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APP, AppLovin

Software asset-light Cyclical

We provide end-to-end artificial intelligence-powered advertising solutions for businesses to reach, monetize and grow their global audience.

We generate revenue when our advertisers achieve their return on advertising spend targets with our advertising solutions, ensuring that their success directly fuels our growth.

AppLovin is critical to the success of advertisers and publishers seeking to solve marketing and monetization challenges.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

APP · AppLovin

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$5.5B

+70.0% YoY · 30% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $6.2B 5-yr avg $3.2B

Operating margin 77.1% 5-yr avg 36.1%

ROIC 130% 5-yr avg 36%

Owner-earnings margin 72% 5-yr avg 37%

Free cash flow margin 72% 5-yr avg 37%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 76% and operating margin about 20% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −4.3% and 76% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −191 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 10%). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 17% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

48% of revenue comes from outside the United States.

Revenue by geography, FY2025

United States52%$2.8B
International48%$2.7B

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2019–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
								Income statement
$994M	$1.5B	$2.8B	$2.8B	$1.8B	$3.2B	$5.5B	$6.2B	RevenueRevenue
76%	62%	65%	55%	81%	84%	—	—	Gross marginGross mgn
3%	5%	6%	6%	8%	5%	4%	4%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
5%	12%	13%	18%	18%	12%	4%	4%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$194M	($62M)	$150M	($48M)	$772M	$1.9B	$4.2B	$4.8B	Operating incomeOp. inc.
19.6%	−4.3%	5.4%	−1.7%	41.9%	59.3%	75.8%	77.1%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$119M	($125M)	$35M	($193M)	$357M	$1.6B	$3.3B	$4.0B	Net incomeNet inc.
6%	—	24%	—	11%	1%	13%	15%	Effective tax rateTax rate
								Cash flow & returns
$198M	$223M	$362M	$413M	$1.1B	$2.1B	$4.0B	$4.4B	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$93M	$255M	$431M	$547M	$489M	$449M	$195M	$149M	DepreciationDeprec.
($24M)	$31M	($238M)	($133M)	($147M)	($299M)	$232M	$87M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$3M	$3M	$1M	$662K	$4M	$5M	—	$5M	CapexCapex
0.3%	0.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%	0.1%	—	0.1%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$195M	$220M	$360M	$412M	$1.1B	$2.1B	—	$4.4B	Owner earningsOwner earn.
19.6%	15.1%	12.9%	14.6%	57.4%	65.0%	—	71.8%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$195M	$220M	$360M	$412M	$1.1B	$2.1B	—	$4.4B	Free cash flowFCF
19.6%	15.1%	12.9%	14.6%	57.4%	65.0%	—	71.8%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$404M	$675M	$1.2B	$1.3B	$64M	—	—	$64M	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$11K	$2M	$0	$339M	$1.2B	$981M	$2.2B	—	BuybacksBuybacks
—	-4%	3%	-1%	18%	48%	114%	130%	ROICROIC
—	—	2%	-10%	28%	145%	156%	168%	Return on equityROE
—	—	2%	−10%	28%	145%	156%	168%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
								Balance sheet
$396M	$317M	$1.5B	$1.1B	$502M	$697M	$2.5B	$2.8B	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
—	$297M	$515M	$703M	$954M	$1.3B	$1.8B	$2.0B	ReceivablesReceiv.
—	$147M	$258M	$273M	$372M	$504M	$747M	$698M	Accounts payablePayables
—	$150M	$256M	$430M	$582M	$779M	$1.1B	$1.3B	Operating working capitalOper. WC
—	$663M	$3.2B	$1.9B	$1.6B	$2.3B	$4.4B	$4.8B	Current assetsCur. assets
—	$598M	$640M	$579M	$944M	$1.1B	$1.3B	$1.5B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
—	1.1×	5.1×	3.3×	1.7×	2.2×	3.3×	3.2×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$137M	$250M	$966M	$1.8B	$1.5B	$1.5B	$1.5B	$1.5B	GoodwillGoodwill
—	$2.2B	$6.2B	$5.8B	$5.4B	$5.9B	$7.3B	$7.7B	Total assetsAssets
—	$1.6B	$3.2B	$3.2B	$3.1B	$3.5B	$3.5B	$3.5B	Total debtDebt
—	$1.3B	$1.7B	$2.1B	$2.6B	$2.8B	$1.0B	$755M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
2.6×	-0.8×	1.5×	-0.3×	2.8×	6.0×	20.1×	23.1×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
($257M)	($159M)	$2.1B	$1.9B	$1.3B	$1.1B	$2.1B	$2.4B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
1.0%	4.3%	4.8%	6.8%	19.7%	11.5%	3.8%	3.8%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
								Per share
212M	215M	343M	372M	363M	348M	342M	339M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$4.68	$6.75	$8.15	$7.58	$5.08	$9.27	$16.03	$18.20	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.56	$-0.58	$0.10	$-0.52	$0.98	$4.54	$9.75	$11.70	EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.92	$1.02	$1.05	$1.11	$2.92	$6.02	—	$13.07	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.92	$1.02	$1.05	$1.11	$2.92	$6.02	—	$13.07	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.02	$0.02	$0.00	$0.00	$0.01	$0.01	—	$0.01	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$-1.21	$-0.74	$6.24	$5.12	$3.46	$3.13	$6.24	$6.98	Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×1.59 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	6-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+22.8%/yr	+18.9%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+45.6%/yr (5-yr)	+45.6%/yr
EPS	+61.0%/yr	—
Capital spending / share	−2.8%/yr (5-yr)	−2.8%/yr

