully selected manufacturing vendors around the world, including domestic upholstery production at our own North Carolina manufacturing facility.

Our vertically integrated model, inclusive of design and product development teams, upholstery manufacturing capabilities, direct vendor sourcing, direct-to-consumer and direct-to-trade selling, allows Arhaus to maintain greater control over product quality, design integrity, and value.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

ARHS · Arhaus Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$1.4B

+8.5% YoY · 22% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $1.4B 5-yr avg $1.2B

Gross margin 39% 5-yr avg 41%

Operating margin 6.2% 5-yr avg 9.1%

ROIC 32% 5-yr avg 63%

Owner-earnings margin 2% 5-yr avg 9%

Free cash flow margin 1% 5-yr avg 5%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 39% and operating margin about 6.4% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from 4.2% to 15% — on a steadier 39% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Inventory runs near 23% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has run high across the record (median 45%, above 15% in 3 of 3 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 8% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2019–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
								Income statement
$495M	$507M	$797M	$1.2B	$1.3B	$1.3B	$1.4B	$1.4B	RevenueRevenue
36%	39%	41%	43%	42%	39%	39%	39%	Gross marginGross mgn
30%	33%	37%	28%	29%	33%	32%	33%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$30M	$31M	$33M	$185M	$164M	$87M	$89M	$86M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
6.0%	6.1%	4.2%	15.0%	12.8%	6.8%	6.4%	6.2%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$8M	$6M	$21M	$137M	$125M	$69M	$67M	$65M	Net incomeNet inc.
5%	11%	—	25%	26%	25%	27%	28%	Effective tax rateTax rate
								Cash flow & returns
$20M	$148M	$140M	$77M	$169M	$147M	$137M	$81M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$16M	$17M	$24M	$25M	$29M	$39M	$47M	$48M	DepreciationDeprec.
($4M)	$125M	$88M	($88M)	$6M	$32M	$14M	($42M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$10M	$13M	$41M	$56M	$93M	$107M	$78M	$67M	CapexCapex
2.0%	2.6%	5.2%	4.5%	7.3%	8.4%	5.6%	4.9%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$10M	$135M	$116M	$53M	$139M	$108M	$90M	$33M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
2.1%	26.7%	14.5%	4.3%	10.8%	8.5%	6.5%	2.4%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$10M	$135M	$98M	$22M	$75M	$40M	$59M	$14M	Free cash flowFCF
2.1%	26.7%	12.3%	1.8%	5.8%	3.1%	4.3%	1.0%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
—	—	—	$0	$0	$70M	$361K	$361K	Dividends paidDiv. paid
$0	$100K	$0	$0	—	—	—	—	BuybacksBuybacks
—	—	—	—	104%	45%	39%	32%	ROICROIC
—	—	30%	65%	37%	20%	16%	17%	Return on equityROE
—	—	—	65%	37%	−0%	16%	17%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
								Balance sheet
$20M	$57M	$124M	$145M	$223M	$198M	$253M	$177M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
—	$600K	$228K	$2M	$2M	$1M	$663K	$432K	ReceivablesReceiv.
—	$108M	$208M	$286M	$254M	$297M	$339M	$369M	InventoryInvent.
—	$29M	$51M	$63M	$64M	$69M	$78M	$68M	Accounts payablePayables
—	$80M	$157M	$226M	$193M	$230M	$261M	$302M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
—	$193M	$368M	$430M	$509M	$531M	$621M	$582M	Current assetsCur. assets
—	$213M	$401M	$445M	$342M	$402M	$453M	$466M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
—	0.9×	0.9×	1.0×	1.5×	1.3×	1.4×	1.2×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
—	$11M	$11M	$11M	$11M	$11M	$11M	$11M	GoodwillGoodwill
—	$323M	$587M	$817M	$1.1B	$1.2B	$1.4B	$1.4B	Total assetsAssets
($20M)	($57M)	($124M)	($145M)	($223M)	($198M)	($253M)	($177M)	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
2.2×	2.4×	6.1×	54.5×	—	—	—	25.3×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
($38M)	($27M)	$70M	$210M	$340M	$344M	$418M	$373M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.1%	0.1%	0.8%	0.3%	0.6%	0.6%	0.7%	0.7%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
								Per share
112M	112M	120M	140M	140M	141M	141M	142M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$4.41	$4.53	$6.67	$8.80	$9.19	$9.03	$9.75	$9.75	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.07	$0.05	$0.18	$0.98	$0.89	$0.49	$0.48	$0.46	EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.09	$1.21	$0.97	$0.38	$0.99	$0.77	$0.64	$0.23	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.09	$1.21	$0.82	$0.16	$0.54	$0.28	$0.42	$0.10	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
—	—	—	$0.00	$0.00	$0.50	$0.00	$0.00	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.09	$0.12	$0.35	$0.40	$0.67	$0.76	$0.55	$0.47	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$-0.34	$-0.24	$0.58	$1.50	$2.43	$2.44	$2.96	$2.63	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	6-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+14.1%/yr	+16.6%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+38.4%/yr	−12.0%/yr
EPS	+38.6%/yr	+54.4%/yr
Capital spending / share	+35.7%/yr	+36.5%/yr

The record, charted

FY2019–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

141Mpeak FY2025

ROIC

39%low FY2025

Gross margin

39%low FY2019

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$90Mowner earningsvs.$67Mnet incomelow FY2019

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2019FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $90M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $47M it takes just to hold its position. It put $31M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $59M.

