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SNAP, Snap Inc.
A software business, earning high margins on code once it is written.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run around −34% through the cycle on a 85% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. Stock-based pay runs about 29% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −24%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Revenue spreads across 3 regions, the largest North America at 59%.
- North America59%$3.5B
- Rest of world23%$1.4B
- Europe18%$1.1B
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $404M | $825M | $1.2B | $1.7B | $2.5B | $4.1B | $4.6B | $4.6B | $5.4B | $5.9B | $6.1B | RevenueRevenue |
| — | — | — | — | — | 84% | — | — | 54% | 55% | 56% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 41% | 186% | 40% | 34% | 21% | 17% | 21% | 19% | 17% | 17% | 16% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 45% | 186% | 65% | 52% | 44% | 38% | 46% | 41% | 32% | 30% | 30% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| ($520M) | ($3.5B) | ($1.3B) | ($1.1B) | ($862M) | ($702M) | ($1.4B) | ($1.4B) | ($787M) | ($532M) | ($413M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −128.7% | −422.5% | −107.5% | −64.3% | −34.4% | −17.1% | −30.3% | −30.4% | −14.7% | −9.0% | −6.8% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($515M) | ($3.4B) | ($1.3B) | ($1.0B) | ($945M) | ($488M) | ($1.4B) | ($1.3B) | ($698M) | ($460M) | ($410M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| ($611M) | ($735M) | ($690M) | ($305M) | ($168M) | $293M | $185M | $247M | $413M | $656M | $831M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $29M | $61M | $92M | $87M | $87M | $119M | $202M | $168M | $158M | $164M | $171M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($158M) | $9M | ($64M) | ($45M) | ($80M) | ($430M) | $24M | $77M | ($88M) | ($64M) | $51M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $66M | $85M | $120M | $36M | $58M | $70M | $129M | $212M | $195M | $219M | $223M | CapexCapex |
| 16.4% | 10.2% | 10.2% | 2.1% | 2.3% | 1.7% | 2.8% | 4.6% | 3.6% | 3.7% | 3.6% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ($640M) | ($796M) | ($782M) | ($341M) | ($225M) | $223M | $55M | $78M | $219M | $493M | $661M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −158.3% | −96.5% | −66.2% | −19.9% | −9.0% | 5.4% | 1.2% | 1.7% | 4.1% | 8.3% | 10.8% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($678M) | ($819M) | ($810M) | ($341M) | ($225M) | $223M | $55M | $35M | $219M | $437M | $609M | Free cash flowFCF |
| −167.5% | −99.3% | −68.6% | −19.9% | −9.0% | 5.4% | 1.2% | 0.8% | 4.1% | 7.4% | 10.0% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $104M | $386M | $815K | $77M | $169M | $311M | $67M | $50M | $0 | $35M | $75M | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| — | — | — | — | $0 | $0 | $1.0B | $189M | $311M | $751M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| -30% | -104% | -52% | -33% | -20% | -14% | -22% | -25% | -12% | -9% | -7% | ROICROIC |
| -34% | -115% | -54% | -46% | -41% | -13% | -55% | -55% | -28% | -20% | -20% | Return on equityROE |
| −34% | −115% | −54% | −46% | −41% | −13% | −55% | −55% | −28% | −20% | −20% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $987M | $2.0B | $1.3B | $2.1B | $2.5B | $3.7B | $3.9B | $3.5B | $3.4B | $2.9B | $2.8B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $163M | $279M | $355M | $492M | $744M | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.2B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $8M | $71M | $31M | $47M | $72M | $125M | $182M | $279M | $173M | $220M | $238M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $154M | $208M | $324M | $445M | $672M | $944M | $1.0B | $999M | $1.2B | $1.2B | $949M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $1.2B | $2.4B | $1.7B | $2.6B | $3.3B | $4.9B | $5.3B | $5.0B | $4.9B | $4.6B | $4.3B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $157M | $346M | $293M | $500M | $667M | $852M | $1.2B | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.2B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 7.5× | 6.8× | 5.7× | 5.3× | 5.0× | 5.7× | 4.3× | 4.4× | 3.9× | 3.6× | 3.5× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $319M | $640M | $632M | $761M | $939M | $1.6B | $1.6B | $1.7B | $1.7B | $1.7B | $1.8B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $1.7B | $3.4B | $2.7B | $4.0B | $5.0B | $7.5B | $8.0B | $8.0B | $7.9B | $7.7B | $7.5B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | — | — | $892M | $1.7B | $2.3B | $3.7B | $3.7B | $3.6B | $3.5B | $3.6B | Total debtDebt |
| — | — | — | ($1.2B) | ($862M) | ($1.4B) | ($197M) | $205M | $231M | $549M | $785M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| -365.4× | -1008.6× | -325.7× | -44.1× | -8.9× | -39.7× | -65.0× | -63.5× | -36.5× | -4.4× | -3.0× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $1.5B | $3.0B | $2.3B | $2.3B | $2.3B | $3.8B | $2.6B | $2.4B | $2.5B | $2.3B | $2.1B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 7.9% | 320.0% | 45.6% | 40.0% | 30.7% | 26.5% | 30.2% | 28.7% | 19.4% | 17.1% | 16.7% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 808M | 1.17B | 1.30B | 1.38B | 1.46B | 1.56B | 1.61B | 1.61B | 1.66B | 1.69B | 1.69B | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $0.50 | $0.71 | $0.91 | $1.25 | $1.72 | $2.64 | $2.86 | $2.86 | $3.23 | $3.50 | $3.61 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-0.64 | $-2.95 | $-0.97 | $-0.75 | $-0.65 | $-0.31 | $-0.89 | $-0.82 | $-0.42 | $-0.27 | $-0.24 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $-0.79 | $-0.68 | $-0.60 | $-0.25 | $-0.15 | $0.14 | $0.03 | $0.05 | $0.13 | $0.29 | $0.39 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-0.84 | $-0.70 | $-0.62 | $-0.25 | $-0.15 | $0.14 | $0.03 | $0.02 | $0.13 | $0.26 | $0.36 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.08 | $0.07 | $0.09 | $0.03 | $0.04 | $0.04 | $0.08 | $0.13 | $0.12 | $0.13 | $0.13 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $1.88 | $2.57 | $1.78 | $1.64 | $1.60 | $2.43 | $1.60 | $1.50 | $1.48 | $1.35 | $1.24 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×1.44 into 2017 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +24.1%/yr | +15.2%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +5.1%/yr | +26.6%/yr |
