Owner Scorecard


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LE, Lands' End Inc.

Specialty Retail retail Distress / turnaroundCyclical

End is a classic American lifestyle brand that creates solutions for life's every journey.

We offer products online at www.landsend.com , through third-party distribution channels, our own Company Operated stores and third-party license agreements.

While our product focus has shifted significantly over the years, we have continued to adhere to our founder's motto as one of our guiding principles: "Take care of the customer, take care of the employee and the rest will take care of itself."

Latest annual: FY2026 10-K
LE · Lands' End Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2026
$1.3B
−2.0% YoY · −1% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $1.3B 5-yr avg $1.5B
Gross margin 48% 5-yr avg 44%
Operating margin 0.2% 5-yr avg 1.7%
ROIC 0% 5-yr avg 2%
Owner-earnings margin −3% 5-yr avg 2%
Free cash flow margin −3% 5-yr avg 2%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is led by US eCommerce (62%) and Outfitters (18%), with 3 more lines behind.
Situation
Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 42% and operating margin about 2.9% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from −11% to 4.9% — on a steadier 42% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Inventory runs near 23% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 6%, above 15% in 0 of 8 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

US eCommerce is 62% of revenue, with Outfitters the other meaningful line at 18%.

Revenue by product line, FY2026
  • US eCommerce62%$830M
  • Outfitters18%$242M
  • Third Party7%$91M
  • Europe eCommerce7%$90M
  • Licensing and Retail6%$82M
By geographyUnited States92%Europe7%Other Foreign1%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’252026’26TTMTTMMay 2026
Income statement
$1.3B$1.4B$1.5B$1.5B$1.4B$1.6B$1.6B$1.5B$1.4B$1.3B$1.3BRevenueRevenue
43%42%42%43%42%42%38%42%48%49%48%Gross marginGross mgn
40%38%38%38%36%35%34%37%41%42%43%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
($153M)$29M$43M$45M$41M$80M$25M($78M)$51M$44M$3MOperating incomeOp. inc.
−11.4%2.1%2.9%3.1%2.9%4.9%1.6%−5.3%3.7%3.3%0.2%Operating marginOp. mgn
($110M)$28M$12M$19M$11M$33M($13M)($131M)$6M$6M$344MNet incomeNet inc.
10%14%27%41%29%24%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$24M$28M$48M$27M$92M$71M($36M)$131M$53M$50M($2M)Operating cash flowOp. cash
$19M$25M$28M$31M$37M$39M$39M$38M$34M$30M$28MDepreciationDeprec.
$113M($29M)$3M($32M)$34M($12M)($66M)$219M$8M$8M($382M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$33M$38M$45M$39M$30M$25M$32M$35M$38M$29M$31MCapexCapex
2.5%2.7%3.1%2.7%2.1%1.5%2.0%2.4%2.8%2.2%2.4%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($9M)($10M)$3M($12M)$61M$45M($68M)$96M$15M$20M($33M)Owner earningsOwner earn.
−0.7%−0.7%0.2%−0.8%4.3%2.8%−4.4%6.5%1.1%1.5%−2.5%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($9M)($10M)$3M($12M)$61M$45M($68M)$96M$15M$20M($33M)Free cash flowFCF
−0.7%−0.7%0.2%−0.8%4.3%2.8%−4.4%6.5%1.1%1.5%−2.5%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
-22%7%6%6%9%-13%7%7%0%ROICROIC
-40%9%4%6%3%8%-3%-54%3%2%69%Return on equityROE
−40%9%4%6%3%8%−3%−54%3%2%69%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$213M$196M$195M$77M$34M$34M$40M$25M$16M$18M$23MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$39M$50M$35M$51M$38M$50M$45M$35M$48M$41M$34MReceivablesReceiv.
$325M$332M$322M$376M$382M$384M$426M$302M$265M$269M$300MInventoryInvent.
$162M$156M$124M$158M$134M$146M$172M$132M$111M$115M$119MAccounts payablePayables
$202M$226M$233M$268M$286M$288M$299M$205M$202M$195M$214MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$607M$607M$588M$545M$496M$507M$557M$410M$370M$361M$393MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$249M$256M$241M$284M$315M$311M$297M$260M$228M$224M$249MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.4×2.4×2.4×1.9×1.6×1.6×1.9×1.6×1.6×1.6×1.6×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$110M$110M$110M$110M$107M$107M$107K$0$0$0$0GoodwillGoodwill
$1.1B$1.1B$1.1B$1.1B$1.0B$1.0B$1.1B$811M$765M$751M$906MTotal assetsAssets
$495M$491M$488M$384M$259M$248M$237M$249M$238M$227M$430MTotal debtDebt
$282M$296M$292M$307M$225M$214M$198M$224M$222M$210M$407MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
-6.2×1.1×1.5×1.7×1.5×2.3×0.6×-1.6×1.3×1.2×0.1×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$271M$307M$323M$348M$370M$407M$381M$242M$239M$244M$501MShareholders’ equityEquity
0.2%0.3%0.4%0.6%0.6%0.6%0.2%0.3%0.4%0.4%0.6%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
$3M$468K$107M$4M$683K$683KGoodwill written downGW imp.
Per share
32.0M32.1M32.5M32.3M32.7M33.7M33.1M32.0M31.7M31.0M31.3MShares out (diluted)Shares
$41.72$43.81$44.63$44.84$43.72$48.59$46.98$46.06$43.04$43.02$41.91Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-3.43$0.88$0.36$0.60$0.33$0.99$-0.38$-4.09$0.20$0.18$11.00EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.29$-0.30$0.10$-0.36$1.88$1.35$-2.06$2.99$0.49$0.66$-1.06Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.29$-0.30$0.10$-0.36$1.88$1.35$-2.06$2.99$0.49$0.66$-1.06Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.04$1.19$1.38$1.20$0.92$0.75$0.96$1.09$1.19$0.94$0.99Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$8.48$9.56$9.92$10.77$11.32$12.07$11.50$7.56$7.56$7.87$16.00Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+0.3%/yr−0.3%/yr
Owner earnings / share−19.0%/yr
EPS−11.8%/yr
Capital spending / share−1.1%/yr+0.4%/yr
Book value / share−0.8%/yr−7.0%/yr