Reported net income$67M

Owner earnings$90M · 7% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$67M	$69M	$125M	$137M	$21M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$47M	+$39M	+$29M	+$25M	+$24M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$9M	+$8M	+$8M	+$4M	+$6M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$14M	+$32M	+$6M	−$88M	+$88M
Cash from operations	$137M	$147M	$169M	$77M	$140M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$47M	−$39M	−$29M	−$25M	−$24M
Owner earnings	$90M	$108M	$139M	$53M	$116M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$31M	−$68M	−$64M	−$31M	−$18M
Free cash flow	$59M	$40M	$75M	$22M	$98M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	7%	8%	11%	4%	15%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $47M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $31M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $9M), owner earnings is nearer $81M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Material weakness in financial controls

“We have identified material weaknesses in our internal control over financial reporting.”

The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 26.2×

Comfortable

Operating income $89M ÷ interest expense $3M

What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$253M

Net cash, debt-free

Cash $253M − debt $0

What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $253M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 113d

Long (60+ days)

DSO 0 + DIO 147 − DPO 34 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital —

Not enough data

Industry peers: median 29%

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Owner-earnings margin 8%

Solid through the cycle

7-yr median margin, range 2%–27%; latest $90M = operating cash $137M − maintenance capex $47M

Industry peers: median 5%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 7% of revenue this year, a 8% median across 7 years. It chose to put $31M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $59M — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $9M of SBC) leaves $81M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 2.03×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $137M ÷ net income $67M

In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 0%

Reinvests most of it

Dividends + buybacks $361K ÷ Owner Earnings $90M

What this means
Of $90M Owner Earnings, $361K (0%) went back to shareholders, $361K dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 1.66×

Expanding

Capex $78M ÷ depreciation $47M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Near

Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.4B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.37×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Earnings stability Pass

A profit every year (7-yr record) · no losses

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · 2 of 7 yrs

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Pass

Earnings +33% over the record · +652%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.62/share (latest year $0.48), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $2.97/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2019–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 7 of 7

What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
Operating margin 5% → 9% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The margin widened even though the filing names price competition — the gain came from volume or cost, not pricing power. Read where.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 5% early to 9% lately, median 6% — pricing power intact or improving.
Owner earnings growth +5%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 5% a year over the record.
Worst year 2021 · 4.2% op. margin

What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
Share count +4.0%/yr

What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
Dividend record paid

What this means
Paid a dividend in 2 of the years on record.
How management talks about it Promotional

What this means
The record is compounding, but the filing leans on a promoter’s vocabulary rather than the per-share, return-on-capital terms an owner uses. The results back the talk here; the register is still worth noting.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$582M

Cash & short-term investments$177M
Receivables$432K
Inventory$369M
Other current assets$35M

Current liabilities$466M

Accounts payable$68M
Other current liabilities$398M

Current ratio1.25×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.46×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.38×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$115Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+0.9%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.3× → 1.2×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$362Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($423M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$547M$547M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $581M (annual-report basis)

Deferred revenue$271Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Lease obligations

the lease note, SEC EDGAR →

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, operating and finance leases together, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

Operating leasesFinance leases

'26$93M

'27$91M

'28$85M

'29$82M

'30$77M

later$385M

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$93Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year

Total lease payments$813Mevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take

On the balance sheet$581Mthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$0

Lease obligations (present value)$581M

Total fixed claims on the business$581M

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $581M, of which the leases are 100%, more than the debt itself. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2019–2025

Over the record, the business generated $838M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

Reinvested$399M · 48%
Dividends$71M · 8%
Buybacks$100K · 0%
Retained (debt / cash)$369M · 44%

Returned to owners$71M
11% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $71M as dividends and $100K as buybacks.
Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $100K over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
Net change in share count26.5%
The diluted count rose from 112M to 142M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record$0.00/sh
Paid in 2 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.
Return on what it retained7%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($362M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $25M, so each retained $1 added about 0.07 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2022	Mr. Reed	$3.6M	−$887k	$53M
2023	Mr. Reed	$2.9M	$2.9M	$139M
2024	Mr. Reed	$2.3M	$2.3M	$108M
2025	Mr. Reed	$4.6M	$4.6M	$90M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership1.2%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$9M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 10% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Arhaus Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2019–2025.

2 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 1 came back clean.

Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?8.6% vs 14.4%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 14.4% early in the record and 8.6% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?26.5%
Diluted shares grew 26.5% over 2019–2025, even as the company spent $100K on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean

Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Does management own its misses?
1 plain admission in this year's filing
“Some of our merchandise has failed to meet our expectations and objectives concerning quality.”verify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Specialty Retail

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
BBYBest Buy Co. Inc.	$41.7B	23%	4.4%	44%	4%
WSMWilliams-Sonoma	$7.8B	46%	14.7%	88%	12%
GMEGameStop Corp.	$3.6B	28%	-2.7%	-59%	2%
RHRH	$3.4B	44%	11.7%	29%	9%
ARHSArhaus Inc.	$1.4B	39%	6.4%	45%	8%
HVTHaverty Furniture Companies Inc.	$759M	56%	5.7%	12%	5%
Group median	—	42%	6.1%	36%	7%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Arhaus Inc. has delivered.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Arhaus Inc. earns about $117M on its 8.5% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 6.5% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($117M) Net of stock comp (−$10M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($34M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+4%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’19→’25−6%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $14M on 141M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net cash $177M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($67M) runs well above depreciation ($48M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $34M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh ARHS against another business →

The owners of ARHS: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Arhaus Inc. (ARHS), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/ARHS, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← ARES its page in the Manual ARI →

Industry order: ← ANF the Specialty Retail chapter ASO →