Owner Scorecard


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SNAP, Snap Inc.

Software asset-light UnprofitableDistress / turnaround

A software business, earning high margins on code once it is written.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
SNAP · Snap Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$5.9B
+10.6% YoY · 19% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $6.1B 5-yr avg $4.9B
Gross margin 56% 5-yr avg 64%
Operating margin −6.8% 5-yr avg −20.3%
ROIC −7% 5-yr avg −17%
Owner-earnings margin 11% 5-yr avg 4%
Free cash flow margin 10% 5-yr avg 4%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run around −34% through the cycle on a 85% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. Stock-based pay runs about 29% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −24%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 3 regions, the largest North America at 59%.

Revenue by geography, FY2025
  • North America59%$3.5B
  • Rest of world23%$1.4B
  • Europe18%$1.1B

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$404M$825M$1.2B$1.7B$2.5B$4.1B$4.6B$4.6B$5.4B$5.9B$6.1BRevenueRevenue
84%54%55%56%Gross marginGross mgn
41%186%40%34%21%17%21%19%17%17%16%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
45%186%65%52%44%38%46%41%32%30%30%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($520M)($3.5B)($1.3B)($1.1B)($862M)($702M)($1.4B)($1.4B)($787M)($532M)($413M)Operating incomeOp. inc.
−128.7%−422.5%−107.5%−64.3%−34.4%−17.1%−30.3%−30.4%−14.7%−9.0%−6.8%Operating marginOp. mgn
($515M)($3.4B)($1.3B)($1.0B)($945M)($488M)($1.4B)($1.3B)($698M)($460M)($410M)Net incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
($611M)($735M)($690M)($305M)($168M)$293M$185M$247M$413M$656M$831MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$29M$61M$92M$87M$87M$119M$202M$168M$158M$164M$171MDepreciationDeprec.
($158M)$9M($64M)($45M)($80M)($430M)$24M$77M($88M)($64M)$51MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$66M$85M$120M$36M$58M$70M$129M$212M$195M$219M$223MCapexCapex
16.4%10.2%10.2%2.1%2.3%1.7%2.8%4.6%3.6%3.7%3.6%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($640M)($796M)($782M)($341M)($225M)$223M$55M$78M$219M$493M$661MOwner earningsOwner earn.
−158.3%−96.5%−66.2%−19.9%−9.0%5.4%1.2%1.7%4.1%8.3%10.8%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($678M)($819M)($810M)($341M)($225M)$223M$55M$35M$219M$437M$609MFree cash flowFCF
−167.5%−99.3%−68.6%−19.9%−9.0%5.4%1.2%0.8%4.1%7.4%10.0%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$104M$386M$815K$77M$169M$311M$67M$50M$0$35M$75MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$0$0$1.0B$189M$311M$751MBuybacksBuybacks
-30%-104%-52%-33%-20%-14%-22%-25%-12%-9%-7%ROICROIC
-34%-115%-54%-46%-41%-13%-55%-55%-28%-20%-20%Return on equityROE
−34%−115%−54%−46%−41%−13%−55%−55%−28%−20%−20%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$987M$2.0B$1.3B$2.1B$2.5B$3.7B$3.9B$3.5B$3.4B$2.9B$2.8BCash & investmentsCash+inv
$163M$279M$355M$492M$744M$1.1B$1.2B$1.3B$1.3B$1.4B$1.2BReceivablesReceiv.
$8M$71M$31M$47M$72M$125M$182M$279M$173M$220M$238MAccounts payablePayables
$154M$208M$324M$445M$672M$944M$1.0B$999M$1.2B$1.2B$949MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$1.2B$2.4B$1.7B$2.6B$3.3B$4.9B$5.3B$5.0B$4.9B$4.6B$4.3BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$157M$346M$293M$500M$667M$852M$1.2B$1.1B$1.2B$1.3B$1.2BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
7.5×6.8×5.7×5.3×5.0×5.7×4.3×4.4×3.9×3.6×3.5×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$319M$640M$632M$761M$939M$1.6B$1.6B$1.7B$1.7B$1.7B$1.8BGoodwillGoodwill
$1.7B$3.4B$2.7B$4.0B$5.0B$7.5B$8.0B$8.0B$7.9B$7.7B$7.5BTotal assetsAssets
$892M$1.7B$2.3B$3.7B$3.7B$3.6B$3.5B$3.6BTotal debtDebt
($1.2B)($862M)($1.4B)($197M)$205M$231M$549M$785MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
-365.4×-1008.6×-325.7×-44.1×-8.9×-39.7×-65.0×-63.5×-36.5×-4.4×-3.0×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$1.5B$3.0B$2.3B$2.3B$2.3B$3.8B$2.6B$2.4B$2.5B$2.3B$2.1BShareholders’ equityEquity
7.9%320.0%45.6%40.0%30.7%26.5%30.2%28.7%19.4%17.1%16.7%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
808M1.17B1.30B1.38B1.46B1.56B1.61B1.61B1.66B1.69B1.69BShares out (diluted)Shares
$0.50$0.71$0.91$1.25$1.72$2.64$2.86$2.86$3.23$3.50$3.61Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.64$-2.95$-0.97$-0.75$-0.65$-0.31$-0.89$-0.82$-0.42$-0.27$-0.24EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.79$-0.68$-0.60$-0.25$-0.15$0.14$0.03$0.05$0.13$0.29$0.39Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.84$-0.70$-0.62$-0.25$-0.15$0.14$0.03$0.02$0.13$0.26$0.36Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.08$0.07$0.09$0.03$0.04$0.04$0.08$0.13$0.12$0.13$0.13Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$1.88$2.57$1.78$1.64$1.60$2.43$1.60$1.50$1.48$1.35$1.24Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×1.44 into 2017 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+24.1%/yr+15.2%/yr
Capital spending / share+5.1%/yr+26.6%/yr
Book value / share−3.6%/yr−3.4%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
1.7Bpeak FY2025
ROIC
−9%low FY2017
Gross margin
55%low FY2024
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
1.1×peak FY2023

