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ATRO, Astronics Corporation

Aerospace & Defense capital-intensive Cyclical

Astronics Corporation is a leading provider of advanced technologies to the global aerospace, defense, and electronics industries.

Our products and services include advanced, high-performance electrical power generation, distribution and motion systems, lighting and safety systems, avionics products, systems certification, aircraft structures and automated test systems.

Our operation in Ukraine is a small engineering office and we have not experienced any significant disruption in staffing or services as a result of the continuing Ukrainian and Russian conflict.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

ATRO · Astronics Corporation

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$862M

+8.4% YoY · 11% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $887M 5-yr avg $665M

Gross margin 31% 5-yr avg 22%

Operating margin 10.2% 5-yr avg −0.2%

Owner-earnings margin 5% 5-yr avg −1%

Free cash flow margin 3% 5-yr avg −1%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is Aerospace (92%) and Test Systems (8%).
Situation: Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 22% and operating margin about 0.2% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −20% and 12% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Inventory runs near 24% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on the backlog and program execution. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 2%, above 15% in 1 of 10 years). By owner earnings: roughly 4% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Aerospace is 92% of revenue, with Test Systems the other meaningful segment at 8%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025

Aerospace92%$797M
Test Systems8%$65M

By geographyUnited States71%Europe18%Asia8%North America, Excluding United States2%Other0%South America0%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMApr 2026
											Income statement
$633M	$624M	$803M	$773M	$503M	$445M	$535M	$689M	$795M	$862M	$887M	RevenueRevenue
25%	22%	22%	20%	19%	15%	13%	25%	28%	30%	31%	Gross marginGross mgn
13%	14%	15%	19%	22%	22%	19%	18%	18%	16%	15%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
14%	15%	14%	14%	8%	10%	9%	8%	7%	5%	5%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$75M	$32M	$64M	$2M	($101M)	($29M)	($30M)	($7M)	$26M	$76M	$91M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
11.8%	5.1%	7.9%	0.2%	−20.0%	−6.4%	−5.6%	−1.0%	3.3%	8.9%	10.2%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$48M	$20M	$47M	$52M	($116M)	($26M)	($36M)	($26M)	($16M)	$29M	$45M	Net incomeNet inc.
30%	21%	10%	24%	—	—	—	—	—	8%	3%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$49M	$38M	$55M	$43M	$37M	($6M)	($28M)	($24M)	$31M	$75M	$65M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$26M	$27M	$35M	$33M	$32M	$29M	$28M	$26M	$24M	$22M	$22M	DepreciationDeprec.
($28M)	($12M)	($30M)	($46M)	$116M	($15M)	($27M)	($31M)	$14M	$17M	($10M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$13M	$13M	$16M	$12M	$7M	$6M	$8M	$8M	$8M	$32M	$41M	CapexCapex
2.1%	2.2%	2.0%	1.6%	1.5%	1.4%	1.4%	1.1%	1.1%	3.7%	4.6%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$36M	$24M	$39M	$31M	$30M	($12M)	($36M)	($32M)	$22M	$53M	$43M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
5.7%	3.9%	4.8%	4.0%	5.9%	−2.6%	−6.7%	−4.6%	2.8%	6.1%	4.8%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$36M	$24M	$39M	$31M	$30M	($12M)	($36M)	($32M)	$22M	$43M	$24M	Free cash flowFCF
5.7%	3.9%	4.8%	4.0%	5.9%	−2.6%	−6.7%	−4.6%	2.8%	5.0%	2.7%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0	$114M	$0	$29M	$0	$0	—	$0	$0	$22M	$22M	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$18M	$32M	$0	$51M	$8M	$0	$0	—	—	—	—	BuybacksBuybacks
11%	4%	9%	0%	-20%	-6%	-6%	-1%	5%	15%	—	ROICROIC
14%	6%	12%	13%	-43%	-10%	-15%	-11%	-6%	21%	28%	Return on equityROE
14%	6%	12%	13%	−43%	−10%	−15%	−11%	−6%	21%	28%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$18M	$18M	$17M	$32M	$40M	$30M	$14M	$5M	$9M	$18M	$12M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$109M	$133M	$182M	$148M	$93M	$107M	$148M	$172M	$191M	$205M	$217M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$117M	$150M	$139M	$146M	$157M	$158M	$188M	$192M	$200M	$197M	$212M	InventoryInvent.
$25M	$42M	$51M	$36M	$26M	$35M	$64M	$61M	$43M	$41M	$56M	Accounts payablePayables
$201M	$241M	$270M	$258M	$224M	$230M	$272M	$303M	$348M	$360M	$373M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$255M	$315M	$374M	$343M	$317M	$340M	$365M	$390M	$426M	$438M	$469M	Current assetsCur. assets
$87M	$103M	$128M	$121M	$94M	$119M	$152M	$143M	$156M	$141M	$158M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.9×	3.1×	2.9×	2.8×	3.4×	2.9×	2.4×	2.7×	2.7×	3.1×	3.0×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$115M	$126M	$125M	$145M	$58M	$58M	$58M	$58M	$58M	$63M	$64M	GoodwillGoodwill
$604M	$736M	$775M	$783M	$620M	$609M	$615M	$634M	$649M	$707M	$747M	Total assetsAssets
$148M	$272M	$234M	$188M	$173M	$163M	$164M	$168M	$169M	$334M	$335M	Total debtDebt
$130M	$254M	$217M	$156M	$133M	$133M	$150M	$163M	$159M	$316M	$323M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
$337M	$330M	$387M	$389M	$270M	$257M	$240M	$250M	$256M	$140M	$162M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.4%	0.4%	0.4%	0.5%	1.0%	1.5%	1.2%	1.0%	1.1%	0.8%	0.8%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
—	$16M	—	$2M	$86M	—	—	—	—	—	—	Goodwill written downGW imp.
											Per share
34.5M	33.7M	33.1M	32.5M	30.8M	31.1M	32.2M	33.1M	35.0M	36.5M	38.2M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$18.33	$18.52	$24.24	$23.81	$16.32	$14.32	$16.63	$20.82	$22.70	$23.64	$23.20	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.40	$0.58	$1.41	$1.60	$-3.76	$-0.82	$-1.11	$-0.80	$-0.46	$0.81	$1.19	EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.04	$0.72	$1.16	$0.94	$0.97	$-0.37	$-1.12	$-0.95	$0.63	$1.45	$1.11	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.04	$0.72	$1.16	$0.94	$0.97	$-0.37	$-1.12	$-0.95	$0.63	$1.18	$0.63	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.38	$0.40	$0.49	$0.37	$0.24	$0.19	$0.24	$0.23	$0.24	$0.87	$1.07	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$9.77	$9.78	$11.67	$11.98	$8.78	$8.26	$7.46	$7.54	$7.31	$3.84	$4.23	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+2.9%/yr	+7.7%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+3.8%/yr	+8.4%/yr
EPS	−6.0%/yr	—
Capital spending / share	+9.7%/yr	+29.1%/yr
Book value / share	−9.9%/yr	−15.2%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