| Book value / share | −3.6%/yr | −3.4%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned $493M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $164M it takes just to hold its position. It put $55M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $437M.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($460M) | ($698M) | ($1.3B) | ($1.4B) | ($488M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$164M | +$158M | +$168M | +$202M | +$119M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$1.0B | +$1.0B | +$1.3B | +$1.4B | +$1.1B |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$64M | −$88M | +$77M | +$24M | −$430M |
| Cash from operations | $656M | $413M | $247M | $185M | $293M |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$164M | −$195M | −$168M | −$129M | −$70M |
| Owner earnings | $493M | $219M | $78M | $55M | $223M |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −$55M | — | −$43M | — | — |
| Free cash flow | $437M | $219M | $35M | $55M | $223M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 8% | 4% | 2% | 1% | 5% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $164M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $55M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $1.0B), owner earnings is nearer ($524M).
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -4.4×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($532M) ÷ interest expense $122M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net debt against an operating lossCash $1.0B + ST investments $1.9B − debt $3.6B
What this means
Netting $2.9B of cash and short-term investments against $3.6B of debt leaves $667M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- TightDSO 84 + DIO 0 − DPO 30 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle10-yr median, range -104%–-9%; -9% latest = NOPAT ($420M) ÷ invested capital $4.9BIndustry peers: median 7%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -9% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid, recently turned positivelatest $493M = operating cash $656M − maintenance capex $164M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median -9%)Industry peers: median 17%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 8% of revenue this year, a -9% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $1.0B of SBC) leaves ($524M).
- Loss, but cash-generativeNet income ($460M) · cash from operations $656M
In the filing’s words And the filing leans heavily on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings — steering you off the GAAP figure just where the cash is not backing it. Read the reconciliation in the notes before taking the adjusted number.
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- Returned more than it generatedDividends + buybacks $751M ÷ Owner Earnings $493M
What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $493M of Owner Earnings, $751M (152%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $751M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($1.0B SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.34×ExpandingCapex $219M ÷ depreciation $164M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $5.9B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 3.56×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt NearDebt ≤ working capital · $3.6B vs $3.3B WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 10 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.47/share (latest year $-0.26), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $1.31/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 0 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 10 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 7 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin −220% → −18% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −220% early to −18% lately, median −34% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 51%
What this means
Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.
- Worst year 2017 · −422.5% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2017, understand why before trusting the good years.
- How management talks about it Owner’s terms
What this means
The record and the register agree: capital is compounding and the filing reasons in an owner’s terms — per-share value, return on capital, the long term — not a promoter’s.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Elevated contestabilityThe product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“We are also increasingly using third party AI platforms and tools, and open source AI to operate and accelerate our business.”
AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$2.8B
- Receivables$1.2B
- Other current assets$269M
- Accounts payable$238M
- Other current liabilities$976M
From the company's latest filing.
Lease obligations
the lease note, SEC EDGAR →Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.
Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.
True leverage: debt plus leases
Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $4.2B, of which the leases are 14%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.
Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.
- Stock-based compensation$1.0B
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 17% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Contingencies as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Software
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SSNCSS&C Technologies | $6.3B | 47% | 21.8% | 7% | 25% |
| TOSTToast Inc. | $6.2B | 19% | -13.4% | -38% | -1% |
| SNAPSnap Inc. | $5.9B | 55% | -32.4% | -24% | -4% |
| APPAppLovin | $5.5B | 70% | 19.6% | 10% | 17% |
| ZMZoom | $4.9B | 76% | 11.6% | 8% | 33% |
| PINSPinterest Inc. | $4.2B | 76% | -4.1% | -5% | 16% |
| NIQNIQ Global Intelligence plc | $4.2B | — | -2.5% | -2% | 1% |
| MTCHMatch Group Inc. | $3.5B | 73% | 26.1% | 17% | 27% |
| Group median | — | 70% | 4.5% | 2% | 17% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Snap Inc. has delivered.
Snap Inc.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, Snap Inc. earns about $71M on its 1.2% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 8.3% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow $609M on 1742M shares outstanding, the balance-sheet count at 2026-03-31; net debt $785M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($223M) runs well above depreciation ($171M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $668M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← SNA its page in the Manual SNDA →
Industry order: ← SMWB the Software chapter SNOW →