The record, charted

FY2019–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

342Mpeak FY2022

ROIC

114%low FY2020

Gross margin

84%low FY2022

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

1.3×peak FY2020

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$2.1Bowner earningsvs.$1.6Bnet incomelow FY2019

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2019FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2020–FY2024cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2024 the business turned $1.6B of profit into $2.1B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$1.6B

Owner earnings$2.1B · 65% of revenue

	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021	FY2020
Reported net income	$1.6B	$357M	($193M)	$35M	($125M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$449M	+$489M	+$547M	+$431M	+$255M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$369M	+$363M	+$192M	+$133M	+$62M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$299M	−$147M	−$133M	−$238M	+$31M
Cash from operations	$2.1B	$1.1B	$413M	$362M	$223M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$5M	−$4M	−$662K	−$1M	−$3M
Owner earnings	$2.1B	$1.1B	$412M	$360M	$220M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	65%	57%	15%	13%	15%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $369M), owner earnings is nearer $1.7B.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 20.1×

Comfortable

Operating income $4.2B ÷ interest expense $207M

What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $1.0B · 0.2× operating profit

Modest net debt

Cash $2.5B − debt $3.5B

What this means
Netting $2.5B of cash and short-term investments against $3.5B of debt leaves $1.0B owed, about 0.2× a year's operating profit (0.8× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? -289d

Negative, funded by others

DSO 121 + DIO 0 − DPO 410 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 3%

Below average through the cycle

6-yr median, range -4%–114%; 114% latest = NOPAT $3.6B ÷ invested capital $3.2B

Industry peers: median 3%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 6 years (it ran 114% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 15%

High through the cycle

6-yr median margin, range 13%–65%; latest $4.0B = operating cash $4.0B − maintenance capex $5M

Industry peers: median 16%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 72% of revenue this year, a 15% median across 6 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $210M of SBC) leaves $3.8B.
Are earnings backed by cash? 1.19×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $4.0B ÷ net income $3.3B

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 55%

Returns about half

Dividends + buybacks $2.2B ÷ Owner Earnings $4.0B

What this means
Of $4.0B Owner Earnings, $2.2B (55%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $2.2B buybacks. Net of $210M stock comp, the real buyback was about $2.0B. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 0.02×

Harvesting

Capex $5M ÷ depreciation $195M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $5.5B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Pass

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 3.32×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Near

Debt ≤ working capital · $3.5B vs $3.1B WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (7-yr record) · 2 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Pass

Earnings +33% over the record · +17888%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $5.22/share (latest year $9.91), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $6.35/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2019–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 5 of 7

What this means
Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 6 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 7% → 59% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 7% early to 59% lately, median 20% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Owner earnings growth +50%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 50% a year over the record.
Worst year 2020 · −4.3% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count +8.3%/yr

What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“In addition, our ability to execute our strategy depends in part on our continued ability to identify, hire, develop, motivate, and retain highly skilled employees, particularly in the competitive fields of AI development, machine learning, product management, engineering and data science.…”

AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$4.8B

Cash & short-term investments$2.8B
Receivables$2.0B
Other current assets$131M

Current liabilities$1.5B

Accounts payable$698M
Other current liabilities$797M

Current ratio3.24×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio3.24×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio1.85×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$3.4Bthe cushion left after near-term bills

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+59.0%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters2.3× → 3.2×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$471Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($497M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$3.5B$32M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$48Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2019–2024

Over the record, the business generated $4.4B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash builder, a large share of cash simply built up on the balance sheet.

Reinvested$18M · 0%
Buybacks$2.5B · 57%
Retained (debt / cash)$1.9B · 43%

Returned to owners$2.5B
57% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $2.5B as buybacks.
Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span cash and short-term investments rose $2.4B.
Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $2.5B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
Net change in share count59.5%
The diluted count rose from 212M to 339M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 7-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$1.9B27% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity72%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$3.7Bover 7 years buying other businesses, against $18M of capital spent building

$189M written down across 1 year (2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 7-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Adam Foroughi	$104k	$104k	$360M
2022	Adam Foroughi	$104k	$104k	$412M
2023	Adam Foroughi	$83.4M	$286.9M	$1.1B
2024	Adam Foroughi	$11.2M	$386.0M	$2.1B
2025	Adam Foroughi	$13.0M	$21.7M	—

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

CEO pay ratio97:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Stock-based compensation$210M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 4% of revenue, equal to 5% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why AppLovin is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2019–2025.

1 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?59.5%
Diluted shares grew 59.5% over 2019–2024, even as the company spent $2.5B on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did reported profit become cash?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Income taxes, Stock compensation as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Software

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
SNAPSnap Inc.	$5.9B	55%	-32.4%	-24%	-4%
APPAppLovin	$5.5B	70%	19.6%	10%	17%
EPAMEPAM Systems	$5.5B	34%	11.9%	31%	11%
TEAMAtlassian	$5.2B	83%	-2.5%	—	27%
ZMZoom	$4.9B	76%	11.6%	8%	33%
PINSPinterest Inc.	$4.2B	76%	-4.1%	-5%	16%
NIQNIQ Global Intelligence plc	$4.2B	—	-2.5%	-2%	1%
MTCHMatch Group Inc.	$3.5B	73%	26.1%	17%	27%
Group median	—	73%	4.6%	8%	17%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what AppLovin has delivered.

AppLovin’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, AppLovin earns about $1.1B on its 19.6% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 72.4% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($1.1B) Net of stock comp (−$233M)

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The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’20→’24+53%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’19→’24+50%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $4.4B on 336M shares outstanding, the balance-sheet count at 2026-03-31; net debt $755M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh APP against another business →

The owners of APP: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "AppLovin (APP), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/APP, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← APOS its page in the Manual APPF →

Industry order: ← API the Software chapter APPF →