36Mpeak FY2025

ROIC

15%low FY2020

Gross margin

30%low FY2022

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

6.0×peak FY2017

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$53Mowner earningsvs.$29Mnet incomelow FY2022

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $53M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $22M it takes just to hold its position. It put $10M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $43M.

Reported net income$29M

Owner earnings$53M · 6% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$29M	($16M)	($26M)	($36M)	($26M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$22M	+$24M	+$26M	+$28M	+$29M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$7M	+$9M	+$7M	+$6M	+$6M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$17M	+$14M	−$31M	−$27M	−$15M
Cash from operations	$75M	$31M	($24M)	($28M)	($6M)
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$22M	−$8M	−$8M	−$8M	−$6M
Owner earnings	$53M	$22M	($32M)	($36M)	($12M)
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$10M	—	—	—	—
Free cash flow	$43M	$22M	($32M)	($36M)	($12M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	6%	3%	-5%	-7%	-3%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $22M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $10M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $7M), owner earnings is nearer $46M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 73.3×

Comfortable

Operating income $76M ÷ interest expense $1M

What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $316M · 4.1× operating profit

Heavy net debt

Cash $18M − debt $334M

What this means
Netting $18M of cash and short-term investments against $334M of debt leaves $316M owed, about 4.1× a year's operating profit (4.4× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 181d

Long (60+ days)

DSO 87 + DIO 119 − DPO 25 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 0%