The record, charted

FY2017–2026

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
31Mpeak FY2022
ROIC
7%low FY2017
Gross margin
49%low FY2023
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
10.3×peak FY2019

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$20Mowner earningsvs.$6Mnet incomelow FY2023

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2017FY2026

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business turned $6M of profit into $20M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$6M
Owner earnings$20M · 2% of revenue
FY2026FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022
Reported net income$6M$6M($131M)($13M)$33M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$30M+$34M+$38M+$39M+$39M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$5M+$5M+$4M+$4M+$10M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$8M+$8M+$219M−$66M−$12M
Cash from operations$50M$53M$131M($36M)$71M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$29M−$38M−$35M−$32M−$25M
Owner earnings$20M$15M$96M($68M)$45M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue2%1%6%-4%3%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $5M), owner earnings is nearer $15M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Thin
    Operating income $44M ÷ interest expense $37M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest, but with little room. A bad year, a refinancing at higher rates, or a revenue wobble closes the gap fast.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $210M · 4.7× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $18M − debt $227M
    What this means

    Netting $18M of cash and short-term investments against $227M of debt leaves $210M owed, about 4.7× a year's operating profit (5.1× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 11 + DIO 143 − DPO 62 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    8-yr median, range -22%–9%; 7% latest = NOPAT $31M ÷ invested capital $454M
    Industry peers: median 14%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years (it ran 7% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Thin, recently turned positive
    latest $20M = operating cash $50M − maintenance capex $29M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median 0%)
    Industry peers: median 5%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 2% of revenue this year, a 0% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $5M of SBC) leaves $15M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $50M ÷ net income $6M

    In the filing’s words The filing leans on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings, but the GAAP profit is itself cash-backed — the adjustments are not papering over a cash shortfall here.

    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $12M ÷ Owner Earnings $20M
    What this means

    Of $20M Owner Earnings, $12M (58%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $12M buybacks. Net of $5M stock comp, the real buyback was about $6M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.97×
    Maintaining
    Capex $29M ÷ depreciation $30M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Near
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.3B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Near
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.61×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $227M vs $137M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 3 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-1.29/share (latest year $0.18), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $7.95/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 7 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin −2% → 1% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The record and the words agree: the margin widened and the filing attributes the gain to its own pricing, not volume alone.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −2% early to 1% lately, median 3% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Worst year 2017 · −11.4% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2017, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count −0.3%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Framed as a capability

The filing positions AI as something the company uses, not something it fears.

“We are focused on advancing our technologies, leveraging artificial intelligence ("AI"), challenging ourselves to think and operate differently, embracing change, testing and learning, and applying our learning to best serve evolving customer needs.”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, May 1, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$393M
  • Cash & short-term investments$23M
  • Receivables$34M
  • Inventory$300M
  • Other current assets$36M
Current liabilities$249M
  • Accounts payable$119M
  • Other current liabilities$130M
Current ratio1.58×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.37×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.09×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$143Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Cash runway0.7 yrsthe business is consuming cash; this is how long the cash on hand lasts at that rate
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−9.9%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.6× → 1.6×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$501Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($12M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$18M$18M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$10Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2017–2026

Over the record, the business generated $487M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$344M · 71%
  • Buybacks$20M · 4%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$123M · 25%
  • Returned to owners$20M

    14% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $20M as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt fell $65M and cash and short-term investments fell $190M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $20M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count−2.2%

    The diluted count fell from 32M to 31M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$0.00/sh

    Paid no dividend over the span; it returns cash through buybacks or retains it.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$257M34% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity0%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$0over 10 years buying other businesses, against $344M of capital spent building

$115M written down across 5 years (2021, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2022Mr. McLean$5.4M$3.5M$45M
2023Mr. McLean$4.3M$129k($68M)
2024Mr. McLean$4.6M$4.5M$96M
2025Mr. McLean$4.2M$6.0M$15M
2026Mr. McLean$5.9M$8.9M$20M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership2.1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio181:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$5M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 12% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Lands' End Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.

1 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?6 of 10 years

    Management took an impairment or write-down in 6 of the last 10 years, $289M in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2026

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Income taxes, Inventory as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Specialty Retail

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
URBNUrban Outfitters$6.2B33%7.9%16%7%
AEOAmerican Eagle$5.5B37%6.7%21%5%
ANFAbercrombie & Fitch$5.3B73%3.5%12%6%
LELands' End Inc.$1.3B42%2.9%6%1%
BKEBuckle$1.3B49%19.2%113%17%
SCVLShoe Carnival$1.1B33%5.6%14%5%
ZUMZZumiez$929M34%5.0%9%5%
CTRNCiti Trends Inc.$820M49%2.9%9%2%
Group median40%5.3%13%5%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Lands' End Inc. has delivered.

Lands' End Inc.’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, a cyclical trough. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

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Through the cycle, Lands' End Inc. earns about $9M on its 0.7% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 1.5% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2024−54%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings ($33M) on 31M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-06-07; net debt $407M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Lands' End Inc. (LE), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/LE, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← LDOS its page in the Manual LEA →

Industry order: ← JWN the Specialty Retail chapter LESL →