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$493Mowner earningsvs.($460M)net incomelow FY2017

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2021FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $493M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $164M it takes just to hold its position. It put $55M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $437M.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($460M)($698M)($1.3B)($1.4B)($488M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$164M+$158M+$168M+$202M+$119M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$1.0B+$1.0B+$1.3B+$1.4B+$1.1B
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$64M−$88M+$77M+$24M−$430M
Cash from operations$656M$413M$247M$185M$293M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$164M−$195M−$168M−$129M−$70M
Owner earnings$493M$219M$78M$55M$223M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$55M−$43M
Free cash flow$437M$219M$35M$55M$223M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue8%4%2%1%5%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $164M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $55M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $1.0B), owner earnings is nearer ($524M).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income ($532M) ÷ interest expense $122M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • Net debt against an operating loss
    Cash $1.0B + ST investments $1.9B − debt $3.6B
    What this means

    Netting $2.9B of cash and short-term investments against $3.6B of debt leaves $667M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 84 + DIO 0 − DPO 30 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -104%–-9%; -9% latest = NOPAT ($420M) ÷ invested capital $4.9B
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -9% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid, recently turned positive
    latest $493M = operating cash $656M − maintenance capex $164M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median -9%)
    Industry peers: median 17%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 8% of revenue this year, a -9% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $1.0B of SBC) leaves ($524M).

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($460M) · cash from operations $656M

    In the filing’s words And the filing leans heavily on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings — steering you off the GAAP figure just where the cash is not backing it. Read the reconciliation in the notes before taking the adjusted number.

    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Returned more than it generated
    Dividends + buybacks $751M ÷ Owner Earnings $493M
    What this means

    The company returned more than it generated: against $493M of Owner Earnings, $751M (152%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $751M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($1.0B SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.34×
    Expanding
    Capex $219M ÷ depreciation $164M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $5.9B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 3.56×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Near
    Debt ≤ working capital · $3.6B vs $3.3B WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 10 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.47/share (latest year $-0.26), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $1.31/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 0 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 10 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 7 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin −220% → −18% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −220% early to −18% lately, median −34% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 51%
    What this means

    Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.

  • Worst year 2017 · −422.5% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2017, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • How management talks about it Owner’s terms
    What this means

    The record and the register agree: capital is compounding and the filing reasons in an owner’s terms — per-share value, return on capital, the long term — not a promoter’s.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“We are also increasingly using third party AI platforms and tools, and open source AI to operate and accelerate our business.”

AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$4.3B
  • Cash & short-term investments$2.8B
  • Receivables$1.2B
  • Other current assets$269M
Current liabilities$1.2B
  • Accounts payable$238M
  • Other current liabilities$976M
Current ratio3.53×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio3.53×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio2.33×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$3.1Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+12.1%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters4.0× → 3.5×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$237Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($1.1B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$4.2B$666M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $4.2B (annual-report basis)
Deferred revenue$169Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

'26$85M
'27$96M
'28$93M
'29$89M
'30$88M
later$348M

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$85Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$800Mevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$606Mthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$3.6B
Lease obligations (present value)$606M
Total fixed claims on the business$4.2B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $4.2B, of which the leases are 14%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$1.8B23% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity75%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$1.2Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $1.2B of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

  • Stock-based compensation$1.0B

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 17% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Contingencies as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Software

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
SSNCSS&C Technologies$6.3B47%21.8%7%25%
TOSTToast Inc.$6.2B19%-13.4%-38%-1%
SNAPSnap Inc.$5.9B55%-32.4%-24%-4%
APPAppLovin$5.5B70%19.6%10%17%
ZMZoom$4.9B76%11.6%8%33%
PINSPinterest Inc.$4.2B76%-4.1%-5%16%
NIQNIQ Global Intelligence plc$4.2B-2.5%-2%1%
MTCHMatch Group Inc.$3.5B73%26.1%17%27%
Group median70%4.5%2%17%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Snap Inc. has delivered.

Snap Inc.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, Snap Inc. earns about $71M on its 1.2% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 8.3% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+26%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2021+18%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $609M on 1742M shares outstanding, the balance-sheet count at 2026-03-31; net debt $785M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($223M) runs well above depreciation ($171M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $668M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Snap Inc. (SNAP), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/SNAP, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← SNA its page in the Manual SNDA →

Industry order: ← SMWB the Software chapter SNOW →