Below average through the cycle

10-yr median, range -20%–15%; the latest year is left out — large non-operating charges put its operating line well above pretax profit

Industry peers: median 6%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years, so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 4%

Thin through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range -7%–6%; latest $53M = operating cash $75M − maintenance capex $22M

Industry peers: median 2%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 6% of revenue this year, a 4% median across 10 years. It chose to put $10M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $43M — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $7M of SBC) leaves $46M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 2.55×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $75M ÷ net income $29M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 0%

Reinvests most of it

Dividends + buybacks $0 ÷ Owner Earnings $53M

What this means
Of $53M Owner Earnings, $0 (0%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 1.45×

Expanding

Capex $32M ÷ depreciation $22M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Miss

Revenue ≥ $2B · $862M

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Pass

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 3.10×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Near

Debt ≤ working capital · $334M vs $296M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 5 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Miss

Earnings +33% over the record · −112%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.12/share (latest year $0.82), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $3.92/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 5 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 5 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 8% → 4% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.

What this means
The recent-years average (4%) sits below the early years (8%), but the latest year (9%) is back near the early level: a cyclical trough dragging the window down, not a one-way slide. The through-cycle median is 0% — read it across the cycle, not on the dip.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Owner earnings growth +3%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 3% a year over the record.
Worst year 2020 · −20.0% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count +0.6%/yr

What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“Our operations and financial performance will be negatively impacted if our competitors: develop products that are superior to our products; develop products that are more competitively priced than our products; develop methods of more efficiently and effectively providing products and services; or adapt more quickly t…”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Apr 4, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$469M

Cash & short-term investments$12M
Receivables$217M
Inventory$212M
Other current assets$28M

Current liabilities$158M

Accounts payable$56M
Other current liabilities$102M

Current ratio2.97×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.63×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.08×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$311Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+12.0%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters2.9× → 3.0×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$45Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($117M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$379M$44M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$30Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $269M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

Reinvested$124M · 46%
Buybacks$109M · 40%
Retained (debt / cash)$37M · 14%

Returned to owners$109M
70% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $109M as buybacks.
Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $187M and cash and short-term investments fell $6M.
Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $109M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
Net change in share count10.7%
The diluted count rose from 35M to 38M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$118M17% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity45%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$165Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $124M of capital spent building

$104M written down across 3 years (2017, 2019, 2020): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 63% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Mr. Gundermann	$2.5M	$2.3M	($12M)
2022	Mr. Gundermann	$1.6M	$1.4M	($36M)
2023	Mr. Gundermann	$2.7M	$4.0M	($32M)
2024	Mr. Gundermann	$2.9M	$2.5M	$22M
2025	Mr. Gundermann	$4.6M	$12.3M	$53M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership5.1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$7M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 9% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Astronics Corporation is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

3 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?10.7%
Diluted shares grew 10.7% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $109M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$148M → $335M
Debt rose from $148M to $335M while owner earnings went from about $33M to $15M — about 4.5 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 23 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?36% → 48% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $226M to $429M while revenue grew 40%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (36% of revenue then, 48% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Aerospace & Defense

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
AVAVAeroVironment Inc.	$2.0B	40%	9.5%	6%	-1%
ATROAstronics Corporation	$862M	22%	1.8%	2%	4%
DCODucommun Incorporated	$825M	21%	5.3%	5%	2%
MBUUMalibu Boats Inc.	$808M	25%	14.0%	23%	11%
MLRMiller Industries Inc.	$790M	12%	5.7%	13%	2%
HLLYHolley Inc.	$614M	40%	12.5%	6%	6%
LOARLoar Holdings Inc.	$496M	49%	21.8%	5%	—
KRMNKarman Holdings Inc.	$472M	38%	16.4%	10%	-4%
Group median	—	31%	11.0%	6%	2%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Astronics Corporation has delivered.

Astronics Corporation’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Astronics Corporation earns about $34M on its 3.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 6.1% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($34M) Net of stock comp (−$7M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($43M)

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The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+1%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $24M on 36M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net debt $323M. The if-converted diluted count is 38M, 7% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($41M) runs well above depreciation ($22M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $43M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh ATRO against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Astronics Corporation (ATRO), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/ATRO, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← ATRC its page in the Manual AUB →

Industry order: ← AIR the Aerospace & Defense chapter AVAV →